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HISTORY AND  
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WALTON

REVOLUTIONS OF SPAIN 1808-1836

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DON CARLOS.

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London, Published by Richard Bentley, 1836.

THE  
REVOLUTIONS OF SPAIN,

FROM 1808 TO THE END OF 1836.

WITH BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE MOST

DISTINGUISHED PERSONAGES,

AND A

NARRATIVE OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME,

FROM THE MOST AUTHENTIC SOURCES.

By W. WALTON, Esq.

IN TWO VOLUMES.


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1837.



DISCARD



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## PREFACE.

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A WISH to make myself thoroughly acquainted with the origin and progress of the Spanish contest, induced me to visit the theatre of war; and a conviction that the most erroneous ideas prevail upon this interesting subject, now urges me to offer to the public the result of my inquiries.

The views of those who seized upon power in Spain are not only misunderstood, but their habits and character are entirely unknown. A patient investigation will convince us, that while they professed to regenerate their country, and lay the foundation of peace and prosperity, they have called into action the most dangerous elements of political and religious strife, torn asunder every bond of society, and finally involved themselves in difficulties which they confess their inability to remove except by the exertion of dictatorial powers.

The question, therefore, no longer is, who shall have the throne; but who can restore order, allay party feeling, and reunite the various sections of

which the Spanish monarchy was composed at the death of Ferdinand VII. There are only royalists and republicans in Spain; in that country there is no middle party: and it becomes a matter of the most serious and pressing consideration for all who have the tranquillity of Europe at heart, to determine which ought to prevail. The liberals have failed in all their endeavours; and after attempting to establish a system of terror and tragalism during a period of three years,—after trying a wicked experiment on the understandings, as well as the forbearance of the Spanish people,—after resorting to a war of extermination, to plans of spoliation, to conscriptions, to anticipations of the revenue, to forced loans, and to other expedients which would have disgraced the worst days of the French Revolution, we find them where they began. Who then can restore order to such a chaos?—The prince alone who unites sufficient wisdom, temper, and influence to devise and establish a system of government that may be acceptable to the great majority of Spaniards.

The people demand repose; and that repose they cannot possess till they know under what institutions they are to live. They are tired of pernicious experiments and never-ending changes. They are disgusted with the follies and crimes committed in Madrid; and revolt at the mockery of reassembling the Cortes of 1812 at a mo-

ment of terror and disorder, when no respectable person dares to appear either as a candidate or an elector. They scorn the talkative patriots who profess to consolidate a throne assailed on all sides, and to revise a constitution already twice tried and as often condemned,—a constitution pronounced illegal and unsuitable by every dispassionate person, whether native or foreigner, who has inquired into the manner in which it was originally framed, and how it operated during the short period of its existence.

In this complicated state of things, I have deemed it best to present the whole question at one view, commencing by an outline of the national institutions, such as they are known to the great body of the Spanish people, in order that they may be contrasted with those which the theorists of the day wish to establish in their stead. This plan naturally carries me back to a remote period; but all that regards the ancient institutions—a subject with which we are only imperfectly acquainted—is comprised in the Introduction.

The narrative commences with the year 1808; not only because the Spanish reformers who have entailed so many calamities on their country first came into notice at that period, but because the real character of the prince whose persecutions and vicissitudes I have undertaken to record, then began to show itself. I have not only traced his

motives of action, and pointed out the pledges which he has given to revive the ancient institutions, as the only means of allaying party feuds and enabling the people to enjoy repose ; but, by showing what he has accomplished in the northern provinces by his firmness and perseverance, I have given some idea of what may be expected from him, should he ascend the throne of Castile.

Every well-wisher to the human race must be anxious for the termination of such a war as that of which I present the details ; a war that has produced unexampled wretchedness, but which has also been illustrated by splendid instances of heroism and devotion. Precautions, too, should be taken against the recurrence of such calamities as those which it has fallen to my lot to enumerate. This must be the interest of every one directly or indirectly connected with the affairs of Spain ; and it may be accomplished if adequate means be employed.

The prejudices of a few hundred persons, of whom some are foreigners, are alone to be overcome ; and this can be done if the sentiments and interests of the Spanish people are properly consulted. The matter concerns them, and they ought to be left to decide it for themselves. Interference has only aggravated their misfortunes. But, before it is possible to form a just conception of the state of Spain, it is not only necessary to take a view of the military opera-

tions of the contending parties, but also to contrast the two courts of the rival competitors for the throne.

Alonzo V. of Aragon was the hero of his age, and sincerely devoted to the welfare of his kingdom. He was not, however, without calumniators, and some of them even frequented his palace; but, instead of punishing them, he used to say, "Sovereigns cannot help making ingrates, but they shall never prevent me from being equitable and beneficent." He frequently walked out unattended; and when his courtiers complained of it, and observed, that his personal security required the attendance of guards,—“Ty-rants,” he would reply, “require guards, but mine are my conscience and the love of my subjects.”

Such in practice has been the conduct of Charles V. since he reached the northern provinces; and when the real history of his life is examined, there will be little hesitation in pronouncing who is best calculated to restore tranquillity to Spain, and promote the general felicity of the inhabitants,—Carlos or Christina.





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REVOLUTIONS  
OF  
SPAIN.

FROM 1808 TO 1836.

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INTRODUCTION.

IN the celebrated conference of nations which followed the final overthrow of Napoleon, the maintenance of general tranquillity formed the basis of an European league, the leading object of which was to prevent the recurrence of war by resorting to a system of mediation; recognising, on the one hand, the perfect independence of each State in its own internal concerns, and, on the other, guarding against everything likely to affect the common safety of all.

With respect to Spain and her present difficulties, this principle, however, the advantages of which have been fully recognised by other nations, has been overlooked, or wholly abandoned. A country which suffered more than any other from the inroads of the common enemy,—a people who contributed to humble, and finally to crush

his power,—seem to be debarred from the benefits of a compact to which they were equally a party. Yet, after the noble stand Spain made against the despoiler of thrones,—after having her fields desolated, and her cultivators carried into captivity,—after being for six years bathed in tears and crimsoned with the blood of her children,—she has surely some claim to the good wishes and good offices of those who applauded her efforts and were benefited by her sacrifices,—some title to repose—some right to have her wounds healed and her social condition bettered.

Relieved from a yoke alike hateful to those upon whom it was forced and to those who resisted it, Spain had reason to hope that her maternal bosom would be open to all her sons,—that party distinctions would be laid aside, past errors forgotten, and all cordially co-operate in the improvement of institutions in which all were interested. Unfortunately these hopes were not realized. No approximation of parties followed,—confidence was not restored,—old feuds were kept alive; while that spirit of calumny, which showed itself before the dissolution of the central Junta, exercised its baneful influence long after the expulsion of the French. Nothing was done to promote oblivion of the past—to put an end to protracted misfortunes by the revival of old attachments, by conciliation and an appeal to the national pride,—finally, by sincere endeavours

to reunite the social bonds, and convert a divided nation into one family.

Really it would seem that for Spain there was no repose,—that she was condemned to the operation of a slow fever, continually preying upon her vitals, and driving her to the verge of dissolution. On her soil, the cessation of anarchy and the restoration of order meet with insurmountable difficulties. Judging from a distance, one would be inclined to think that there was something rotten in the State,—some disorganising element—some revolutionary mania, that marred all efforts and baffled all control. Yet, in reality, such is not the fact. Examine her more closely, and it will be found that none of these frightful symptoms exist. Excepting some of the large towns, the country is sound at heart—uncontaminated by the theories of the French school, and panting only for repose. National prejudices and old predilections are as strong as ever. The same analogy in the wants, the same identity in the wishes, of the people prevail. The same good sense and correct feeling are seen as when Napoleon entrapped the royal family, and possessed himself of the principal fortresses. The same patriotism glows in the peasant's breast which then produced traits of heroism worthy of ancient Rome, and would ensure similar results were the national energies again called forth.

This is a modern portrait; but, if we study their history, we shall find that the Spaniards were far advanced in civilization and jurisprudence at a time when we were only starting in the same course. In their opposition to the Moors, we behold them displaying a valour, magnanimity, and firmness, never surpassed; often vanquished, yet never desponding, and eventually setting their country free. We find them, too, not only sustaining the highest military reputation, but evincing sound judgment and ability in other more desirable respects; while in those feats of chivalry—those wild enterprises of romantic valour which distinguished them in two hemispheres during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, they showed how well they were fitted for high and arduous undertakings.

These distinctive traits are not obliterated; whence then can it arise that, of late, we see such frequent convulsions, such continued disunion, such apathy, such versatility, so many legislative follies, and so many changes in the scenes of the political drama? Statesmen of all ranks and creeds are at a loss how to reconcile these contradictions; and hence the sincerest friends of order—those who are most interested in the preservation of peace, scarcely know how to afford relief, or even to give advice.

Most persons are agreed that Spain is hurrying on to a fearful crisis,—that unless a remedy be

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speedily provided for the calamities with which she is assailed, the torrent of anarchy and confusion will overwhelm the country ; and yet few are disposed to examine the real cause of these calamities, or to search out the secret spring from which they flow. The task is indeed arduous : for although the relations of foreigners with Spain, of late years, have been both many and intimate, neither the French nor ourselves seem capable of appreciating the peculiarities of the national character ; while such is the confusion of ideas—so perplexing has the question become, so dexterous the fallacies put forth to promote deception, that it is difficult to determine how or where to commence the investigation. It is, however, consoling to see that Spanish affairs begin to excite a more lively interest and to be better understood upon the Continent : for, whatever may be the political principles or private wishes of the northern cabinets, they doubtless feel an anxious desire to see Spain restored to tranquillity ; no longer viewing the question as between two rival competitors for a throne, but as a struggle between monarchy and republicanism.

The contest in Spain presents a question paramount in importance to any that has arisen there since the French invasion,—a question which involves the rights and franchises of a whole kingdom, and in the result of which surrounding nations are deeply interested. The point really at



issue is, whether one million shall trample upon thirteen times that number of their fellow-countrymen,—whether a minority, a headstrong faction, shall, contrary to the wishes and interests of the great majority, abolish ancient institutions, abrogate established laws, and force their theoretical improvements upon a people who consider them as useless innovations and unjustifiable spoliations. Away with the mask of liberality, the cant of principle! The dispute now left to the decision of the sword is, not who shall have the throne, but which party shall have political ascendancy: not whether acknowledged abuses shall be removed, and judicious reforms introduced; but whether a league, banded together for interested purposes and actuated by a desperate infatuation, shall compel the people of Spain to accept a new constitution, spurned by the majority as a foul abortion, and condemned as being unsuitable, illegal, and unjust.

This is the true origin of the struggle now going on. If traced to their source, the misfortunes of Spain will be found to have commenced at the time when a few theorists in Cadiz attempted to introduce a new order of things, by substituting their own crude speculations for ancient laws and usages. To understand the real nature and extent of these changes, it will however be necessary to define and establish what those ancient laws and usages *actually were*; first, by



proving that in former times the Spaniards possessed a constitution suited to their wants and wishes, and then showing the practical operation of that constitution as observed in the Cortes.

The matrimonial union of the House of Castile with that of Aragon, and a subsequent alliance with Austria, produced the most extensive empire witnessed since the days of Charlemagne.\* Spain was thus placed at the head of Europe, and became the leading power. Had the mass of strength which then passed into the hands of her ministers been well managed, the duration of her grandeur would have been more lasting; but she was destined to be the victim of errors, committed by those to whom her welfare was confided. Her rise and decline were equally extraordinary. The first was gradual, the latter accelerated by a concurrence of those causes which most contribute to the downfall of kingdoms. During the Austrian dynasty, misgovernment at home and improvidence abroad plunged Spain into a series of difficulties, from which the fostering care of the

\* The various countries thus incorporated not having till then been under the same sway, the following new title was adopted:—"Don Fernando and Doña Isabel, by the grace of God, King and Queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, Sicily, Toledo, Valencia, Galicia, Majorca, Seville, Sardinia, Cordova, Corsica, Murcia, Jaen, Algarves, Algeciras, and Gibraltar; Counts of Barcelona; Lords of Biscay and Molina; Dukes of Athens and Neopatria; Counts of Roussillon and Cerdania; Marquesses of Oristan and Gocian."—*Garivay*, lib. xviii, cap. 14.

Bourbon sovereigns was scarcely able to retrieve her.

Spanish annals abound with interesting remarks on the causes of this decline; but the present inquiry is rather directed to the national institutions and their practical operation, than to war or politics. It is perhaps the most difficult study of the two; for on the precise nature of the legislative functions exercised by the Cortes doubts long existed, which the royal academy of Madrid, as well as Marina, Sempere, and other modern writers, have endeavoured to clear up, although not always agreeing in opinion. The disputes between the *Afrancesados* and *Liberales*, in which the most eminent pens on both sides were engaged, have however thrown great light upon the subject. From the days of Alonzo I. almost every sovereign had his particular chronicle, or history, usually written by command of his successor, whilst events were still fresh in the memories of all. In these narratives, the battles, deeds of valour, matrimonial alliances, embassies, pageants, and other stirring and important occurrences, are recorded; but, as Jovellanos justly lamented,\* the early histories of Spain do not pointedly mark the progress and changes made in the constitution, or describe, with anything like accuracy, the civil action of the government.

\* Discourse pronounced before the Royal Academy of Madrid in 1780.

History informs us that the early Germans had councils, at which matters of general import were debated and settled,\* and that they carried with them their own institutions to those countries which they occupied after the dissolution of the Roman empire. The Goths who conquered Spain were, beyond doubt, governed by kings, with the assistance of a council composed of nobles and commons. If the questions to be discussed were momentous, the attendance of both orders was required; if not, that of the first sufficed: but crimes affecting the State were judged in general assembly. Their institutions were subsequently improved by contact with the Romans, and modified by local circumstances. After attaining the western limit of their conquests, finding themselves possessed of a genial climate and rich soil, they laid aside the falchion and became agriculturists. Blending with the natives, they still retained most of their own customs, among which some of Roman origin were intermixed. Their rulers enjoyed the confidence—often the love of the people, who, so long as the highest dignity was elective, controlled those entrusted with the supreme command. For the sake of economy, the government was simplified, so far as was thought consistent with the rights of the community; but, in the end, this security proved fatal:

\* *De minoribus rebus principes consultant, de majoribus omnes.*—Tac. de Mor. Germ. c. 11.

the councils no longer met on fixed days,—they were convened only at the sovereign's will.

This relaxation in ancient usages led to changes as well as abuses; and it is an established fact, that in the last century and a half of Gothic dominion in Spain, the general council met no more than eighteen times. Eventually, the king was elected solely by the nobles and clergy, the popular voice being excluded. After the conversion of the Goths, the clergy attained so great an ascendancy, that at the seventh Council of Toledo, seventy-four bishops and abbots took their seats, when only sixteen nobles were present; a proportion which afterwards varied. The nobles attended more by virtue of their courtly offices, than any right or privilege attached to their order. From the thirteenth to the sixteenth meeting of the Council of Toledo, the names of more nobles are noticed on the acts, summoned by royal mandate. Independently of those held at Toledo, other councils sat at Coyanca, in 1050; Palencia, in 1159; and at Leon, in 1220.

After the death of Don Rodrigo,\* the natives

\* Don Rodrigo was the last of the Gothic kings, and the first to whom the Spaniards applied the title of Don. He commenced his reign in 711, and perished in the memorable battle near Xerez, fought against the Moors, when the power of the Goths was destroyed. The conqueror's son, Abdalazir, afterwards became enamoured of his widow, Egilona, and married her, allowing her the use of her own religion. She thus reigned as queen a second time, holding her residence at Seville. It is singular that the first history of this king was

who refused submission to the Mahometan invaders, sheltered themselves in the Asturian and Pyrenean mountains, where they kept on the defensive, having no other rulers than their military leaders—no restraints on their actions except those which their wants required. As they gained strength and territory, they became better organised, when their institutions assumed the feudal character. Alonzo I. re-established the government at Oviedo, under the forms it previously bore at Toledo; and the *Fuero Juzgo* continued to be the code by which the Christians, freed from the Moslem yoke, were governed. The privileges profusely granted to the *ricos hombres*, or rich and illustrious men, in return for their sacrifices of property or deeds of valour, created a new order of things. The sovereign's poverty prevented him from otherwise rewarding those who were daily in the enemy's presence; but, in the course of time, these privileged classes became nearly as powerful as their master, and, in a corresponding degree, audacious. They raised, equipped, and commanded large bodies of men, having the right of *pendon y caldera* (banner and kettle), by virtue of which they levied soldiers, as well as resources to support them. By successive grants they were enriched, and frequently entered into leagues among themselves for the security of their ac-

written in Arabic by the Alcayde Albucacim Tarif, and afterwards translated into Spanish, under the title of *Historia Verdadera del Rey Don Rodrigo*. Ed. Madrid, 1676.



quisitions. One of the characteristic privileges conferred upon the nobles was that of a seat in the assembly, afterwards called Cortes, when their convocation was notified by writ, or summons.\*

Many years elapsed before the *Tiers Etat*, or commoners, were called to the national assembly. The districts wrested from the Moors presented scenes of desolation, occasioned by the ravages of contending armies. It therefore became necessary to replenish them with cultivators, and, in many instances, to build new towns. Then it was that the sovereigns felt the value of an industrious peasantry and good artisans. These classes were accordingly encouraged by donations of lands and exemptions. To promote settlements, towns were incorporated, and franchises bestowed upon them, corresponding to their services and importance, which were prized by the possessors, and carefully recorded in charters. This is the origin of the innumerable *fueros*, one of the most estimable of which is that granted to certain places to send deputies to the Cortes.

As the commoners became rich and powerful, they united in brotherhoods for mutual protection; and in the course of time served as useful

\* The grandees of the present day, among other privileges, enjoy that of being covered in the king's presence. There are three classes, distinguished by the manner of covering themselves when they do homage for the first time.

instruments in the suppression of anarchy, as well as in checking the arrogance of the nobles. Their wealth and influence rendered them valuable auxiliaries to the reigning monarch, and they were called into more conspicuous notice. They sat, for the first time, at the Cortes of Leon, in 1188, and afterwards at those of Benevente, in 1202, in the character of delegates from cities and towns. The *Tiers Etat* were specially favoured by several monarchs, not always, it must be confessed, for equitable purposes. In the Cortes of Valladolid, Sancho IV. not only confirmed the franchises of privileged cities and towns, but also permitted, and even ordained them to unite for their mutual protection.

Several new brotherhoods were formed by virtue of this privilege, representatives from which some years afterwards met at Medina del Campo, and came to the following resolutions:—"That when the king assembles Cortes, each city ought to send to them two of its ablest individuals, most distinguished for their love of God and the public welfare." In 1295, thirty-two cities of Leon and Galicia confederated in support of their rights, mutually pledged against the despotism of the sovereign and the encroachments of the aristocracy, notwithstanding in those days the Cortes of Castile met nearly every year. In 1315, a new confederation was formed by upwards of one hundred cities and towns, when the resolutions of



the old league were adopted. The minorities of Ferdinand IV. and Alonzo XI. further strengthened the influence of the commons, whose aid was courted in opposition to the caballing grandees. Ferdinand IV. always had with him twelve commoners, designated by the cities of Castile, to serve as councillors in financial and other affairs.

For Alonzo XIth's minority, the Cortes named the regency, composed of four bishops and sixteen nobles and commoners. Its long duration, nevertheless, led to incessant misfortunes; and, in the end, it was found necessary to resort to extraordinary measures in order to restore tranquillity. Having attained the age required by law, Alonzo succeeded in re-establishing order, after some exemplary punishments; and at the Cortes of Medina del Campo, in 1328, pledged himself never to impose new taxes without convening the three estates,\* and receiving the approbation of the popular delegates. Notwithstanding the two daughters of Peter II. had been acknowledged by the Cortes, Henry II. bore away the crown, and, in the hope of consolidating his own dynasty, lavished favours upon his supporters, principally the commoners. In 1367 and 1371, they petitioned for the admission of twelve of their class

\* *Estamento* is frequently used in reference to the estates of the realm. This term, however, is not strictly speaking applicable to those of Castile, being confined to the crown of Aragon, where the estates amounted to four.

into the royal council. This prayer was rejected, on the plea that a high court of appeal had been created, the members of which sat as councillors. The power and influence of the commons was, it thus appears, gradually acquired; but, from the fourteenth century, it is evident that they have in some degree possessed a representative character. Ferdinand IV. convened them in large numbers to the Cortes of Valladolid, in 1309. At those of Seville, in 1340, a large proportion took their seats; and when assembled at Madrid, in 1390, one hundred and twenty-eight deputies represented forty-eight cities and towns.

The ecclesiastical estate, or spiritual lords, resembled ours previously to the dissolution of the monasteries, when, besides the bishops, mitred abbots sat with the temporal nobility. The Spanish clergy derived the tenure of their seats from dignities held by them; the nobles, as before remarked, from their rank or special favour. The popular deputies were members of, or elected by, the municipalities, in some places by lot, and provided with regular powers. The purity of elections was at various periods enjoined, and regulations devised to prevent abuses. In the *Leyes de Recopilacion*,\* or Statute Book, is a decree issued by Philip IV, July 27th, 1660, to prevent the sale or transfer of procurations given to deputies; nevertheless allowing substitution, with

\* Tom. iii. ed. Madrid, 1775. Auto i. libro vii. tit. 7.

the sanction of the constituency, on the assignment of a legitimate cause. The preamble states that a similar ordinance was promulgated in the reign of John II : and, as the more modern one sets forth, re-enacted with fresh penalties, “in consequence of its having been discovered that powerful persons desired to have procurations for their own private purposes, and not for the public benefit.” Nine references are made to particular ordinances upon this subject, of which Philip IVth’s decree is little more than a recapitulation.

John I. granted the prayer refused by his father, and, in 1385, created a new council, to which four bishops, four nobles, and four commoners were appointed. By testament, he further directed that the regency, during his son’s minority, “should not determine any weighty matter without the advice of six commoners, deputed by Burgos, Toledo, Leon, Seville, Cordova, and Murcia ; for,” added the testator, “although we are king, we are of opinion that when anything momentous is to be discussed, we are ourselves bound to withhold our decision until we have obtained counsel from the city delegates, which is still more necessary with the king’s guardians, however enlightened they may be.” In the early part of the reign of Henry III, the commons enjoyed the highest consideration, which afterwards declined, owing to their refusal to vote all the supplies required for the Moorish war. In 1419,

the delegates complained that their four commissioners were no longer admitted into the king's council, attributing their exclusion to the ascendancy gained by the Archbishop of Toledo and the grandees.

When the influence of the commons declined, the constituencies objected to pay the expenses of their delegates. At the Ocaña Cortes, held in 1422, the cities remonstrated with John II, alleging that they could no longer bear the charge of sending up deputies; in consequence of which he ordered them to be paid out of the treasury: a measure which afterwards proved fatal to public freedom; for on the oath of allegiance being taken to his son Henry, no more than twelve delegates were present, the rest having been instructed to send up proxies, by which means an expedient originally suggested from motives of economy became a dangerous precedent. Though the king enjoyed the prerogatives of sovereignty, almost uniting in himself the legislative and executive powers, little apprehension was entertained of an undue stretch of authority, as the Cortes possessed the means of moderating his acts, either when called upon to deliberate with him on public business, or by withholding the supplies and disposing of the armed force.

The king's legislative power was however by no means absolute, since it is an incontestable fact that constitutionally he could not alter the law;

no statute being valid unless previously enacted and published with the concurrence of the national representatives, whose interference on some occasions was very remarkable. Sancho IV. obtained the crown of Leon and Castile through a vote passed by the Cortes of Segovia, in 1276. The Infante Don Fernando, eldest son of Alonzo X, dying before his father, a dispute arose whether his issue should succeed, or the throne pass to the king's second son, recommended by his good qualities and greater proximity; when the Cortes decided in favour of the adult, notwithstanding that the *Partida* law, if it had been appealed to, favoured the claims of the brother's children. This is one of the most memorable cases in Spanish annals; its difficulties being so great that the king declined taking the decision upon himself, notwithstanding he had the support of his council. The Cortes also annulled the will of Alonzo X. because it interfered with their own award, on the principle that the sovereign has no right to dispose of the crown in any way contrary to the provisions of an established law. At a subsequent period, they also legalised the title of Henry II. in opposition to other claimants.

Though the constitution did not receive that improvement of which it was susceptible, and the Cortes were never reduced to the forms of a regular parliament, their combined action was nevertheless productive of the best effects, as proved



by practice ; for if our information respecting the progress of the laws is defective, and a want of uniformity is noticed in the operations of the national assembly, we have still sufficient data to mark the genius and character of the government. The early monarchs, besides commanding their armies, were provident statesmen. Often having to contend with aspiring nobles or turbulent commoners, the exterior forms of popular government were nevertheless preserved, and they rendered themselves powerful by an ascendancy gained over the affections of their subjects. Constantly occupied in the expulsion of a crafty and strongly intrenched foe, war absorbed the attention of the Spaniards for two centuries, leaving little time for the introduction of system into the proceedings of a deliberative assembly. Usage and deference to public opinion, however, rendered the concurrence of the three estates necessary on all great questions, and the commons were unquestionably the most important branch : still, when the estates did meet, the representative principle had only a limited share in their acts.

The want of money and recruits was sure to bring the sovereign into contact with his subjects. The public revenue being precarious and chiefly derived from benevolences, spoils, heriots, and commutations of military services, recurrence was had to the plan of subsidies, requiring the sanction of those who were to provide them. Then

it was that the third estate rose into consequence ; but its powers, and the part which it was to take in the direction of public affairs, were not clearly defined. Much depended on the wants and whims of the prince. It is indeed to this day difficult to discern how far the judicial and censorial attributes of the Cortes extended, or where an invasion of the royal prerogative commenced. Nevertheless, the early Spanish kings lived in harmony with their subjects, the presence of danger tending to strengthen the union. Oppressive acts doubtless occurred ; but the feudal law in Spain long retained its primitive simplicity and moderation,—never did it assume the harsh character which it bore among the Anglo-Normans.

Though the remedial influence of the Cortes was limited, the sovereigns who had a regard for the commonwealth and valued their own reputation, paid great deference to the counsel and suggestions of a body to a certain extent clothed with national representation. As before remarked, the Cortes were a relic of the primitive institutions ; and this form being retained after the overthrow of the Saracens, the kings of Leon and Castile continued to administer the government with the advice of their subjects. Still, it does not appear that the Cortes had a legislative power independent of the crown. They could not, of themselves, originate or propose any law, or public measure. This fact Marina admits, ascribing



to them the right of remonstrance.\* It was their office to complain of grievances, suggest remedies, and, in cases of injury and wrong, to supplicate for redress. They memorialised the crown upon all kinds of subjects, more particularly contributions, expenditure, and municipal rights.† They inter-

\* *Ensayo Historico-critico sobre la Antigua Legislacion de los Reynos de Leon y Castilla, &c.* Dr. Francisco Martinez Marina, a deputy in the Cortes of 1820, was a canon of St. Isidore at Madrid and also of the collegiate church of Lerida, as well as Director of the Royal Academy of History, and well versed in everything connected with the ancient institutions. His work upon this subject was published at Madrid in 1808, and noticed in the 43rd number of the Edinburgh Review, corresponding to October 1813. It is the result of laborious compilation, favoured by great facilities of research, but little suited for practical purposes. Marina was rather a philosopher than a politician: still he became the idol of the Cadiz legislators, and his work tended to mislead their judgment. The author of the "*Semblanzas*," the smartest *brochure* produced since the revolution, in his portraits of the deputies to the Cortes of 1826, represents Marina as an "unwearied compiler of ancient Cortes;" and after alluding to the immense number of laws referred to, and regretting their inobservance, thus sarcastically speaks of the rage for legislation which in 1812 showed itself at Cadiz:—" *Bendigamos pues la actual Constitucion que tenemos, pues ella basta para ahorrarnos infinitos males y preparar la felicidad de las futuras generaciones. Pero, Legisladores! ojo alerta—y si repasais las compilaciones de Marina, escarmentad en nuestros mayores. Pocas leyes, pero que sean observadas y observables. Huid de la mania y del furor de legislar mucho.*"

† In the respective archives, the *Quaderno de Peticiones*, or Book of Petitions, for each session is kept, with the king's answer appended to each numbered petition. This was also the primitive practice in England: the petitions which had received the king's assent were registered among the Rolls of Parliament, and the judges formed them into statutes.

ferred in foreign, as well as domestic concerns. When the proposal of a law was submitted to them, they determined its expediency, and the enactment having passed by virtue of their suggestions, it acquired after publication all the force of law. The wording and supplementary parts were the work of government.

The Cortes had other functions to perform. Sometimes they were employed as peacemakers between members of the royal family, or the king and his dignitaries. They were invariably summoned to take the oath of allegiance to the heir apparent, but did not always do it collectively. In the reign of John II. the Galician delegates not being present when the others acknowledged Henry IV, they afterwards performed the ceremony alone at Zamora.\* There was no fixed place for their sittings. If not convened to the place where the court was held,† the sovereign directed the members to meet him where he expected to be at the period their services were required. The deputies came at the expense of their constituents, as previously noticed, until their influence declined. Sometimes the nobles and deputies were convened separately—the clergy never, if it

\* *Cronica del Rey Don Juan II.* Año 1432.

† Madrid ranks as a *villa*, or town, and as such has a voice in Cortes. The Court was not established there till the reign of Philip II, and during that of Charles III. it was made a *place d'armes*.

was intended to discuss temporal questions. When an important event liable to misconception occurred, official statements of facts were separately sent down to the deputies, in order to obviate misunderstandings and prevent the public from being misled.\*

In any national emergency the king forthwith summoned the Cortes, and never were the fundamental laws changed without their concurrence. When a sovereign met them for the first time, he confirmed the privileges and immunities granted by his predecessors; and there are declarations from the throne similar to our King John's Charter for assembling parliament. If the Spaniards have anything like a Bill of Rights, it must be traced to the pledges given by their kings on opening the legislature. In cases of disputed succession they were invariably consulted,† as well as upon the formation of regencies. The granting of supplies, however, seems to have been their peculiar department, and there are instances of refusal. The members summoned sometimes varied, and

\* In the reign of John II. there are several instances of these direct communications from the crown to the city delegates.

† Robertson, speaking of the Archduke Philip, father of Charles V, observes that, being a stranger, it was thought expedient to invite him to Spain, that he might accustom himself to the laws and manners; adding, "that it was expected that the Cortes, whose authority was then so great in Spain that no title to the crown was reckoned valid unless it received their sanction, would acknowledge his right of succession, together with that of the Infanta, his wife."—*Hist. Charles V.* Book I.

deviations from precedent are frequently noticed ; but it is well established that the existence of the Cortes was coeval with the monarchy, and an essential part of the ancient, as well as modern constitution.

On their mode of proceeding the Spaniards do not agree among themselves. From practical operation it results that the constituent parts had no check upon each other ; nor were the propositions, or intimations, (a term which they frequently deserved,) of the commons submitted to the lords before they were sent up to the king. There was no upper and lower house ; yet there was no intermixture of votes ; for although the estates did not meet in distinct chambers, they deliberated apart and separately addressed the throne. If the sense of either branch was taken upon a project of law, the discussion turned first upon the necessity or expediency of the measure, not upon the form in which it was to be promulgated. In cases of a division, each member threw a ticket into an urn, with his name and vote upon it ; when a scrutiny followed. Priority in seats was punctiliously observed. The answers and addresses of the deputies are marked with dignity and manliness.

Castile, Aragon, Navarre, and Catalonia had the right of holding Cortes, and the practice in each varied. Previously to the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, Spain was divided into several small

kingdoms, like the Saxon Heptarchy; and, after the union of the two principal crowns, some sections retained a species of independence not always respected by the central power. The king was the only bond of union; but that union did not rest upon solemn compacts, similar to those by which Scotland and Ireland are united with us. Aragon and Catalonia were deprived of their right to hold local legislatures by no act of their own.

Scarcely can it be said that this right is in abeyance, since by virtue of their *fueros* the Catalonians in 1835 formed a junta of their own, when they refused obedience to the Madrid government. With the right of Navarre to hold Cortes no sovereign ever interfered; nor were the ancient charters of Aragon and Catalonia disturbed till Philip Vth's time. The Basque provinces were not represented in Cortes.

Cursory remarks do not, however, convey an adequate idea of the nature and diversity of the business, or the manner in which it was transacted, in the Spanish legislature. A sketch of the principal proceedings of the Castilian Cortes from the commencement of the fourteenth century is therefore subjoined;—the best mode of replying to those who contend that the Spanish constitution was a dubious one, or that, owing to its disuse, all recollection of it had ceased. These were the pleas alleged by the central Junta when they advised the formation of a new code, not-



withstanding the meetings of the Cortes occur so frequently in the national history, and the right of being represented in them was one of the idols of Castilian pride, as well as the most boasted privilege of the oldest cities.\* The inquiry may be tedious; but this is the only mode of obtaining a comprehensive view of the subject, and trying the changes lately attempted by a fixed standard.

In 1309, Ferdinand IV. assembled Cortes at Valladolid, and informed them of his intention to proceed to the Moorish war, for which he received subsidiary grants.† Dying soon afterwards, his son, Alonzo XI, then little more than a year old, was proclaimed king, and disputes having arisen respecting the regency, the Cortes assembled at Burgos, in 1311, and determined that the queen-mother and the king's two uncles should be joint guardians and regents, under particular regulations framed for them, assisted by a council. They also demanded hostages from the king's guardians, not only as a greater security for his

\* There is no gazetteer or geographical work on a large scale in use among the Spaniards, that does not make particular mention of the places having a voice in Cortes.

† The particulars regarding this reign are taken from the *Cronica de D. Alfonso el Onceno*, copied from an ancient MS. kept in the Escorial, and published with notes, by Don Francisco Cerdá y Rico; ed. Madrid, 1787. The old idiom is retained; this is nevertheless one of the finest specimens of Spanish Chronicles.



person, but also as a check upon their administration, and required the accounts of the royal household to be submitted to them; both which conditions were agreed to.

In 1312, the Cortes met at Carrion, to examine the accounts and regulate the royal expenditure, as well as the manner in which the Moorish war was to be carried on. In the same year, the delegates from Castile sat at Valladolid, and those from Estremadura and Leon at Medina del Campo, for the purpose of voting more supplies. In 1322, when Alonzo had completed his fourteenth year, he convened Cortes, and told them that, having attained the age required by law, he should take the government into his own hands; after which he confirmed their privileges. In 1327, the Cortes met at Madrid, composed of the prelates, nobles, and delegates from Castile, Leon, Galicia, Seville, Cordova, Murcia, Jaen, Algarve, Molina, and Biscay :\* the king consulted them on a plan for the better administration of justice, and other important matters. In 1340, Alonzo convened Cortes to meet at Arenas, and laid before them the state of the war; when, after explaining the manner in which the money voted

\* The composition of these Cortes is unusual. The conquest of Algarve was completed by Alonzo III. of Portugal, in 1249, and renounced by Castile in 1264. It is presumable that the lordships of Molina and Biscay were invited to send up delegates on business connected with their own affairs, and not to take part in discussions which concerned the Castilians.

had been expended, he asked for further supplies, and the grant of *alcabalas* was made.

On his accession in 1351, Peter I. assembled Cortes at Valladolid, when several ordinances were passed,—one for the regulation of operative mechanics, and another to promote municipal reforms.\* On taking his seat, the usual competition between Toledo and Burgos took place, each claiming the right of reply to the king's speech.† In 1366, when Peter I. abandoned the kingdom to his successful rival, afterwards Henry II, the Cortes met at Burgos, and took the oath of allegiance to his son, known as John I. The new king asked for pecuniary aid, and then it was that the tax called the *decima* was first granted. He also informed the assembly that his competitor was coming against him, accompanied by the Prince of Wales and a large military force, praying their counsel. In 1371, Henry

\* The particulars of this and the three following reigns are extracted from Ayala's Chronicles, corrected by Zurita, and republished with notes, Madrid, 1779.

† This is a curious and old dispute, one which the sovereigns never ventured to decide, notwithstanding there is a charter, granted by Peter I. and quoted by Zurita, in which Toledo is styled "head of the Spanish empire since the time of the Gothic kings," and consequently entitled to priority. Burgos claimed as the head of Castile, and by special favour has always taken precedence. When the nobles were concerned, the right of reply rested with the head of the Lara family; a precedence which, as Mondejar observes, (*Memorias Historicas de D. Alonzo el Sabio*, lib. v. cap. ii.) they enjoyed over the Infantes, or princes of the blood.

again met the estates at Toro; when, owing to a depreciation in the *cruzados*, he ordered them to be received at less than their fixed value. In 1384, John I. had Cortes at Segovia, and passed the memorable law for changing the computation of time.\* In 1390, he summoned the Cortes to meet at Guadalajara, intending to propose a division of his kingdom. Having first asked the advice of his council and heard their objections, he declined submitting his project to the estates, anticipating a rejection. He however laid before them certain grants of lordships and dignities made to his younger son, to which assent was given. The chronicler quotes several messages and speeches regarding contributions, levies of men, and other matters of general interest, proving that this was a long and important session. The estates complained that the Pope gave away benefices in Spain, without any sanction of the local government.

In 1391, John I. dying suddenly through the fall of his horse, the Archbishop of Toledo sent circulars to the estates, announcing the accident, but artfully concealing the result. He merely notified the king's inability to sign, being in imminent danger. Learning the demise of the crown from public report, the several members

\* This law is copied entire in the History of Segovia, by D. Diego Colmenares, who records several interesting particulars relating to these Cortes.

flocked to Madrid, where they did homage to Henry III, only eleven years old. They then met in Cortes to settle the regency ; and it appearing that the deceased king had made no testamentary arrangements, the archbishop formed the plan of taking the government into his own hands, with the aid of a few supporters. To this end he appealed to one of the laws of *Partida*, in which it was provided that, in case of a minority, one, three, or five persons should be chosen to govern. To this plan objections were raised, the archbishop being told that it would not be acceptable to the kingdom. It was contended that the appointment of a regency was a matter of grave and general importance,—the more so as the minority of Alonzo XI. gave rise to great calamities until the king attained his fourteenth year, and took the government into his own hands. Notwithstanding the archbishop's strenuous opposition, supported by influential nobles, it was determined that the kingdom should be governed by a mixed council, including eight popular delegates.

In 1393, the state of the kingdom being deplorable, its strength wasted through the unabating enmities of the nobles, the abuses of the regency, and the penury of the treasury,\* Cortes were convened. It had indeed been agreed that

\* The public expenditure at that time was only rated at thirty-five *cuentos* or millions of maravedis per annum.

they should meet on the king's coming of age, to settle the disputes between John I. and the Duke of Lancaster, as well as to confirm the duke's renunciation to the crown of Castile, and complete his daughter's marriage with Henry III: important business with Portugal was also to be settled, and assent given to treaties with France. The young king fixed the meeting for September, and, in the mean while, went in person to take possession of the lordship of Biscay. At the time appointed, he took his seat, and told the estates, that being of age, he had resolved to take the government upon himself, confirming all privileges and liberties heretofore granted. He also revoked all acts of his guardians contrary thereto, and begged the Cortes to provide money for the public exigencies. They congratulated him on his assumption of power, thanked him for the confirmation of their privileges, and promised to supply his wants; offering, on a future day, to give a specific answer to his communication. They accordingly met, and the king being seated, the usual competition between Burgos and Toledo arose. To avoid altercations, the deputies agreed to answer in writing, and accordingly handed the following to the high chancellor, requesting him to read it aloud. This paper is so highly illustrative that it is presented entire.

“Sire—The procurators of the cities and towns come to these Cortes by your commands. They



understand your intentions, as manifested at the first sitting, when you told them that you had completed your fourteenth year, and wished to take the government into your own hands, without the control of guardians. To this they reply, that they thank God for your being of age to govern your kingdoms, since, during the last years of your minority, things have been done to the injury and vexation of your kingdom; and they trust in God and yourself, that He will be pleased to bestow upon you grace, so as to enable you to well govern that which he confided to you. As a favour, they pray that, notwithstanding the laws and usages of these realms allow you to take the government upon yourself on the completion of fourteen years, you will be pleased to have near you good counsellors, prelates, lords, and good men of the cities and towns, living in the fear and love of God; and that, with their advice, you will ordain those things requisite for the service of God and yourself, as well as for the benefit, defence, and good administration of your kingdoms.

“ Furthermore—Regarding your assurances respecting the privileges, immunities, and charters, derived from kings your ancestors, and hitherto kept.—To this, sire, they make answer, that they thank you for this distinguished kindness, and pray God to prolong your life, with an increase of honours, again beseeching you to cause the



said privileges, immunities, and charters to be kept, many of your officers acting in opposition thereto.

“ Furthermore—With regard to your offer to exhibit the accounts of your household expenditure, from which it would seem that you require aid to enable you to maintain your dignity, that of the queen, of your brother, and the court, as well as to keep your manors and castles.—To this they observe, that all they possess is at your service: but, sire, they beg you first to moderate these expenses, because the kingdom has too much diminished in population to pay subsidies, owing to the mortality that still continues to prevail; as well as on account of the many losses which these realms have sustained since the demise of King Alonzo, your great-grandfather. Wherefore, they pray you most graciously to be pleased to see that the maintenances bestowed upon lords and others be so regulated that the kingdom may be in a situation to provide for them.”

“ Furthermore—Concerning the tenure of lands held of you by lords and others, in accordance with the regulations made by your late father, with the advice of the kingdom in the Cortes of Guadalajara.—To this, sire, they reply, that it is well; but there is nevertheless a custom, through the prevalence of which you are not well served, and the privileged parties incur

great expenses, eventually defrayed out of your revenue." This clause enumerates the abuses practised in the commutations of military services, and ends thus: "Wherefore the whole kingdom earnestly pray you to provide a remedy."\*

"Furthermore, Sire,—As the King of Aragon is now your friend, and you have besides entered into truces with the Kings of England and Granada, as well as with Portugal, it might be possible, were you so pleased, to dispense with so large an expenditure as the present one; but as these things must be left to time, the kingdom grants the subsidies required. They, however, pray you to promise us, to-day and in this place, not to levy any other contribution this year; and if you should stand in need of further aid, that you will obtain it with the advice of the kingdom, assembled in Cortes."

The chronicler adds, that the king expressed himself grateful for this reply, and engaged to make no demand except in the manner prayed.

In 1406, Henry III, desirous of pressing the

\* The nobles and gentlemen holding lands and dignities under the crown, by the tenure of their titles, are bound to furnish the king, when he takes the field, with a contingent of men equipped at their own expensè. It was of the abused commutation of this service that the Cortes complained. The obligation of military service still exists, and if the competitor who now claims the throne by virtue of the law of Philip V. succeeds, the position of those nobles who followed the fortunes of his rival will be precarious.

Moorish war, proceeded to Toledo, where he directed the Cortes to meet him. Falling sick, he commissioned the Infante Don Fernando to transact business for him ; who, presiding at the assembly of the three estates, delivered the following speech :

“ Prelates, counts, rich men, and procurators, here assembled,—You know the king, our lord, is so ill that he cannot be present at these Cortes. He has therefore directed me, on his behalf, to inform you of the motive of his coming to this city ; which is, because the King of Granada has broken the truce had with him, and refuses to restore the castle of Ayamonte, or pay the stipulated sums due. Wherefore, the king proposes to wage a vigorous war against him, by entering his dominions in person with a large force, and thereon wishes to have your opinion and advice. Principally he desires you to see whether the war which he is so pleased to undertake be just ; and this done, that you will determine in what manner it is to be conducted, as well in reference to the number of men, as the artillery, stores and provisions, besides the equipment of a fleet necessary to guard the straits, and money for six months’ pay.” Before the delegates entered upon their deliberations, they requested to be furnished with a copy of the Infante’s speech, and the information on which his statements were founded. On due consideration of the whole, they declared

that the war was just, ought to be undertaken, and that the king would do well to go forth with a competent force; adding, that as the other estates were of the same opinion, the demands should be complied with.

The preceding outline exhibits the practice observed in the Castilian Cortes, and the objects for which they assembled, in the course of five successive reigns,—that is, from the year 1309 to 1406.\* The next reign through which it is proposed to carry the inquiry, is that of John II; a new era in the history of Spain.†

Henry III. expiring at Toledo towards the close of 1406, his brother, Don Fernando, proclaimed John II, then an infant, at Segovia. At the opening of the Cortes, the Infante informed them that, by the will of the deceased, the queen and himself were named co-regents; and they accordingly took the usual oaths to keep the privileges and good usages of the realm. Presiding at a future day, the Infante pressed the undertaking of the proposed war against the Moors, urged supplies, and begged permission to take the field in person. The deputies expressed their

\* Juan Jacobo de Chiflet, quoted by the Marquis de Mondejar in his *Memorias Historicas del Rey D. Alonzo el Sabio*, (Madrid, 1777), published a collection of the transactions of all the Cortes held in Castile.

† The authority consulted for this reign is the *Cronica de Don Juan II*, written by Fernan Perez de Gusman, pursuant to the orders of the Emperor Charles V; ed. Logroño, 1517.

assent, and enjoined the regents not to appropriate any part of the monies voted for the war to any other purpose whatsoever; and to the observance of this injunction the regents jointly made oath before the estates. The queen next year assembled the Cortes at Guadalajara, intimating her anxiety to lay the state of the war before them, and have the benefit of their opinion. Upon this occasion they granted further subsidies, to the amount of sixty *cuentos*. In 1410, she again convened the deputies, in order to submit the marriage projected between the Infanta Doña Maria, the king's sister, and the Infante Don Alonzo, eldest son of the co-regent; an alliance which afterwards led to the union of Aragon and Castile. The deputies witnessed the espousals, sanctioning the grants made on this occasion.

In 1419, full Cortes met at Madrid, when the deputies urged the king to take the administration into his own hands. During this reign they were several times appealed to, as peace-makers between the King and his sister's husband, who, with a large party of nobles, had raised the standard of opposition. In 1425, John convened the Cortes to take counsel upon the disputes between himself and the King of Aragon, and generally on the state of the nation. Being threatened with an attack by the Aragonese, the delegates advised him to resist manfully, and promised supplies. Next year he again summoned them to



Palenzuela, demanding succours against the Moors. At the close of the business, they petitioned him against the retention of a thousand lancers in the capital, urging their removal on the plea of useless expense. In 1429, John again met the Cortes, and consulted them upon his negotiations with the King of Granada. A rupture ensuing, fresh supplies were granted. In the same year, he called them together at Medina del Campo, to report the exigencies of the army, when he received a grant for forty-five *cuentos* and other subsidies. Next year he assembled the estates at the same place, and laid before them a statement of his disputes with the Infantes Don Enrique and Don Pedro, asking advice how to deal with them. On this subject the deputies declined expressing an opinion without consulting their constituents.

In 1431, the Moors having been repulsed and driven into Granada, John established his headquarters in the vicinity of that city, and sent letters to the estates, directing them to meet him at Medina del Campo, or wherever else he might be on the day fixed. At this meeting, peace with Portugal was agreed to, and forty-five *cuentos* voted to cover the war charges. In 1442, the deputies sat at Toro, and assigned eighty *cuentos* for the public service. John dying July 20th, 1454, after a reign of forty-seven years, he was succeeded by his son Henry IV, who



immediately assembled general Cortes at Cuellar, and harangued them on his proposed prosecution of the war against the Moors.\* At the end of his speech, and after expressing his reliance on the Most High for success, he spoke to the Cortes thus:—"Wherefore, I have ordered you to be called together, in order that all may be done with your accord; and in giving me your counsel, I beg you to express your opinion upon that which it is most meet to do, since you have heard my determined will." The Cortes manifested their satisfaction, and suggested the expediency of choosing good leaders, and adopting judicious plans. The king replied, and it was agreed that the war should commence next year.

After his divorce, Henry espoused the Princess Juana of Portugal; who bore him a daughter, the only child he had. When this young princess was only two months old the general Cortes were assembled to take the oath of allegiance to her.† The ceremony was performed with great

\* *Cronica del Rey Don Enrique Quarto*, corrected by D. Jose Miguel de Flores; ed. Madrid, 1787. The king's speech is preserved in this chronicle, together with the answer of the Cortes.

† The Chronicle contains the king's speech pronounced on this occasion, in which, addressing himself to the assembled Cortes, he says: "I beseech the prelates and command the nobles and deputies here to make oath to the Princess Doña Juana, my first-born, and do homage to her." The ceremony took place at the beginning of 1642, and the Infante Don Alonzo and Infanta Doña Isabel, the king's brother and sister,

pomp, the Archbishop of Toledo holding the child in his arms, whilst the grandees and members of the Cortes kissed hands: but they were not after-

were among those who swore allegiance. Through one of the strangest revolutions recorded in the annals of any country, Henry, the commencement of whose reign had been so auspicious, was set aside, and his daughter deprived of the succession. Father Henry Florez, who published *Memorias de las Reynas Catolicas* about the year 1760, and a writer much esteemed, seems to have investigated the origin of this intrigue with great diligence. He attributes it entirely to the jealousy and enmity of the Marquis de Villena against D. Beltran de la Cueva, Count de Ledesma, at whose marriage with the youngest daughter of the Marquis de Santillana the king and queen had been present. This jealousy was increased by the count's being appointed Grand Master of the Order of Santiago; and the Archbishop of Toledo, together with several grandees, joining in the conspiracy, the country was involved in a civil war, which proved fatal to Henry. Florez defends the queen's character and conduct, which, he says, was aspersed only by those who had an interest in exalting the daughter's rival. He repels the tangible charges, and quotes various facts to prove that King Henry believed the Princess Juana to be his daughter to the very last moment of his life. Many circumstances contributed to render this one of the boldest, most extensive, and most successful conspiracies ever plotted; and if it has a parallel, it is in that which is at this moment going on in Spain. However great and glorious the reign of Isabel the Catholic, she unquestionably ascended the throne by the aid of a confederacy, after a great act of injustice had been committed. She legally succeeded to the crown the moment the Princess Juana took the veil, which was in 1480, being the sister of Henry IV. and the male line becoming extinct by the death of her brother Alonzo; but clearly this is not a case at any time to be quoted as a rule of succession in Spain, and much less by those who are seeking to set aside the law of Philip V.

wards assembled during the remaining tumultuous part of this reign ; consequently they were not present when the Princess Isabel was acknowledged by Henry and the court.\*

In consequence of the union of Leon, Castile, and Aragon, followed by the expulsion of the Moors and the discovery of America, Spain assumed a new attitude in the eyes of Europe. Ferdinand and Isabel were the first who ruled that country as a united kingdom ; but as we have been familiarised with the annals of that and the following reign by the labours of our own countryman, they will not be dwelt upon longer than is necessary to elucidate the subject immediately under consideration.

As previously stated, Isabel ascended the Castilian throne more through a preference evinced in her favour and subsequently sanctioned by the Cortes, than by hereditary right. Notwithstanding her endeavours to humble the nobles, this queen evinced a due regard for the national institutions. So far was her respect for ancient usages carried,

\* This ceremony took place September 19, 1468, at the Venta de los Toros de Guisando, a short distance from Madrid, whence the king had proceeded to meet her, accompanied by the Archbishop of Seville and other courtiers. The king's harangue on this occasion, as reported in the Chronicle, is remarkable ;—he declares that he caused his sister, the Princess Isabel, to be acknowledged heiress to the throne, “ at the request of his subjects, and in order to put an end to scandals, deaths, robberies and injuries, and that the people might enjoy security and repose.”

that in 1476 she and her husband proceeded to Biscay, and, under the tree of Guernica, swore to maintain the Basque *fueros*. In 1481, Ferdinand named Isabel regent of Aragon; and the law requiring the person exercising that high trust to take the oath of fidelity in presence of the Cortes, she complied with the precept. Being considered a foreigner, the Aragonese Cortes previously had to pass a special act for the Queen of Castile to enter the hall of their sittings.\* On the demise of Isabel, Ferdinand's appointment to the regency of Castile was also acknowledged by the Cortes.

In 1506, the Valladolid Cortes declared Juana and Philip queen and king of Castile, at the same time acknowledging their son Charles V. as prince of Asturias.† In 1518, on reaching Spain, Charles

\* Zurita, *Anales de Aragon*. Subsequently to their coronation, Ferdinand and Isabel held Cortes at Toledo, in May 1480, where the oath was taken to their son, Don Juan; and next year the same ceremony was performed in the Cortes of Aragon. The queen afterwards went to Barcelona, to open the Cortes of Catalonia. Cortes were also held at Madrid, in 1483, for the purpose of obtaining supplies.

† In these Cortes the delegates, in their sixth petition, addressed Queen Juana and King Philip in these words: "Our wise authors and writings say that each province abounds in its own sense, on which account it is requisite that the laws and ordinances should be conformable to the provinces: wherefore they cannot be equal, nor ought they to contain similar provisions for all the sections; for which reason our kings established that when laws were to be enacted, in order that they might be beneficial to their realm and each province satisfied, Cortes and delegates should be assembled to take part therein, and it

assembled the Cortes of Castile, which proclaimed him king and granted subsidies.\* After much difficulty, he also obtained the recognition of his title from the Aragonese Cortes, when he bound himself by oath never to violate their privileges. He then summoned the Catalonian Cortes to meet

was therefore established that no laws should be enacted or renewed unless in Cortes. Wherefore, they pray your highnesses that now and henceforward the same may be done," &c.—This prayer was repeated in the first petition of the Madrid Cortes in 1607, during the reign of Philip III, of which the following is part of the recital: "From experience it has been seen that although the laws and pragmatics which your majesty orders to be published are made with great judgment and conformably to your most Christian zeal, it nevertheless occurs that your majesty is sometimes prayed to abrogate or alter the same, because, as these kingdoms are composed of such diversified provinces, it appears necessary that the laws should be made in accordance with the cities having a vote in Cortes, by which means they would be better adapted to the public good;—hence the kingdom prays your majesty not to allow new laws to be promulgated, nor old ones altered, wholly or in part, unless with the concurrence of Cortes," &c.

\* These Cortes were held at Valladolid. In one of their addresses, the representatives of the cities and towns spoke to the king thus: "Considering that your highness is bound to provide for the wants of your natural subjects in preference to attending to your own affairs, we wish to remind your highness that you were chosen and called king, which means, to govern well, as otherwise it would not be to govern, but to waste,—which is not being a king, for governing well is doing justice,—and this is, to give to each one that which is his own; and this is being a real king. For this it is that your subjects give you part of their fruits and earnings, serving you with their persons whenever they are called. Let your highness therefore see if you are not bound to act justly towards them."



him at Barcelona; and, at a subsequent period, those of Castile at Santiago de Compostella, in Galicia. The choice of place, the influence of the Flemish courtiers, and the king's preparations to quit Spain, excited universal indignation. His extravagance was blamed, more particularly as it was known that he intended to ask for fresh subsidies actually before the previous ones were paid in.

To a people jealous of their liberties, disliking foreigners, and accustomed to supply the wants of their sovereign with a frugal hand, this conduct appeared alarming. The cities protested against the national council being held in Galicia, and in many districts the people flew to arms. Eventually the deputies met at the place designated, with the exception of a few, and by stratagems the opposition against the government was calmed. Frequent collisions had widened the breach between the nobles and commons; an advantage of which Charles dexterously availed himself. He gained the ascendancy; the supplies were allowed, and the Cortes dismissed, without any regard to their remonstrances. The king sailed for Germany, leaving a regent of his own appointment, with viceroys in the provinces.

His departure was a signal for the general revolt of the commons, who had previously been armed, by virtue of a military ordinance issued by Cardinal Cisneros, in order to check the auda-



city of the nobles. From this period the calamities of Spain take date. Charles abandoned his kingdom whilst in a state of disorder bordering on insurrection. The feelings of the natives were wounded by his neglect, their pride roused at the preferences shown to foreigners, and their resentment fired on seeing their remonstrances contemned. Charles's affections seemed set upon his German dominions, and, in abruptly going in search of another crown the moment he obtained money, he had the appearance of regarding the one acknowledged to be his inheritance only so far as it served to promote his own designs.

When too late, Charles became sensible of his imprudence in slighting the murmurs and disregarding the complaints of his Castilian subjects. The transactions in the Cortes of 1520, and the war of the communities, show the state of public feeling in Spain at the commencement of the sixteenth century, when the kingly authority ceased to be respected, and the seeds of dissension were sown between the upper and lower orders.\* Re-

\* The Cortes of 1520 were held at Valladolid, and in the twenty-second article of their acts a resolution to this effect appears:—"That when and each time the king wishes to make war, he shall convene the Cortes, and submit to the delegates therein the cause, in order that they may judge whether it be just or arbitrary; and if it should be just, or against Moors, that they may see the number of men required, and thereon provide the requisite supplies: and that, without the consent of the said delegates he shall not declare or carry on any war."

publican principles also then showed themselves, and the proceedings of those days have served as models to the modern reformers of Cadiz and Madrid. Armed and elated with success, the commons formed a supreme junta, by assembling the representatives of the cities entitled to a vote in Cortes, and took the government upon themselves. Charles tried the experiment of concessions, which totally failed. After frequent deliberations, and issuing a declaration that they met for the safety of the country, as well as for that of the constitution, the junta embodied their complaints and adopted strong resolutions, among which were the following: \*—“That the king be required to return home—that no foreigner be regent—that no foreign troops enter the kingdom—that natives alone hold offices—that the taxes be reduced to the state they were in at the death of Queen Isabel—that the subsidy granted in Galicia be not exacted—that no deputy receive an office or pension from the king—that the cities pay their own representatives—that the Cortes assemble once in three years—that the judges have fixed salaries—that the privileged orders equally pay taxes—that the privileges of nobles obtained to the prejudice of the commons be revoked, and that the king abide by the stipulations proposed.”

The commons rushed to extremes, and the tone

\* Sandoval, *Hist. de Carlos V.*

assumed by them may be considered haughty ; but it cannot be concealed that the first faults were committed by the court. A compromise, effected by a dexterous mediator, would then have saved Spain from all the calamities which ensued, the fatal effects of which are felt to this day. Had Charles been just, he might then have dried the tears of unhappy Spain—he might have introduced a new bond of union between the various orders in the state. The settlement of the question at issue was, however, left to the decision of the sword, and, after the usual misfortunes of hasty insurrections against the established authorities, the commons were disarmed.

The popular confederacy was broken, but the spirit which gave rise to it was by no means extinguished. Charles, however, it must be acknowledged, signalised his return to Spain by an act of clemency alike prudent and generous. The late demonstrations afforded him a salutary lesson, and for a long time he persevered in his plan of conciliation. So great was the ascendancy which he eventually gained over the Castilians, that they felt proud of his glories acquired abroad, and were disposed to uphold him. Driven to great shifts through the want of money, he assembled the three estates at Valladolid, in 1527, and demanded large supplies ; but the exhausted state of the country precluded the possibility of complying with his request to its full extent. The trifling

supplies granted by each estate were far from pleasing Charles; but he dissembled and abruptly dismissed them without assigning a motive. In the Cortes of Toledo, held in 1538, he however acted differently. The ordinary revenue and loans not sufficing for his wants, an excise tax was proposed. Charles entered the hall, and, after his secretary had read the exposition, briefly addressed the house thus:—"I recommend despatch in this business; and take care that no one of you utters a word that may destroy the good effect of this proposal."

Each estate deliberated separately; and the nobles having solicited a conference with the burgesses, by the king's orders it was refused. The clergy agreed to the excise, provided it was sanctioned by the papal see; but the nobles opposed it strenuously, alleging that it was contrary to their privileges. In a moment of irritation Charles dismissed these two estates, and during the dominion of the Austrian dynasty they were never again called to the national assembly. That balance to which the estates of the realm owed their security was thus destroyed. Charles, however, continued to assemble the representatives of the corporate towns when in want of money. Meeting at Madrid in 1548, their remonstrances on the score of ameliorations were ineffectual, as well as in 1570. They subsequently assembled at Cordova and at Toro, in 1650; but these

meetings were merely ceremonial, although they served to keep alive the recollection of what the Cortes were in ancient times.\*

From this period till the time of Philip V. Spain may almost be said to have been governed without the aid or intervention of Cortes; but the impolicy of thus superseding the functions and privileges of the national assembly, was strongly marked by a general decline in prosperity and independence. Indeed, so low had the government sunk — so far was public opinion perverted in the reign of Charles II, that this monarch, having no children and being perplexed as to the descent of the crown, instead of assembling the Cortes, submitted his dilemma to the Papal See and acted upon its decision;† although,

\* It would be impossible to conceal the painful impressions caused by a moment's reflection upon the state to which the Spaniards were reduced through the imprudence of the court, on the one hand, and the impetuous and revolutionary spirit which, during the reign of Charles V, drove the commons to arms. The collision which then arose out of the folly of a sovereign attempting to govern two kingdoms, unlike in habits, opposed in interests, and situated at different extremities of Europe, entailed calamities for two centuries upon the Peninsula; in like manner, as the great error of allowing Dom Pedro to retain claims to the Portuguese succession after he had declared himself Emperor of Brazil, prepared endless calamities for that unhappy country, to maintain the welfare of which we are bound by ancient treaties.

† Coxe, *Mem. of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon*, Introd. sec. 3.



with singular inconsistency, he actually appended to the statement of his case copies of the various decrees of the general Cortes respecting the succession to the throne ! By this very act, he acknowledged the power and constitutionality of the only tribunal competent to determine a question of so much moment to the peace and welfare of the land.\*

The accession of Philip V. was followed by many and important changes. Spain, which had long lain prostrate, arose in all the vigour of early manhood : the ravages of a long and wasteful war disappeared ; and even so early as 1718, a fleet was seen in her ports outnumbering that of Philip II.

How were these changes brought about ? The answer is clear and simple. Guided by so experienced a preceptor as Louis XIV., the new monarch of Spain shaped his conduct according to two leading maxims : first, to avoid the errors of the Austrian dynasty ; secondly, to adapt his measures and policy to the usages and even the prejudices of the people he was called upon to govern. By becoming a patriot king, he healed

\* Ferdinand VII. went a step further than the weak and distrustful Charles ; and not only disposed of the crown by testament, in opposition to a well-known law, enacted for the general settlement of Europe and recorded in the statute-book of Spain, but also prevailed on England and France, rivals in the days of Charles, to uphold his folly.



rankling wounds, and prepared the way for that regeneration, the progressive workings of which continued until the French revolution destroyed the equilibrium established in Europe. Philip Vth's policy was judicious, his wishes ardent and his intentions sincere. He studied his adopted country, and his ears were open to salutary counsels. Sometimes he became the victim of intrigues and squabbles—often was he thwarted by the nobles; but his main purpose was fixed, and all enlightened Spaniards agree that to him they are indebted for the revival of the ancient constitutions of the several divisions of the monarchy. The accession of the Bourbons unquestionably saved Spain from total ruin; and never was this fact so generally avowed by the reflecting inhabitants as at this moment.

He gave the first proof of consideration for the feelings of his subjects in the respect which he evinced for the ancient institutions. He was received at Madrid with the enthusiasm so natural to a sensitive people who had seen foreigners presume to partition their country as emperors divide the spoils of a battle-field. They looked upon the Duke d'Anjou not only as the rightful heir, but also as a necessary instrument to save them from degradation; and the more he was persecuted by those who had an interest in placing another sovereign over them, the more they

clung to him—the more were they disposed to make every sacrifice in his favour.\*

The moment his arrival was known in the provinces, congratulatory letters were sent up from the municipalities and ecclesiastical chapters of Castile, Leon, Catalonia, Valencia, Aragon, and Navarre, asking permission to despatch deputies to do homage and acknowledge his title. Philip was much affected by these demonstrations of regard ; but, as his ordinance distinctly asserts, aware that the provinces were groaning under a weight of taxes and had every prospect of an arduous contest before them, he felt reluctant to expose them to the expenses of a formal convocation of the Cortes for the mere purpose of performing a ceremony which could be safely delayed to a more favourable moment. He therefore ordained the cities of Castile and Leon to send up their proxies to the deputies already in Madrid. The meeting took place April 8th, 1701, and was conducted with all the usual forms. It was not, perhaps, so full an assembly as usage required ; but the Spaniards gave the king due credit for his sincerity and good wishes. Particulars of the sitting are given in the *Diario* of the Marquis de

\* This is evident, not only from a careful perusal of the *Comentarios* of the Marquis de San Philipe, but also from the *Diario* of the Marquis de Rivas, and other contemporaneous authors, as well as the impressions remaining in the minds of modern Spaniards acquainted with the history of their country.

Rivas ; from which it appears, that, among other things, the king confirmed and swore to preserve to the cities and towns their rights and privileges, whilst the deputies, in the name of their constituents, acknowledged him as their lawful and liege sovereign.

By this act the old constitution was revived, and a new compact between the king and his subjects sealed. The Marquis de Villena pressed the council to have the Cortes convened, for the correction of abuses and the formation of new laws better adapted to the spirit of the age, urging that enactments would be willingly obeyed if promulgated with the advice of the estates ; but the moment was deemed unpropitious. Those of the opposite opinion were perhaps right, as preparations were already making on all sides for a fierce struggle. In December 1701, Philip proceeded to Barcelona, where he assembled Cortes. This was a novel and stirring event, the Catalonian estates not having met for a number of years.\* At the opening, Philip stated his motives for convoking them, and received a donation of money. The ancient privileges of the principality were confirmed, and fresh ones granted ; but no measure of general utility was adopted. In the mean while, the queen assembled the

\* Philip IV. convened them in 1606 ; but, intestine troubles arising, he was obliged to prorogue them till 1632, when he presided at their opening.

Cortes of Aragon, where she presided by the king's special appointment during his absence in Italy, for which precedents were quoted. On opening the session, she told the estates that she came to receive their oath of fidelity, as well as to confirm, moderate, or correct their *fueros* and laws, as might be thought expedient.\*

Before proceeding further, it may be proper to premise, that when Philip V. reached his adopted country, he found it politically divided into four great sections, viz. :

1st. Castile, including Leon, Galicia, Asturias, Murcia, Andalusia and Granada, with the lordships of the Basque Provinces and Molina.†

\* These transactions are also preserved by the Marquis de Rivas, as well as in the archives of Zaragoza.

† The Kings of Castile have been Lords of Molina since 1293, when this lordship was incorporated with their crown by the will of Doña Blanca Alfonso de Leon, sister to the spouse of Sancho the Brave. It stands in the province of Guadalajara, and has a district containing eighty small towns and villages, thirty-two leagues E. of Madrid. The city of the same name, in the centre of the lordship, has a population of four thousand souls, surrounded by strong walls and old fortifications. In ancient times it was an important place, often resisting both the power of Aragon and Castile. The buildings are still in a ruinous state, having been burnt by Napoleon's order in 1810. It formerly had a vote in Cortes, as mentioned in the Chronicle of Alonzo XI, and gave title to the King of Castile's eldest son. The history of this lordship was written by D. Diego Portocarrero, who inserts a number of early grants, wills, &c. It is now governed by a mayor, and is dependent upon the Bishop of Sigüenza in ecclesiastical matters, and upon the Governor of New Castile in everything that relates to the military.

2nd. Aragon, joined with Valencia and the Balearic Islands.

3rd. Catalonia, annexed to the crown of Aragon.

4th. Navarre, still retaining its ancient institutions.

During the war of succession, Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia took part against Philip V, and after the battle of Almanza fell into his hands. Whether the constitution of Aragon had become an object of jealousy to the crown, or a disposition was felt to punish the natives for their alleged infidelity, matters little in the present inquiry. Certain it is, that, after a warm discussion in the cabinet, it was resolved to deprive the Aragonese and Valencians of their *fueros*; and accordingly, under date of June 29th, 1707, Philip V. issued an ordinance,\* of which the introductory clauses are subjoined :

“Considering that the kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia have, through the act of rebellion committed against me contrary to their oath of fidelity, lost all their *fueros*, privileges, exemptions, and liberties which they enjoyed, &c.:—And the absolute dominion of the said kingdoms belonging to me, since, besides being comprehended in the rest which I so legitimately possess in this monarchy, the just right of conquest is now added:—And considering also that one of the principal attributes of sovereignty is the imposition and abro-

\* *Perpetuacion*, tom. iii. lib. 3. tit. 2. auto 3.



gation of laws, which, through the changes in times and habits, I could consistently vary without the weighty and well-founded motives and circumstances concurring thereto:—Wherefore, as regards Aragon and Valencia, I have, as well for these reasons, as because it is my wish to reduce my kingdoms of Spain to an uniform standard in laws, usages, customs, and tribunals, in order that they may be equally governed by the laws of Castile, deemed it expedient to abolish and entirely abrogate all the aforesaid *fueros*, privileges, practices, and customs hitherto observed in the said kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia, it being my will that they be reduced to the laws of Castile,” &c.

A subsequent ordinance, dated July 29th in the same year, recites that, “as many of the cities, towns, and places of the said kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia, as well as many individuals, both clergy, seculars, and nobles, had conducted themselves loyally, and on account of their constant and tried fidelity experienced the loss of their property and persecutions:—And this being notorious, and it not being my wish to punish as delinquents those whom I know to have been loyal, in order that my intentions may be more clearly understood, I hereby declare that the greater part of the said nobles, &c. only yielded to the irresistible force of the enemy when they could no longer defend themselves, and did not violate their fidelity:—Wherefore they shall retain all the privileges, &c.



which they had obtained, &c. excepting as regards the government, laws, and *fueros* of the said kingdoms," &c. This was followed by subsequent decrees; one ordering stamps to be introduced into Aragon and Valencia, another ordaining the personal and local immunity of the Church to be maintained, a third establishing the rights of the order of Calatrava, and a fourth providing for the erection of a high court of justice at Zaragoza.

The chancery of Valencia was also reduced to an *audiencia*, and in both provinces the administration was assimilated to that of Castile, in everything connected with the criminal legislation, receipt of taxes, municipal regulations, and the levy of troops. At the time this was considered an abrupt and injudicious step on the part of Philip V, if not an act of injustice. The Dukes of Medina Sidonia, and Montellano, together with the Count de Frigiliana, warmly opposed it in the council; but the advice of the French minister, M. Amelot, supported by Ronquillo and the Dukes of Veragua and San Juan, prevailed. Catalonia and the Balearic Islands were subsequently put upon a similar footing. The ordinance relating to the former, dated January 16th, 1716, contains the following remarkable introduction: "Having, by my decree of the 9th of last October, announced that, with divine aid and the justice of my cause, I had by arms pacified the principality of Catalonia, and it devolves to me of right there to establish a govern-

ment and take such measures as may enable the inhabitants to live in peace," &c.\* The Aragonese, Catalonians, and Valencians were thus deprived of the most essential of their *fueros*, without a remonstrance or protest. They made this great sacrifice for the public welfare ; but it would be a folly to suppose they are satisfied. It is needless to remark, that since this period their deputies, few in number and convened by no established rule, have sat in the Cortes of Castile.

On the 7th of April 1709, the Cortes acknowledged Philip's son Louis presumptive heir to the throne. On this occasion, the representatives of Aragon sat for the first time with those of Castile in Cortes. The king's attorney-general demanded real possession to be given to Louis, as Prince of Asturias, of his domains, to hold them in entire sovereignty and independence, as was done in 1388 with Prince Henry, son of John I, when he espoused Catherine, daughter of the Duke of Lancaster ; the same rule having been afterwards observed by John II. towards his son Henry IV. This demand was negatived, and the king frankly told that the title only ought to be given to the prince, it being dangerous to acknowledge two sovereigns within one realm, as the insurrection of Henry IV. against his father amply proved.

In 1714, after a long and expensive war, the

\* *Recopilacion*, tom. iii. lib. 3. tit. 2. auto 16.

negotiations for the settlement of a general peace were transferred to Versailles, where the material points in dispute were arranged by Bolingbroke and Torci. Philip V. was required to renounce his claims to the French crown; and Lord Lexington, as British envoy, proceeded to Spain to witness the ceremony. The renunciation was first made before the council, in presence of his lordship, and then in Cortes expressly convened. At this meeting the representatives of twenty-seven provinces, cities, and towns were present; viz. Burgos, Leon, Zaragoza, Granada, Valencia, Seville, Cordova, Murcia, Jaen, Galicia, Salamanca, Catalonia, Madrid, Guadalajara, Tarragona, Jaca, Avila, Fraga, Badajoz, Palencia, Toro, Peñiscola, Borja, Zamora, Cuenca, Valladolid, and Toledo.

These were no longer the Cortes of Castile, but a mixed and more general assembly. The exclusion of the Austrian dynasty was next agreed to, by the house of Savoy being called to the Spanish throne in case of failure in the issue of Philip V, agreeably to a requisition on the part of England. A new rule of succession was also established, calculated to obviate the union of the two crowns; a point previously settled by the British and French negotiators, and formally stipulated in article 11 of the Treaty of Utrecht.\*

\* *Article 11.*—“ But whereas the war which is so happily ended by this peace was at the beginning undertaken, and was

After the ratification of the Cortes, the new law of succession was promulgated, under date of March 10th, 1713, with all the usual formalities, and entered on the statute-book of Spain, headed with these words : “ Forms to be observed in the succession of males to these kingdoms.”

Till this period no general rule of succession existed in Spain : the manner in which the several sections became united in the persons of Ferdinand and Isabella did not indeed admit of any such provision. The new mode of transmitting the *jus coronæ* might be contrary to the Castilian usage, but it was agreeable to those who had secured the throne to Philip ; and by this means it was also hoped that the chances of war would be diminished. The new law was besides an ad-

carried on for so many years with the utmost force, at immense charge, and with almost infinite slaughter, because of the great danger which threatened the liberty and safety of all Europe from the too close conjunction of the kingdoms of Spain and France : And whereas to take away all uneasiness and suspicion concerning such conjunction out of the minds of people, and to settle and establish the peace and tranquillity of Christendom by an equal balance of power, (which is the best and most solid foundation of a mutual friendship, and of a concord which will be lasting on all sides,) as well the Catholic King as the most Christian King have consented, that care should be taken by sufficient precautions that the kingdoms of Spain and France should never come to be united under the same dominion, and that one and the same person should never become king of both kingdoms : And to this end his Catholic Majesty has for himself, his heirs and successors, most solemnly renounced all manner of right, title, and pretension to the crown of France.”

ditional guarantee to the stability of general peace; confirmed the exclusion of the Austrian dynasty, at that moment a matter of general exultation to the Spaniards; and, moreover, satisfied the maritime powers which had hitherto opposed Philip's accession. It is by virtue of this law, in force one hundred and twenty years previously to Ferdinand VIIth's attempt to abolish it by a simple act of his own, that his brother claims the throne, in preference to the female line: and as England was a leading party to the stipulations ratified by the peace of Utrecht, it is a flagrant violation of public faith to assist in their subversion, and disgraceful to us, as a nation, to allow the employment of fraud in order to perpetrate a wrong, the melancholy effects of which are likely to entail upon Spain years of agony and convulsions.\*

Before the Cortes of 1714 closed, the Aragonese deputies presented a petition, praying to form part of the *junta de millones*. That a due conception may be formed of the meaning of this application, it may be proper to remark, that in the reign of Philip II. the revenue not sufficing for his wants, in order to enable him to carry on the war against England and repair the loss of the

\* I have entered at full length into the formation of the law of Philip V. and the causes which led to it in a pamphlet entitled "Spain, or Who is the lawful Successor?" (London, 1834.)



grand Armada, the Cortes granted him a subsidy of eight millions of ducats, payable in six years, and leviable on six articles of consumption, viz. wine, vinegar, oil, meat, soap, and candles. In the Cortes of 1639, this subsidy was increased to twenty-four millions, and, after various modifications, became a permanent tax, assessible only in the twenty-two provinces of Castile and Leon, and payable by the clergy, agreeably to a bull of Clement X, dated Dec. 9th, 1663. It was however agreed that it should be renewable every six years: and in order to obviate the necessity of the Cortes meeting, a deputation of five Castilian delegates was left in the capital, to whom the commission of the periodical renewal was confided. This deputation was eventually converted into a kind of board for the assessment and collection of the tax, with a regular office, called *la sala de millones*.

Regulations were formed for the guidance of this board, with which the Aragonese deputies wished to be incorporated. The Castilians objected, on the plea that they did not pay this charge; but the objection was overruled and the Aragonese and Valencians admitted, it being contended that their provinces paid equivalent taxes. A deputy from each was accordingly chosen and added to the board. In 1715, Philip V. published a series of regulations for the administration of the revenue, when the council of



finance assumed a new form, and the *sala de millones* was blended with it.\*

Particular notice is taken of this incident, because it has been argued that this manifestation on the part of the Aragonese to become incorporated with a Castilian board, established merely for economical purposes, amounted to an acquiescence in the privation of their rights and liberties, forcibly effected by Philip II. in 1592. During the reign of Philip V. the estates of Aragon ceased to meet; but it was by deputies from that section being convened to the general assembly, on the principle of convenience and economy. Since that period, the administration of Aragon has been assimilated to that of the Castilian provinces, except in the payment of the provincial rents.

In 1760, Charles III. succeeded to the Spanish crown, and from this period to 1789 no meeting of the Cortes took place; but in that year Charles IV. wishing his son, afterwards Ferdinand VII, to be acknowledged, writs were addressed to the cities having a voice in Cortes, directing them to send up deputies to do homage and take the oath of allegiance to the prince, and also "to treat of other matters, *should they be proposed.*" The representatives of thirty-seven cities and one town accordingly met, Septem-

\* Vide *Leyes de Recopilacion*, vol. iii. lib. 9. tit. 2. autos 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ber 14th, 1789, to the number of seventy-six, and the ceremony of the opening was performed with the usual formalities. A special meeting was afterwards ordered, and the deputies being bound to secrecy, they were told that their concurrence was wished to vary the law of succession as it then stood, by revising law 2, title 5 of the *Partidas*, whereby females succeed to the crown on a par with males. By this most extraordinary stratagem, the proposed measure was carried, and the Cortes petitioned Charles IV. to have a law passed to the effect desired.

To the petition Charles appended the following answer, bearing the date of Madrid, September 30, 1789: "I have adopted the resolution, pursuant to the accompanying petition, enjoining the greatest secrecy to be kept for the present, this being expedient for my service." This reply being communicated to the meeting, a fresh petition was submitted to the king, praying him to adopt the usual formalities, in order that the old law might be observed in preference to the new one. To this the subjoined was returned: "I answer you, that I will ordain those of my council to issue the pragmatic sanction usual in such cases, bearing in mind your petition and the opinions thereon taken." Here the matter ended; the deputies dispersed, and, being bound to secrecy, the whole affair was buried in oblivion. No new law was enacted, and that of Philip V.

continued in force, as may be seen from the several editions of the *Leyes de Recopilacion*, published during the long reign of Charles IV. It afterwards appeared that the monarch wished to be provided with powers to change the rule of succession in favour of his eldest daughter Charlotte, *in case Prince Ferdinand, then sickly, did not survive*. Of this power, unconstitutionally granted and rendered obsolete, Ferdinand VII. forty-four years afterwards availed himself, in order to bar the rights of his brother and secure the throne to the Princess Isabel.

Having now brought our notice of the legislative proceedings of the Cortes down to recent times, it may be interesting, in the way of further illustration, to subjoin some account of their composition, mode of assembling, and ceremonies observed at their opening, in the four principal divisions of the kingdom, without however indulging in any remarks beyond the constitution of Castile. This is the chief section, and its laws have at least practically and in the progress of time superseded those of the rest, with the exception of Navarre; a proof that the several kingdoms are still held together by slender ties. This is a delicate subject; but it ought not to be overlooked. The inhabitants of each section have strong prejudices, and are actuated by local interests, as well as by past examples; and they labour under many of the defects which mark the fede-

rative principle. If, therefore, the bond of union is weak or precarious, it ought to be strengthened. At all events, on a review of the subject it will appear evident that a more general assimilation between the several divisions constituting the monarchy must be effected, not by violence, but by mutual consent and compromise, before tranquillity can rest upon a secure basis.

In Spain, as with us, the king is the fountain of honour—the supreme judge of merit. He holds the prerogative of distributing rewards and appointing to offices; he watches over the administration of justice and the maintenance of order, and is the guardian of the lives and property of his subjects. He declares war and makes peace—the armed force is under his control—he can raise forces at home with the consent of the Cortes, but cannot introduce foreign troops;\* neither can he alter any fundamental law of the land, nor administer justice according to any other forms than those prescribed in the statute-book. Finally, he requires the approbation of the national council as a sanction to his measures, and depends upon the resources supplied to carry them into effect.

In Castile the right of legislation was divided (a peculiarity which we value as one of the ex-

\* Charles I. was obliged to dismiss his Flemish soldiers and courtiers, as our William III. was his Dutch guards, though they had been instrumental in consolidating his throne.

cellences of our own constitution), and till the reign of Charles I. this right was preserved. In other Continental kingdoms the sovereign directed the deliberations of his assistant councils only to such topics as he pleased; but the Castilian Cortes, on the true model of a limited monarchy, called his attention to others, which they deemed essential to public welfare; often addressing him in firm and dignified terms, pointing out the errors of his government, remonstrating against what they considered injurious, and, in cases of wrong, urging redress.

The composition of the Castilian Cortes, as previously remarked, varied in different reigns, particularly as regarded the clergy and nobles, upon whose legislative labours the *Cronicas* are sparing. The period, however, when the commons were admitted into the national assembly, their number, and the part they took in its deliberations, are sufficiently attested. Although the popular deputies were elected by the municipalities or chosen by lot from among the members, they consulted the interests of the other corporations as well as those of their own constituents. They were also under some responsibility. On their return home, it was usual for them to meet their fellow-citizens in the principal church, the market, or the town-hall, where they rendered an account of their stewardship. If they had betrayed their trust, they were



visited with public indignation, which in some instances burst heavily upon the heads of defaulters.

The Castilian Cortes were early distinguished for their independence, and for the important part they took in the affairs of government; a course which produced the most beneficial effects upon society. Robertson, (whose researches into the history of Spain were profound, considering the scanty materials which he possessed compared with those now attainable,) speaking of the reign of Charles V, does not hesitate to say, that “the principles of freedom seem to have been better understood at this period by the Castilians than by any other people in Europe;” adding, “they had acquired more liberal ideas with regard to their own rights and privileges, they had formed more bold and generous sentiments concerning government, and discovered an extent of political knowledge to which the English themselves did not attain until more than a century afterwards.\* Mr. Hallam, too,† observing that the primary and most essential characteristic of a limited monarchy is, that money can only be levied upon the people through the consent of their representatives, adds, — “This principle was thoroughly established in Castile; and the statutes which enforce it, the remonstrances which protest against its violation,

\* Hist. Charles V. book iii.

† State of Europe during the Middle Ages, vol. ii. c. 4.



bear a lively analogy to corresponding circumstances in the history of our own constitution."

The Castilian delegates were sometimes exclusively appealed to for money. They had the right of imposing taxes or otherwise providing for public exigencies, with the nature and extent of which they were made acquainted by the head of the executive. Constitutionally, therefore, the sovereign could not take away any part of the people's substance without previous consent, expressed through their representatives; by which means economy was enforced, and a salutary control exercised over the influence of the crown.\* Direct taxes were seldom agreed to, as being contrary to privileges.†

The Cortes determined the succession to the throne, and had power to alter the ordinary rule. This fact is established by general practice, and recently exemplified by the settlement made in 1713, and by Charles IV's appeal in 1789. In questions regarding regencies, they annulled wills and arrangements made by the deceased sovereign,

\* Ferdinand IV, in 1307, promised to raise no money beyond his legal dues; and Alonzo XI, in 1328, bound himself never to cause any tax to be paid when it was contrary to privileges, without the consent of the Cortes.

† When a specific sum was required of the cities and towns by a vote passed in the Cortes of 1393, the municipality of Murcia replied that this demand was contrary to privileges; but as a proof of their readiness to serve the new monarch (Henry III.) without infringing their charter, they sent up an equivalent in a splendid service of plate.

themselves designating the persons most suitable to act as guardians to the minor.

The justice or expediency of a war about to be undertaken, proposed matrimonial alliances of the royal family,\* treaties with foreign powers,

\* The marriage of Alonzo VIII, A.D. 1169, with Eleanor, eldest daughter of Henry II. of England, was proposed by the Cortes of Burgos; and it is a curious fact, that two of the delegates and two bishops were the ambassadors sent to Guienne, where her royal parents then were, to negotiate this alliance. The particulars are recorded in the *Cronica General*, which, according to Mondejar and several other eminent Spaniards, was written by Alonzo the Wise, great grandson of Alonzo VIII; and the fact is so remarkable, the language so quaint, and the compliments paid to the beauty, amiable qualities, and virtues of the English princess, so delicate, that as a curious specimen of old Spanish the words are copied here. “ En estas Cortes de Burgos (dice) vieron los Concejos et ricos omes del Reyno, que era ya tiempo de casar su Rey : et acordaron de enviar demandar la fija del Rey D. Enrique de Inglaterra, que era de doce años, porque sopieron que era muy ferosa, et muy apuesta de todas buenas costumbres. E en esto acordaron todas que la enviassen pedir á su padre. Et ella avie nombre Doña Leonor ; et los mensageros fueron luego escogidos de los mejores et mas honrados de la Corte ; et estos fueron dos ricos omes, et dos obispos omes buenos et de gran seso, et de muy gran entendimento, bastantes assaz para tal mensageria. Et estos metieronse en camino, et entraron en la mar, et passaron a Inglaterra. E el Rey de Inglaterra, desque sopio aquello porque los mensageros ivan, plogol mucho, et rescibiolos muy bien, et fizoles mucha honra el et sus fijos, que adelante contaremos ; et los mensageros pidieronle su fija para el Rey D. Alfonso su Señor ; et el se la otorgó ; et dioles de sus dones : et enviola con ellos mucho honradamente : et ellos la troxeron con muy gran honra al Rey D. Alfonso á Burgos. Las bodas luego fueron fechas muy ricas et muy honradas ; et fueron luego yuntadas muchas gentes de todas partes de los Rey-

and various other matters of state policy, were also submitted to the consideration of the Cortes : in short, there was scarcely any measure of public importance on which they were not consulted. In the *Recopilacion*, or Statute-book, is a law of

nos de Castiella e de Leon, et de todos los Reynos de España : et fueron fechas muchas nobrezas, et dadas grandes donas. Estas bodas deste nobre Rey D. Alfonso de Castiella et de la nobre Infanta Doña Leonor, fija del Rey de Inglaterra, fueron fechas en la era 1198 años, et andaba entonces el año de la nascencia del Señor en 1168 años." After describing the marriage ceremonies, the queen is thus spoken of:—"Esta nobre Reyna Doña Leonor departe aun la Estoria de sus bienes, et de las sus nobrezas ; et diz que fue palanciana, et asosegada, et muy ferosa, et muy mercendera contra las Ordenes, et mucho limosnera contra los pobres de Dios, muy amare á su marido el Rey, et mucho honradera á todas las gentes cada uno en sus estados. Quien podrie contar las nobrezas, et los compridos bienes que en ella avie."

The marriage was solemnised at Tarazona, and Zurita furnishes the names of the persons sent by Alonzo to Bordeaux to receive the princess ; among whom was the Archbishop of Toledo ; the Bishops of Palencia, Segovia, Burgos, and Calahorra, together with several noblemen. The persons of the princess's suite are also named by him, and consisted of the Bishops of Bordeaux, Poitiers, Angoulême, Perigord, and many English and French nobles. Among the clergy was the Dean of St. Paul's. The festivities were the grandest ever before seen in Spain, partly in compliment to our Henry, who was considered as the mightiest monarch in Christendom, and by the Spanish annalist called *Invictissimo y siempre triunfador*. Many towns in Spain were assigned to the queen as her own patrimony ; among which were Burgos, Tudela, Penafiel, &c. and she also received a grant of one half of all that might be conquered from the Moors. From her own father she received the duchy of Gascony as her dowry, afterwards restored to Edward Prince of Wales, and son of Henry III, by Alonzo the

Alonzo XI, passed in 1328, with this clause :  
“ As, in the arduous affairs of the kingdom, the advice of our subjects is necessary, especially that of the deputies of our cities and towns, we accordingly ordain and command that on such occasions the Cortes shall be assembled and counsel taken of the three estates, as the kings, our ancestors were wont to do.”\*

Throughout the sixteenth century, the Castilian Cortes maintained a degree of firmness and courage really astonishing, when their comparative weakness is considered. On many occasions they fearlessly remonstrated against the arbitrary stretches of power ; and often complained of unconstitutional proceedings on the part of the king, as well as of his officers. They were also the avowed champions of economy and retrenchment. In the best times, they refused fresh subsidies, until assured that those previously granted had been properly expended. In 1559, they remonstrated with Philip II. on his wasteful expenditure, of which earlier examples might be quoted ; and there are repeated instances of the king exhibiting the state of his household expenses before he applied for fresh grants.

Wise, as his sister's dowry, by deed, dated Burgos, May 1, 1254, Eleanor endowed a chapel at Toledo, in honour of Thomas à Becket, almost immediately after her arrival in Spain. She was the mother of Queen Berenguela, renowned in Spanish annals, of whom mention is hereafter made.

\* Tom. i. p. 31, ed. of Philip II.

During the reign of Charles V, the commons cherished the recollection of pledges and charters which they hoped would have secured their liberties, solemnly reminding the destroyer of the nature of those guarantees under which they had been transmitted. By force, or by artifice, the liberties of the Spanish people were gradually taken away, and the power of making, interpreting, and executing the laws, seized by the government. Thus was the balance destroyed; but the people were no parties to this spoliation. They endured, yet did not consent. They felt the privation, though their emotions did not drive them to acts of popular fury. The flame of rational freedom was kept alive by recollections of the past and hopes of the future. They never lost sight of the general interests, and were sensible that their social condition might be ameliorated; but they thought it better to trust to the combinations of the government, than seek redress by means of open insurrection. Till the reign of Charles IV, they were in some measure consoled for the loss of their Cortes by the mild and paternal government of the Bourbons. From 1793 they were at war with France, and consequently had no time for the revival or improvement of civil institutions by any other means than those placed at the disposal of government.

In the following account of the composition of



the Cortes in the four principal divisions of the kingdom, it has been thought necessary to refer to some modern standard of acknowledged authority, in preference to scattered records from various sources. The Royal Academy's definitions of the Cortes of Castile and Navarre, given in the *present* tense, and those of Aragon and Catalonia described in the past, are therefore adopted.\* No authority stands higher. The great object is, to remove doubts by diffusing the light of truth. Ignorance, whether in religion or politics, is a source of turbulence, confusion, and suffering. To no country can this truism be so justly applied as to Spain.

“The Cortes of Castile *are* the assembly of the three estates of the realm, clergy, nobles and

\* *Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana, por la Real Academia*; Madrid, 1817. This academy was founded in 1713 by Philip V, on a plan formed by the Duke de Ascalona, better known as the Marquis de Villena and Viceroy of Naples, a man well versed in the literature of his country. He became acquainted with the leading *savans* of the day, and was an observant traveller. He traced his project for a general academy by following the division of sciences marked out by Lord Verulam. The first labours of this establishment were however confined to the construction of a new dictionary, which in 1817 had gone through five editions. The Academy of History was also established by Philip V, as the Institute says, “for the purpose of purging the national history from the fables which degrade it,” and its labours have been valuable and extensive. The best *Cronicas* have been published by its members, with useful notes. To these two establishments the literature and history of Spain are much indebted.

people, convened by the king to deliberate upon matters of importance. The ecclesiastical estate is composed of the archbishops and bishops, of whom the Archbishop of Toledo is the head. That of the nobility includes the grandees, titulars, and some knights enjoying this hereditary privilege. The people, or commons, are represented by the procurators, or deputies of the kingdoms, cities, and towns having a voice in Cortes; viz. the kingdoms of Burgos, head of Castile, Leon, Granada, Seville, Cordova, Murcia, Jaen, and Toledo. The cities are, Valladolid, Segovia, Salamanca, Avila, Toro, Zamora, Cuenca, Soria, Guadalajara, and the town of Madrid; also, in modern times, Galicia, with the name of a city."

The Cortes being assembled, the king, seated under a canopy and attended by his council and the *camara* of Castile, announces the motive of the meeting; and by his command, the secretary of the *camara* of Castile reads a statement of the matters to be taken into consideration. The competition between Burgos and Toledo follows. The first deputy for Burgos answers in the name of the kingdoms, and asks the king's permission to sit with the president of the council and assistants, to deliberate upon what has been submitted to them. With the royal permission each estate meets separately, and all afterwards agree on a reply by previous communication with each other. The deputies exhibit the burdens and injuries

experienced by the people and pray for remedies. The Cortes end by accomplishing the object for which they were convened; such as taking the oath to the Prince of Asturias as heir to the crown, or other important matters. Before they close, the king is held to make answer to the petitions of the deputies, by adopting corresponding measures. In ancient times, there were some variations.

“ In Aragon, the Cortes *were* the general meeting of the four estates representing the kingdom: first, clergy; second, nobles, anciently called *ricos hombres*; third, the equestrian order; and fourth, the universities or towns. These four branches enjoyed the right of being convened; but this was not always done, as the clergy were not admitted till the year 1301. This branch consisted of the Archbishop of Zaragoza, the bishops of the kingdom, some abbots and priors, the Castellan\* of Amposta, and the head Commander of Montalvan.† Of the nobles and equestrian order, no fixed scale can be given. It is only known that among the first, the heads of the eight privileged

\* *Castellan* is the same as *Castellano*, literally the governor of a castle, and only applied to the head of the order of St. John in Aragon. Amposta is a small town on the right bank of the Ebro, near its mouth, where in former times there was a castellany, or lordship belonging to a castle, with many commanderies and several convents. It is an appendage of the crown of Aragon.

† A small town in Aragon and the district of Alcañiz.

houses were numbered ; and among the second, all the knights, whether convened or not. The women inheriting their husbands' rights could also name attorneys to sit for them, provided they were Aragonese. That of the universities was composed of the syndics of the cities, communities, and towns entitled to vote in Cortes, in which there was great variation. It is however established that, in latter times, this privilege was enjoyed by the cities of Zaragoza, Huesca, Tarazona, Jaca, Barbastro, Calatayud, Daroca, Teruel, Borja, Albarracin ; the town of Alcañiz ; the communities of Calatayud, Daroca, and Teruel ; the towns of Fraga, Montalvan, Monzon, Cariñena, San Estevan de Litera, Tamarite, Magallon, Boléa, Alquezar, Ainsa, Loharre, Mosqueruela, Murillo, Berbegal, Almudevar, Alagon, and Canfranc ; the representatives of which usually took their seats in the order above set down. The *cinco villas*, or five towns, viz. Egéa, Tauste, Uncastillo, Sos and Sadava, formed part of the estate of the nobles.

“ The king only could convene Cortes, which was done by letters. He alone could preside at them ; or some person near of kin, after various protests and reservations,—such as his wife, son, brother, uncle, or son-in-law. The place in which they assemble must have at least four hundred houses, and be within the kingdom. The justiciary of Aragon was the judge over the Cortes,

and executed all the corresponding acts of authority; and among others, that of proroguing them before and after they began, by the king's command. They could only be prorogued for some days; and if the period exceeded forty, they were held as dissolved, as well as when the king absented himself without having prorogued them.

“ The Cortes began by a proposition from the king, in which he explained the motives of their convocation and the services required; when the archbishop replied in the name of the rest. After returning thanks to the king, they conferred among themselves, and endeavoured to close the business in a manner conducive to the service of God and the king, and the welfare of his realm. Each branch deliberated separately, and communicated with each other by means of ambassadors, or through the medium of persons named by the king. When all were agreed, a solemn embassy, composed of two persons from each branch, was sent to the king. The Cortes closed with the ceremony called *celebracion del solio*, as a sanction to all matters agreed upon. These were the Cortes peculiar to Aragon, in which Aragonese only took part. There were however general Cortes, substantially similar, at which Catalonians, Valencians, Majorcans, Minorcans, and, it is believed, Sardinians and Corsicans, assisted.

“ Cortes in Catalonia *were* the general Congress, or legislative body of the principality, convened



by the king, and over which he presided in person. It was composed of the three orders in the state, clergy, nobles and people, there called *brazos*, or *estamentos*, arms,—or estates. The first consisted of the Archbishop of Tarragona, acting as president; eight suffragan bishops, twenty-two mitred abbots, the syndics of the nine cathedral churches, and the Grand Prior and Castellan of Amposta, of the order of St. John. The second consisted of the Duke de Cardona, president, and all counts, viscounts, barons, nobles, titulars, and knights beyond the age of twenty. The third was formed of the syndics of the cities of Barcelona, Gerona, Lerida, Tortosa, Cervera, Balaguer, and twenty-four royal towns entitled to a seat. In the Cortes held at Barcelona by Peter III. in 1283, the commons were admitted; and from that period, agreeably to the constitution of the principality, amounting to a social contract between the sovereign and the nation, each king is bound to take the oath on his accession, otherwise he is not to be acknowledged or proclaimed.

“ The Cortes of Navarre *embrace* the three estates, clergy, nobles or military orders, and the republics or universities. The first consists of the Bishop of Pamplona, president; the Prior of Roncesvalles, the Grand Prior of the order of St. John, the Dean of the church of Tudela, the Vicar-general of the bishopric of Pamplona when a native, and the Abbots of Irache, Oliva, Leire, Iranzu,

Fitero, Urdax, and Marcilla. The nobles are persons of this class having a vote in Cortes, over whom the perpetual constable, Count de Lerin, presides, and in his absence the perpetual marshal, Marques de Cortes. The republics or universities are represented by delegates from cities and towns over whom those from Pamplona preside.

“To convene the Cortes of Navarre, the king issues a decree, declaring his resolution to hold general Cortes, therein to treat of and determine matters connected with his service and the public good. For this purpose he usually confers his powers on the viceroy, as his representative, who hands them to the deputation of the kingdom, and, if found conformable to the provisions of the law, they are returned to the viceroy, who fixes the place, day, and hour for what is called *la apertura del solio*, the opening of the throne, with which the Cortes commence. The viceroy assists with the twelve legates of the kingdom, four belonging to each estate, with the prothonotary and king-at-arms in front, when the royal powers and writs are read, together with the proposition submitted by the viceroy.”

The preceding outline of the progressive formation and proceedings of the Cortes down to their assembly in 1789, though perhaps imperfect, will be found sufficiently correct and explicit to establish the *fact* that the Spaniards possessed, from very early times, a constitution adapted to their

manners and habits—a constitution preserved in their history, registered in their statute-books, stored up in their memories, and, with some judicious alterations and modifications, fully capable of being applied to modern times and exigencies. And yet some would have it believed that Spain possessed *no* constitution till one was framed at Cadiz in 1812; whilst others go so far as to assume that the Spaniards have hitherto been without laws or government, and that the task of legislating for them exclusively devolves upon those who lately seized the helm of state!

On the contrary, it will be seen that from the time of the Goths, the Spaniards have been accustomed to take part in the administration of public affairs, to deliberate and decide upon matters of state policy, and to exercise a control over those appointed to govern them. Indeed no one who examines the numerous records still remaining of the ancient legislature of Spain, or reflects on the free and independent spirit of the people, tempered by sincere devotion and fidelity to the reigning prince, will venture to affirm that the Spaniards had no constitution; or that the functions of the Cortes were undefined and their labours useless. Nor are modern Spaniards sunk so low as not to appreciate the value of the legacy bequeathed to them by their forefathers. In the opinion of the great majority, no comparison can be conceived more fraught with humiliation and regret than

that which they have had an opportunity of forming between the new and old institutions.

The Spaniards had the advantage of early and good instructors in the art of government, from whom they copied all that was useful. Their first rulers, chosen by universal suffrage for their distinguished courage, virtues, and prudence, bore the character of indulgent masters; and it is evident from the deeds achieved by the followers of Pelayo, that, in the infancy of the monarchy, approved worth diffused its salutary influence among all orders of the community. The necessary bond of union could not otherwise have been established. In an age of simplicity, few regulations were wanted to enforce subordination and secure right. The abuses of power at length led to the necessity of written laws, defining the duties of all, calculated alike to check the selfishness of the ruler and the irregular passions of the ruled.

As the social sphere enlarged, additional institutions were devised, and their improvement left to the operation of time. In this manner the Iberian constitutions were brought to the standard which they had reached towards the commencement of the fourteenth century, the date at which the exemplifications above given of the practice of the Cortes commence. The multiplicity of records would render the task of carrying the research beyond that period extremely laborious, and it has not been thought advisable to trust

to the judgment of commentators. Sufficient, however, has been adduced to show that although the four great sections of the kingdom had separate and independent constitutions, each differing from the other in minor points, they were all based upon the same general principles.

A leading feature in all of them was, that the approbation of the estates preceded the formation of a law, without which formality no new measure could constitutionally become a fixed rule. They were all equally favourable to the liberties of the subject. With the exception of Aragon and Navarre, those liberties however did not rest so much upon a specific bill of rights, as upon declarations, made at various periods by the sovereigns, and immunities granted to cities and towns, not as mere emanations of royal favour, but as rewards for services performed—immunities which each new monarch was expected to confirm when he first met his subjects in parliament.

Jealous as the Spaniards have always shown themselves of their rights and liberties—possessing a constitution capable, if properly administered, of conferring substantial benefits, and easily roused into action by the illegal or injudicious exercise of power, it appears astonishing that they endured with such apathy the loss of their institutions; particularly as *Major hæreditas venit unicuique nostrum à jure et legibus quam à parentibus*, was a maxim well known to their civilians. Generally



speaking, they are not experimentalists ; yet, strange as the assertion may appear, there is more *real* republicanism in Spain than in any other part of Europe, except Switzerland. The Basque provinces and Navarre, as will be hereafter shown, practise in their internal concerns republicanism in all its purity ; at the same time acknowledging that, situated as they are, the hand of a monarch alone can adequately protect them.

The Spaniards have long been convinced that they could not exist as a nation under any other form of government than a monarchy. They are further sensible that to govern such a country as theirs, the king must have great physical and moral power. Were it otherwise, he could not be a bond of union between so many discordant elements. Hence it is their interest that his power should be great, and his influence extensive. Their loyalty and devotion to the reigning prince are unbounded ; a feeling much strengthened by the misfortunes of Louis XVI. and the other members of the Bourbon family. Since the accession of a new dynasty, the Spaniards have felt towards their sovereign that implicit confidence—that sincere love and reverential awe which never actuate the breast of one who is under the fear of either injustice or oppression. The dread of the calamities which befel their country during the war of the communities, the horror of the subversive principles let loose by the French

revolution, and their own natural discretion, repressed the feelings of indignation excited by the errors of Godoy's administration, and checked the ebullitions of popular resentment to which another direction was afterwards given.

Let the acts of the *soi-disant* liberals be tried by those tests preserved in the history of Spain, almost every page of which reminds us of the Juntas, Councils, or Cortes, in which at first the officers of state, aided by the bishops, discussed the public interests, and provided for the public wants. This form of government was imperfect, yet legal, and as such was respected and cheerfully obeyed. Being found inadequate to the ends which civil associations propose to themselves, owing to the want of a popular representation, delegates at a more advanced period were added, and by this means the inclinations of the clergy and nobles to high pretensions checked. While yet the remnant of the Gothic nobles found shelter in the mountains of Covadonga,\* it is

\* As a proof of the enthusiasm with which the Spaniards regard everything connected with their early history and institutions, the following may be taken. The great Pelayo died in 737, and was buried in the church of St. Eulalia de Velamio, in the Asturian district of Cangas; and in the same tomb the body of his wife Gaudiosa was interred. Alonzo the Wise caused a small temple to be constructed on the summit of the Covadonga mountains, where the Spaniards had sheltered themselves from the Saracens, and thither the bodies of Pelayo and his spouse were conveyed. This spot was for ages visited with

presumable that the institutions retained much of their primitive character, and that even in those secluded regions, and amidst the cares of a pressing war, they acquired some development, by the new compacts entered into when Pelayo and his associates were chosen leaders, and commissioned to re-conquer the country from the Moors.

According to Ambrosio de Morales, these chieftains covenanted with their retainers that the crown should be elective—that the king should adjudge to the state all that he might re-conquer—that the state should be one and undivided—that the king should have no power to take away the property of his subjects by force, nor to judge

profound veneration, and for its historical associations much esteemed. In 1775 the building was destroyed by fire ; an occurrence deeply regretted by the Asturians, as well as in every other part of Spain. Charles III. formed the noble project of rebuilding it on a more magnificent scale, and the architect Ventura Rodriguez was chosen to carry his commands into effect. Jovellanos, whose researches in his native province of Asturias reflect so much credit upon his memory, thus describes the erection of this interesting monument :—"Rodrigues flew to Asturias, penetrated into the Auseban ridges, and there, whilst contemplating one of those grand scenes in which Nature sometimes delights to display her majesty, he is inflamed with a thirst for glory, and prepares to contend with surrounding difficulties. He has before him a rent mountain half hidden in the clouds, at the bottom of which flows a torrent, denying access—a deep and narrow defile—overhanging rocks—blocks of mouldering granite, with streams gushing from the interstices, and indicating the mass of water collected within—trees which for ages had resisted the winter's blast—ruins, caverns,

them unless with the concurrence of twelve elders of the land ;—that these judges were to be natives of the province to which the culprit belonged—that without their advice the king should not declare war, make peace, or enter into alliances.\* Such were the constitutive elements of that confederation which afterwards became the nucleus of a great monarchy ; and although these covenants were not then sanctioned by an award of the Cortes, they were nevertheless held binding, and considered as the basis of those civil rights which the Spaniards possessed long before their neighbours. Conquests and progressive civilization recalled the councils, or Cortes, and gradually

and precipices ;—such were the obstacles which he had to overcome. Nothing daunted his courage, or wearied his perseverance. On a spot which man was almost forbidden to tread, by removing rocks and filling up chasms he forms a wide and majestic platform, approached by an easy ascent ; on one side he hangs a bridge to connect the lower mountain, and in the centre builds a substantial square pantheon, in the interior of which he raises a monument to the memory of the great Pelayo, and on the top erects a magnificent temple, in the form of a rotunda, with a handsome vestibule and cupola, supported by isolated columns. This building he enriches with a beautiful tabernacle and adorns it with embellishments of the choicest Grecian order. What a wonderful contrast does this masterpiece of art present, amidst all that nature can boast of wild, secluded, and appalling !”

\* This compact must have been made towards the year 720. Is not then this the earliest instance of trial by jury on record ;—at least earlier than that of our Alfred, which corresponds to a period subsequent to the year 900 ?

the people acquired the benefit of representation ; first in local assemblies, or municipalities, and next in the general congress.

Thus were the three orders in the state established, and the basis of a regular form of government laid, in which the sovereign served as the intermediate or balancing power. Improvements followed practice ; but, taking the history of the Spanish Cortes only from the commencement of the fourteenth century, and consulting merely the few elucidations which it has been possible to adduce, it will appear evident that the people whose alleged oppression is, contrary to their wishes, made the plea for modern innovations and organic changes, through their delegates remonstrated against irregularities in the palace, wasteful expenditure, the excessive number of *employés*, the negligence of ministers, malversation of public funds, want of economy, defects in the administration of justice, arrogance and encroachments of the nobles, abuses of all kinds—in short, against everything that interfered with established right, or operated to the detriment of the public good.

These remonstrances, it is true, bore the humble character of petitions ; but the prayer which they embodied, although expressed with becoming respect, was not the less firm and pointed, often partaking of that indomitable energy of character



—that severe and masculine vigour which distinguished the Spaniards previous to the accession of the Austrian dynasty. However strong the language, no instance is on record of offence having been given, and the petitions were always sent back with a marginal reply written upon each.\* For centuries this mode answered the ends of government, and the popular representation was as effective as times and circumstances would allow. If it declined, it was owing to the gradual abolition of the admirable institutions by which the municipalities were regulated. According to the ancient ordinances, and particularly the *Leyes de Foro*, the assemblies appointed for municipal purposes consisted of a mayor, aldermen, jurats and elders, annually elected;† by which means a fair representation was obtained—at least sufficiently so to answer the wants and satisfy the wishes of the country. From the accession of the Austrian dynasty, the foreign wars in which the Spaniards became involved, pressed so heavily upon the resources of the country, that almost every situation

\* The originals were preserved among the government records, with a leaden seal appended to each, and copies, made by the chancery, duly attested and sealed with wax, afterwards furnished to the several cities and towns, under a guarantee that if any order was issued contrary to the rule therein established, it was to be *obeyed, but not carried into execution*.

† *Alcaldes, regidores, jurados y ciudadanos cadañeros*—Mayors, aldermen, jurats and citizens, or common-councilmen annually chosen.

of trust or emolument was offered for sale, or bestowed upon favourites.

By this means the municipal offices in many instances became hereditary, and the people lost that share which they were accustomed to have in the national representation, which fell into the hands of nobles, or became the patrimony of powerful families.\* The good effect of civil privileges, gained by sacrifices and prized as the best protection to life, property, and free-agency, was in this manner destroyed, and the respect for public opinion, which had always operated as a check upon the acts of the king and his ministers, ceased to have any influence. Then it was that the tendency of power to corrupt became most conspicuous. That harmony between the three orders of the state which had enabled the Spaniards to perform so many great and daring deeds also disappeared, each being actuated by a separate, if not opposite interest. The clergy, as it were forgetting that they formed a component part of the population, devoted themselves so entirely to the objects of their institution and the amassing of wealth, that they became an isolated body, having few sympathies with the other orders; while the nobles, unmindful of their origin and feeling no stimulus

\* From this abuse the *regidoratos* and *veinticuatrias* had their origin. The possession of these offices gave the right of wearing an uniform, which was also an attraction.

to exertion, sunk into the slothful enjoyment of pleasure, under the protection of their exemptions. The people, or the *estado llano*, were thus left to bear the burdens and carry on the drudgery of the public cause, disregarded by the two rival orders, and without any adequate remuneration to compensate their efforts.

Still this change, which only dates from the beginning of the sixteenth century, was not attributable to defects in the constitution; but rather to the abuses of power, and the establishment of an oligarchy, which ended in a species of tyranny, hitherto unknown in the annals of Spain, founded on a false and empty pride, gradually growing into insolence, outrage, and oppression. The Spaniards felt their altered condition, and assigned their misfortunes to the right causes. Even the *comuneros* of Castile did not demand new systems or new laws. Their complaints were directed against abuses of a modern kind. They rose and flew to arms because they were no longer able to endure the arbitrary conduct of the Flemish rulers, sent to insult them—because they were exposed to depredations, and had been deprived of those safeguards which the laws afforded as a protection to their liberties. They confederated, not with a view to pull down the edifice of the constitution, but rather to restore it to that state to which it had been brought through the wisdom and experience

of their ancestors. A redress of grievances was the real motive of their rebellion. They claimed the restitution of civil and corporate rights, intimately connected with the constitution, and so inseparably bound with it, that together they considered those rights must either stand or fall.

Not so the liberals of the day. By the following outline of their political history at Cadiz, it will be seen that they constituted themselves into a legislative faction, and by a short bill repealed the whole statute-book. All its provisions they cancelled by one sweeping measure—by a simple declaration that they were the only source of power, and consequently that all laws hitherto enacted, no matter by whom, should be null, void, and of no effect; adding further, that the laws so annulled should be replaced by others of their framing. They preferred their own projects to the revival and gradual improvement of that constitution which the great body of the people held as indispensable to the honour, dignity, and safety of the state. Nothing escaped their immolating hands; and by a system of legislation, of which they were the inventors, at the same time that they appealed to ancient precedents, a moderate monarchy as established by law was converted into a fierce democracy: for such it will appear was the result of their labours, if the theory of the Cadiz Code, in reference to its operation, is regarded. All char-

ters by them were treated as waste parchment—all rights therein established at once extinguished. In an old and prejudiced country, abounding with privileged orders, they rushed into all the follies of republican *liberalism*.

From 1820 to 1823, they again persisted in their old errors, and convulsed the country in pursuit of a phantom. A third time they have risen into power, and although the Cadiz Constitution is dropped, thanks to royalist perseverance and a new name given to its substitute, the object of the liberals and the ends by which they seek to obtain it are by no means dissimilar.

The same men who figured in 1812 and 1820 now hold the reins of government, or move its springs. There is scarcely a new face among the reformers, now called Queenites. The scene is in Madrid, instead of Cadiz; and there the old performers, in new dresses, are strutting and fretting away their little hour, in pranks of power, in lawgiving, and in proscriptions. In consequence of encouragement experienced from abroad, they have acquired an energy equal to the parts which they are severally playing, and we see them equally eager to push the work of legislation, without a greater chance of their labours being accepted. They care nothing for the words of warning addressed to them in 1814 and 1823. The theatre is re-opened, and the political drama



proceeds. The two first acts developed the plot and made the audience acquainted with the merits of the performers;—undismayed by previous failures, they are rapidly proceeding with the third, and the catastrophe must come.

## CHAPTER I.

Godoy's Rise. — His erroneous Policy. — Dissensions in the Royal Family. — The Invasion of 1808. — Prince Ferdinand charged with Treason. — A characteristic Trait of Don Carlos. — Plots and Counterplots. — Scenes at the Escorial and Aranjuez. — The Guards and Manchegans. — Attempted Flight of Charles IV. — An Affray. — Sympathies. — Spanish Gravity during a tumult. — Godoy's life saved by an incident. — Commotion at Madrid.

THE calamities which befel Spain at the commencement of the present century are chiefly attributable to the errors and ambition of the favourite Godoy, who, in 1787, was a simple *garde du corps*, and, in 1792, a lieutenant-general, an admiral, a duke, a knight of the Golden Fleece, and minister of foreign affairs. At a moment when men of talent and experience were most required to guide the public councils, the Counts de Aranda and Florida Blanca had been dismissed to make room for an obscure upstart. Godoy placed his country at the disposal of France against the wishes of Charles IV, and, when too late, sought to oppose the imperious demands of the jacobins of Paris. He incurred their anger; and the easy advance of the French army to Miranda de Ebro,

in 1794, suggested to Napoleon, only a few years afterwards, the idea of marching to Madrid, and led him to suppose that Spain was then equally unprepared for resistance.

While so many living witnesses can be yet appealed to, it is singular that attempts should be made to palliate, if not defend the conduct of Godoy, by the publication of his *Memoirs*.\* The current of public opinion cannot be changed by efforts of this kind. The treaty of Basle was the first humiliation to which Spain was condemned under the administration of Godoy: that of

\* The author does not wish to insinuate that Don Manuel de Godoy was badly advised when he determined to publish his *Memoirs*. Quite the contrary. No man was ever more assailed than the "Prince of the Peace," and he was right to endeavour to extricate himself from the imputations cast upon him; but, the question is, has he succeeded in rebutting the graver charges? In his attempt to defend himself he has, however, rendered a public service. Europe is indebted to him for the production of a large mass of important information, which otherwise could not have appeared in so authentic and complete a form. No one else possessed such a collection of records, and the value of the present makes the reader forget the source from which it comes. As far as foreigners are concerned, the acquisition obliterates the remembrance of the minister's errors, the consequences of which cannot now be repaired, as it completes the series of administrative acts and social reforms, commenced under the Count de Aranda, continued by Count de Florida Blanca, and afterwards by Godoy; who, however, is not to be compared with his predecessors in point of talent. With the result of their labours we had already been made acquainted; but there was a void in that portion of Spanish history, connected with the events which happened towards the close of last century, which is now

St. Ildefonso, negotiated in the following year, proved still more ignominious. He thereby not only acknowledged the legitimacy of the French republic, but also concluded with it an offensive and defensive alliance, among other things binding Spain to furnish a fleet provisioned for six months. Charles IV, a Bourbon, and a Catholic king, thus became the ally of jacobins and atheists—an associate with the murderers of Louis XVI. Through this disgraceful treaty, Spain in the sequel lost her fleet,\* her commerce, her colonies, and nearly her independence. The insi-

filled up. Florida Blanca himself, in writing the apology for his own administration, furnished an interesting picture of the reign of Charles III; and Godoy, imitating his example, although not impelled by motives quite so high, has given a delineation of the principal occurrences which marked that of Charles IV, and the English reader will feel disposed to pardon that animosity on the part of a fallen minister which he evinces towards us.

\* According to the *Estado General de la Real Armada*, published by authority in 1801, the royal navy of Spain, in the three marine departments of Cadiz, Ferrol, and Carthagena, then consisted as follows:—Ships of the line, sixty-four; frigates, forty-two; corvettes, nine; xebèques, seven; store-ships, thirteen; brigs, forty-one; packet-boats, eight; cutters, twelve; schooners, twenty-one. According to the same official publication for the year 1817, the royal navy then was—Ships of the line, armed, one; disarmed, nineteen: frigates, armed, seven; disarmed, nine; corvettes, armed, eight; disarmed, two: store-ships, one: xebèques, one: brigs, armed, fifteen; disarmed, three: packet-boats, armed, one; disarmed, one: cutters, armed, three: schooners, armed, twenty-three; disarmed, nineteen.

dious and cautious manner in which the invasion by Napoleon was prepared, as well as the means and instruments by which it was accomplished, are too well remembered to require repetition. There are, however, some occurrences connected with the present inquiry and only imperfectly known to us, to which attention ought to be directed.

Godoy's influence over the mind of Charles IV. would scarcely be credited, if so many proofs of the melancholy fact did not exist. In a country where the distinctions of birth are more powerful than in any other, uneducated and from comparative obscurity, the favourite suddenly rose to the highest honours.\* Placed on an eminence

\* Godoy was first noticed at court as a good player upon the guitar, and singer of *seguidillas graciosas y picantes*. His person, when young, was graceful, and his manners attractive. His first advancement was to the rank of *exento* in the Spanish Body Guards, inferior to *alferez* and higher than brigadier in the regular army, corresponding to a colonel of cavalry. He commands one of the brigades into which, by the peculiar organisation of this corps, the companies are divided, and his duty is never to quit the side of the individual of the royal family whom it is his duty to guard. After this appointment, honours showered down upon him. In order that envy might not be excited among the courtiers and the nobility, in consequence of the Godoy family being drawn from obscurity, it was semi-officially announced that he descended from the Gothic kings. The cunning Florida Blanca seeing that the favourite would soon tread upon his heels, told the king that it would be advisable to send young Godoy to travel, in order to improve those superior abilities with which nature had gifted him, this being the only means of forming a statesman. The idea pleased the king; but Florida Blanca did not long afterwards retain the seals of office.



which no individual before attained, he was still ambitious of ascending higher. Looking forward with apprehension to the accession of the Prince of Asturias, the wily courtier solicited and obtained the king's niece in marriage, though he was wedded to another by whom he had children. Charles felt anxious to withdraw into private life, wearied out with the turmoils into which he had been dragged. Aware of his wishes and plans, Godoy endeavoured to secure the regency for himself, and with this view submitted queries to the Council of Castile. The latter energetically replied, that the prince, to whom an oath of allegiance had been taken, was of age to ascend the throne, in case his father retired.

From that moment, the Prince of Asturias and the Infante Don Carlos became objects of hatred to Godoy. Fearing their opposition and unable to succeed in his last design, he threw himself into the arms of Napoleon, and asked his protection. The treaty of Fontainebleau sealed this alliance. An army of twenty-five thousand Spanish infantry and three thousand horse were placed at his new master's disposal; a service for which the aspiring premier was to receive the sovereignty of Algarve and Alemtejo. Spain was thus literally sold to her enemy; the delivery only remained to be completed. Here difficulties arose which it required caution to surmount. Napoleon stood in awe of the national character of the Spaniards,

who, he was well aware, were formidable so long as the royal family remained at their head. He had calculated chances for some time before, and the flattering reports of his agents encouraged him to carry his schemes into execution. Still he could not divest himself of the idea, that local circumstances were exactly the same as when Henry IV. said, "Spain was a country where a weak army must be beaten and a strong one starved."

The revolting scènes which followed are on record. French legions were already within the Spanish territory, under pretext of marching against Portugal, when the expedient of charging the Prince of Asturias with treason was devised. The court was then at the Escorial, eight leagues from Madrid, and no apprehensions were entertained of a popular commotion in his favour. Godoy's intended victim was arrested, and guards were placed within his apartment.\* The confu-

\* The arrest took place under the following circumstances. In the evening of the 27th of October, and whilst the prince was riding out, one of Godoy's coadjutors entered his apartment, it being supposed that on that day the prince had received a letter from his ex-preceptor, Escoiquiz, inclosing one from Napoleon, and, breaking open his desk, seized his private papers. On his return from shooting, these papers were mysteriously handed to Charles IV. as proof of his son's guilt, and the good old man was induced to believe that a plot was really hatching to dethrone him, by means of foreign aid, at the head of which was the prince. The king's jealousies and enmities being thus preyed upon, and his angry disposition roused, he ordered the

sion to which an incident of this kind gave rise at the royal country residence, may be well imagined. The Infante Don Carlos, who had been exposed to the same persecutions as the prince, flew to his father's room, and, disregarding his violent temper, urged his brother's innocence, courageously denouncing his arrest as part of a plot to create dissensions among the royal family. The Infante Don Antonio, the king's brother, joined in his entreaties; whilst the demonstrations made by the guards, as well as by the Jeromite monks of the Escorial convent, clearly indicated the effect which this event would produce upon the public mind.

arrest of his son and changed his attendants, some of whom were confined, and among them the Duke del Infantado. The charge against the prince was however dropped, for prudential reasons; but, early in November, a commission, composed of the president of the Council of Castile, and Counsellors Campomanes and Torres, was named to try his supposed accomplices; who, after a full investigation, were all honourably acquitted. The seized papers produced in evidence, were a draft of a remonstrance, in the prince's handwriting, respectfully addressed to his father, complaining of Godoy's irregularities and urging his dismissal; another paper, disapproving of his marriage with one of the blood royal; a money-order from the Duke del Infantado; some pencil drawings; cyphers with keys to them, and old letters of no moment. It however did appear that the prince had consulted Napoleon on a marriage project, for which he was blamed. French agents were implicated in this diabolical conspiracy; and if it had succeeded, the Infante Don Carlos was to have been the next victim. This affair brought vengeance down upon the head of the president, who, when Bonaparte reached Madrid, was seized and sent a prisoner to Paris, where he died in the prison hospital.

On the 28th, the papers were handed over to the Marquez Cavallero, minister of grace and justice; and on the following day a meeting of all the high functionaries was held, and the papers were read. D. Arias Antonio Mon, *ad interim* president of the Council of Castile, expressed his belief that there was no criminality in the prince's conduct; adding, that, at all events, he had a right to be tried and confronted with his accusers. This energetic demonstration sufficed to defeat the whole conspiracy.

The firmness displayed by the two infantes and the president of the Council of Castile, checked the king's impetuosity and caused him to pause. Godoy's master-plot was thus disconcerted; but he retained, even to the last, his hold on the king's confidence. The spirited part which the Infante Don Carlos took in this affair endeared him to his admiring countrymen, and throughout the whole of that tremendous drama, of which this was only the opening scene, he behaved with equal promptitude and devotion. Fresh trials, however, awaited both princes. Napoleon changed his tactics, and giving up Godoy, whose downfall after the late failure became inevitable, instructed his agents to make the most they could of the altered position of Prince Ferdinand. Godoy saw the storm gathering round his head, and convening a meeting of influential persons, such as he never before dreamt of consulting, he sub-

mitted the state of affairs to them, concealing nevertheless the principal causes which had placed the country in so frightful a situation.

It was then, for the first time, that the infatuated favourite heard the language of truth, and became sensible of his errors. After a stormy debate, it was agreed that no other alternative remained than to arm the nation *en masse*, and place the prince at the head of public affairs. However galling to his pride and destructive of his hopes, Godoy acquiesced in the plan, but deferred its execution, only sending off expresses to the Spanish commanders where French troops were stationed, to promote desertion and obstruct their movements by every occult means in their power. In the mean while, Isquierdo reached Madrid from Paris, and alighting at Godoy's house, informed him that Napoleon had resolved to seize upon Spain, that everything was ready, and that resistance would be fruitless; adding, that the royal family would do well to retire to Mexico, as the Prince Regent of Portugal had done to Brazil.

This information increased Godoy's embarrassments; but he agreed that Isquierdo should next morning accompany him to Aranjuez, whither the royal family had removed, in order that the whole might be submitted to the king. In the evening, Godoy called another meeting of the persons before alluded to, and laid before them



the report brought by Isquierdo, when it was given as their unanimous opinion that the royal family should withdraw to Andalusia, the ports be opened to England, and every inch of ground disputed. Isquierdo's\* venality being well known, it was suggested that precautions ought to be adopted, in order to conceal from him the ulterior determination that might be taken in consequence of his arrival. He was, however, considered a fit instrument to persuade the king to proceed to the south, and Godoy was again reminded of the necessity of placing the prince at the head of the army.

The same night the disposable forces in the capital were ordered to march towards La Mancha and Estremadura; but no other important step was taken. The next morning Godoy and Isquierdo proceeded to Aranjuez in the same carriage, where the accounts brought from Paris were laid before the king. It is believed that Charles IV's confidence in Napoleon was not staggered by Isquierdo's recital; whilst others, at the time in the palace, contend that the conclusion drawn after the interview was, that Isquierdo had been purposely sent to act a part in the eventful drama then preparing. Certain it is, that on descending

\* Isquierdo was the Spanish consul-general and Godoy's private agent in Paris. He was also the negotiator of the treaty of Fontainebleau, jointly with General Duroc, concluded Oct. 27th, 1807.

the palace staircase, he threw himself into a post-chaise waiting for him, and did not stop till he reached Paris, where, in all probability, he received a recompense proportioned to his service.

The eyes of the whole country were now fixed upon Madrid, the occurrences at the Escorial having excited intense interest. Everybody exultingly anticipated Godoy's removal and disgrace. Perceiving so evident a change in public opinion, perhaps provided with suitable instructions, the French agents suddenly gave out that their troops were coming to dislodge the unworthy favourite, by raising the prince to the head of the government. The movement of the French in the direction of Madrid produced the long-expected crisis. It now became necessary to act, no other alternative being left. The beautiful town of Aranjuez, situated on the banks of the Tagus, seven leagues from Madrid, was filled with Manchegans, who were obliged to sleep in the streets and public walks.\* Although the place was

\* This is a spring residence, and perhaps the most beautiful of the four belonging to the royal family. The gardens are superb; but they, as well as the interior of the palace, were exposed to a barbarous devastation during the war of independence. Ferdinand VII, during the last years of his reign, spent large sums of money on the embellishment of this place of recreation, the favourite haunt of Charles IV. The town, built in a semicircular form, and capable of accommodating twenty thousand persons, also suffered greatly in consequence of the ravages of the war. The erection of the palace was after the designs of Juan de Herrera, and not Viñola, as some travellers have asserted.

thronged to excess, a mournful silence prevailed ; but every countenance was marked with rancour and distrust. It seemed to be the eve of an awful visitation, from the fatal consequences of which an Omnipotent hand alone could save them. The French ambassador, constantly changing his dress, was seen moving rapidly from one point to another, immersed in intrigues. So great was the disgust felt at his appearance as he passed the groups of Manchegans enveloped in their cloaks, that a single word from one in the prince's confidence would have produced a catastrophe of the most terrific kind.

The palace gardens were constantly crowded with spectators, all looking anxiously forward to a *dénouement* in which each was so deeply interested ; yet no one ventured to ask a question at the gates. Attempts had been made beforehand to divide the household troops, so as to render them as unfavourable to the prince as possible. It was in fact thought by the officers themselves that their opinions were divided, when an incident proved that the unanimity among them was much greater than they imagined. Some officers of the Spanish guards clashed with others of the *gardes du corps*, when, without any explanation, each party drew their swords, a contest ensued, and two were left wounded on the ground. The assailants virulently reproached the others with a want of attachment to the prince ; a charge in-

stantly repelled in the most indignant terms. It was then ascertained that Godoy's intrigues had been ineffectual, and, for the first time, the severity depicted upon the countenances of the Manchegan peasants relaxed.

Beauharnois now perceived that no other chance was left than to precipitate the favourite by exciting a commotion, in which he hoped to see the elder branch of the royal family involved. Godoy trembled, smitten by his conscience, and not unmindful that the people surrounding the palace thirsted for his blood. No language can adequately describe what passed in the interior of the royal residence. The functionaries stood aghast, no one venturing to offer advice to the king, or transmit a single mandate to the provinces. Every one seemed spell-bound; yet nobody slept, day or night. The prince and his brother occupied the same room, dreading to show themselves, well aware that if they unsuccessfully made the smallest demonstration, their death-warrants were signed; or, in case they placed themselves at the head of the guards and Manchegans, they felt equally apprehensive that a general massacre must be the result, in which innocent and guilty might indiscriminately perish.

Charles IV. suddenly ordered the travelling-coaches to be ready to take the Toledo road at eleven in the night of the 17th March (1808), and that the guards, commanded by Colonel

Godoy, the favourite's brother,\* should hold the people in check, and follow the next day, escorting the valuables, archives, and servants; the instructions adding, that they were to meet at Toledo or Talavera, where the troops under the command of the Marquis del Socorro were arriving from Portugal. This order the French ambassador studiously interpreted so as to induce a belief that the Prince of Asturias and the Infante Don Carlos would be either murdered or forever separated from the Spanish people. The guards and Manchegans took the alarm, resolved to accompany the royal *cortége*, and, in case of foul play, to defend the prince and kill Godoy. With this view, at nightfall drummers and trumpeters were posted near the palace and on the points leading to the road fixed upon, to make signal if any movement occurred. Whilst the preparations went on for the king and queen's departure, the prince and his brother remained in a state of painful anxiety as to their own fate, no official communication respecting the proposed journey having been sent to them. They, however, privately learnt from an individual near the king's person that they were to be left behind—a fact of which the people were totally ignorant: had it been otherwise, things most probably would have

\* D. Diego Godoy, in 1794, during the short war with the French, attained the rank of lieutenant-general, and at the time here alluded to was colonel of the guards.



taken a different turn. Godoy's fears hastened the moment of departure, and the coaches drew up at a quarter past ten. Scarcely had their majesties reached the first step of the staircase, when clarions were heard sounding "bridles on" and drums beating alarm. Godoy was seized with terror, and the royal party returned to their rooms, more dead than alive. A pause ensued; and after some inquiries, they again attempted to descend the staircase; and again were the clarions heard, shriller and with longer notes than before. The prince and the infante then left their apartment, and throwing themselves at the feet of their parents, implored them to suspend their journey that night.\* The occurrences of this evening,

\* It was at the time stated and very generally believed, that on this occasion a warm altercation took place between the prince and Godoy, when the latter reproached the former for having a separate interest in the state. Nothing of the kind occurred. Godoy was too much perplexed and confounded to utter a word in the presence of one whom he had so deeply injured. In his own mind he doubtless attributed to the prince the late demonstrations on the part of the guards and Manchegans, erroneously, it may be well imagined; but ever since the affair of the Escorial he stood in awe of the prince, as well as of the Infante Don Carlos, whose fearless denunciations of his duplicity paved the way for his downfall. The accounts of the early occurrences in Spain were at the time chiefly derived from French sources, and consequently were much distorted. The particulars embodied in this chapter are derived from high authority—an eye-witness who stood in a prominent position—and their accuracy has been ascertained on the spot, as well as by the testimony of other persons who took part in some of the passing events.

however, convinced Godoy that the prince was sustained by the people and the guards, if not by the French ambassador, as well as by the Infantes Don Carlos and Don Antonio.

Whilst these scenes passed in the palace, the Royal Spanish and Walloon Guards were drawn out in front of the barracks, with their knapsacks on and everything ready for a march, though before they had received very different orders. Colonel Godoy, the new commander, more daring than his brother, learning the king's first return to his apartment, hastened to the barracks, and unexpectedly finding the guards extended in line, placed himself at their head, and gave the word of command—"On to the palace." The several battalions remained immovable. The colonel turned round, lost in amazement; but, recovering himself and raising his *baton*, uttered an angry reproach, conveyed in a single word of much meaning, and was about to proceed, when a private of the grenadier guards rushed forward, and, with the butt-end of his musket, struck him down from his horse. He was taken up in a state of frantic madness, uttering execrations and vowing vengeance, till secured in the guard-house. During the whole of this affair not a single soldier except the one mentioned quitted his ranks, and amidst the general agitation so much serenity was never witnessed among men who, for the

moment, had, as it were, the destinies of Spain in their hands.

The sound of trumpets and beat of drums, followed by the scenes at the barracks, had roused everybody in Aranjuez. Groups of Manchegans occupied the open spaces in front and on the flanks of the palace, yet no symptom of disorder was seen. When, however, towards midnight, the trembling favourite, concealed in his cloak, was noticed stealing home through a sombre avenue in the gardens, the Manchegans lost their habitual gravity; yet no leader prompted their movements.\* Their first anger seemed vented by the hisses and imprecations with which Godoy was followed till his door closed, when a pause ensued. A detachment of carabineers was drawn up in front of the house, with shouldered arms, and, on the Manchegans eyeing them in surly mood, the conclusion was that they were the protectors, if not the accomplices of the guilty; but no disposition existed to shed blood. As the crowd pressed in the rear, the foremost Manchegans were actually driven upon the carabineers, who, to their great astonishment, offered no violence, merely persuading the people to observe order.

This sufficed to undeceive the Manchegans.

\* Godoy at the time occupied a small royal tenement in the Queen's Walk, since appropriated to the use of the Infante Don Francisco de Paula.

They rushed to the door, broke it open, and hurried to Godoy's room, where they found the bed from which he had just escaped still warm. They then proceeded to the apartment of his spouse, who had retired in a dreadful state of consternation. Their spokesman treated her with the utmost respect, and begged her not to be alarmed. They persuaded her to rise and dress herself; when, withdrawing to the gallery, they quietly waited till she made her appearance. They then led her and her daughter to a carriage which had been brought to the door, and themselves drew her to the palace, which, as a member of the royal family, they told her was a fitter residence for her than the one which she had just left; at the same time felicitating her on this separation from the husband who in an evil hour had been assigned to her.\* The presence of the

\* Charles III, though sincerely attached to all the members of his family, was severe in every thing regarding rank and etiquette. His brother Luis was destined for the church, and doubtless would have been made archbishop of Toledo and a cardinal. At the age of twenty-seven, and before he had taken holy orders, not finding his vocation complete, he renounced his promised dignities. Being rather of a libertine turn, and some of his irregularities having been bruited at court, the king's confessor, Father Eleta, spoke to him upon the subject. As the only means of extricating himself, the infante by letter interceded with the reverend gentleman to obtain from the king the name of the lady whom his majesty wished him to marry. This rather deranged Charles's views on the succession, and the answer was withheld. The infante some time

afflicted princess disarmed the vengeance of the Manchegans.

To this incident Godoy was chiefly indebted for his life. The Manchegans afterwards searched the rooms of his house, destroyed part of the furniture, and broke open every closet capable of concealing a human form. Their search was however fruitless, though the object of it was still upon the premises. At the end of thirty hours, thirst forced him from his concealment. Descending cautiously, with a loaded pistol in his hand, in the hope of meeting a servant and obtaining water, he was recognised, and, without offering the smallest resistance, was seized by the few Manchegans still lingering on the spot. The report of his capture was instantly conveyed to the palace, where, in the interval, everything had

afterwards pressed for the king's determination; and as the matter was now represented as a point of conscience, he consented, provided his brother did not marry any princess belonging to the reigning families of Europe.

The motives of this policy and the reasons why it was then so firmly maintained have some connexion with the transactions of the present day, and ought therefore to be explained. When the law of Philip V. was enacted, besides the exclusion of females, so long as male issue uninterruptedly descending from him in a direct or collateral line could be had, it had been agreed (*vide Memorias de San Felipe*) that the prince so inheriting should be born and educated in Spain; otherwise the crown was to pass to the next male relative of the last sovereign, and in default thereof to the princess nearest of kin. It is singular that this clause relating to the birth and education of the Prince of Asturias is not mentioned in the *Auto*



changed. Ferdinand was triumphant, and his enemies at his feet. Forgetting his own injuries, the prince instantly flew to save the fallen favourite from public vengeance, taking with him some companies of guards. The party found Godoy half naked, some small wounds upon his person, and his hands tied behind him. A more

*Acordado*, or statute, published in the Madrid edition of the *Recopilacion* of 1775; but it is evident that in Charles III's time it was held to form part of the law, and if the Infante Don Luis had then contracted a marriage suited to his high birth, and been blessed with male issue, his descendants might have raised difficulties in the way of Charles's children, all of whom were born in Naples, whereby Spain would have been plunged into the calamities of a civil war. It is presumable that the omission above alluded to was made by order of Charles, or to suit his policy; but in other respects he did not venture to interfere with the law as it then stood, which, as hereafter noticed, was in a most undue manner attempted by his descendant Ferdinand VII.

The Infante Don Luis, under the restrictions imposed upon him, determined upon settling for life, and out of the three Spanish ladies proposed to him, chose Doña Maria Teresa de Villabriga y Rosas, niece of the Marquis de San Leonardo, the grandson of Marshal Berwick—consequently descended from the Stuart family. The infante retired almost into private life; the king's ordinance which granted permission for the marriage stipulating that his spouse should reside in one of the provinces, and not at Madrid, or near the royal residences; and that the infante himself should not appear at court without the king's license. The issue of this marriage was Don Luis de Bourbon, politically made a cardinal, who, after taking some small share in the constitutional government of 1810, died in 1823. Of the infante's two daughters, one married the Prince of Peace, and the other the Duke de San Fernando, who thus obtained his title.

singular rencontre can scarcely be imagined. Godoy's feelings, when he heard the prince, whom he had so long persecuted, give orders for his hands to be untied, could not be described. The attendants stood motionless as they looked upon this sample of fallen greatness, and for his own personal security it was determined to convey him to the barrack guard-house.

This prompt interference in favour of a prostrate enemy is alike honourable to the Infante Don Carlos, who advised it, and to Ferdinand, who acted at his brother's suggestion. Had he on all occasions been guided by the same attached and faithful counsellor, what a different name would he have left behind him!—what incalculable miseries would he have spared his distressed country! The whole of this scene is creditable to the Spanish character. Both the princes and the people had many wrongs to avenge. The passions of the mob were moreover worked up to the highest pitch; and had not the Manchegans found sympathies among Godoy's sentinels, the consequences might have been fatal.

The popular commotion at Madrid in the afternoon of the 19th (March), the destruction of the houses of Godoy's brother and other relatives, as well as those of the minister Soler and the accountant-general Espinosa, were indications of the state of public feeling which could not be mistaken. These demonstrations of dislike evinced towards

Godoy's most obnoxious satellites were not, however, accompanied by any offensive remarks against the members of the royal family. *Vivan sus Magestades y muera Godoy!* or *muera el Choricero!*\* were the only cries uttered by the populace. The council of Castile endeavoured to check the tumult and restore order. This was easily accomplished by an expedient which circumstances suggested. Observing the great respect shown to the royal family, boards, with the king's arms upon them, or words indicating that the property about to be assailed belonged to the crown, were placed in front of the houses threatened with conflagration. By this means the admiralty, which Godoy occupied as an official residence, as well as the sumptuous palace which he had just before built, were saved from destruction.

\* *Long live their Majesties ! and death to Godoy, or the Sausage-maker !* — Godoy is a native of Estremadura, famed for its good sausages, and in the slang used by the lower orders, this *apodo* is frequently applied to persons born in that province. Although belonging to a respectable family, and provided with all the proofs of *clean blood* required to enter a privileged corps, Godoy was considered in Madrid as a *guardia pelon*, and owing to his scanty allowance from home, experienced the hospitality of the Marquis de Branchiforte, a rich grandee, who had been viceroy of Mexico. To the patronage of this family, he owed his introduction into the upper circles.

## CHAPTER II.

Abdication and Protest of Charles IV.—Ferdinand VIIth's Entry into Madrid.—First Measures.—Suspensions of the French.—Godoy released.—Royal Family entrapped.—Scenes at Bayonne.—Ebullitions of popular feeling.—Ferdinand VII. orders Cortes to be convened.—Elements of Resistance.—Delays.—Central Junta assumes power.—Illegality of this step.—Defective Organisation.—Origin of parties.—Madrid evacuated.—Devotion of the Inhabitants.—Errors of the Central Junta.—Jovellanos.

THE day after the tumult at Aranjuez, Charles IV, in the presence of the ministers, grandees, and prelates, abdicated in favour of his son; and two days afterwards, *privately* protested against his own act, taking care to have a copy of this strange paper secretly conveyed to Napoleon, and communicated only to his confidential agents.\*

\* *Abdication*.—"My infirmities not allowing me any longer to endure the weight of government, and for the re-establishment of my health having need of repose and the enjoyment of private life; I have, after most mature deliberation, determined to abdicate my crown in favour of my heir and most beloved son, the Prince of Asturias. Wherefore, it is my royal will that he be forthwith acknowledged and obeyed as king and natural lord of these my kingdoms. And in order that this free and spontaneous act of abdication may be duly fulfilled,

This protest afterwards became a pretext for Napoleon's ulterior designs, and, it will be remembered, was used to justify his conduct towards the royal family. Isquierdo, in the mean while, had reached Paris and informed him of the real state of affairs at the Spanish court. The moment having arrived for unmasking his operations, orders were sent by express to Murat, then at Valladolid and on his way to Portugal, to hurry to the capital, where by means of forced marches he arrived on the 23rd. So strongly were the inha-

you will communicate the same to my council, &c.—Aranjuez, March 19th, 1808.—Signed, I THE KING."

*Protest.*—"I protest and declare, that all I set forth in my decree of the 19th instant, abdicating the crown in favour of my son, was forced from me, and done in order to obviate greater evils, and spare the effusion of the blood of my beloved subjects, and is therefore to be held as of no effect.—Aranjuez, March 21st, 1808.—Signed, I THE KING."

Charles IV, although an amiable and good man, was not suited to hold the reins of government in turbulent times. He had lost ground in the affections of his subjects, but on account of his virtues was still much revered. When public indignation raged highest, he clung to Godoy with a most unaccountable infatuation, and to a certain extent experienced the effects of his minister's unpopularity. The people sided with Prince Ferdinand; and the evidence of this fact, coupled with the dislike manifested against Godoy, first induced the king to think of going to Andalusia, and thence to America, most probably Mexico. Such a project would doubtless have been attended with important consequences, if it had been realised; and most probably the United States would now have had upon their southern flank a monarchy instead of weak republics, torn asunder by factions and constantly agitated through the ambition of aspiring chiefs. When it was



bitants impressed with the idea that he came to support the young king, that his reception was actually enthusiastic.

The next day Ferdinand VII. made his triumphal entry into Madrid; but, desirous of not depriving his royal parents of any part of their travelling establishment, the Duke del Infantado, the Marquis de Astorga, and Count de Altamira supplied him with conveyances. His entry formed a striking contrast with the splendid military *spectacle* which, only twenty-four hours before, had distinguished Murat's arrival. When first

found impossible to carry the plan into effect, no other alternative than abdication remained; but, from the existence of the protest, as well as the memoir afterwards laid before the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle on behalf of Charles IV. by D. Candido de Almeida y Sandoval, his chamberlain, it is evident that the king had a wish to recover his rights. Dupont was the first French general who arrived at Aranjuez after Charles IV. surrendered up his power. To him the protest was cautiously communicated, and every effort made to interest him in favour of the elder branch of the royal family. When the king removed to the Escorial, where General Mouton had fifteen thousand men, the monarch continued to receive royal honours, and this division was retained there as a guard in case of a commotion. Charles IV. was escorted to France by part of this force. On reaching Tolosa, he would however have been stopped by a corps of Spanish body-guards which happened to be there, if the French escort had not been so strong. He crossed the Bidassoa on the 21st of April (1808), accompanied by the queen, the Infante Don Francisco de Paula, and the little Duchess de Alcudia, Godoy's daughter. Charles IV. first took up his residence at Fontainebleau, and next at Compiègne, where he had the use of the palaces. Finding the climate of the latter place uncongenial, he removed to Marseilles,

proclaimed at Aranjuez, he issued a decree reviving the ancient laws, annulling various acts of the last administration, recalling all persons banished since the time of Florida Blanca, and enjoining that the Cortes should be forthwith convened. The difficulty of forming a ministry was soon felt, so many of the public men having been employed under Godoy, or in some other way having forfeited the confidence of the nation. Azanza was however appointed to the finance department, and reached Madrid on the 28th of March; O'Farril to that of war, and he entered on his functions April 5th; whilst Ceballos acted as prime minis-

and subsequently to Rome, where he died, leaving directions that his body should be conveyed to Spain; and it was entombed with that of his spouse, at the Escorial. Napoleon had pledged to him an annual allowance of thirty millions of rials; but payment was not solicited till after the exiles arrived at Marseilles. No supply could be obtained, notwithstanding the king's remonstrances: evasive answers were returned to pressing letters. This additional instance of bad faith was not expected, and amidst his privations Charles IV. was compelled to reduce his establishment and sell his horses. A project was then formed for his escape. One of his confidential servants, availing himself of the cover of a boisterous and obscure evening, in an open boat went off to a British frigate, at that time engaged in an attack upon one of the French forts. A conference took place with the captain on the 11th of October 1810; and an endeavour was made to interest the British government in a scheme, which was to favour the king's escape either to Spain or America; but, as affairs then stood, it is most probable that the step was too embarrassing to meet with support. Evidently the captain did not venture to take the responsibility upon himself.

ter.\* The Duke del Infantado was also named to the command of the guards and presidency of the Council of Castile.

Ferdinand VII. was congratulated on his accession by all the foreign envoys in the capital, except the chargé d'affaires from France. Murat also hesitated, and did not approach the palace. It was even noticed that he avoided meeting the king at the public walk, uncertain perhaps of the effect which the father's protest might produce upon Napoleon's mind. This symptom was discouraging ; it being evident that, with a large French army occupying the frontier fortresses and even the

\* *Memoria de D. M. José de Azanza y D. Gonzalo O'Farril*, Paris, 1815.—Descended from an Irish family and born in the Havannah, O'Farril entered the Spanish army at an early age, and served in the defence of Melilla and Oran, in Africa, as well as at the sieges of Mahon and Gibraltar. In 1780, he solicited and obtained permission to serve as a volunteer in the French army destined to land in England, and on the project being abandoned, visited the best artillery and engineer schools in France. He served in the campaigns of 1793 and 94, under the orders of General Ventura Caro, in the Pyrenees and Navarre, and was wounded at the actions of Lecumberri and Tolosa. In the campaign of 1795, he served in Catalonia, under the orders of General Urrutia, as quartermaster-general, and commanded in the action of Bañolas. He afterwards superintended the academy of Port St. Mary's and the military school of cadets. After the treaty of Basle, he was appointed commissioner-general to settle the limits with France, and gradually rose to the rank of lieutenant-general. In 1798, he was made inspector-general of infantry ; and the next year, commanded the Spanish troops sent to Rochefort for a secret expedition. Subsequently, he performed the functions of envoy

capital, it would be impossible, at least for the moment, to adopt any other plan than that of conciliating the French emperor. Never was a government placed in a more difficult position. In the public offices, scarcely could a document be found that indicated what had been done for the three previous months. Even the treaty of Fontainebleau was not in the minister's portfolio; nor could the motive which led to the entry of the French troops be ascertained with anything like precision. Letters were discovered from the commanders of places held by the French, praying for instructions; but not a single answer made its appearance. It had been thought that

extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary near the King of Prussia, and also travelled in England, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Holland, and commanded the Spanish troops sent to Tuscany. On his return in 1808, he was appointed by Ferdinand VII. director-general of artillery; and in April of the same year, war minister.

Azanza entered the service of his country in 1768, and when young visited the western side of the South American continent, as far as California and Sonora. Having joined the army, he served as a subaltern at the siege of Gibraltar. He was afterwards chargé d'affaires at the courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin; provincial intendant at Toro and Salamanca, and army intendant in Valencia and Murcia, during the campaign of Roussillon. In 1795, he was made a councillor of war, and in that year minister of the same department. He also served as captain-general of New Spain, and president of the *Audiencia* of Mexico. In 1799, he was named a councillor of state; and in 1808, Ferdinand VII. appointed him minister of finance.

These two distinguished Spaniards adhered to the French; and in 1815, wrote their joint defence.

the French were only on their way to Portugal; whereas it was now evident that they had passed into Catalonia and occupied Barcelona, as well as the citadel and castle of Monjuich.

It is impossible for an Englishman to contemplate the situation in which the Madrid government was placed at the end of March and the beginning of April, 1808, without lamenting that we had no agent at hand capable of turning so favourable a crisis to account. Such an agent might have rendered essential service to the common cause of Spain and of Europe. Ferdinand VII. had just ascended a throne stripped of all the elements of security. From a combination of various causes, his kingdom was on the point of becoming a prey to France; and yet it was, or ought to have been known, that the Spaniards would never tamely crouch beneath the foreign yoke which fraud and falsehood were plotting to fix on their necks. Weeks previously, when the difficulties of the country were discussed at the meeting held at the house of Godoy, it was declared that the only means of saving the country were, to arm *en masse*—to place the Prince of Asturias at the head of the nation, form new connexions, and to open the ports to England. Were we unaware of this fact? Were we unmindful of the predisposition existing in our favour? Godoy had prepared a golden harvest for us, which unfortunately we did not endea-



your to reap till it was half spoiled from over-ripeness.

Savary reached Madrid, and, under vehement protestations of sincerity, expressed to the new king Napoleon's anxious wish to have a conference, which, it was insinuated, would lead to his acknowledgment. The Dukes de Frias and Medina Celi, with Count Fernan Nuñez, had previously been sent to compliment Napoleon; and as soon as the proposed journey was decided on, the Infante Don Carlos set out to convey the intelligence. It is well ascertained that this prince undertook the journey with great reluctance, and only in obedience to his brother's commands. Whilst the preparations for the king's departure were going on, Savary addressed a note to the Duke del Infantado, urging Godoy's release.\* The answer given was, that at the approaching interview with the emperor, the prisoner's fate should be decided, and, in the interval, the proceedings instituted against him suspended. After establishing a supreme junta of government under the presidency of the Infante Don Antonio, Ferdinand VII. left Madrid for Burgos, on the morning of the 10th April, accompanied by Ceballos and a number of noblemen.

\* He had been confined at Villa Viciosa, a country residence belonging to the king, three leagues from Madrid, and legal proceedings instituted against him, at the suit of aggrieved parties. On his release he was sent to France, under the protection of French troops.

No sooner had the king quitted his capital than Murat assumed an imperious tone towards the junta, on the very same morning demanding the delivery of Godoy's person. Being told that no orders existed for his release, the French commander two days afterwards went so far as to threaten to send troops and open his prison-door. On the 20th, General Belliard formally claimed his liberation; when, fearful of the consequences of a refusal, he was set at liberty. The general's application stated that he reiterated the demand by special orders from Napoleon, who, he now added, would acknowledge no other authority than that of Charles IV. as king of Spain. The junta resisted to the last moment; but by this time the plans of the French were laid bare. They felt their strength and were determined to use it. So much importance was at the moment attached to Godoy's release, that the Infante Don Antonio, president of the junta, observed, that this incident actually tried the question whether father or son in Napoleon's eyes was king of Spain. After these altercations, the junta and Murat continued at variance. The latter even threatened to re-proclaim Charles IV, and take the government into his own hands. From allies, the French were now changed into open enemies, and resistance seemed impossible.\*

\* The French at this moment had 25,000 men in Madrid; and at Aranjuez, Toledo and the Escorial, 10,000 more. All the

When Ferdinand VII. reached Burgos, the Infante Don Carlos was at Tolosa, and Napoleon at Bordeaux, on his way to Bayonne, where the infante was invited to join him. He had in fact been officially told that this would be a delicate compliment to the personage upon whose good will his brother's future prosperity in great measure depended. The infante made the sacrifice, and at Bayonne was received with apparent kindness; but at the first interview he became convinced of Napoleon's foul design, and wrote a letter to his unsuspecting brother, begging him, if he valued the independence of his country and his own dignity, not to cross the Bidassoa. This letter was unfortunately intercepted by Napoleon, and Ferdinand VII. fell into the snare.\* The plan had been dexterously laid, the agents employed acted their several parts with consummate address, and, as before noticed, the victims were besides overawed by the presence of a large military force. The treachery was too complicated—too monstrous to be suspected. Century had followed century since a similar act of perfidy had stained the history of Europe.†

heights and commanding points were also in possession of their artillery. The Spanish garrison did not exceed 3000, mostly recruits.

\* When the king was about to leave Vitoria, the people cut the traces of his carriage: thus evincing their feelings on the subject of his journey.

† Similar was the award of the Scottish crown to himself by

The scenes which took place at Bayonne after the meeting of Napoleon with the Spanish princes, were such as would not be credited but for the irrefragable testimonies of authentic documents. The despoiler had the deluded victims in his power, and he was ready for the accomplishment of his long-meditated design. On the first day of his arrival, Ferdinand VII. was told that he must exchange his claims to the crown of Spain for the kingdom of Tuscany. To this unexpected proposal a negative answer was returned. Godoy closed his pernicious and disgraceful career by negotiating the treaty, dated Bayonne, May 5th, 1808, by which Charles IV. transferred the crown of Spain to Napoleon, "as the only person in the existing state of things capable of restoring order." To complete this melancholy farce, the sword of Francis I, the trophy of Pescara's victory, was delivered up to Murat, and Joseph Bonaparte was nominated king of Spain.\*

The rising of the inhabitants of Madrid on the 2nd of May,† in the presence of a large French

Edward I, whose policy on that occasion so strongly resembles that of Bonaparte in the Spanish affair, that the latter, who was a great imitator, seems to have trodden in Edward's path, not from accident, but intention.

\* The first protest which appeared against this compulsory abdication was that of the Infante Don Carlos Pedro, nephew of Charles IV, and married to the Princess de Beira, who had emigrated with the Braganza family to Brazil. It is dated Rio de Janeiro, August 20, 1808.

† This tumult commenced in a singular manner. The

force, proved the state of public feeling there ; and before the Bayonne renunciations and Murat's appointment of viceroy were published, various commotions also occurred in the provinces, particularly at Seville, Badajoz, and Oviedo. Deserted by their government and threatened with subjugation, the Spanish people seemed determined never to sanction the disgraceful bargain made at Bayonne. In every province they stood firm ; and the loyalty that was evinced on all sides gave every reason to expect that the ebullitions of wounded pride would soon settle down into a steady determination to exact an adequate revenge for a national injury. The loyalty of

Queen of Etruria, who had also been dispossessed of her crown, being still at Madrid with her only son, arrangements were made for them to proceed to France ; which, after what had happened at Bayonne, excited great indignation among the inhabitants. The morning was fixed for her departure, and the carriages were drawn up at the palace gate, when some of the *Manolas* cried out, "*La llevan—la llevan !*"—"They are carrying her off." Madrid was instantly in a commotion, and an attempt was made to cut the traces of the carriage. The French guard fired upon the people, and a dreadful carnage ensued in the square fronting the palace. The people flew to arms—Murat ordered in the troops stationed at the Casa del Campo and Chamartin ; when an attack was made upon the park of artillery, defended by Daoyz and Vélarde, which was thrice repelled. These two brave men having been killed at the foot of their guns, the park was taken. Eventually the people were pacified by the appearance of some influential Spaniards among them.



Spaniards is proverbial. In conformity with this principle they submitted to the misdeeds of a corrupt minister ; but when they saw their independence violated and the members of the royal family entrapped, the idea of resistance arose in every breast. Nothing but system, and a government capable of inspiring confidence, was wanting to enable them to make a noble stand.

Two decrees safely reached Madrid, signed by Ferdinand VII, on the 5th of May ; the one addressed to the supreme junta, directing its members to remove to a secure place and exercise the functions of sovereignty ; adding, that the war was to commence the moment he was sent into the interior of France ; the other, to the royal council, or in defect thereof, to any chancery or high court, commanding, through either medium, Cortes to be assembled in any place deemed most expedient.\* Similar instructions had also been left before his departure ; and in both instances, alluding to the convocation of the Cortes, it was expressly ordained that they were only to occupy themselves in organising a government, and *in obtaining means for the defence of the kingdom* ; a step doubtless impracticable, so long as Murat retained possession of Madrid. The junta here alluded to had besides been dissolved, and its members

\* Exposicion de D. Pedro Ceballos ; also Azanza and O'Farri's Memoir.

dispersed ; nevertheless, some combinations might have been formed in the provinces for the due fulfilment of the king's orders.

The elements of resistance which Spain then presented were, a brave, hardy, and unanimous population, supported by thirty-five thousand soldiers on the Portuguese frontiers ; fifteen thousand at Ceuta, the Balearic and Canary Islands ; ten thousand at St. Roque, and the same number in Galicia, besides fifty thousand militia.\* The Bayonne exhortation, enjoining submission, and signed on the 8th of June by a number of influential Spaniards, if it reached the provinces, had produced no effect. So early as the 23rd May, Valencia ceased all communications with Madrid ; as did Seville on the 26th, and Aragon on the 27th. Gradually and on all sides the insurrections assumed a serious aspect, notwithstanding the too evident want of competent leaders ; and juntas were formed in most of the provincial capitals, with an accord worthy of the cause in which the Spanish people were suddenly called upon to exert themselves.

Joseph Bonaparte did not reach Madrid till the 20th of July ;† but, in the whole of this

\* A corps of fifteen thousand Spanish troops was also at this time in Denmark, sent there by Napoleon.

† The cavalier manner in which Napoleon treated the affairs of Spain, is evident from the following extract of a letter written to his brother, the King of Holland, under date of March 27th — “ Mon frère ;—Le Roi d'Espagne vient

interval, no attempt was made to convene the Cortes. The attack upon Zaragoza was gallantly repelled, the French were driven from the gates of Valencia, and on the 28th of the same month the news of Dupont's defeat reached Madrid; in consequence of which, King Joseph thought it prudent to retire beyond the Ebro. Then it was that the convocation of the Cortes was

d'abdiquer. Le Prince de la Paix a été mis en prison. Un commencement d'insurrection a éclaté à Madrid. Dans cette circonstance, mes troupes étaient éloignées de 40 lieues de Madrid; le Grand Duc de Berg a dû y entrer le 23 avec 40 mille hommes. Jusqu'à cette heure, le peuple m'appelle à grands cris. Certain que je n'aurai de paix solide avec l'Angleterre qu'en donnant un grand mouvement au Continent, j'ai résolu de mettre un prince français sur le trône d'Espagne. Le climat de la Hollande ne vous convient pas. D'ailleurs, la Hollande ne saurait sortir de ses ruines. Dans le tourbillon du monde, que la paix ait lieu ou non, il n'y a pas de moyen pour qu'elle se soutienne. Dans cette situation des choses, je pense à vous pour le trône d'Espagne. Vous serez souverain d'une nation généreuse, de onze millions d'hommes, et de colonies importantes. Avec de l'économie et de l'activité, l'Espagne put avoir 60 mille hommes sous les armes, et cinquante vaisseaux dans ses ports. Répondez-moi cathégoriquement quelle est votre opinion sur ce projet? Vous sentez que ceci n'est encore qu'un projet, et que quoique j'aie cent mille hommes en Espagne, il est possible par les circonstances qui peuvent survenir, ou que je marche directement et que tout soit fait dans quinze jours, ou que je marche plus lentement, et que cela soit le secret de plusieurs mois d'opérations. Répondez-moi cathégoriquement; si je vous nomme Roi d'Espagne, l'agréerez-vous? puis-je compter sur vous? Comme il serait possible que votre courrier ne me trouvât plus à Paris, et qu'alors il faudrait qu'il traversât l'Espagne au milieu des chances que l'on ne peut prévoir, répondez-moi seulement ces deux mots."

thought of, and deputies were elected by the provincial juntas to meet at Madrid. Disputes arose as to the manner in which they were to open their sittings, and much time was lost in correspondence upon this subject. Some deputies were disposed to follow the ancient practice in Castile, whilst those from Aragon claimed the revival of their own *fueros*. After many disagreements and delays, the delegates met at Aranjuez, and severally exhibited their powers, limited to the appointment of a central board, for general purposes, and to act in concert with the provinces; when, to the astonishment of every one, the thirty-four assembled deputies declared themselves a central junta, and at once assumed the supreme government in the name of Ferdinand VII. Count Florida Blanca was elected president, and took possession of the royal apartments as a matter of course.\*

\* Nothing could have been more distant from the ideas of the provincial juntas than the creation of such a power as this. Those of Seville and Valencia were the most influential among them, and the spirit by which the latter was then actuated may be seen from the subjoined translation of the instructions given to its deputies sent to Madrid. Those of the Junta of Seville were similar and specially enjoined that nothing should be done affecting the church.—*Instructions, &c.*: “1st. The central junta is to be the concentration of the provincial ones, whence those orders are to issue which the latter cannot give separately. 2nd. Its powers are to be confined to what is called high government; such as peace and war, direction of the armies, government of America, and the naming of diplomatic agents. 3rd. Each provincial junta is to continue in the

This step, so strongly marked with illegality and usurpation, engendered distrust, and soon destroyed that bond of union which circumstances had created. The provincial juntas did not wish to dispossess themselves of any particle of that sovereignty which, they contended, had been conferred upon them by the people; and thus a kind of federative government was established, incapable of acting with either vigour or promptitude. To a want of unity in the command, opposite interests, local jealousies, and rival in-

command of its own district; and its deputies to the central junta are to be dependent upon them, and act according to instructions. 4th. Each provincial junta shall watch over the conduct of its deputies to the central junta, and decide thereon. 5th. The time of their mission shall be for one year, with the faculty of being re-elected;—without this, however, preventing any junta from removing them, if deemed expedient. 6th. In all matters of moment, such as treaties of peace, declarations of war, imposts, &c., the opinions of the provincial juntas shall be first obtained. 7th. The central junta shall form and execute the plans of defence, through the medium of generals whom it may appoint, giving due advice thereof to the provincial juntas. 8th. The central junta shall decree the pecuniary sacrifices required, and assign a corresponding quota to each province. 9th. The central junta shall attend to the collection of that part which may belong to it, as well as the payment of its own expenses, in such manner that the army, fleet, and all other classes shall receive their pay from the provinces, and not from the central junta, no common fund being made as heretofore. 10th. The central junta is to regulate the constitution of the kingdom, reform the civil and criminal codes; but it shall communicate to the provincial juntas its ideas on each point, when the opinion of the greatest number shall decide, &c.”



fluences were added, and it became impossible to combine the operations of a campaign. The result was a diminution in the enthusiasm which had begun to display itself. The people of Madrid murmured at the follies and parade which they witnessed. The supreme junta pompously assumed the title of majesty ; whilst the president and leading members were more anxious to have the corresponding honours paid to them, than to organise the army and provide means for the public defence.

Twice did the Council of Castile remonstrate against these idle proceedings. In vain did its members appeal to the laws, to precedents, and to the king's own commands. They pleaded the exigency of the moment, and pressed the meeting of the Cortes according to ancient usages as the only means of satisfying all parties. The situation of the country was indeed melancholy. Fluctuations and uncertainty marked the conduct of reflecting men who had anything to lose ;—not that they ceased to hold the French aggressions in less abhorrence ; but because, after such a lapse of time, they saw no concerted plan of resistance,—nothing that inspired confidence or warranted the hope of eventual success. Many waited, as it were, to be dragged on by the current of events. A condemnation of the war, as well as of the manner in which the French used their victories, was depicted upon every countenance ;

yet so marked was the reserve maintained by some whose example and co-operation might have been useful, that they were set down as suspicious persons, and thus disabled from afterwards serving their country. A war of pasquinades commenced; vindictive passions were unchained, and in some instances homicides applauded as patriotic acts. On the subversion of the local authorities, the command frequently fell into the hands of willing yet inexperienced persons, guided more by their feelings than by sound judgment.

It must, however, be confessed, that although the middle and lower orders, generally speaking, were eager to appeal to arms in the cause of national independence, numbers of the higher and educated class felt disposed to compromise. This difference of opinions might be attributed to a variety of causes. Though the mass of the population was sound at heart and susceptible of the best impressions, the Pyrenees had not presented a barrier sufficiently strong to prevent doctrines of the French school from reaching the provincial capitals and maritime towns. Novelty has its attractions in Spain as well as elsewhere, and the young, the ardent-minded, the idle, and the speculative, embraced principles which at first sight promised a new and better order of things. This division between the higher and lower orders must therefore be taken into account in any serious review of Spanish affairs,

because it is from this period of the contest that those wounds were opened which have been left to rankle ever since. Then it was that the two great political parties were formed in the state; but it cannot be disguised, that from the commencement many well-meaning Spaniards thought that no other means existed of obtaining salutary reforms than through French intervention. The idea appears strange, it is nevertheless a fact, that numbers looked up to Napoleon as the future regenerator of Spain, and on this account only sided with him. Among them General Alava himself may be numbered, since he signed the Bayonne Constitution and accompanied Joseph to Madrid. He certainly had foresight or patriotism enough to retract, when he beheld the efforts of his spirited countrymen, or became convinced that the new sovereign to whom he had sworn allegiance could never be anything else than the tool of an insatiable conqueror and the viceroy of a foreign despot. In this respect he was more fortunate than others, as well as in his attachment to the British party; but his name stands at the foot of the Bayonne Constitution as a memento of his early errors.\*

The capitulation of Dupont's army, as before noticed, followed by the evacuation of the capital,

\* It was signed by ninety-one Spaniards of the highest distinction purposely convened; among them, dukes, counts, and marquises, as well as several heads of the religious orders.

gave a new turn to public opinion, and induced many to join the popular cause who before had not ventured to form an estimate of the probable vicissitudes and ulterior consequences of the war. Each one then took his stand, and from that period only ought the actions of public functionaries to be judged. Numbers had previously erred, partly influenced by the example of the royal family, and partly from a conviction that resistance was fruitless. When Joseph Bonaparte reached Madrid, a deputation of grandees, offering their congratulations, addressed him thus: "Sire—The grandees of Spain have at all times been celebrated for loyalty to their sovereigns, and in them your majesty will now find the same fidelity and adhesion." The Council of Castile assured him, "that he was the principal branch of a family destined by Heaven to reign;" yet who could be so far deceived as not to see that this was empty etiquette—mere verbiage—words of course, extorted by dread and suited to the moment? The conduct of the other great party must be traced in their actions.

The central junta being installed, and defying opposition, acted as if they had been invested with regal power, or really possessed the attributes of national representation. Amidst the forms of the old court, they commenced their labours on a secluded spot, under the idea that the country was satisfied with their appointment and

disposed to respect their authority. It was soon observed that they were engaged in personal controversies and unseasonable plans of reform, calculated rather to disgust the people than animate them in the defence of their liberties. Again the Council of Castile endeavoured to stop their giddy career. Their ambiguous and scornful answer to the highest tribunal in the land was inserted in the Madrid Gazette, and read with feelings of indignation by those who were aware of the situation in which the country was placed. This reply was taken as a final sentence against the council, and employed in such a manner as to confirm the supremacy of the central junta, the members of which had already tasted the sweets of power, and were by no means disposed to forego them.\*

\* The cleverest man in Spain at that time unquestionably was D. Melchior Gaspar de Jovellanos, a native of Gijon, where he established the Royal Institute of Asturias, under the patronage of Charles IV, for the purpose of extending the knowledge of mathematics, mineralogy, and navigation. The two leading objects of this interesting establishment were, to educate and train sailors on a scientific as well as practical plan of tuition, and extract from the neighbouring mountains the coal, which for ages had lain neglected. Jovellanos was a civilian, well versed in the laws and constitutional history of his country. He was also liberal in his opinions,—although perhaps, like some other of the Spanish philosophers of the day, rather too much infatuated with the writings of the French politicians who flourished from the middle of the last century. Being of a studious disposition, his attention was turned to a variety of subjects; among others, to agriculture. His memoir upon the Agrarian laws, published in 1795, is a master-piece. Laborde,



The inhabitants of Madrid, who had testified their enmity towards the French in such a variety of ways, continued their efforts under the united direction of the Municipality and Council of Castile. By them the Andalusian army was clothed, and hastened forward to Navarre. They re-proclaimed Ferdinand VII. in the most enthusiastic manner. They called forth the resources remaining in the districts under their care; and it is a well-established fact, that if a proper government had then existed, from the 2nd of August to the end of November upwards of twenty thousand men might have been organised in Madrid and the neighbouring towns, independently of militia. The jealousies or imbecilities of the central junta marred the best projects. The people of Madrid

who inserts it entire, (vol. iv. art. Agriculture), says, that "it is one of the best treatises ever published upon the various branches of political economy;" and adds, that "the country which possesses such men as the author is not very distant from speedy melioration." His work on the public diversions of Spain is spoken of elsewhere. To Jovellanos, his countrymen are also indebted for researches into the history and statistics of his native province, Asturias, to which he was ardently attached; and in the course of his inquiries, he suggested many valuable improvements. His style was the purest Castilian, and is quoted as among the best models. Occasionally he indulged in a sarcastic strain; and his little piece called *Pan y Toros*, in which he endeavoured to rouse the slumbering energies of his countrymen, by showing that as long as they had bread to eat and bull-fights to amuse them, they thought of little else, is smart and sportive.

In March 1798, Jovellanos was called to the ministry, jointly with D. Francisco Saavedra, (vide Godoy's Memoirs, vol. ii.)

nevertheless succeeded in raising a corps of infantry and cavalry, under the command of Colonel Freyre. Their efforts were unceasing; their success incredible, when the opposition which they met with is considered; and it is further to be taken into account, that in Godoy's time, specie had become scarce—that commerce was at a stand, that no corporation funds had been collected for eighteen months, and that for many weeks the

and when, in 1808, the country was left both without a government and a sovereign, on this account, as well as the great repute in which he was held, this distinguished Asturian was elected a deputy for his own province. The presidency of the central junta was however given to Florida Blanca, who, although venerable for his age and devotion, was not suited for the stirring times which called him from retirement. The majority of the members on most points agreed with the president, and from their opinions Jovellanos frequently dissented. When, for example, the liberty of the press was agitated, although a man of liberal notions, he expressed his belief, that however much such a measure was eligible in other countries more advanced in general knowledge, it would be dangerous in Spain during a party contest; adding moreover, that the new and provisional government which might be established, had no power to alter any existing law. This opinion was given before the central junta was installed; the author, at the same time protesting that it was his resolution never to accept any appointment or office, or to derive any other advantage from the honourable trust confided to him than that of freely stating whatever he thought best for the public good; which resolution he declared, arose from his declining health and repugnance to public life. He also entered into a long examination of the principle upon which the power of the central junta was founded. A right of insurrection, he argued, such as had been proclaimed by the French, was incompatible with the well-being of society. That people, in the

inhabitants of the capital had previously been obliged to feed fifty-five thousand French, who, on their departure, spiked one hundred and twenty brass cannon, and destroyed the arms which they could not carry with them.

This part of the subject is dwelt upon, because the fatal error in not early establishing a government in accordance with the national forms and prejudices was a source of incalculable misfortunes, delirium of their revolution, laid down this right in a constitution which was made in a few days, contained in a few pages, and destroyed in a few months. Every nation, however, that finds itself suddenly attacked by a foreign enemy, and sees its own natural governors either betraying the people or acting under compulsion, acquired in such circumstances an extraordinary right of insurrection, growing out of the necessity of self-defence. This had been the state of Spain: the provincial juntas, therefore, in whatever manner they had been constituted, were lawful authorities; but they were not established to alter the constitution of the kingdom, nor abrogate its fundamental laws. The central junta, which united in itself the authority of the provincial juntas, possessed that authority by the same right and under the same restrictions; but anything which should be done beyond those bounds would be unlawful. Their duty was to consult the laws of Spain, and see what provisions had been made for an emergency like the present. In these laws it was appointed, that if at any time the sovereign should be prevented from exercising his functions, the Cortes should be assembled for the purpose of forming a regency; and even the mode of forming it was prescribed. The fundamental laws of Spain, therefore, prescribed to the central junta the course which it ought to pursue; and if the pressure of immediate circumstances was such that the Cortes could not directly be convoked, it ought to announce to the nation its determination of convening that assembly, and fix a time for the purpose.

and tended to retard the expulsion of the French ; a fact of which no persons were more sensible than English officers afterwards employed upon the spot. Whilst the central junta continued immersed in cabals, the spirit of patriotism did not cease to glow in the provinces, encouraged by the aid and sympathies of the British people. Fresh impulse was also given to the cause by the French atrocities at Rio Seco and other places. The amount of resistance by this time could be calculated ; nevertheless, in the capital, permission was not granted by the central junta to organise the militia till after the defeats experienced by the patriots at Burgos and Lerin. Scarcely had the order for a general enlistment been posted up on the doors of the municipality, when, to the dismay of the good people of Madrid, a courier arrived from Aranjuez with a command to suspend the measure till further orders.

Decrees and reports filled with empty professions and visionary plans were issued every hour ; yet the war languished, the people suffered, and the French gained ground. A melancholy succession of disasters soon convinced the nation that, however enlightened and patriotic many of the members of the supreme junta might be, they were alike defective in the theory and practice of government, and, as a body, had utterly mistaken the object for which they assumed power. Nothing effective proceeded from a coun-

cil which had presumptuously taken the destinies of Spain into its own hands. Their proclamations were vigorous, and their measures weak; no concert was introduced into either their civil or military arrangements; and at length the feeling of self-confidence which had roused the spirit of individual exertion in every province became utterly extinct, and gave way to a despondency, when it was observed that the government continued merely to wage a war of edicts from the royal palace of Aranjuez, while the armies of France were assembling on the Ebro.



## CHAPTER III.

Flight of the Central Junta.—Fall of Madrid.—Sacrifices of the Inhabitants.—Sir John Moore's perilous position.—Our early errors in Spain.—Central Junta at Seville.—Their plans.—Propose the convocation of Cortes.—The period indefinite.—Why.—Fall of Seville, and Flight of the Central Junta.—Re-appear at La Isla, and name a Regency.—The Duke of Orleans.—New Electoral Law.—Meeting of the Cortes of 1810.

TOWARDS the close of November, news reached Madrid that Napoleon was advancing in person, at the head of an overwhelming force, to see his brother crowned. The loss of so much valuable time now became more than ever apparent. The Council of Castile prayed permission to carry off the archives and valuables that they might not fall into the hands of the enemy, and with the other tribunals remove to a secure place. Again they urged the arming of the militia; but their applications were treated with the usual neglect, if not contempt,—the members of the central junta, delighted with the terrestrial paradise of Aranjuez, and seemingly considering themselves as safe there as if they had been legislating in the island of Majorca, though at that

very moment no more than four thousand recruits, just arrived from Estremadura, occupied Samosierra, without tents stores, or intrenchments, never dreaming of an ejection. The pass was forced, and for the first time the eyes of the sylvan legislators were opened. The leading members flocked to Madrid, preceded by a decree, announcing that "His Majesty" had<sup>d</sup> resolved to pass on towards Estremadura, enjoining the tribunals and corporate bodies to follow in the best order they could.\*

This decree was brought in on the 1st December by two influential members, with their portmanteaus ready packed up, and who till then had been busily occupied in legislative labours, in making out a list of traitors, and forming plans of confiscation. General Morla, one of the junta, also came in, specially commissioned to take the

\* The breaking up of the junta at Aranjuez presented a scene quite as curious, although more riotous, than that which occurred there on the fall of Godoy. The Manchegans again assembled and felt disposed to make an example or two. They singled out Count de Tilly, one of the deputies from Seville, and were about to lay hands upon him, when, suddenly turning round, he scattered a quantity of loose money among the foremost of the crowd, and during the scramble escaped. He was a man of infamous character, having at the time a cause pending against him in the courts of law for a robbery. Besides the titles of Majesty and Excellency which the members voted for themselves, they adopted a species of gay uniform, resembling that of the generals, which, as they hurried off, afforded the Manchegans a fair opportunity for that play of sportive words for which they are distinguished.

command and commence fortifications; but it was only four days before the appearance of the enemy that the inhabitants were called upon to enrol themselves, after which the lines of defence were traced. With such tools as each had in his house, they proceeded to open ditches and construct redoubts, lamenting these tardy preparations and apprehensive that their efforts would be unavailing. The members, in the interval, were quietly journeying on towards Estremadura, leaving the good people of the capital to shift for themselves, with a garrison consisting of eighteen *gardes du corps*, one company of Walloon Guards, four squadrons of mounted volunteers, a few invalids, some recruits, and such militia as could be mustered.

The French advanced with upwards of sixty thousand men, abundantly supplied with artillery. The leading inhabitants nevertheless set an example of devotion by emulously sharing the dangers and fatigues of the defence. A permanent committee was formed, and sat at the Post office, giving such directions as circumstances might permit. Even the women unpaved the streets, and carried stones to the tops of those houses which it was likely the assailants would pass, in order to use them as missiles: their exertions and sacrifices indeed could not be surpassed by any heroines renowned in history. Two volunteer companies of Avila and a battalion of the second volunteer regiment of Madrid, being at Alcala de Henares,

withdrew towards the capital, closely followed by the French, who on approaching the suburbs opened a battery of thirty pieces against the positions of the Buen Retiro, and on carrying them, spread themselves along the line of the Prado, in front of the principal streets leading to the town.

Batteries and cross-cuts in the streets prevented them from penetrating, and their loss was severe; but it was expected that the defence must cease the moment the main body came up. In the afternoon of the 3rd, Morla sent proposals to Berthier offering to capitulate, without the knowledge of the committee, who, however disheartening their prospects, had nevertheless determined to resist to the last. That evening the remnant of the troops flying from Samosierra, reached the gate of Segovia, whilst the white flag was still flying, and Morla at Chamartin, where he had gone to have a conference with Napoleon. Learning the state of affairs, and fearful of falling into the hands of the enemy, the fugitives set off for Estremadura, though they had been marching for three days without intermission. The night of the 3rd and morning of the 4th presented scenes of horror which cannot be described. A thick fog obscured the atmosphere, whilst a profound silence reigned on all sides, interrupted only by the lamentations and curses of those who were preparing to quit their habitations, perhaps for ever.

Madrid was thus sacrificed through the errors and jealousies of the central junta. Devotion and exertion were not wanting in the inhabitants, who, as before stated, had actually been prevented from using in time the means of defence which their own resources afforded. When we look upon this picture, can we fail to recollect the dangerous position in which Sir John Moore and his troops were then placed at Salamanca, after the dispersion of Blake's army and the defeat of Castaños? If our gallant countrymen had then marched upon Madrid, as they were advised to do, not a man would have escaped. When the enemy entered, the town was pillaged, the archives conveyed to France, and the principal inhabitants who had remained behind were sent thither as prisoners. This event, let it be borne in mind, took place in the tenth month after the views of the French upon Spain had been ascertained.

When the Spanish insurrection broke out, a new field of action was opened to the British government. It had then a fair prospect of bringing the war to a happy termination, since Napoleon was rashly entering upon an enterprise that would divide his forces and disarrange his plans. He miscalculated the character of the Spaniards, and did not take the nature of the ground into account; but, on the other hand, the English were not prompt in availing themselves of his er-



rors. Napoleon had secured to his interest a number of influential persons, his great object being to prevent the Spaniards from organising an efficient and popular government. The policy of the British government, therefore, ought to have been to see that this was done, and no time lost. Napoleon's agents were constantly employed in sowing the seeds of distrust, and lowering their allies in the estimation of the Spanish people; ours perhaps thought expedients of this kind beneath their notice,—but were they better employed?

It cannot be disguised, and ought not to be dissembled, that when the British government entered into an alliance with the Spanish patriots, it was imperfectly acquainted with their position and resources. Hence the first measures were adopted with hesitation, and the assistance rendered was ill-timed, badly directed, and inadequate to the object in view. Had the situation of the interior been known, and had lost time been taken into account—had the follies of that government (supreme only in name, and near the seat of which an English envoy resided) been reflected upon—and had the want of organisation in every department of the state (though the people were ready to support their allies) been duly estimated, a British force would not, in the very commencement, have been trusted at so great a distance from the coast. Throughout his preparations for an advance, Sir John

Moore's information was incorrect, and his hopes of co-operation were founded upon false data. The spirit of the people of Madrid was unquestionably excellent; but it is an open town, in the centre of the country, far from resources, and the inhabitants besides felt that they had been betrayed by the government which ought to have afforded them protection. Could a British force hope to overcome the difficulties which such a state of things presented?

After their ignominious exit from Aranjuez, the members of the central junta proceeded towards Estremadura, and eventually assembled at Truxillo. Long debates and warm discussions ensued on their future movements, when, the Sevillian party prevailing, it was at length determined that they should direct their course to Andalusia. On reaching Seville, an amalgamation took place with the provincial junta established there, which had from the first acted in a spirited, although not always in a discreet manner. Here the plans which had been arranged at Aranjuez were pursued and even enlarged upon. The government thought of nothing but its own consolidation, and with this view the necessary departments were opened, the supreme tribunals re-established, and plans of reform suggested. The press was next set to work; and from this period papers and pamphlets of the most democratic and subversive character were put into circulation.

The liberals here gained that ascendancy which afterwards engendered divisions, weakened the confidence of the provincial juntas, and caused the expulsion of the French to be viewed only as a matter of secondary consideration.\*

At length the supreme junta, unable to bear the weight of government and the storm of public indignation, as a relief bethought themselves of the convocation of the Cortes, and Mr. Frere announced this disposition on their part in a despatch, dated Seville, April 25th, 1809, in these words :—  
“ This government have at length become so seriously penetrated with a truth which must long have been present to their minds,—namely, the

\* The position of the British army in August, after the battle of Talavera, will be remembered. Writing to the English envoy on the subject of defective supplies, Sir Arthur Wellesley said :—“ It is useless to complain ; but we are certainly not treated as friends, much less as the only prop on which the cause of Spain can depend.” The Marquis of Wellesley suspected some members of the junta of treason, and all of them of insincerity. “ Far from affording any just foundation of confidence in their intentions,” said he to his government, “ such assiduous declarations of activity and enterprise, unaccompanied by any provident or regular attention to the means and object of the war serve only to create additional suspicions of ignorance, weakness, or insincerity. Whatever insincerity or jealousy existed towards England,” he added, “ was to be found in the government, its officers and adherents—no such unworthy sentiment prevailed among the people.” This state of things compelled the British army to retire towards the Portuguese frontiers. Again Sir Arthur, writing to his brother, under date of Sept. 1, 1809, expresses himself in these words :—“ I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the central junta, that in

inability of a government like the present, reposing upon no assignable basis, which is not monarchy, though it assumes, in a collective body, to represent the person and exercise the prerogative of the sovereign—which contains a very small portion (not above three individuals) of the higher nobility, and which certainly is not popular, either in its composition or in its forms,—that they have determined to place it upon a more extended and regular basis. The main object is to assemble the Cortes, to be held about a year hence, with the variation which the change in the character of the offices which gave a title to a seat in that body may render necessary.”\*

the distribution of their forces they do not consider military defence, and military operations, so much as they do political intrigue, and the attainment of trifling political objects. They wish to strengthen the army of Venegas, not because it is necessary or desirable on military grounds, but because they think the army, as an instrument of mischief, safer in his hands than in those of another; and they leave 12,000 men in Estremadura, not because they are not or may not be deemed necessary in any military view of the question, but because they are averse to placing a larger body under the command of the Duke of Albuquerque, whom, I know, the junta of Estremadura have insisted should be employed to command the army in this province. I cannot avoid to observe these little views and objects, and to mention them to your excellency; at the same time that I lament the attention of those who have to manage such great and important affairs as those are which are entrusted to the management of the central junta should be diverted from great objects, to others of trifling importance.”

\* Vide correspondence relative to the government of Spain, ordered to be printed the 27th March, 1810.

The latter part of this paragraph is not very intelligible; and it would almost seem that the English envoy at the time had no precise notions of the composition of the Spanish Cortes, or of the attributes with which they were invested by the constitution. On the 27th May, a decree for their convocation however appeared; in the preamble of which it was pompously stated, “that it was but just that the Spanish people should terminate the present contest with the certainty of leaving to their posterity an inheritance of prosperity and glory worthy of their efforts, an object of which the supreme junta had never lost sight;” at the same time regretting “that all the disasters to which the nation had been exposed were solely attributable to the disuse of those salutary institutions which in happier days secured the welfare and strength of the state;” adding, “that the time had now arrived for taking this great work in hand and devising the reforms which ought to be made in the administration, by re-establishing the *fundamental laws of the monarchy*.”

Pursuant to this splendid announcement, it was decreed, “that the legal and known representation of the monarchy in *ancient Cortes* should be established by their convocation next year, or sooner if circumstances allowed;” that the junta in the interval would occupy itself in ascertaining the number, qualifications, and mode of assem-



bling deputies, for which purpose a committee should be named to prepare the requisite documents; that with the view of submitting the same to the Cortes, the junta would extend its researches to the means of maintaining the war, of causing the *fundamental laws* to be observed, of improving the legislation, correcting abuses and facilitating reforms; also of taking into consideration the part which America was to have in the meeting of the Cortes.

Here is the "Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies" in its true colours. The pressure of danger had been previously avowed in a variety of ways, as well as that the Cortes alone could supply an adequate remedy to existing emergencies, and yet their meeting is put off to an indefinite period, and, if ever convened, it was to be according to a plan framed by the junta, in which even the provinces of America were to take part. Yet these were to be the *ancient Cortes*—this was to be the revival of "those salutary institutions which in happier times secured the welfare and strength of the state!" The truth is, that the members of the central junta had no inclination to loosen their hold upon power. The opportunity of bestowing offices and commands to friends and flatterers was with them as inviting as in Godoy's time. The sweets of patronage were equally alluring—honours and titles even more seductive at Seville than at Aranjuez. On

entering office they thought of no restrictions ; and when once in the possession of authority, dreamt only of its extent and duration. The people, on the other hand, wanted no plans of reform—no legislative schemes—no theories. They merely wished to see that restored which had been suspended ; whereas the high functionaries with sounding titles were eager to change the face of the monarchy and hand down their names to posterity, not as contributors to the expulsion of the French, but as founders of a new system of legislation.

The loss of the battle of Ocaña threw fresh discredit upon the individuals of the central junta, who were treated with pasquinades and rough music, after the Sevilian fashion. The forcing of the passes of the Sierra Morena sealed their doom, and, as it afterwards turned out, these valuable positions were no better defended than those of Samosierra had been. The perplexed rulers, however, had for some time before entertained the awkward presentiment that Seville was not more tenable than Aranjuez, and, to save appearances, on the 13th of January notice was given that “ his majesty proposed to remove to the Isla de Leon, and there establish himself on the approaching 1st February, leaving nevertheless in Seville a sufficient number of deputies for the despatch of business.” In the night of the 23rd, eight days before the period appointed, a

general *saue qui peut* nevertheless took place; and when the inhabitants of Seville next morning ascertained the secret flight of their guests, the natural conclusion was, that the government was dissolved, and that they themselves had been betrayed. It would be of no use to recapitulate the charges then levelled against the locomotive junta. Had the members not escaped in time, most probably they would have been torn to pieces, so furious was the indignation of the people of Seville.\*

The central junta nevertheless reappeared, with less brilliancy and a lowered tone it must be confessed, in the Isla de Leon, and on the 29th of January issued a decree, acknowledging "that the local change of the government and the meeting of the Cortes could not be any

\* Jovellanos, who in the morning of the 24th had been stopped by the populace and certainly treated in a rough manner, afterwards wrote a memoir in defence of his colleagues, in which he stated that in these occurrences "the enemy gained a triumph equal to that of one hundred battles;" but he seemed to forget the long series of errors committed by the junta, as well as the dreadful predicament in which the people of Seville were then placed, equally as bad as that of those of Madrid when the junta fled from Aranjuez and their defenceless town was delivered up to the French. The inhabitants of Seville wished to defend their city, and with this view took up arms in the morning of the 24th, forbidding all persons to leave the place. It was however too late—the French were close upon them, and Cadiz only presented an asylum: yet, under these circumstances, the central junta actually ordered the Duke de Albuquerque's corps to proceed to Cordova. If the duke had not disobeyed their orders by going to Cadiz, all would then have been lost.

longer delayed without imminent danger to the country;" afterwards ordaining that a regency of five persons, named by themselves, should be formed, (one to represent America,) to whom *all* the authority possessed by the supreme junta was to be transferred, without any limitation; adding, that the new vicegerents should convene the Cortes. Here another error was committed. Jealousies and distrust prevented the nomination of a president, the arrangement being that each member should alternately assume that character; an ominous feature in the construction of a regency, for the support of whose delegated power scarcely any other chance remained than that which might arise out of the confidence placed in the respectability of its members.\*

\* The difficulties into which the Spaniards were plunged through the loss of the royal family, and the dread of their falling into a state of confusion in the absence of a directing power, induced two members of the Bourbon family to offer their services as regents. One was the King of the Two Sicilies; and with this view, his second son, Prince Leopold, was sent to Gibraltar, in July 1808, with letters of recommendation to Sir Hew Dalrymple, written by Mr. Drummond, the English envoy at Palermo, informing him that "the prince went to Gibraltar to communicate with the loyal Spaniards, and to notify to them that his father will accept the regency if they desired it, until his nephew Ferdinand VII. should be liberated from captivity;" adding, that "Prince Leopold and his cousin, the Duke of Orleans, would also offer themselves as soldiers to the Spaniards, and take such situations as might be given to them suitable to their illustrious rank." At the same time, Sir Alexander Ball, governor of Malta, wrote to Sir Hew in sup-

In the decrees and other preparations made by the central junta, in anticipation of the meeting of Cortes, the old mode of convening the national assembly had been abandoned, the illu-

port of this plan, having, under date of July 4th (1808), received from the Duke of Orleans a letter, in which is the subjoined passage:—

“ You have heard the delightful news from Spain, and the glories, the wonderful exertions of the Spanish nation for their king, their government, their religion, and their independence. You cannot wonder that, being a Bourbon, and so very near the spot where my services may be of some use, I should be most anxious to make a tender of them; and, setting aside all personal considerations, I must own that I am persuaded my presence and services at this critical juncture might be of use in giving impulse to the generous efforts of the Spaniards, and lead them there where a deadly blow may be struck at the usurper and upset his odious empire. My name and my presence may have great effect on the French troops in Spain, and upon the French in France; but no time is to be lost, and I know you well enough to be certain that you need not be put in mind *qu’il faut battre le fer pendant qu’il est chaud*. I know you would do for me alone, what I ask of you for public considerations of such magnitude. What I wish is, that you might send me any ship to convey me from hence to Gibraltar. Mr. Drummond sends you this express, and writes to you to request it from you, as he heartily concurs in my wishes to see me conveyed there, where both duty, honour, and gratitude to the country who so generously supported me, imperiously call me. This court are also informed of my intention, and are very anxious that I might be enabled to repair to Spain with the greatest despatch.”

Sir Hew Dalrymple objected to the proposed arrangement, and in his letter of August 11th to Mr. Drummond observed, “ that nothing could happen more out of season than the arrival of the Duke of Orleans and Prince Leopold at that time.” In support of this opinion, Sir Hew observed that “ the French



minati congregated at Seville being of opinion “that the ancient usages were more a matter of historical research than of practical importance.” It was therefore agreed, that in their stead a new

had been beaten and laid down their arms to Spanish generals and soldiers,—that the several juntas of government had in all parts exercised a wise authority, which had been universally acquiesced in within their limits;” acknowledging, at the same time, that the “Junta of Seville was suspected of entertaining a design to ingross more than their share of power.” The very reasons here alleged ought rather to have induced the British functionary to support the formation of a regency, calculated to inspire confidence, promote union, and call forth the energies of the people: all that was at that time wanted to give efficiency to the cause. Sir Hew, in another part of the same letter, tells Mr. Drummond that “this step was probably suggested by an address from Murcia, recommending a national government, but sustaining the claim of the Princess Charlotte of Brazil.” This spirited princess, on the other side of the Atlantic, foresaw the confusion into which Spain was likely to fall through the want of a government, and accordingly offered her services as regent. They were rejected, as were those of the King of the Two Sicilies; there being, on the part of those persons who had taken the destinies of Spain into their own hands, a disposition to favour the creation of a central junta, without stopping to consider the elements of which it was to be composed, or the means of guarding against the abuses of power.

The Duke of Orleans, who had long before turned his attention to the study of Spanish affairs, nevertheless persisted in his tender of services, and received from the regency a letter to the following effect, dated Isla de Leon, 4th March, 1810.

“Most Serene Sir,—The Spanish nation raised its voice against the unjust aggression of Bayonne, and unanimously swore to maintain its independence or perish in the cause of its legitimate sovereign. Neither the reverses of arms nor the tyrant’s power have been able to weaken its constancy.

electoral law should be framed, more congenial to the general principle of representation; the result of which was, that those cities which had deputies in the Cortes last assembled were

The love of our country, of our religion and of our monarch, burns in every breast, and will continue to burn, because the sentiments of honour and loyalty can never be extinguished in this heroic land. Your highness desires to fight in the Spanish ranks, and defend the cause of your august family. This generous wish has been hitherto frustrated by circumstances; but the supreme council of regency now invites your highness to take the command of an army in Catalonia. The enthusiasm of the gallant inhabitants of that province will be strongly excited on seeing a prince, the relative of our own good king, sharing with them the hardships of the war, and leading them on to victory. The recollection of triumphs gained by one of your highness's illustrious ancestors is still retained in Catalonia, and it is for your highness to revive the freshness of those laurels," &c. The letter is signed by President Castaños and the other regents.

This plan was frustrated through the influence of Sir Henry Wellesley, as will be seen from the following letter, dated Cadiz, Aug. 25, 1810. The duke's laconic reply shows his feelings on the subject, of which it is however to be hoped that no rankling recollections remain.

"SÉRÉNISSIME SEIGNEUR,

"Depuis que par ma lettre du 1<sup>er</sup> de ce mois, j'eus l'honneur de faire connoître à V. A. S. ce que le conseil suprême de régence croyoit devoir répondre à celle de V. A. en date du 28 du mois précédent, S. M. n'a pas cessé de méditer sur la manière dont ses désirs pourroient être satisfaits en donnant à V. A. le commandement d'une armée espagnole; mais elle s'est convaincue enfin que les circonstances ne laissent aucune possibilité de réaliser les intentions de S. M. avec l'utilité ou les avantages pour la cause commune que S. M. s'en étoit proposé.

"Pendant que le conseil de régence s'occupoit de cette

to have a voice, as well as the superior juntas, and that one deputy should besides be elected for every fifty thousand souls. It was also settled that the South American provinces, at the time actually in a state of insurrection, should for the present have substitutes chosen for them, until they sent over delegates duly elected. It is a curious fact, that on the 18th of the previous

affaire importante avec le désir le plus vif de se satisfaire lui-même en se rendant agréable à V. A. il est venu confidentiellement à sa connoissance que le gouvernement de S. M. B. ne pensoit pas qu'il fût utile, dans les circonstances présentes, d'employer V. A. S en Espagne; opinion qui paroissoit renfermer l'idée que ce même gouvernement ne verroit pas avec plaisir une telle nomination. L'attention de S. M. ne pouvoit qu'être appelée par ce rapport; et en effet, elle est parvenue à savoir d'une manière authentique et officielle que le gouvernement de S. M. B. a l'opinion qu'employer V. A. durant l'état présent des choses dans la Péninsule est une mesure de laquelle on ne pourroit espérer avec probabilité que la cause commune ne retirât aucun avantage.

“ Cette opinion du gouvernement britannique, qui ne contrarie en rien la haute estime que ce gouvernement fait si justement de la personne de V. A. est d'accord avec celle que l'état des affaires publiques dans la Péninsule a obligé forcément le conseil de régence à former, ne laisse pas que de lui donner une valeur que la sage pénétration de V. A. ne pourra reconnoître.

“ Dans cette situation, c'est une grand peine pour le conseil de régence d'avoir à informer V. A. que tandis que les circonstances politiques de l'Espagne ne changeront pas et qu'avant que l'état des choses aient varié une route ne s'ouvre pour mener à bien les idées que S. M. eut présentes lorsqu'elle invita V. A. à venir. Il ne reste à S. M., quant à présent,

April, Joseph Bonaparte convened Cortes, and it was at the time thought that this example served to stimulate the central junta to perform their long-forgotten promise.

The new-fashioned Cortes opened on the 24th of September, consisting only of popular deputies, or one estate, the other two being excluded. When the inaugural ceremonies were over, the members assembled declared themselves legally constituted in "general and extraordinary Cortes," in whom the national sovereignty re-

aucun moyen d'employer la personne et les talens de V. A. comme elle se l'étoit proposé.

"Je puis cependant assurer V. A. qu'il sera extrêmement agréable à S. M. de rencontrer par la suite quelque occurrence favorable pour effectuer avec avantage ce que l'état des choses ne permet pas d'arranger quand à présent, occurrence que S. M. ne laissera pas échapper; et qu'en attendant elle conservera invariablement les sentimens de haute estime et de considération que les qualités recommandables de V. A., les circonstances grandes et extraordinaires qui la distinguent, lui ont méritées, et lui mériteront dans tous les temps.

"C'est tout ce dont j'ai l'honneur d'informer V. A. S. au nom de S. M. et je mets à profit cette occasion d'offrir à S. A. toute ma considération. Dieu garde la vie de S. A. beaucoup d'années, Sérénissime Seigneur.

(Signé,) "PEDRO EVÊQUE D'ORENSE,  
Président."

"SÉRÉNISSIME SEIGNEUR,

"J'ai reçu la lettre que V. A. m'a écrite le 25 Août, et je reste informé de son contenu. Dieu garde la vie de V. A. pour beaucoup d'années. Sérénissime Seigneur, &c.

"LOUIS-PHILIPPE D'ORLEANS.

"Cadiz, ce 29 Août 18 10."

sided ; or, in other words, they at once declared themselves a constituent assembly. The regency was then called upon to acknowledge the national sovereignty of the Cortes, and swear obedience to such laws as they might enact. It was also determined that the Cortes should have the title of Majesty, and the executive that of Highness. All officers, functionaries, juntas, corporate bodies, and ecclesiastical authorities were likewise required to swear obedience to the Cortes ; and their installation was ordered to be made known in every part of the Spanish dominions by *Te Deums* and discharges of artillery ;—after which, prayers were to be offered up during three days, imploring the Divine blessing upon their labours.



## CHAPTER IV.

The Cortes become a Constituent Assembly.—Principles avowed.—Organic Changes—Unseasonable—Weaken the Popular Cause.—Rage for Legislation.—Divisions and Party Enmities.—Scenes in Cadiz.—The Central Junta and South America.—General Castaños.—New Constitution proclaimed.—Composition of the Cortes.—Substitutes.—No Principle of Representation observed.

IN one respect, the assembly of the Spanish Cortes of 1810 resembled that of the French States-general in 1791, the members being mostly new men whose names had scarcely been heard of before. In another sense, the disparity between the two assemblies was great. The States-general opened their sittings under legal forms, with the three orders, and, after stormy debates, one estate ejected or absorbed the other two, when the triumphant party, declaring themselves a constituent assembly, proceeded to enact laws and frame a constitution; in the end, rendering themselves superior to the authority which had convened them, and no longer responsible to those whom they were intended to represent. The Cadiz Cortes adopted a readier and less complicated plan. In utter defiance of legal forms

and ancient usages, the Spanish Commons beforehand excluded the two privileged estates; and assembling entirely on their own account, at once voted themselves to be a constituent assembly, possessing all the essential attributes of sovereignty, and deliberately proceeded to imitate the example of their Parisian prototypes.

The examples given in our early pages show the little analogy between the ancient and new Cortes. The latter did not meet to supply the want of a regal power, to provide means of defence, obtain the redress of grievances, or reconcile opposite and jarring interests. Their object was not to heal the wounds in the state, to introduce order and concert, or remove those obstacles which had hitherto impeded the progress of the national cause. As the genuine offspring of the central junta, they rather thought of seizing upon power, enjoying its sweets, and carrying into effect those theories with a fondness for which an admiration of the French Revolution had infected many leading members, some of whom were anxious to shine after the manner of Mirabeau, — whilst others thought they could emulate the example of Abbé Sieyès, or took Brissot as their model. In a word, wholly unpractised in the science of legislation, and unmindful that the enemy was at their gates, they set to work with a full determination to tread in the footsteps of the French constituent assembly,

and began by a vote similar to that passed by our house of commons in 1648, whereby they declared that the sovereign power exclusively resided in them,—and, consequently, that whatever they enacted was law, without the consent of either king, peers, or clergy.

More particular notice will be hereafter taken of the composition of the new Cortes; the object at present in view being to examine the principles put forth by them, and the manner in which it was attempted to carry those principles into practice. The Cadiz legislators had a wider field to act in than the central junta; and from the consistency which they acquired even at the outset, their actions and maxims can be followed with more ease, and their motives traced with a greater degree of precision;—not that it would be possible to scrutinise the minutiae into which they entered, or lay before the reader more than general results; yet sufficient can be gathered to enable the dispassionate to form his own opinion, without bewildering the reader with long and tedious details.

The Spanish reformers resolved to take an extensive range, anxious to do much in a little time;—nay, they set themselves to work so zealously, that it seemed as if they had agreed to settle the ulterior destinies of both Spain and the Indies within the sound of the French cannon, and to regenerate their country while they

could scarcely be said to have a country to regenerate.\*

Never did lawgivers enter upon their important functions under a stronger impulse. Their first measures served to indicate a sense of power, and a determination to exert it. Scarcely had they taken their seats and felt their consequence, than the responsibility of the regents was proclaimed. This was a startling proposition to begin with. Not understanding the meaning of the term, the perplexed regents informed the house, that they were totally ignorant of the nature of the duties and the extent of the authority confided to them, finding no precedents to appeal to; consequently, that they did not know at what point they should err in the performance of their trust, no line of distinction being drawn between their powers and those of the new legislature. The reply proved with what levity the decree was passed, the Cortes being obliged to confess that they had not yet limited the authority of the executive, or defined the duties which it was called upon to discharge. No sooner had they separated the legislative, executive and judicial branches, than they themselves confounded them in their own practice,—so unwilling were they that any one else should share in the glory of the proposed regeneration.

\* Owing to the approaches of the French, the Cortes removed their sittings from the Isla de Leon to Cadiz, pursuant to a resolution taken February 18th, 1811.

The grand work of reform went on apace within sight of the French camp, though the Cortes evinced frequent symptoms of inexperience, sometimes of precipitation, and on several occasions that proneness to tyranny by which the proceedings of popular assemblies in ancient as well as modern times have been disgracefully distinguished. The first regency did not last many weeks after the meeting of the Cortes. The Bishop of Orense, one of its members, ceased to act from the day they were installed, having declined to subscribe to the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people; a proceeding deemed refractory and equivalent to disobedience, which was punished with banishment. The same happened to the Marquis del Palacio, one of the new regents appointed by the Cortes. He equally objected to take the oath set before him, and was instantly ordered into custody, there to await the sentence of the legislature; and it was eventually ruled that he had forfeited the confidence of the nation. A few days afterwards, as if ashamed of their intemperance, the Cortes referred this case and that of the Bishop of Orense to the judges.

Nearly the whole of 1811 was spent in metaphysical discussions on the scheme of a constitution, the sovereignty of the people, the liberty of the press, and other abstract matters not likely to be reduced to practice. A rage for legislation seemed to have seized upon the Cadiz theorists,



and they pursued their labours with all the ardour of men who had embraced new opinions and strove to promote them; never imagining that their projects could be impracticable, nor questioning the legality of the powers under which they themselves were acting. Their aim was to commence a new era of change and innovation, trusting to chance for results. Instead of diffusing energy into the government, they thus weakened and embarrassed its action. Instead of making the deliverance of the country their primary object, they sowed the seeds of distrust; vainly imagining that past errors could be repaired by impotent and unseasonable decrees, addressed to provinces occupied by a foreign foe, or exposed to his immediate inroads. They were ambitious of being the founders of a new code; whereas their countrymen beyond the precincts of Cadiz were fighting for their independence, their religion, and their laws, as they stood. This was the only watchword heard in the provinces,—these the only objects for which the people were contending: changes in the fundamental laws never entered into their dreams. Some of their institutions were defective;—their government had been oppressive, but their habits were formed to the yoke; and besides, this was not the moment for repining. Whatever others thought of their religion, they were attached to it in all its forms. Their predilections might be thought

peculiar—their prejudices antiquated, yet both were connected with proud recollections and feelings of lofty patriotism. A national character had been formed which the new legislators could not appreciate, although it served to carry the combatants through an arduous struggle.

At this period of delirium it was that the system of calumny and defamation commenced, which spread so many enmities among the Spanish people and destroyed the character of deserving individuals. Numbers were called traitors for yielding to forces which they had no power to resist. For this, their conduct was held up to public execration, by judges who were ignorant of the difficulties in which they had been placed, or otherwise incapable of discerning their motives of action. In this way were those divisions engendered which still continue to exercise so baneful an influence over the community. The Cortes acted as if Cadiz and La Isla had been all Spain—as if they themselves were really invested with representative powers. Decrees followed decrees in rapid succession, at a moment when it was impossible for the people to know anything of their contents. Most of the provinces were in the hands of the French; consequently, the inhabitants received no information beyond that of which their oppressors were the organs. They were nevertheless made accountable for their ignorance, and anathemas fulminated against them

for neglecting mandates which were scarcely heard of beyond the Bay of Cadiz.

It was soon evident that a powerful machinery had been set in motion by artificers who neither knew its use, nor how to control its movements. Still they went on, pleased with the noise produced, and encouraged by journals devoted to their interest.\* So strong was the infatuation that the friends of the Cortes defended their acts by attempting to prove that they really possessed a national representation, and therefore their enactments were legal and binding. The people of Athens, abandoned by their allies and threatened by the powerful army of Xerxes (argued the government organs), fled to their ships, yet still preserved their national rights unimpaired. Our position is the same, (re-echoed the Cortes galleries): here we are, in Cadiz and La Isla; hither we have come to avoid the invaders—the sovereignty of the nation has been declared; *ergo*, we can legislate. These flaming patriots forgot that Athens was a small district, as well as that the government and leading men embarked previously to the enemy's advance and agreeably to a preconcerted plan: whereas the Spanish Archontes had casually assembled in their insular asylum, without powers or any understanding with their countrymen; and whilst thus protected, they commanded the

\* Eight or nine new periodicals had started in Cadiz, among which was one called the *Robespierre*.

provincial authorities to lay waste the fields, hamstring the cattle, and destroy the dwellings, in order to deprive the enemy of food and shelter. "If Spain does not obtain her freedom," said a government manifesto of the day, "at least she will become an immense desert—an extended sepulchre, where the bodies of French and Spaniards, heaped together, will exhibit to after ages a monument of our glory and their disgrace."

This was deemed heroic and sublime. The Cortes journals, it has since been argued, are filled with interesting debates upon various topics, and contain instructive memoirs on political economy, legislation, manufactures, agriculture, and the like; besides eloquent addresses, eagerly copied into the principal newspapers of Europe. The Cadiz periodicals, it is also boasted, spread broad streams of light upon the dark surface of the country, and taught the people a noble emulation in the race of freedom. This is beautiful on paper, and flattering to the admirers of the Cortes; but, let it be asked, what was the practical result? It is painful to look back and behold the literary labours and philosophic exertions of a number of distinguished individuals, actuated by good intentions, and, to the best of their abilities, honestly working to regenerate their country, yet devoid of circumspection, and not only choosing an unseasonable moment for the realization of their benevolent plans, but also employing means ut-

terly inadequate to the ends they had in view. The French did not evacuate Madrid till August 1812; and in the course of the same month, Andalusia and the Castiles were abandoned. The invaders still lingered in the northern provinces, and did not quit them till the end of 1813: what interest then could the inhabitants of these sections take in the transactions of the Cortes? how could they know what was going on? Even in the free provinces—in Cadiz itself, the bulk of the people did not participate in the revolutionary mania of those who frequented the Cortes galleries, and were constantly congregated in the public squares to cheer the popular orators. For reflecting persons, the new code and all its glowing appendages had no charms. They thought only of the present, dreading the consequences of theoretical changes, and exotic doctrines too subtle for their comprehension, and from which no practical benefit could be derived.

The wildest of all the projects conceived by the central junta was that of forming a mixed Spanish South American and Asiatic Congress, at a moment when its members were flying from their retreat at Aranjuez to take shelter in the Alcazar of Seville, and afterwards in La Isla. Without entering into the social condition of the ultramarine provinces, or dwelling upon the dilemma into which they also were thrown by Napoleon's designs, it may be proper to observe,



that the king was the only bond of union between them and the mother country,—at the same time that the inhabitants of both hemispheres, owing to the kindred and powerful relations which existed between them, were mutually interested in the preservation of this union. The first feeling manifested in the trans-atlantic dominions was that of indignation at Napoleon's aggression, followed by a resolve to afford every possible aid, and await the issue of the contest, without breaking the connexion. The invitation of the central junta to send over deputies was acquiesced in by the South Americans, and several arrived after the opening of the Cortes ; when they found that substitutes or nominees had usurped their seats, and besides that the ancient institutions and forms of government were entirely overthrown.

In the course of business, a plan for the pacification of the South American provinces was proposed and submitted to discussion. In the temper of the times, after so many errors and amidst fresh difficulties and conflicting interests, it was soon visible that the Cortes and regency, constituted as they were, could not replace that bond of union which had been lost, or, by such means as it was intended to adopt, restore the confidence and cordiality necessary to enable both divisions of the monarchy to weather the storm which assailed them. On the 1st August 1811,

thirty-three South American deputies presented a remonstrance, in which they showed that the commotions in the several sections of the New World had not arisen out of external influence or any desire of separation, but only through the misconduct of the persons governing them; that all had expressed sincere attachment and firm adhesion to the parent state, had sworn allegiance to Ferdinand VII, and sent over subsidies in aid of the common cause. The declaration of war against France had been received with enthusiastic acclamations in all Spanish America, and Ferdinand VII. proclaimed with all the enthusiasm of loyalty. Addresses were presented to the governors by the corporate bodies, breathing avowals of allegiance to the newly-acknowledged sovereign, and pledging the persons and property of their constituents to defend his dominions. His bust was placed upon the banners and new coin; all kinds of rejoicings followed; and never was any one of the monarchs who have swayed the united kingdoms of Spain and the Indies accepted under such lively demonstrations of loyalty and regard. How all this ended in alienation and a fratricidal war, it is for the Cadiz Cortes and regency or their friends to explain.\*

\* In many instances the Cortes and regency persecuted individuals who had deserved well of their country. Among the victims of their jealousies and piques was General Castaños,

On the 19th March 1812, the new constitution being completed, it was published with the usual formalities, and its observance ordained as the fundamental law of the monarchy. It was

whose services merit particular notice. D. Francisco Xavier Castaños was born in Biscay towards the year 1743, and was the relative and *élève* of Gen. O'Reilly, who figured in the reigns of Charles III. and IV. Castaños accompanied him to Prussia, and there studied tactics. In 1794 he served in the army of Navarre, under Gen. Caro, and was wounded whilst fighting at the head of the regiment of Africa, of which he was the colonel. In 1796 he was made a major-general, and two years afterwards a lieutenant-general; but was exiled by Godoy, whom he had the courage to contradict. Having been appointed Captain-general of Andalusia by the Junta of Seville, on the 22nd July 1808 he defeated General Dupont and gained the battle of Baylen, though it is acknowledged that a large share of the glory acquired on that day belonged to General Reding, whose plans were highly judicious. The French, unable to retire from the heart of the country owing to the general rising of the inhabitants, were compelled to capitulate; and this unexpected event doubtless tended to derange Napoleon's plans and encourage the patriotic cause. In the month of October, Castaños was in his turn beaten at Tudela, by a column under Napoleon's orders. In 1811 he had the command of the fourth army, and took an active part in the operations of the South, frequently acting in concert with the Duke of Wellington. With him he was present at the battle of Vitoria, on which occasion honourable mention was made of his services and those of his division. This intimacy with the British general gave umbrage to the regency, and he was named a counsellor of state, to afford a pretext for withdrawing the command from him; which was not restored, notwithstanding the solicitations of his British friend. Castaños, sensible of the intrigues carried on against him, wrote to the regency, informing them that, "according to orders, he had,

subscribed by one hundred and eighty-four members, parties to its construction, of whom one hundred and thirty-three were Spaniards and fifty-one South Americans. The difficulty and

on the frontiers of France, delivered up the command of that army which, in March 1811, he had assumed in sight of Lisbon." On Ferdinand's return, he was created Duke de Baylen, the army of the Eastern Pyrenees, or Catalonia, was confided to him, and at its head he crossed the French frontiers when Napoleon returned from Elba. Whilst in command of that province, he discovered the conspiracy plotted by General Lacy, and by the liberals was blamed for following up the prosecution against him with so much severity; but, as a public functionary, he only performed his duty. A trial ensued, in which the circumstances of the case were proved, and the execution was the effect of a legal investigation and a sentence passed by a competent tribunal. Conspiracies had become so frequent, that the government deemed it necessary to make an example; but in that affair Castaños did no more than obey the mandate of his superiors. He published a proclamation on the subject, dated Barcelona, April 12, 1817, in which he asserts, that the object of the conspiracy was to "subvert the government, re-establish the abolished constitution, and strip him of the command." Under such circumstances, as an honourable man, he could not favour the parties implicated, after they had been captured. When the La Isla mutiny proved successful, he retired, after having received various insults from the demagogues of Barcelona. He then ceased to take part in the affairs of his country, the misfortunes of which, in 1823, at the age of 70, he continued to deplore, in the seclusion of an estate in one of the southern provinces. By the will of Ferdinand VII, he was appointed to the council of Regency; but has kept aloof from public affairs as much as he could during the present turmoils. The duke is now believed to be among the refugees who have lately sought an asylum in France.

delays in assembling deputies elected on so large a scale as that proposed by the central junta had been early foreseen by the regents. On their first appointment, as they themselves acknowledge, they therefore despatched circulars to all the dominions of Spain and the Indies, pointing out the urgent necessity of sending forward delegates who were to meet in the island of Majorca; a pretty evident sign that, in February 1810, no very sanguine hopes were entertained of their ability to retain for any long period a footing in the Peninsular provinces.

It is to be presumed that the notice taken of these circulars, if they reached their destination, was limited; as on the 10th September, a fortnight before the opening of the Cortes, the regents issued an edict, accompanied by a decree, in which the impossibility of obtaining proper representatives from the ultra-marine provinces and those occupied by the enemy is lamented, and a plan devised to remedy the defect, by means of substitutes chosen upon the spot. It was accordingly ordained that twenty-three persons should be picked out to represent the places held by the French, and thirty for the Indies; which number of substitutes, incorporated with the real delegates already arrived or about to arrive, it was thought would compose a respectable congress, sufficient under existing circumstances to open the house and carry on business,



even although others should unfortunately not arrive.\*

The decree directs the president of the council, by means of edicts, to cite before himself and the returning judges named, the natives and emigrants from the provinces, occupied by the French, who may happen to be in La Isla and Cadiz, calling upon them to appear for the purpose of forming lists, and afterwards electing deputies in the following proportion:—Before the president of the council, for Avila 1, Madrid 1, Segovia 1, Toledo 1; before D. Manuel de Lardizabal, for Alava 1, Aragon 1, Guipuscoa 1, Navarre 1, Soria 1, Biscay and the Encartations 1; before D. Bernardo de Reiga, for Cordova 1; Granada 1, Jaen 1, La Mancha 1, Seville 1; before Count del Pinar, for Asturias 1, Burgos 1, Leon 1, Palencia 1, Salamanca 1, Toro 1, Valladolid 1, and Zamora 1.—Total 23. For the electors and the elected, the only qualifications required were, the age of twenty-five years, to be a householder and in the possession of a fair character. For the South American and Asiatic provinces, it was also ordained that deputies

\* The original, a scarce document, is signed by the five regents, viz. Pedro, Bishop of Orense, president,—Francisco de Saavedra, Xavier de Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, and Miguel de Lardizabal y Uribe, under the date of Cadiz, Sept. 8th, 1810, addressed to the president of the council, Jose Colon, by whom, under date of Sept. 12, it was ordered to be posted up in the public places at La Isla and Cadiz.

should be named in the following proportion :--For Mexico 7, Guatemala 2, St. Domingo 1, Cuba 2, Porto Rico 1, Philippine Islands 2, Peru 5, Chili 2, Buenos Ayres 3, Santa Fe 2, Caracas 2.—Total 30. D. Jose Pablo Vallente was named as the returning judge; and persons domiciled in any of the above provinces were admitted as electors and substitutes, owing to the small number of natives on the spot. It was further established, that if any native Indians could be found, they should be entitled to a seat in Cortes. Such deputies as afterwards arrived were blended with the rest.\*

\* In the *Guia Politica de las Españas* for 1812, equivalent to our Red Book, the number of deputies is thus stated, returned and substitutes.

## SPAIN.

	Ret.	Sub.		Ret.	Sub.
Alava . . .	0	1	Brought forward	85	8
Aragon . . .	3	1	Madrid . . .	0	1
Asturias . . .	7	0	Majorca . . .	4	0
Avila . . .	1	0	La Mancha . . .	3	1
Burgos . . .	1	1	Molina . . .	2	0
Biscay . . .	0	1	Murcia . . .	8	0
Cadiz . . .	5	0	Navarre . . .	0	1
Canary Islands . . .	3	0	Palencia . . .	0	1
Catalonia . . .	20	0	Ronda . . .	2	0
Cordova . . .	0	1	Salamanca . . .	1	0
Estremadura . . .	12	0	Segovia . . .	0	1
Galicia . . .	23	0	Seville . . .	3	1
Guadalajara . . .	2	0	Soria . . .	0	1
Guipuscoa . . .	0	1	Toledo . . .	0	1
Granada . . .	1	1	Toro . . .	0	1
Iviza . . .	1	0	Valencia . . .	19	0
Jaen . . .	0	1	Valladolid . . .	0	1
Leon . . .	6	0	Zamara . . .	0	1
Carried forward	85	8		127	19

It would be almost insulting to the judgment of the reader to offer any remarks upon either the illegality or the incongruity of a legislature composed of such elements as the preceding sketch presents. Independently of a total abandonment of ancient usages, and an utter disregard of the elective franchise practised in former times; besides the exclusion of two estates, and the enlargement of the third on a basis not only impracticable, but also ridiculous; substitutes are put in to represent an infinitely larger proportion of territory in both hemispheres than that which, with the free agency of the inhabitants, is enabled to return representatives, elected according to the scale proposed by the conveners of the Cortes themselves, founded on rules of their own framing. The representative principle was thus entirely lost; and how a party of politicians and philosophers, circumscribed to a small spot of ground and protected only by the naval force of an ally, could during eighteen months sit quietly down and frame a constitution for the acceptance of nearly thirty millions of people, situated in

## SOUTH AMERICA AND ASIA.

	Ret.	Sub.		Ret.	Sub.
Buenos Ayres .	1	3	Brought forward	4	13
Chili . . .	0	2	Mexico . . .	18	9
New Granada .	0	3	Cuba . . .	5	1
Peru . . .	3	5	Philipine Islands .	0	3
			Porto Rico .	1	0
Carried forward	4	13			
				28	26

three quarters of the globe, and opposed in interests as well as in habits, on a plan so defective in all its parts, is the most extraordinary of the many singularities which marked the Spanish contest.

In the new representative plan, neither population nor wealth was taken as a basis. Valencia, with 1,040,740 souls, was allowed nineteen deputies; whilst Granada, including Malaga, and containing 1,100,640, had only two. The ancient kingdom of Navarre with 271,285 souls, Biscay with 130,000, Guipuscoa with 126,789, and Alava with 85,139, are rated at one each; whereas, the mountains of Ronda had two. Spain, with fourteen millions of souls, is set down at one hundred and fifty-four deputies; when the South American and Asiatic provinces, by the central junta declared integral and equal parts of the monarchy, and containing a population of more than seventeen millions, were represented by fifty-four. Never was anything more monstrous than the organisation of the Cadiz legislature—more opposed to the practice in ancient times, or more at variance with the objects for which the Cortes were to meet. It was not even in accordance with the wild theories of the day. The absence of opposition was the only sanction given to their labours; a circumstance which may be easily accounted for in the existing state of the Peninsula.

## CHAPTER V.

Principles and Effects of the Constitution.—Opposition.—Prospects of the War change.—French expelled.—Treaty of Valençay—Rejected.—Ferdinand VII. returns.—Violent Proceedings of the Cortes.—They declare War against the King.—He lingers in Valencia.—A Reaction in Public Opinion.—Manifesto of May 4th.—The Constitution overthrown.—The King reaches Madrid.

NAVARRE, the Basque provinces, and other sections occupied by the French, it thus appears did not become parties to this singular exhibition of mock legislation;\* and it is equally evident that the new code was sent forth without its principles or the changes introduced by it being understood by those for whose observance it was intended. The powers of the framers, however, would never have been questioned had they confined themselves to the exigencies of the moment; but when they were seen rashly subverting the ancient institutions and replacing them by others purely democratical, the indignation

\* It is a curious fact, that D. Miguel Antonio Zumulacarregui, one of the judges of the high court of Asturias and brother of the lamented Carlist chieftain, sat as a substitute for the province of Guipuscoa.



became general, and numbers who had hitherto been zealous partisans of the patriotic cause deserted it on witnessing so many extravagant proceedings. As the French retired, a host of petty tyrants was sent forth to the provinces, where they established their pro-consular authority. Ambitious of power and eager for revenge, they began by inquiries and prosecutions. Lists of obnoxious persons were made out, secret denunciations admitted, and in some instances persons cast into prison and deprived, without a hearing, of the little they had saved from the general wreck. These inquisitorial proceedings became more odious to the nation than the yoke of the French.

The principles proclaimed by the constitution, if possible, are more monstrous than the manner in which it was constructed. It begins by declaring that the legislature is composed of the general and extraordinary Cortes of the Spanish nation, represented by deputies from Spain, America, and Asia ; that the national sovereignty resides in the Cortes, and that the power of making laws belongs to them, jointly with the king ; that the population is to be taken as a basis for the new electoral law, without any defined qualification for eligibility ; that the Cortes were to meet every year, and, on closing, leave a permanent deputation sitting, to watch over the observance of the constitution, report infractions and convene the

legislature in extraordinary cases, and that the king should be the head of the executive and sanction the laws. A new plan was also formed for the government of the provinces, the election of municipalities, the assessment of taxes, and a variety of other purposes. In a word, the Cadiz Code deprived the king of the power of dissolving or proroguing the Cortes, and in other respects destroyed the royal prerogative, as well as feudal tenures and the rights of property. It confounded the various classes, reduced the power of the clergy, extinguished the civil rights of a whole community, cancelled all previous compacts made between the sovereign and the people, broke the bond of union, tore asunder the charters, confiscated the privileges and franchises so highly valued by the inhabitants, and, in a word, obliterated every line and feature of the ancient institutions, by transforming Spain into the reverse of what she had been. It was a sweeping proscription of every privileged and corporate body in the country, annihilating the whole, and leaving neither wreck nor vestige behind.\*

\* The pressure of the moment would unquestionably justify the exercise of power, either irregularly or accidentally obtained, when directed to proper purposes and circumscribed by due limits; but unfortunately the Cortes lost sight of the origin of that power which they wielded, and cared little how they used it. In their onset, they professed to be a substitution for the central junta, by its orders convened; and yet they forgot that if this junta possessed any power, it must have been derived from the provincial juntas, some of them, under the name

Such a transition as that which this code was calculated to effect, was too sudden and too violent not to meet with decided opposition. Its levelling principles and subversive doctrines were accordingly denounced from the pulpit and by the press. Every epithet of odium and contempt was applied to its officious framers; and so great was the apprehension of disturbances entertained by the government itself, that, within a month after its promulgation, they prevented arms from being

of *deputations*, instituted even before the French invasion, for municipal and provincial matters only. After all then, this was the real and original source of the central power so extensively exercised, the laws of the realm and the king's commands having been set aside; and can any one imagine that the provincial juntas ever contemplated the idea of transmitting to a central government, provisionally established, the power of annulling general laws, changing the national institutions, and destroying ancient usages? Busied, as they were, in the defence of those districts over which, by virtue of the popular will, they presided, and obliged even to encourage the prejudices of those who seconded their exertions, can it be supposed that the provincial juntas ever imagined that their delegated authority would serve to outrage the feelings of the community? In 1812, for example, whilst the clergy were exhorting the people against the French, and, in many instances, personally offered a daring resistance, the Cortes were destroying the clergy, and plotting how to seize upon their property. Was this agreeably to the wishes of the provincial juntas, or their constituents? The Cortes suppressed the Council of Castile in an illegal and impolitic manner. Its decisions doubtless had often been biassed by the opinions of the court, still it had done much good—recent good, and was besides a tribunal consolidated in public opinion. The Cortes boasted of their good administration of justice, and yet they did not see that the very laws en-

entrusted to the Galician peasantry. Individuals of rank and influence were banished for merely expressing their disapprobation of its provisions or their dread of the calamities which it was likely to produce. The Cortes, however, had at first so far stood in awe of religious prejudices as to abstain from entering upon the dangerous question of church reforms. Having launched the new code, encouraged by success, they passed on to the discussion of measures affecting the clergy,

acted by themselves were duly observed. In the 287th article of the constitution it is ordained that no one shall be arrested without the charge against him being previously substantiated; and yet Mr. Richard Meade, of Philadelphia, was thrown into prison for merely urging a settlement for supplies, delivered under a pledge of prompt payment. Nor was this a solitary instance. Many members of the Cortes, particularly abroad, have attributed to themselves all the glory of the defence made by their countrymen. To them, have their admirers said, the triumph of Europe over France is due, and yet they did not even assemble till December 1810! To them, therefore, neither the battle of Baylen, nor the evacuation of Madrid, in 1808, was to be attributed. They did not bring back Romana with 10,000 men from the North—nor did they originally treat with England. Both Moore and Wellington were in Spain before their time. They treated Castaños as an enemy, and yet he contributed to the success achieved at Vitoria. M. de Pradt, in his *Mémoires Historiques sur la Révolution d'Espagne*, says, that in March 1811, the Cadiz Cortes sent deputies to Joseph Bonaparte, then in Andalusia, and that these deputies stopped at Seville on learning the result of the battle of Albuera, gained over Soult by Beresford on the 27th of March. Let the framers of the *immortal* constitution repel this charge before they seek either pensions or glory in a foreign land; but if they are to be tried, let it be by a tribunal of their own countrymen.

which ended in the abolition of tithes, thus affording a foretaste of what might hereafter be expected in this important department as the legislators proceeded on in their labours.

Notwithstanding the disadvantages under which the Spanish people laboured, inadequately supported by their government, and deserted by those who ought to have been their guides, they nevertheless persevered, and the character and prospects of the war soon afterwards changed. Napoleon had established military governments in all the Northern provinces immediately dependant upon himself. By this means he was better enabled to call forth local resources; but his operations became more embarrassed, although from the plans pursued it is pretty clear that his ulterior design was to incorporate with France all the territory on the left of the Ebro. The memorable campaign in the North disconcerted his projects, and his colossal power was shaken to its very centre. The moment was propitious, and the British armies in the Peninsula were increased. The capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, followed by the battle of Salamanca, compelled Joseph to quit Madrid and abandon Andalusia.

The battle of Vitoria broke Napoleon's sceptre in Spain; and that proud day will be ever renowned in the annals of the Peninsula. This was no ordinary defeat; and it is owing alone to the exertions of Foy's division, that the portion



of the French force then broken was enabled to concentrate itself once more within the Spanish territory. Napoleon was now threatened with invasion from that country which he had vainly endeavoured to subdue; and as a relief to his difficulties, he proposed a treaty with the captive sovereign, in the name of the Spanish nation. This treaty was concluded on the 11th of December 1813, when it was stipulated that "hostilities should cease; that Napoleon acknowledged Ferdinand VII, and his successors, according to the order of succession established by the fundamental laws; that the Spanish territory should be evacuated; and finally, that the Spaniards who had followed the fortunes of Joseph should be restored to their former employments, honours, and rights.

The Duke de San Carlos bore this treaty to Spain; but its ratification was refused by the regency. Napoleon's object doubtless was to guard his southern frontier and thwart the British,—a fact easily perceived at Madrid, where the regency and Cortes were now assembled;\* but the refusal to sanction the arrangement made at Valençay at the same time left the royal captives at the mercy of their oppressor, and liable to the contingencies of the war. So rapid however was

\* The Cadiz Cortes closed their sittings on the 14th of September 1813, three years all but ten days from the period of their opening. The Cortes assembled in Madrid were composed of fresh deputies, with the exception of those from the ultramarine provinces.

the succession of adverse events, and so well combined were the movements of the allied armies entering France, that Napoleon consented to release the king and his brother unconditionally; and towards the latter end of March they reached the Spanish territory, were received by General Copous, and welcomed with every demonstration of loyalty and attachment. Their return became the signal for a general rejoicing; and it was hoped that balm would be laid upon the wounds of all parties—that much would be forgotten and forgiven.

If the Cortes and regency had stopped after refusing to sanction the treaty, they would have acted wisely; but they determined to proceed further, and on the 2nd of February issued a decree, ordaining “that the king should not be acknowledged as free, and therefore not obeyed, until in the midst of the national congress he had taken the oath prescribed by the 173rd article of the constitution; that is, to keep and observe it. He was thus peremptorily called upon to accept and bind himself to the observance of a code of which he knew nothing except from the public prints—a code which subverted the fundamental laws of the monarchy, changed the legislation of the land, stripped him of his royal prerogative, and which had besides been framed by men wholly unprovided with powers, on a plan objectionable to the great majority of the people, and calculated only

to produce anarchy and civil war. In a word, he was required to receive the crown from the Cortes, and act as it should please them to direct. "Here are our enactments," said they to the king: "it is for you to confirm them as laws; we expect neither hesitation nor reply."

On the 19th of February, the Cortes addressed a manifesto to the Spanish people, in which, after giving themselves credit for almost all that had been done towards the expulsion of the French, and alluding to the treaty of Valençay, as well as the return of the *Afrancesados*, they indulge in the following tirade: "Can the father of his people, on seeing himself redeemed by their inimitable constancy, wish to return home, surrounded by the butchers of his nation, the perjurers who sold him, those who shed the blood of their own brethren, and covering them under his royal mantle in order to shield them from national justice, can he wish that they should thence insult with impunity, and as it were in triumph, so many thousands of patriots—so many orphans and widows, as will surround the throne and cry out for just and tremendous vengeance against the cruel parricides? Or do they seek, as a reward for their infamous treason, that the victims of their rapacity should restore to them their ill-gotten pelf, in order that they may go and tranquilly enjoy it in foreign regions, at the same time that in our desolated fields, our deserted

towns and burnt cities, the accents of misery and the cries of despair are alone heard ?”

Was this language to be held by a national congress at such an awful moment—a congress that had committed as many errors as those against whom this manifesto was issued? The fiery and declamatory style, coupled with the malignity breathed in every line, excited universal disgust. It was viewed as a firebrand cast forth to enkindle fresh enmities. It professed to be a philippic against the Valençay treaty; whereas its venom was directed against those who, either through a want of judgment, intimidation, or human frailty, had sided with the enemy, or emigrated in order to escape from the horrors of a disastrous war. No distinction was made between this class of persons and those who voluntarily served the invaders and wilfully betrayed their country. All who had bowed to a superior force were placed beyond the pale of the law, degraded, and treated as public enemies. There are other similar decrees on record, which would have disgraced the most sanguinary tribunal established in the worst days of the French revolution. The Cortes had already declared that the partisans of the French should not return, and there was little chance of their mandate being disobeyed by persons really criminal. Would it not therefore have been more prudent to abstain from scurrilities and wait for calmer moments, without de-

stroying the good effects of an amnesty, if it should have been deemed expedient to grant one.

Relieved from the presence of a powerful enemy, the reflecting classes saw that abyss to the verge of which they had been dragged by a few theorists, and loudly expressed their abhorrence of what had been done. Now it was that they became sensible of the extent of their misfortunes and had leisure to examine the nature of their injuries. Heretofore they had only been occupied with the cares of the war. The king's first intention doubtless was, to accept the constitution, of which he had only an imperfect idea ; but, in his progress towards the capital, finding the acts of the Cortes pronounced illegal, the clergy and nobles disgusted, the people clamorous, and everything unhinged, he naturally hesitated ; when, unfortunately, no mediator was at hand, to induce each party to yield up the extremes of their respective creeds, in the way of compromise. Spain during the king's absence had unquestionably undergone a change ; and whilst the royalists were not prepared to receive institutions so democratic and mischievous as those which it was wished to impose upon them, the people were nevertheless favourable to improvements, and this was the time for their introduction.

It ought to be remarked, that unanimity never prevailed in the Cortes, either at Cadiz or Madrid, though the new code was signed by a large ma-



jority. It cannot indeed be concealed that the country then was, and still is, divided into two great parties, both hostile to the French and equally disposed to support the national independence, but differing in opinions regarding the changes advisable in the national institutions. The liberals were, however, resolved to avail themselves of the favourable opportunity which presented itself of having a new constitution ; whilst the royalists preferred the ancient forms, with gradual improvements. On this point the two parties were at issue. Even in the Cortes, where care had been taken to muster as many liberals as was possible, a strong opposition prevailed, particularly after the opening of the second session ; and this opposition was greatly increased by the measures taken to compel the king to submit, as well as by the furious manifesto of the 19th February.

By this time the sentiments of the great body of the people were known upon the merits of the constitution, as well as the position in which the king was placed. He reached Catalonia on the 24th of March, and refrained from exercising the smallest act of sovereignty, taking the part of an observant traveller ; and it is on all hands acknowledged, that nothing could exceed his amiable conduct, and the gratitude evinced for his deliverance. He was often heard to express his anxiety for the welfare of his realm, and a hope that it

would be in his power to reward the Spaniards for all their sacrifices. From Catalonia he proceeded to Zaragoza, next to Teruel, and thence to Valencia, avoiding Madrid. This delay and hesitation gave a stimulus to public opinion: nevertheless the opposition members did not venture upon any motion condemnatory of the constitution, or the decrees passed to enforce its acceptance. To the number of sixty-nine they however met privately, and on the 22nd April signed an address to the king, which was sent to him by a deputation, pointing out the defects of the constitution, the dangerous tendency of its principles, the illegality of the powers under which it was framed, and advising him, in order to obviate greater evils, to reject it.

This paper was afterwards printed, under the title of "Address, signed at Madrid by some of the deputies to the extraordinary Cortes in the most difficult moments of their oppression, having for object to make known to his majesty, on his entry into Spain, the state of the nation, the wishes of the provinces, and the remedies which they deem most suitable for existing evils." The proceeding was doubtless a strange one; yet, if at that time it had been moved to reject the constitution, with so large a number in favour of the proposition and the exclusion of the South American deputies and nominees, the friends of the Cadiz Code would unquestionably have been left

in a minority. The reaction in the country had been great; but the liberals were concentrated in Madrid and they defied control, refusing to listen to any terms which were not of their own dictating. They seemed determined to scare their opponents into silence and submission. Some show of military preparations was made, and General Lacy appointed to command their forces; but it was soon seen that the framers of the Cadiz Code were an isolated party in the state, notwithstanding they had the command of the army and wielded the resources of government.

A *coup d'état* was now inevitable. The king had remained quietly at Valencia, where he was visited by dignitaries and deputations from all parts of the kingdom, whilst in Madrid the utmost consternation prevailed as to his future intentions. Twice were chosen members sent down to beg him to come to the capital and put an end to public alarm.\* Addresses were again voted on

\* Among the individuals sent was the Cardinal de Bourbon, president of the regency, who was to inform the king of all that had happened during his absence, and not kiss hands before his majesty had accepted the constitution. The cardinal arrived, was graciously received, and hesitated what to do. Seeing that there was a fixed determination not to bend to the mandates of the Cortes, the cardinal kissed hands. The news of this incident filled the Madrid liberals with alarm, and from that instant the most cunning among them pronounced their cause lost. Had they been less proud and more circumspect, matters would have taken a different turn. They had then the fairest chance of redemption, and they flung it away.

the 25th and 30th April, describing the constitution as the only safeguard of the nation—the iris of peace and the seal of public felicity. These reiterated remonstrances were left unanswered, and produced no effect at Valencia, where an ominous silence prevailed till the 4th May, when a manifesto appeared, in which the king, after giving an account of his accession, the mode in which the royal family were entrapped, and the sacrifices made for his liberation, alludes to his decree of 8th May 1808, to convene Cortes for the purpose only of providing subsidies and other means of defence; after which he takes a rapid view of the manner in which the central junta and regency were formed, and passes on to the meeting of the general and extraordinary Cortes, which, he says, opened with fifty-seven elected deputies and forty-seven substitutes. The manifesto then proceeds thus:—

“ But to these Cortes, convened in a manner never practised in Spain even in the most arduous cases and in the turbulent times of minorities, when the meeting of deputies has been more numerous than in usual and ordinary Cortes, the estates of the nobility and clergy were not called, notwithstanding the central junta ordered this to be done by a decree, artfully concealed from the council of regency, who were equally unaware that to them the junta had assigned the presidency of the Cortes; a prerogative which other-

wise would never have been left at the will of the congress. Everything was thus placed at the disposal of the Cortes, who, on the very day of their installation and as a commencement of their acts, stripped me of the sovereignty which the deputies themselves had just before acknowledged, nominally attributing it to the nation, in order to appropriate it to themselves, and by this usurpation enact such laws as they deemed fit, imposing on the people the obligation of forcibly receiving them in the form of a new constitution, which the deputies established, and afterwards sanctioned and published in 1812, without powers from either provinces, towns, or juntas, and without even the knowledge of those said to be represented by the substitutes of Spain and the Indies.

“ This first outrage against the royal prerogative was, as it were, a basis for the many others which followed; and notwithstanding the repugnance of many deputies, laws were enacted, adopted, and called fundamental ones, amidst the cries, threats, and violence of those who frequented the Cortes galleries; whereby to that which was only the work of a faction the specious colouring of the general will was given, and for such made to pass among a few seditious persons at Cadiz, and afterwards at Madrid. These are notorious facts, and thus were those good laws altered which once constituted the felicity of our nation. The



ancient form of the monarchy was changed, and by copying the revolutionary and democratic principles of the French constitution of 1791, were sanctioned, not the fundamental laws of a moderate monarchy, but rather those of a popular government, with a chief magistrate at its head—a mere delegated executive, and not a king, notwithstanding the introduction of the name as a deception to the uncautious.”

The manifesto then exhibits the studious efforts made to prepare the public mind for the reception of the new code, to degrade royalty, and keep the revolutionary spirit alive, and ends thus: “I swear and promise to you, true and loyal Spaniards, that, at the same time I pity your misfortunes, your noble hopes shall not be frustrated. As your sovereign, I wish only to be such for you. I glory in being a king over an heroic nation which, by immortal deeds, has obtained universal admiration and preserved its liberties and honour. I abhor and detest despotism. The enlightened nations of Europe no longer endure it; nor were kings ever despots in Spain. This our good laws and constitution do not allow, although unfortunately, as everywhere else, and as happens in all that is human, abuses of power have from time to time occurred such as no constitution could entirely prevent; but, to guard against their recurrence and yet preserve the royal dignity and its rights, as well as those of the people, which are equally

inviolable, I will treat with the deputies of Spain and the Indies in Cortes legally assembled, as early as they can be convened after the restoration of order and the good usages of the nation; when, in a solid and legal manner, all shall be done that may be expedient for the welfare of my kingdoms, in order that my subjects may live happy and prosperous in one religion and under one government, bound together by an indissoluble bond, in which consists the temporal felicity of a king and kingdom pre-eminently Catholic; and preparations and arrangements shall at once be made for their meeting," &c.

This declaration virtually put an end to the order of things established by the Cadiz Cortes. Their immortal code, together with all its commemorative monuments, at once fell to the ground. No effort was made in its defence,—the oaths, registered in heaven, were forgotten. Eguia, who had been appointed Captain-general of Castile, took the king's edict to Madrid, where he arrived on the 11th, and immediately announced the suppression of the regency and dissolution of the Cortes. On the 10th of May the sun thus set, for the last time, during the period of the second experiment at least, upon Constitutional Spain. Some members and other flaming patriots proposed open resistance, but soon found that they possessed neither physical nor moral power. As far as outward appearances went, they preserved

their consistency, or rather their delirium, till the close. Some of the most vociferous were however seized ; and this put an end to the show of opposition.\* Ferdinand VII. entered the capital on the 14th, amidst general acclamations and other demonstrations of joy. Persons present attest that never did Madrid witness such a scene of general exultation. When the king alighted, the people took him up in their arms and triumphantly showed him to the immense concourse assembled in front of the palace, and in their arms conveyed him to his apartment. From Aranjuez to Madrid, his carriage had been previously drawn by the people. In the afternoon of the 16th, he walked through several parts of the town, the streets thronged with spectators ; but not a single constitutionalist ventured to show his face.

\* The number of persons arrested did not exceed thirty-four, among whom were four officers, two of them belonging to the navy, and not one who had distinguished himself in the annals of the Peninsular war. They were not however confined in dungeons, or put to hard labour, as has been asserted. Some of the most dangerous or vociferous were sent to the *presidios* of Ceuta and Melilla ; but they were not confounded with the *presidarios*. They resided there as exiles. Others were confined to certain towns or monasteries ; but they were allowed the enjoyment of their own property and intercourse with their friends. Let this treatment be compared with that experienced in 1823, or in the present time by the royalists : this is the only means of judging the severities alternately exercised by the two Spanish parties against each other.

## CHAPTER VI.

Reflections on the Overthrow of the Constitution.—The King's Position.—Tranquillity not restored.—Conspiracies follow.—Attempts at a Reaction.—Consequences of Failures.—The King does not redeem his Pledge.—Military Mutiny of La Isla.—Apathy of the Government.—The Constitution forced upon the King.

It is painful, at this remote period, to recur to the distressing scenes which followed the expulsion of the French; but there is no other mode of thoroughly understanding Spanish affairs. The events just recorded happened at a moment when public attention was absorbed by other more pressing matters—when the European nations were contending almost for their existence. Many important facts were consequently unknown, and others misrepresented. The victims of those unhappy times flocked among us, told us their disappointments and their sufferings; our sympathies were excited, and we formed our opinions from their inspirations. We judged between them and the king, whom they represented as their persecutor; but it is only now that we can judge between them and the great body of the Spanish

people.\* It is only now that the calm and dispassionate can duly appreciate the reasons which led to the overthrow of the legislative abortion of 1812, respecting which so much has been said and written;—reasons more fully developed by the incidents of the day, for the theories broached and the experiments tried at Cadiz were the offspring

\* Scarcely is a Spaniard to be met with who does not acknowledge the kind and generous conduct of Ferdinand VII. on reaching Madrid. At his levees every one was admitted. The number of memorials received with his own hand are spoken of as presented in cart-loads. In some instances he was egregiously imposed upon; but it is on all hands admitted that there was scarcely a case of merit left unrewarded, though the applications were so numerous. Such rapid promotions in the army, church, and civil departments were never before witnessed. Widows were particularly befriended, and the fatherless also had strong claims upon his bounty. Mina, in the extract of his "Life" before quoted, confesses "that the king, wishing to know him personally, sent him a royal permission to go to court;" and adds, "that during the twenty-five days he remained there, obtaining private audiences, he did all in his power to convince his majesty of the mistaken course which he was pursuing." What answer was made to the guerrilla counsellor is not stated; but Mina could not deny that, at his first interview, the king thanked him in the warmest and most affectionate terms for the services which he had rendered to his cause, and told him that during his captivity at Valençay he had obtained his portrait, and kept it hung up over his piano, in order that he might have it before him as a remembrance of his countrymen's exertions when he solaced his grief by the aid of music. It however appears that Ferdinand VII, even after this demonstration of regard, had counsellors near him whose advice was preferable to that of Mina, notwithstanding, as the hero of Navarre himself boasts, he had eighteen French generals at one time pursuing him and baffled them all;" taking care at the



of the moment; but, unfortunately, the errors to which they gave rise have protracted the existence of manifold calamities.

The Madrid Cortes were not so levelling as their predecessors, but not courageous enough to disavow the disorganising principles acted upon in Cadiz. They found a political system enforced at variance with every pre-existing in-

same time never to mention the name of a single officer of the many who contributed to his success. All the honours won in Navarre were exclusively his own; and to show how he sought to enhance his own prowess, his description of an escape will suffice. It is given in his own words; but the author forgets to tell us in what museum or cabinet of curiosities the *tranca*, or bar of the door, with which the wonderful deed was performed, is deposited, or in the possession of what English radical a weapon more valuable than the sword of either El Cid or Pizarro is preserved.

"I never suffered a surprise. Once, on the 23rd of April 1812, at break of day, having been sold by the partisan Malcarado, who had previously made his arrangements with General Panetier, and had withdrawn the advanced guard from before Robres, I saw myself surrounded in the town by one thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, and was attacked by five hussars at the very door of the house where I lodged. I defended myself from these latter with the bar of the door, the only weapon I had at hand, while my attendant, Louis Gaston, was saddling my horse; and mounting immediately, with his assistance, I sallied forth, charged them, followed them up the street, cut off an arm of one of them at one blow, immediately collected some of my men, charged the enemy several times, rescued many of my soldiers and officers who had been made prisoners, and continued the contest for more than three quarters of an hour, in order that the remainder might escape. This Louis Gaston I always retain about my person as a friend. The next day I caused Malcarado and his attendant to be shot; while

stitution, and yet no one ventured to denounce the consequences, notwithstanding so many were convinced that tyranny can be exercised by hundreds of men as well as by one, and that in proclaiming public liberty, individual security is not always obtained. There is only one mode of accounting for this hesitation. The opposition members of the Madrid Cortes were as much

three alcaides and a parish priest, likewise concerned in the plot, were hanging."

Among the instances of imposition practised upon the king, the following are worthy of notice. If he met, as he passed along the streets, a parish curate carrying the host, he was in the habit of alighting, in compliment to the sacrament, and making the curate enter his carriage, himself walked on foot. The king usually asked for the curate's name, who was sure to obtain preferment, till it was at length discovered that the opportunities of meeting the king with the little procession were purposely sought for.

Canon Varela, whose principal claim to public notice was the translation of a history of the Crusades, which he published with his own portrait, was made Commissary-general of the *Cruzada*. The canon soon grew rich, had the best cook in Madrid, and gave splendid entertainments. It was reported that his table was better served than that of the king, who mentioned the fact to him. "May I be allowed," said the canon, "to send to your majesty's table two dishes every day, as a sample of my own taste and my cook's ability." Out of a joke, the king consented to receive them. The canon now thought himself on the high road to preferment, and shortly afterwards asked for a bishopric. The king hesitated, and begged him to discontinue sending his daily dishes. Driving in the grounds of the Buen Retiro, the king one afternoon noticed Varela, wrapped in thought, looking steadfastly upon a little brook. "What, Varela," said the king, addressing him, "are you seeing whether you can fish up a mitre?"

overawed as they had been at Cadiz; and those who felt assured that the country could not be tranquil unless past errors were repaired, would have been in danger of their lives had they openly expressed their sentiments. The troops of the capital were commanded by officers of the movement party, and politics ran high. Instead therefore of endeavouring to allay the feelings of rancour which prevailed to a frightful extent, the sixty-nine members who signed the address presented at Valencia were obliged to deplore the public misfortunes in solitude.

It is an error to suppose that the Cortes bore the burdens of the war. On this point we have been deluded in England—on the spot only can the truth be learned. They pretended to engraft upon the monarchical constitution the principles of freedom, an undertaking in which their time was chiefly employed; but in this they rather advanced the interests of the French. Their proud and inflexible countrymen were disposed to reject all innovations, as alike dangerous and unnecessary. The old institutions might be infirm in principle and corrupt in practice; nevertheless, the Spaniards were accustomed to them. If defective, they ought to be improved; if abuses had crept in, they ought to be taken away; and if inapplicable to existing times and circumstances, they ought to be adapted to them: but the whole is not to be destroyed to please a few.

The temporary possession of Spain by the French had not loosened the bonds between the sovereign and his subjects; the machinery of the state was not broken—no convulsion, either lasting or general had occurred—no act, in short, by which the provinces had expressed their disapprobation of existing forms, or a desire for change; and even if they had, the task ought not to have been undertaken by a popular committee chiefly self-elected.

The crisis occasioned by the king's return was a momentous one, and for upwards of a month public opinion remained suspended between hope and fear. He then stood as an umpire between the Cortes and the people. He was called upon to decide a great and important question—one that concerned the whole community, and upon the issue of which tranquillity depended. The menacing attitude of the Cortes left him no alternative. They had proclaimed a proud defiance, and not only braved his authority, but also his popularity. They and their friends had said to him, "You shall do our bidding—you shall exercise no sovereignty until empowered by us—you shall be king after our fashion; when you return such attendants only as are of our choosing shall accompany you, and your subjects shall have no laws but those of our enacting. We will not even allow them time to inquire into the merits of that code which we have framed for their be-

nefit. They must accept it and thank us for the boon. They have no right to deliberate and decide: that right was vested in us, and we exercised it. It is therefore their duty to submit, as it is yours to obey our summons. If you do not, we shall resort to force."

This is the real position in which the Cortes then stood in reference to the king and people. Disguise is useless; the question must be looked full in the face, and each party judged according to its acts. The king and Cortes were then warring planets in opposite spheres, and submission would only have spread the seeds of confusion and created fresh occasions for strife. Three-fourths of the population were not disposed to yield themselves up to the bondage of an usurping faction. The constitutionalists were not perhaps either reckless or desperate revolutionists. Under the magical influence of change they commenced their labours, actuated by the best intentions. They had the welfare of the country at heart, but were misled by sophistry and delusive theories. A political delirium had seized upon their minds and blinded them as to their own faults. They were so far deceived as even to suppose that the knowledge and habits of a free constitution can be acquired by the mere change of form. They deceived themselves to such an extent as to imagine that all the talent and virtue in the nation were concentrated in



their own body, and they raised the hopes of their supporters by professions which could never be realised. They had drunk deep and intoxicating draughts of flattery. In Cadiz they had been likened to Pelayo, the restorer of Spanish freedom. Constantly were they eulogised in prose and verse, till at length, elated with success, they ordered *lapidas*, or commemorative monuments, to be raised to the constitution in every town and village, so as to render the glorious work of their own hands immortal.\*

The king's interposition could not therefore be dispensed with. The *veto* was with him, and he alone could solve the difficulty. He listened to the numbers who flocked to greet him from all parts of the kingdom, and felt that to have been taken away which his predecessors, when they entered upon their royal trust, had invariably confirmed. He had to choose between the Cortes, described as a mere legislative faction, and the great majority of the people, supported by the privileged orders. The result proved that he was right. When the Cortes ventured on a personal quarrel with him, they mistook their own strength. They had forgotten the empire

\* As a sample of constitutional compliments, the following may be taken:—*Se acabó ya nuestra deshonra. Ya no somos bestias—ya somos hombres—ya somos libres—ya somos todo lo que en la sociedad politica podiamos desear. Todo lo somos y todo lo seremos con la immortal constitucion que hemos jurado—obra la mas grande y perfecta que ha visto el mundo social.*

which the sacred and august name of king holds over the Spanish people, who in the person of the captive of Valençay and the victims of Godoy's tyranny besides beheld the triumph of their own patriotism and perseverance. Some were consoled by the promises which had just emanated from the throne, whilst others offered resistance which led to fresh calamities. The king did not redeem his pledge, and order and unanimity were far from being restored by his re-assumption of arbitrary power. Plots and conspiracies continued to agitate the country; whilst the constitutionalists, who sought an asylum abroad, were pitied and befriended.

From 1815 to the close of 1819, Spain presented a gloomy picture.\* A general reaction followed the fall of the Cortes; the acts emanating from them were rescinded, and everything restored to its ancient footing. Had those who now gained the ascendancy gone no further, or had the king then performed his promise, huma-

\* During the Hundred Days, the Duke d'Angoulême went to Madrid, and then became acquainted with the real state of public feeling in Spain. Ferdinand VII, relying upon the fidelity of the army, ordered two Spanish divisions to move towards the French frontiers, in support of the head of the Bourbon family. One of them, under the orders of General Castaños, entered France on the side of Roussillon; whilst the Count de Abisbal conducted the other as far as Ustaritz, near Bayonne. They withdrew on the 28th of August. It is presumable that the Duke d'Angoulême did not forget this service.

nity would not have had so much to deplore—the sunshine of hope which began to beam upon the land would not have been so long obscured. There was a long list of errors to atone for, a heavy load of grievances to lighten, of a date even anterior to the Cortes; and the new government seemed unwilling or incapable of undertaking the task. It became necessary to rebuild the frame of government in a manner better suited to the wants and wishes of the people; general relief was required, and the ravages of a long war remained to be effaced. After a display of such unparalleled energy during a six years' contest, it was scarcely to be thought that Spain would relapse into the enfeebled state from which she had suddenly started at the call of patriotism, into that apathy which prevailed when Napoleon planned his invasion. This anomaly was nevertheless witnessed by astonished Europe. The retrograde movement was complete, and again everything seemed stationary, as if the new authorities were afraid of taking a single step in the way of advancement. A local malady had seized upon the nation—a lethargy which it was impossible to overcome. There was a tendency to remain fixed in that position in which the country was left after the invaders' yoke had been broken. The government slumbered; and to the people it appeared preferable to endure the evils by which they were beset, than rush upon others unknown and untried.

It is by no means easy to account for the turn which affairs now took in Spain, although it must be confessed that careful inquiries on the spot lead to the conclusion that errors were committed on both sides. Ferdinand VII. had solemnly promised to convene Cortes, under the legal and national forms: why then did he not redeem this pledge? For this omission, his advisers doubtless were in some measure to blame; and there was perhaps on his part an hereditary dislike to the meeting of deputies, whose deliberations have sometimes been turbulent. The state of the nobility and privileged orders, however, was not propitious. Some had joined the French, whilst others were with the constitutionalists. Party effervescence had not subsided, and extensive preparations were besides necessary. There was one great difficulty to overcome, which alone would have rendered all plans of conciliation abortive. It was estimated that upwards of ten thousand families, mostly in exile, had been compromised by adhering to the French, or were labouring under suspicion on account of absence. It was necessary to recall and reconcile them without wounding public opinion or setting a bad example. These unhappy beings had been indiscriminately pursued with relentless fury and fell proscription by the constitutionalists, although the latter were the smaller number, not being estimated at more than one thousand families. They

had nevertheless acted as if the country could not contain them and the *Afrancesados*, so deep was that enmity which they had uniformly evinced.\*

The king was better able than any one else to judge of the feelings and position of the French party. He knew all the circumstances under which the invaders entered Spain, and that peremptory orders for their favourable reception had been extorted from his father and himself at Bayonne. The treaty of Valençay also contained stipulations in their favour ; and besides, he doubtless felt anxious to signalise his return by some act of justice and mercy towards many who had erred merely from a want of judgment. A limited amnesty was accordingly published on the 30th May 1814, excluding all who had accepted civil or military employments, honours, and distinctions from the French ; but allowing the rest, under certain restrictions, to return home. Sergeants, corporals, and privates were also included in the amnesty. More was expected from him by the exiles, but the state of public opinion even among the royalists would not allow it : nevertheless, it must not be forgotten, that whatever were the errors or even the infidelities of the

\* That these parties were irreconcilable enemies, is proved by the first decree of the Cortes against the *Afrancesados*, dated Cadiz, August 11th, 1812 ; the second, of September 21st ; the circular of the Ministry of Grace and Justice, September 29th ; and the third decree of the Cortes, dated November 14th,—all in the same year.



*Afrancesados*, they gradually blended down with the rest of the population, and ceased to form a separate faction in the state.

Not so the constitutionalists; their confederacy remained unbroken. They thought themselves wronged, and determined to regain their lost power even by force. The internal state of Spain was certainly wretched, and yet in the provinces the symptoms of discontent were only partial. The people, generally, seemed wearied out with disasters and convulsions, desirous only of repose. Under great disadvantages they had set to work, in the hope of repairing the ravages of a protracted war, and felt anxious not to be disturbed. In some of the provincial capitals, maritime towns, and among the officers of the army and navy, disaffection unquestionably prevailed to a considerable extent. Of these elements the constitutionalists resolved to avail themselves in order to create a reaction, and with this view every engine was set to work. Mina gave the first signal for resistance, by an appeal to arms. Trusting to his popularity in Navarre, he collected a party and succeeded in entering the fortress of Pamplona; but finding that the soldiers who followed him could not be trusted, he withdrew to France.\* The government caught the alarm, and

\* Mina acknowledges that this happened on the 25th September 1814; further adding, "that he disclosed, for the first time, that his object was to *proclaim the Constitution and the*

it is natural to suppose that, with the fresh difficulties which had arisen, all idea of convening the Cortes was for the time being abandoned.

On the 18th of September 1815, Porlier succeeded in gaining over the garrison of Corunna, and arrested the local authorities. He afterwards

*Cortes.*" These unseasonable attempts, which commenced four months after the king reached Madrid, served as a plea to delay, and afterwards to suspend the convocation of the Cortes. Francisco Espoz y Mina, in the extract above mentioned, says that he was born at Idozin, a village of Navarre, June 17th, 1781; and that his parents were honest farmers. As soon as he had learned to read and write, he devoted himself to the labours of husbandry; and on his father's death, took charge of the little patrimonial farm and continued there till twenty-six years of age. On the invasion of the French, he entered Doyle's battalion as a soldier; and in the same character joined the guerrilla commanded by his nephew Xavier, who died in Mexico.

In April 1810, Mina was named commander-in-chief of the guerrillas of Navarre. He describes the organisation of his corps in these words:—"Immediately after I was named to this command, I disarmed all those who were at the head of guerrillas, and particularly one named Echeverria. This man, under the mask of *guerrillero*, with from six to seven hundred infantry, and about two hundred cavalry, was the terror of the villages, which he plundered and oppressed in a thousand ways; which obliged them to complain to me concerning him. In consequence, I proceeded to Estella on the 13th July 1810; and having myself arrested him in a house where he was, though my force was considerably inferior to his, I caused him on the same day to be shot, together with three of his principal accomplices; and I incorporated his soldiers with those I commanded, who did not exceed at that time four hundred men of all arms." This is a tolerably good sample of the origin of a guerrilla corps in those days.

took possession of Ferrol, and issued a proclamation, complaining that the hopes of the nation had been disappointed—that the king was badly advised, and, in order to remedy the evils of misgovernment, suggested the expediency of reassembling the Cortes.

After retaining his power for four days without these complaints being responded to, Porlier's troops abandoned him, and the unfortunate man fell a victim to his own rashness, or ignorance of the state of public opinion.\* Whether this was an isolated effort of despair, or the constitutional leader had rational hopes of success from the number of partisans pledged to his support, is not easily ascertained. Be this as it may, these failures increased the vigilance of the Madrid

\* D. Juan Diaz Porlier, called *el Marquesito*, or Little Marquis, was a native of Carthagena in South America, and educated by his uncle, the Marquis de Bajamar. He entered the navy, and served as a midshipman at the battle of Trafalgar. On the invasion of the French, he joined an infantry regiment, and through his gallantry rapidly advanced to the rank of colonel. He was afterwards commissioned to form a guerrilla, which greatly harassed the division of General Bonnet. As a reward for his services, he was made Captain-general of Asturias; which command he held at the time of Ferdinand's return from France. Being confined in the Castle of San Anton, under the plea of ill health he obtained permission to drink the waters of Arteijo, a small town near the coast, two and a half leagues from Corunna. Here the project of proclaiming the constitution was formed, jointly with Colonel Cabrera, commanding the Lugo regiment, and several other officers. It is well known that Porlier was

government, and in some measure warranted the acts of severity to which they resorted. Whatever the more immediate causes of failure may have been, it is evident from the part which the troops and people of Galicia took in Porlier's affair, that they were not prepared for the diffusion of those lights with which he expected to allure them. Vidal's conspiracy was equally unsuccessful. Similar attempts, successively made in the course of four years, only added to the list of victims and exasperated the ruling power. Still conspiracies continued; and in order to promote them, secret societies were formed which corresponded with the emigrants abroad. Although the result of so many attempts appeared sufficient to deter ordinary men from exposing themselves to the fate

denounced by some person who had entered into his views and possessed his secrets. Among those who at the moment hastened up to court with the news of his arrest, was Captain Quiroga, who for some service or other performed on this occasion advanced two steps and was made a lieutenant-colonel. After the affair of La Isla, and when he had become the hero of the day, Quiroga appeared at the first levee with all his new honours blushing upon him, and knelt down to kiss the king's hand. Whilst the ceremony was performing, Ferdinand VII, drily whispered to the kneeling knight, *Te acuerdas de lo de Porlier?*—(Dost thou remember what happened respecting Porlier?) The effect of this little hint upon the general's nerves was so great, that he nearly sunk down in confusion; which the king observing, he called out to the attendants, *Que traigan un vaso de agua para el heroe que se desmaya*;—(Bring a glass of water for the fainting hero.)

which befel Porlier, Lacy,\* and others, disappointments rather served to stimulate than to deter the Spanish constitutionalists.

We now approach a more eventful period of the history of this turbulent and aspiring party. In December 1819, a large force was assembled in Lower Andalusia, destined for America; a service by no means liked either by the officers or privates. The opportunity so long desired of effecting a change on a large scale now presented itself, and due notice was given to the secret societies. Pledges of support were also received from several officers commanding in the maritime towns; and if anything exceeded the infatuation of the Madrid government, it was the ignorance of its

\* D. Luis Lacy, descended from an Irish family, was born at St. Roque in 1775. He entered the army at an early age and served against the French. With the rank of captain, he afterwards went to the Canary Islands, where an affair of honour obliged him to quit his regiment. Flying to France in October 1808, he entered the 6th regiment of light infantry, then at Boulogne, as a private. General Clarke, afterwards Duke de Feltre, having mentioned to Napoleon the incidents which obliged Lacy, his relative, to quit the Spanish service, a captain's commission was presented to him, and he was attached to the Irish Legion, then organising at Morlaix under Arthur O'Connor. With the rank of lieutenant-colonel, he followed Murat to Spain, and was at Madrid during the memorable rising of the 2nd of May. Not liking the part which he had taken against his native land, he abandoned the French, and resumed his old rank in the Spanish army. He was soon made a lieutenant-colonel, and named to the command of Catalonia. Subsequently he served with the same rank in Galicia, and acquired the reputation of a



agents regarding the transactions of men conspiring almost at mid-day. A general plan of insurrection was organised in the Expeditionary Army, and broke out on the 1st of January 1820, when the Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed.\* This example was followed in Galicia, where the soldiery equally took part.

Mina at this juncture appeared in Navarre, and issued a proclamation, in which he stated, "that he had just arrived from the French capital, whither he had been carried by his desire of being useful; that he hurried back to unite his efforts with those of the men, who at the very gates of Cadiz had invoked the sacred names of the Constitution and Cortes." Agar, the late re-

skilful and gallant officer. At the peace, he retired to Vinaroz, on the coast of Valencia, where he lived in retirement till 1816. He was a great favourite with the army, as well as with the liberals. Having gone to the baths of Caldetes, a few leagues from Barcelona, he there met with General Milans, an old comrade, and several others, who were plotting a reaction. Lacy was induced to join the confederacy, and a plan laid for him to raise the constitutional standard, on the 5th of April 1817. Having been betrayed by some person initiated in the secret, he fled, was overtaken by Llauder, conducted to Barcelona, and tried. Being sentenced to death, apprehensions were entertained of a commotion at Barcelona; and he was taken to Majorca, and there shot, July 5th, 1817.

\* Don A. M. Alcala Galiano, who happened to be at Cadiz, his native place, was one of the projectors, and wrote a "Sketch of the Origin of the Revolution undertaken for the purpose of establishing the Constitution." After regretting the failure of the project concerted in 1819, and defeated through the vigi-

gent, also raised the standard of revolt, and soon the flame spread to Aragon, as well as Catalonia. After Abisbal's defection, the revolution was no longer confined to the extremities of the kingdom, or to the army. It reached Madrid, when the king and his advisers were so far terrified as to believe that no other alternative was left than to yield. In the morning of the 6th of March, an order appeared for the convocation of the Cortes; but it was now too late for half measures or indefinite concessions. The inhabitants, purposely excited, formed groups in the streets, and their spokesmen loudly demanded the constitution. A panic seized upon the au-

lance of General Sarsfield, the author enumerates the facilities by which the new enterprise was favoured; viz.—“a respectable army on a war-footing—the daring ideas of its officers—the remains of the fleet assembled on one point—a large supply of funds—the position of Cadiz, strong by nature, and proud of having been a barrier to the French, as well as the cradle of liberal ideas.” With these elements the revolution was effected and the position of La Isla taken, when proclamations and addresses were sent into the interior. Riego made several successful sorties towards Port St. Mary's, and gained over some detachments of the military; but the historian of the day himself confesses that “his appearance on the people produced only astonishment.” The mutineers do not disguise the fact that “the moral character of their soldiers was strengthened by the certainty that the position occupied by them could not be surprised; and, in the interval, they had an opportunity of training them.” It is afterwards acknowledged that “the obstacles to success went on increasing—that the Governor of Cadiz redoubled his efforts—that the city militia became more resolute, and the marine corps ardently hastened to defend the place,

thorities, and no one ventured to act. The accounts from the provinces were exaggerated, and it was feared that the whole army had changed sides and been joined by the people. The eyes of every one were turned to the palace, when suddenly the decree of the 7th made its appearance, and without the slightest opposition the liberals gained a signal triumph.

Treachery or imbecility was evidently mixed up in this affair. Towards the end of February,—that is, nearly two months after the first movement of the mutineers,—the king himself wished to go down to the army; but was dissuaded by his minister, the Duke de San Fernando. This

whilst the remainder of the army, whose adhesion was expected, remained passive. Our revolution, (they add,) “confined to the walls of La Isla, neither advanced, nor receded.” D. Evaristo San Miguel, the other historian, alluding to the failure upon Cadiz, writes thus:—“The hopes of gaining the most important point of Cadiz gradually vanished. By force it was considered impossible to do anything; and negotiations, intrigues, and conspiracies no longer produced effect. Our situation was truly extraordinary; and the revolution, stationary for twenty-five days, without losing or gaining an inch of ground, presented one of the most singular phenomena in politics.” Riego’s sortie towards Malaga was unsuccessful, and during the months of January and February the people looked on as indifferent spectators. A military movement at Corunna on the 22nd of February, and Mina’s appearance in Navarre, turned the scale; otherwise the La Isla mutiny would have been defeated. After all, it was a mere speculative enterprise favoured by contingencies and the apathy of the government—an enterprise confined to one particular class—another mutiny of the Nore, although attended with different consequences.

was the first fatal error. Elio, captain-general of Valencia, learning how matters stood at court, posted up and begged the king to allow him to proceed to Andalusia, and, jointly with General Freyre, adopt some plan of pacification. Again the duke prevailed over the king, and the offer was rejected. Then it was that Elio gave utterance to his memorable saying—*El Rey esta perdido, y nosotros tambien*. The Infante Don Carlos ~~also~~ went to his brother's apartment, and after expostulating with him and pointing out the dangers of delay, asked permission to set out for the army in order to quell the mutiny, with only a royal authority to pardon the deluded soldiery. To his great mortification, the Infante's advice was overruled, and a military mutiny, which required prompt and energetic measures for its suppression, thus left to take its course.

Two months passed in inactivity, during which time the contagion spread to other parts of the kingdom, notwithstanding in the Northern provinces General San Roman had at first been equally as successful as Joseph O'Donnell in Andalusia. No advantage was taken of these triumphs; the king literally seemed spell-bound, and his ministers totally unaware of what was going on in the South. General Ballesteros, who in the previous year, and while acting as war-minister, filled the army with officers of dubious character, had just been appointed to the mili-

tary command of Madrid. He was deep in the plot, and ready to second the efforts of the Andalusian mutineers. The disaffected in the capital had been worked up, and in the morning of the 7th a large concourse of riotous persons assembled in front of the palace. Ballesteros happened to be with the king, and looking out of the window, as if alarmed at the popular movement, he abruptly told his royal master that all was lost if he did not instantly accept the constitution, as the people were already forcing their way into the palace. The Infante Don Carlos and the Duke del Infantado wished to place themselves at the head of the royal guards and quell the tumult; but Ballesteros, drawing a list from his pocket, and handing it to the king, assured him that the officers whose names it contained could not be trusted, and that the whole army was infected. His artifices prevailed, and the revolution was completed in the very palace, literally as if the scene had occurred in Constantinople, at a moment when a trivial effort would have saved the monarchy from misfortune and disgrace.



## CHAPTER VII.

Dangers of a Military Revolution.—Reprobated by the Allied Powers.—Measures of the New Cortes.—Disband the La Isla Army.—Banishments.—Discontent.—Riego and his Comrades.—Attempted Reaction.—Suppression of Convents.—Demands of the Liberals rise.—The King submits.—Murder of Curate Tamajon.—Curate Merino.—An Affray.—King's perilous Position.—Verona Negotiations.—Civil War.—The Trappist.—The Seo d'Urgel Regency.—Mataflorida and Baron d'Eroles.—Bessieres.

THE situation of a country must be dreadful indeed, when its destinies depend upon the results of a military mutiny.\* However great the

\* D. Rafael del Riego was doubtless the principal hero in this conspiracy. A student when the French invasion commenced, like many others of his companions he entered the army, and first served in the regiment of his native province, Asturias. Being taken prisoner and conveyed to France, he remained there till the end of the war, and then travelled in Germany and England. At the close of 1819, he found himself in Andalusia with the rank of colonel, and in command of his old regiment. The first plan for a rising, in which Count de Abisbal took part, having failed, and Quiroga, Arco-Aguero, Lopez Baños, O'Daly, and others being then arrested, Colonel Riego, well acquainted with the previous combinations, at the head of his regiment proclaimed the constitution at Las Cabezas de San Juan, next at Arcos, and then at Alcalá de los Gazules, where he liberated Quiroga, who as elder in rank took the command. M. Alcala Galiano assisted in a civil ca-

errors of the Madrid government, and however lamentable the king's forfeiture of his pledge, still it cannot be denied that blame was equally attached to the opposite party. The remedy therefore was worse than the disease ; since, when the soldiery are invited to revolt as a means of redressing grievances, the safeguards of society are at once broken down. The experiment of the power derived from so formidable an engine of revolution was calculated to excite alarm even in the breasts of those who employed it ; for although the government were eventually obliged to submit to their conquerors, the triumph was not a bloodless one, and it was achieved at the expense of discipline and subordination. The

pacify, and when the mutineers were shut up in La Isla, wrote the principal proclamations and addresses which served to extend the insurrection. On reaching Madrid, this civilian became one of the leading speakers at the debating society of the *Fontana de Oro*, and was afterwards named Intendant of Cordova. In 1822 he was elected to the Cortes, from which period he is classed among the leaders of the *exaltados*. His speeches were marked with impetuosity and extreme liberalism ; but his ideas were not always regular, or his conduct consistent. He was among the emigrants in this country, and a warm admirer of radicalism,—a blessing of which the last importation into Spain has been pretty extensive. The latter part of his political career was the most successful, his labours having been crowned with the appointment of minister of marine. Whilst the army remained at La Isla, the naval arsenals were completely gutted. The copper, brass cannon, rigging, and other valuables, were sold to the Gibraltar Jews, who ascended the river of Santi Petri and fetched their purchases away.

people were no parties to the expedient adopted; and if it had not been for the improvidence of the government, the accidental circumstance of a large military force being collected near Cadiz destined for an unpopular service, and the defection of several generals, the unwearied exertions and extensive plots of the constitutionalists would in all probability have been rendered fruitless. As it was, a change effected in so extraordinary a manner was not likely to lead to final and permanent measures.

Although the revolution of 1820 was now complete and celebrated in the principal towns with comparatively few symptoms of dislike, the mass of the population were by no means satisfied; and when the first ebullitions of party feeling and political intoxication had subsided, it became apparent that the drama of 1814 would ere long be re-enacted. For some time a disposition was, however, felt to try the prudence of those whom the military mutiny had restored to power, and even hopes were entertained that they had acquired some judgment and temper in the school of adversity; but the experience of a single month served only to sharpen the sting of disappointment. Having overcome the first obstacles, the next aim of the liberals was to secure their new acquisitions; and with this view, everything was put upon the same footing as in the time of the constitution. The functionaries

found in office were dismissed and replaced by others, the press set to work, and every possible precaution adopted to guard against the contingency of a second overthrow. Orders were issued for the convocation of the Cortes, the emigrants returned, and their party was greatly strengthened by the amalgamation of the officers who had been instrumental in the rising at La Isla.

The reign of liberalism being triumphantly re-established, circulars were addressed to the several cabinets of Europe, and among others to that of St. James. The answer returned, dated April 21st, and signed by George IV, merely acknowledged the receipt of the Spanish communication, accompanied with an assurance of the sincere interest felt by his Britannic Majesty in the well-being and prosperity of the Spanish nation, as well as in the stability and honour of the crown. That given by the Imperial Russian ministry, under date of May 2nd, was prophetic, and spoke of the La Isla occurrences in terms of abhorrence and reprobation, at the same time denouncing the fatal effect which such an example must have upon the general tranquillity of Europe.\* The

\* The following are among the most important passages:—  
“ Even though these events should be considered only as the deplorable consequences of the errors which, since the year 1814, seemed to presage a catastrophe for the Peninsula; still nothing can justify the aggressions which deliver up the destinies of a country to a violent crisis. Too often have similar disorders announced days of sorrow for empires. The future

circular of the Imperial government, inclosing this note to the Russian ministers residing at foreign courts, is still more highly condemnatory of the manner in which the changes in Spain were effected; and after alluding to the great transactions which led to the European alliance, and the

for Spain appears again under a sombrous and disturbed aspect. Well-founded disquietude must consequently be awakened throughout all Europe; but, the more serious the circumstances and the more likely they are to become fatal to that general tranquillity of which the world has scarcely tasted the first-fruits, the less does it belong to the powers guaranteeing that universal benefit to pronounce separately, precipitately, or only with partial information, a definitive judgment upon the transactions which marked the commencement of the month of March in Spain. Not doubting that the cabinet of Madrid will have addressed similar communications to all the allied courts, his Imperial Majesty readily believes that all Europe is about to speak in one unanimous voice to the Spanish government the language of truth, and consequently the language of a friendship equally frank and well-intentioned.

“Meanwhile the Russian ministry cannot refrain from adding some considerations on the occurrences to which the Chevalier Zea de Bermudez refers in his note. Like him, the Imperial cabinet will invoke the testimony of those facts, and in so doing make known to him the principles which the emperor proposes to follow in his relations with his Catholic Majesty. In shaking off the foreign yoke which the French revolution sought to impose, Spain acquired indelible titles to the esteem and gratitude of all European powers. Russia paid to her the tribute of these sentiments in the treaty of July 21, 1812.”

“Since the general pacification, Russia has, in concert with her allies, given more than one proof of the interest she takes in Spanish affairs. The correspondence which took place between the various courts of Europe attests the wish which the emperor has always formed, that the authority of the king



obligations of its members to prevent the storm which lately threatened France from bursting a third time from the same horizon to desolate Europe, it concludes with a hope that the Cortes would never consent to legalise insurrection.\*

France, Austria, and Prussia participated in

should be consolidated, through the medium of pure and generous principles, as well as by the support of vigorous institutions, rendered so by the regular mode of their establishment. Institutions emanating from thrones are conservative; but when they spring up amidst troubles, they only engender a new chaos. In declaring his conviction on this point, the emperor only speaks according to the lessons of experience. If we look back to the past, great examples present themselves for the meditation of nations, as well as sovereigns. His Majesty persists in his opinion—his wishes are not changed, and of that he hereby gives the most formal assurance.

“It now belongs to the government of the Peninsula to judge whether institutions imposed by one of those violent acts, the fatal patrimony of the revolution against which Spain had struggled with so much honour, can realise the benefits expected from the wisdom of his Catholic Majesty and the patriotism of his councils. The path by which Spain shall choose to seek this important object, and the measures by which she endeavours to destroy the impression produced in Europe by the events of the month of March, must determine the nature of the relations which his Imperial Majesty will preserve with the Spanish government, and the confidence which he would always wish to testify towards it.”

\* The events now happening in Spain so closely resemble those of 1820, that the opinions expressed in this state paper deserve more than ordinary attention. Subjoined is an extract.

“Nevertheless, as if the alarms then excited by the state of France were not sufficient, it seemed necessary that the Genius of Evil should select a new theatre, and that Spain, in her turn, should be offered up as a fearful sacrifice. Revolution has

the views taken by Russia of Spanish affairs, and did not conceal their sentiments from the Madrid government. The work of revolution was nevertheless obstinately pushed forward, and on the 9th of July the Cortes met with the usual solemnities. The character of the discussions and the turn which public affairs soon afterwards took convinced the country that the new deputies were little else than nominees of the government, late emigrants, or persons who had taken part in the mutiny of the Expeditionary Army. The old system of intolerance was again introduced to

therefore changed its ground; but the duties of monarchs cannot change their nature—neither is the power of the insurrection less formidable or less dangerous than it would have been in France.

“ In unison, therefore, with his allies, his Majesty cannot but desire to see granted to the Peninsula such a government as may justify some hope in this age of calamities. By virtue of his engagements of the 15th of November 1818, his Majesty is bound to mark with the strongest reprobation, the revolutionary measures lately employed to give new institutions to Spain. Such is the twofold idea, developed in the annexed answer, which the cabinet of Russia has returned to the Chevalier de Zea by order of his Imperial Majesty. The emperor does not doubt that his august allies will approve of its contents—possibly they have already addressed similar sentiments to the court of Madrid. The same wishes may have inspired the same language; and convinced as is his Majesty that crime must always yield pernicious fruit, they may have equally deplored the outrage which has so recently tarnished the annals of Spain. We repeat it, this outrage is deplorable. It is deplorable for the Peninsula—for Europe; and the Spanish nation owes the example of an expiatory deed to the people of

prevent freedom in debate ; and if perchance a speaker had the courage to recommend moderation, or argue the question of expediency in reference to a measure proposed, he was silenced from the galleries, or the next day set down as a *servil*, and loaded with invectives in the movement prints. Having secured a majority in the chamber, the ministers cared little for the impotent opposition of their adversaries, and soon began to develop their projects against everything that menaced their own authority.\*

both hemispheres. Till this is done, the unhappy object of disquietude can only make others dread the contagion of their calamities. Nevertheless, amidst all these elements of disaster, and when so many motives combine to afflict the real friends of the welfare of nations, may a better future still be looked for. Is there no wise and redeeming measure calculated to reconcile Spain with herself, as well as with the other powers of Europe ?

“ We dare not affirm it, since experience has taught us to consider almost always as an illusion, the hope of a happy event ; but if we might trust the calculations which personal interest would seem to indicate—if it were permitted to presume that the Cortes would consult the interest of their own preservation, it might be believed that they would hasten to expiate by a solemn measure all that is culpable in the circumstances which accompanied the change of the administration in Spain. In this the interests of the Cortes are identified with those of Europe. The misled soldiery who protected may to-morrow assail them, and their first duty towards their monarch—towards their country and themselves, seems to be to prove that they will never consent to legalise insurrection.”

\* The ministers were, M. Perez de Castro for foreign affairs, a native of Valladolid, a deputy in the Cortes of 1812, and well read ; M. Garcia Herreros for justice, born at Soria, an advocate and a deputy for his native province in the Cortes of

Whether it was owing to the disapprobation expressed throughout Europe at the part lately taken by the army, or a dread that the same soldiers might be turned against themselves, does not appear; but it is a fact that one of the earliest measures devised by the new cabinet was the disbanding of the very force which had raised the standard of liberty at La Isla and restored them to power. The execution was hazardous, and it became necessary to enter upon it with the greatest precaution. In the way of experiment, the war minister removed Colonel Alexander O'Donnell and several of his officers from their regiment, which had early declared for the constitution at Ocaña. They complained to the congress, but their prayer was rejected. Encouraged by this essay, orders were issued to separate the army of San Fernando, till then concentrated in Andalusia. Its commander, Riego, was directed to proceed to Galicia, Espinosa to Tortosa, whilst Arco-Aguero and Lopez Baños were taken away on separate commissions.

This measure was met by a remonstrance from

1812; M. Canga Arguelles for finances, experienced in that department, and the author of the *Diccionario de Hacienda*, published in London (1827); M. Augustin Arguelles for the interior, born in 1775, at Ribadeselba, a small town in Asturias, and a deputy to the Cortes of 1812 and 1822; Marquis de las Amarillas for the war department; and Admiral Jabat for the navy, afterwards ambassador at the court of St. James, in 1823.

the dismissed officers, and addresses from several corporate bodies, so strongly worded that the government were compelled to pause and wait for a more favourable opportunity to realise their scheme. In order to have the appearance of bending to public opinion, the war minister was sacrificed and Riego invited to Madrid, whence, together with Governor Velasco, he was some time afterwards exiled to Oviedo. Several other officers were also sent into banishment, and among them Evaristo San Miguel, Manzanares, and Nuñez. This affair was brought before the Cortes, and the liberals themselves at the time heard to complain that, with the respectful submission of slaves, the minority had to listen to a calumniating ministry defending its own illegal acts.\* The La Isla officers, patriots *par excellence* in the opinion of the liberal party, through the influence of the ministers, the majority in the chamber, and the expedients resorted to, were thus banished without the formality of a legal process; but in order to mislead the public, a report was given out that they and their friends were favourable to the establishment of a republic.

The subdued party in the provinces were not disposed to look upon the events passing in Madrid with indifference. Early in March a

\* *Manifiesto á la Nacion Española*, &c. by Moreno de Guerra, deputy for Cordova in the Cortes of 1820 and 1821. Paris, 1822.



considerable number of persons assembled at Zaragoza and tore down the *lapida* of the constitution; but were dispersed, after some bloodshed, by a military force. Similar scenes took place in Galicia, Estremadura, and other places, without any result. The Spaniards were evidently brooding over their misfortunes, but the time had not yet come for strong manifestations of resentment. Notwithstanding the oppressive acts of the ministers, the liberals clung together and made common cause, taking care to keep their enemies disarmed and closely watched. More follies and outrages were requisite to undeceive the inhabitants of the leading towns and rouse public indignation. In the mean while, the labours of the Cortes went on and added to the general fund of discontent. The sixty-nine deputies who signed the address presented to the king at Valencia in April 1814 were disqualified for the exercise of any office, civil or military; at the same time that the *Afrancesados*, hitherto persecuted, with vindictive fury, were restored to their rights. Among the new measures was a decree awarding the penalty of banishment for eight years against any one endeavouring to dissuade the people from the observance of the constitution, and imprisonment for that period if an ecclesiastic.\* The law of

\* After the extinction of the monarchical government in England, that select assembly of the independent faction styled

entails was also altered, which gave great offence to the nobles.

Various reports on the poverty of the treasury, the annual deficit, the arrears of pay, and a variety of other financial matters, had been submitted to the chamber, and produced no small degree of embarrassment. The expedient of a foreign loan was adopted; and it being no longer necessary to temporise with the clergy, a plan was formed for the appropriation of church property, which it was supposed would yield an abundant harvest. By a decree passed October 1st, the monasteries were suppressed, excepting a certain number, and also several of the military orders, the revenues of which, it was agreed, should be set apart for the payment of the national debt, after pensions had

Parliament passed several bills as muniments of their power. In the same spirit of policy the laws of treason were also extended far beyond the limits within which they had been previously confined, and were declared to reach verbal offences, and even intentions, although not followed by any overt act. By the statute of May 14th, 1649, to affirm the present government to be an usurpation—to assert that the parliament or council of state was tyrannical or illegal—to endeavour to subvert their authority or stir up sedition against them, were all declared acts of high treason. It has often been remarked that the Spanish emigrants studied and copied examples from the reign of Henry VIII. and the Protectorate; as well as that they were desirous of introducing into their own Cortes the practice of our parliament. This was particularly observable in the Cortes of 1820; and when M. Mendizabel went to Madrid, it is well known that he frequently boasted of his acquaintance with our parliamentary usages.

been secured to Riego, Quiroga, and the other leaders of the La Isla mutiny. The inmates of the suppressed convents were to receive stipends from the government; but it was clear that the exigencies of the state, if no other reasons existed, would prevent the performance of this promise. Hitherto the king had remained passive, and sanctioned, certainly against his will, yet without any remonstrance, the various acts tending to destroy the little authority left to him; but when called upon for his assent to the suppression of the regular orders, he hesitated. At the end of a month his signature was reluctantly affixed, and the next day he departed for the Escorial.

The situation of Ferdinand VII. after the ascendancy gained by the constitutionalists resembled that of our Charles I. when at variance with the parliament. Educated in a high sense of the amplitude of the powers exercised by his predecessors, and holding them as the legitimate rights of the sovereign, his repugnance must have been great on finding himself the mere instrument of a party avowedly aiming at the overthrow of the ancient institutions, and the introduction of others obnoxious to the people, fraught with danger, and destructive of the trust committed to his own care. His predecessors of the Bourbon dynasty had acted upon the great principle of conservation; and although they refrained from convening the Cortes, though in

many other respects they introduced a new system of policy, Spain is to them nevertheless indebted for many benefits—many substantial ameliorations, which the enlightened natives are not tardy in acknowledging.\* The abrupt extinction of the religious orders, the confusion which it was likely to create, and the conviction that the proceeds would be liable to great malversation, must have given rise to considerable anxiety in the king's breast, if he merely recollected the difficulties attending the suppression of the jesuits in tranquil times, by means much more legal, and with the concurrence of the papal see.

\* “La politique des Bourbons sut non-seulement fermer et cicatrizer les plaies profondes, mais encore lui donner de plus grandes forces que celles qu'elle avait eues à ses époques les plus glorieuses.”—Sempere, *Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur et Décadence de la Monarchie Espagnole*. Paris, 1816.—In 1827, an interesting French translation was published of “Coxe's Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon,” by Don Andres Muriel, a Spanish exile, to which numerous notes and several fresh chapters are added, highly illustrative, and in some instances correcting the errors of our industrious countrymen. The production of this new work is a compliment to our literature, and at the same time throws more light upon the history of Spain from the time of Philip V. to that of Charles IV. than any other before the public. Volume vi. consists entirely of additional chapters, embracing the character of Charles III, his external policy, ameliorations introduced by the Bourbons, literary and economical societies of their creation, followed by a full account of the administration of Count de Florida Blanca. The heading of *Chapitre IV. Additionnel* begins thus—“*Progrès des lumières sous les Bourbons. Leur esprit réformateur, mais sage.*”

At a more advanced stage of the present undertaking, the several questions arising out of the confiscation and sale of church property will be more particularly considered, when notice will be taken of the several attempts in previous reigns to reduce the number of ecclesiastical establishments; but in the mean time, it must be evident to every one acquainted with the construction of society in Spain, that this precipitate, if not unjust measure on the part of the Cortes, could not fail to rouse public indignation and prepare the way for their own downfall. Besides the nature of the act, which general opinion regarded as a profanation, numbers of persons venerable in the eyes of the people were sent forth from their seclusion to beg their bread. The project therefore came before the public stamped with a double title to reprobation. It was pronounced a violent spoliation, as well as a revolting act of irreligion; and it appears strange that the patriotic senators of 1820, after clashing with the nobles and depriving so many public functionaries of their places, should have thus braved the anger of so powerful a body as the clergy.

As naturally may be imagined, confidence between the king and Cortes was now at an end. The latter were by this time openly arrayed against the sovereign, the clergy, the nobles, and the people, and upon some points divided even among themselves. Happy for Spain would it



have been if, during this second reign of delusion, future calamities could have been warded off by means of a compromise. The constitutionalists returned to power, not only actuated by vindictive feelings, but also determined to enforce their plans of reform; in doing which they disregarded the habits and prejudices of their countrymen, as well as the difficult position in which they placed the sovereign. Having obtained possession of the political stage, they formed a confederacy to keep it exclusively to themselves; and if anything was wanting to complete their usurpation, it was to vote their own perpetuity, as the long parliament did in 1642, and by means of intimidation obtain the king's consent. They had an army at their disposal, and, as was done in the time of Charles I, some of the king's advisers were denounced as enemies of the state. The indignity offered to him previously to his abrupt departure for the Escorial called into action all the elements of collision. The reduction of the monastic orders might be deemed advisable — nay necessary,—so it had been thought before; but the constitutionalists having resolved upon that important measure, contrived to render it doubly dangerous by the manner and degree in which it was to be executed, and the time chosen for carrying it into effect. Religious establishments of this kind had been interwoven with the frame of society in Spain—they were considered as a principal appendage of

the religion of the state, had been formed by the collective funds of private individuals, were associated with proud recollections of the past, and still held in veneration by all excepting the liberal party. When, therefore, the people saw these establishments suppressed,—the aged, who had spent their little all to procure an asylum for life, cast upon the world, and their substance bestowed upon persons who had set the worst possible example by heading a military rebellion,—their resentment passed all bounds.\*

Having succeeded in forcing the constitution upon the king—that same constitution which, only a few years before, had been pronounced illegal in its organisation and injurious in its effects—the demands of the liberals rose with every fresh concession, till at length it seemed that they not only sought to offer every species of indignity to the sovereign, but, in the end, actually to destroy the kingly office. Ferdinand VII. doubtless felt, and keenly too, the humiliations heaped upon him, at the same time that he was constantly reminded of the gloomy prospects of the country by those who ventured to his retreat. He was

\* Quiroga, for example, had capitalised his pension, and thus obtained possession of the Granja de Cernadas, a valuable estate near Betanzos, in Galicia, belonging to the monastery of San Martin, at Santiago, of the Benedictine order, upon which he cut a large quantity of timber. Others had obtained estates, the property of the suppressed orders, in a similar manner.

well aware that his sincerity was doubted, particularly after his protracted stay at the Escorial, and his pleading illness, not to be present at the closing of the Cortes on the 9th of November. On the day previous, it had been privately agreed by the deputies that no more than one fourth of their number should quit the capital during the recess, in order that a majority might be present in case of any emergency. The fair conclusion is, that both parties were preparing for a trial of strength, each disposed to pursue measures not altogether justifiable: but there was this difference in favour of the sovereign, that he was engaged in a defensive struggle for the maintenance of the just, necessary, and hitherto acknowledged prerogative of the crown, which his opponents had violently and unwarrantably invaded. His position was perilous, unprecedented; and if he transgressed any established rule, it was none of those acknowledged by the ancient forms, but only such as the usurpations of his enemies had compelled him to submit to.

Whether Ferdinand VII. wished to put his remaining power to the test, or entertained some secret design, would be useless to inquire; but, without any ministerial intervention, he directed General Vigodet to give up the command of New Castile to General Caravajal, which led to an immediate meeting of the permanent deputation, and a remonstrance from the ministers, tendering

their resignation. The royal order was signed on the 16th November, and the expectation of a rupture caused the garrison to be put under arms. The clubs received notice of their danger, the leaders of the party were instructed to hold themselves in readiness, and other preparations for resistance were made. This being done, the ministers and permanent deputation forwarded stronger representations to the king, advising him to return to the capital, at the same time taking care to have it conveyed to his ear that the consequences of a civil war would rest upon his own head.

Things were now in such a state, that the king found himself again compelled to choose between the anger of the Cortes and submission. A disposition unquestionably prevailed to rise in his favour, and some influential persons had already joined the royalist confederacy; yet no plan was concerted—no leaders named: the sympathies of the Continental powers could be relied upon, but their precise opinions had not been ascertained; nor were funds prepared for another contest. It must also be taken into account, that a government, whatever may have been its origin, acquires great strength from the mere circumstance of its being established; and had the constitutionalists, when they regained their lost places, acted with anything like tact and ability, they might have retained the ascendancy for a long period. Ferdinand VII. was neither a

stirring nor a bold prince. His spirits were besides much broken, and he dreaded to plunge the country into the misfortunes of a civil strife. The horrors of the French revolution and the fate of Louis XVI. were constantly before his eyes; nevertheless he knew his own influence, and that his signal only was wanted for an explosion; but he hesitated when he reflected upon the hazard of confiding his cause to the defence of popular masses entirely unprovided with arms.

He was, however, far from being unmindful that his enemies were divided among themselves—that the structure which they had reared in itself possessed no strong principle of durability, made up as it was by the forced and unnatural union of incoherent parts. Experience had besides shown that the new order of things had given rise to an earnest struggle between the prejudices and habits of an ancient monarchy, and the maxims and policy of a new one. It might therefore be reasonably anticipated, that when the combined influence holding the machine together was weakened, the fabric would tend to dissolution even through the operation of its own moving powers. It owed its origin to military force; and that force was already much enfeebled by the separation of the La Isla Army, for reasons operating in favour of the royalist cause. The king's plan for the present seems, therefore, to have been confined to the introduction of more



moderate men into the cabinet, for which an opportunity presented itself, and acting on a temporising policy, he gave notice of his immediate return to the capital, as well as of the removal of several obnoxious persons from his palace.\*

On the 21st (November) he arrived, prepared for further concessions. Riego was accordingly made Captain-general of Aragon; whilst Velasco received the command of Estremadura, and Espinosa that of Old Castile. O'Donoju, Mina, Doaiz, Lopez Baños, and Arco-Aguero, were equally raised to separate commands; but Quiroga retained his seat in the Cortes. These condescensions sufficed in the way of atonement, and something like a reconciliation was effected. Manifestations of popular discontent nevertheless continued to show themselves. Royalist papers were flying about the country, of which one of a mixed character made its appearance in the capital, tending to excite a counter-revolutionary move-

\* Among these were his confessor, his principal chamberlain, the Duke del Infantado, and Generals Bassecourt and St. Mare, who were also exiled to the provinces, and the Archbishop of Valencia sent out of the kingdom. Bassecourt was a French royalist, who entered the Spanish service after the death of Louis XVI. St. Mare was a native of Flanders, and, as a disciplinarian, was attached to the Spanish army previously to the French revolution. Both these officers distinguished themselves in the war against Napoleon. The latter was captain-general of Valencia in 1826, and afterwards made a counsellor of war. He died in 1831.

ment. It preached—"No despotism and no anarchy—no *camarilla* and no factious Cortes ; but a free and national government, founded on the ancient institutions." The author being discovered was thrown into prison, and his name ascertained to be Vinuesa, formerly the curate of Tamañon, a small town in the province of Guadalajara, seven leagues from the capital, and lately one of the king's honorary chaplains. At a moment of public excitement an incident of this kind was likely to produce much noise in a place where idlers and politicians abound. A surmise got abroad that the prisoner, in consequence of his high connexions, would be protected, and an evasion of justice was apprehended. This sufficed to rouse the ardent spirits frequenting the Puerta del Sol, and, in the true sense of the sovereignty of the people, they rushed in a crowd to the prison, forced open the door, entered the curate's cell, and with a blacksmith's hammer beat out his brains.\*

\* This deed was celebrated in songs, sung about the streets and in the guard-houses. In its commemoration, seals were worn with a crest representing a brawny and naked arm holding a hammer in the hand. This seal became fashionable among the *martillo* or hammer faction, and letters at that time received in England frequently had that impression upon them. The mob were also in the habit of expressing their displeasure at the conduct of an individual by beating hammers on the pavement under his windows ; a pretty significant indication of the fate which awaited him if he sinned against the sovereign people.

This murder was a signal for general agitation. The nobles, royalist officers, and ex-functionaries, held up to contempt and derision the conduct of those who were unable to prevent the commission of such an atrocity. The ejected monks called the peasants to arms, by invoking the altar and the throne, or appealing to their own wrongs. The habits of insurrection and irregular warfare had become so familiar to the Spaniards, that armed bands easily collected, which at first had the appearance of a church militant, being chiefly headed by monks or secular clergymen.\*

\* Of these the curate Merino was the most distinguished. This extraordinary individual, still alive, although repeatedly killed in the official reports of his adversaries, was a partisan leader in the war of independence. Being a parish curate at Villabiao in Castile, when the French entered, they embargoed his mules, and forced him to accompany them on the road, in other respects treating him with indignities. Vowing vengeance, he assembled his parishioners, armed the youths, and the vicinity of Burgos became the theatre of his exploits. At the close of the war, the honorary rank of colonel was confirmed to him; but wishing to pursue his clerical profession, he was made a canon of the cathedral church of Valencia. Having quarrelled with the chapter, he returned to his old curacy, where he happened to be in 1821 when the cry against the constitution was raised. The curate's adventures border on romance, and his escapes, when surrounded by enemies, are spoken of with astonishment. Old, yet hardy, he is always on the alert; and through his own vigilance and the fidelity of the Castilian peasants, at the commencement of the present contest he eluded the pursuit of large divisions having orders to bring him in dead or alive.

In last August the curate was in Guipuscoa, nearly cured of

The large cities were, in a contrary sense, agitated by clubs and debating societies. At first these clubs had been the organs of government; now they wished to dictate the means by which the commonwealth was to be saved. They publicly reproached the ministers for their apathy, almost accusing them of being leagued with the king, whom they denounced as the chief plotter, and his palace as a ready receptacle for the *Serviles*. The system of menace and personal insult was carried on against him to such an extent, that on the 4th of February he complained to

a kick received from a horse, which has prevented him from taking part in the late movements. He still limps a little; but although upwards of eighty years old, when mounted he has the appearance of a youth, being perfectly upright. He rides the best horse in the country, six years old, of the choicest Andalusian breed. His nephew was killed at Aguilar, near Burgos, whilst accompanying him to Portugal. Curate Merino is unpolished in his manners, abrupt in his conversation, and little acquainted with the elegancies of life; but correct in his morals, and by no means marked with that ferocity attributed to him. He is fond of his horse, his dog and his gun, and when not otherwise employed habitually spends his time in field-sports. He is a man of an extremely disinterested disposition, and much esteemed in his own neighbourhood. He is an excellent partisan leader, but never laid claim to any share of military skill. His popularity in the two Castiles is unbounded, and there is no man in Spain who can raise and retain so large a number of hardy peasants without expense.

Merino is plain-spoken, frank, and fearless. He sleeps little and never undresses himself, being satisfied to lie down between the same blankets which serve as a covering to his horses. He never has two suits together, and consequently no baggage.

the municipality, and policemen were stationed in front of the palace. The next afternoon he took his usual ride, and was again assailed with offensive vociferations, blended with cries of *Tragala!*\* A party of life-guards, irritated by these indignities, rushed out sword in hand, and dispersed the populace. Several were wounded in the affray; but the people returning with increased numbers, the guards were driven back to their barracks. A ferment ensued, and the disbanding of the guards was now imperiously demanded. The militia were put under arms, and the liberals flew to their respective posts. Serious consequences were apprehended; when

He wears the black *zamarra*, black pantaloons, and a *calañez* hat, such as is used by the Castilian peasant, with a low crown and large flap, like that of a quaker. He never wears any insignia of his general's rank. He is extremely frugal, and never smokes, or drinks wine. Water is his only beverage. He is of the middle stature, strong, but not robust. He allows no etiquette, and never admits the title of excellency in private conversation. Although he has long enjoyed clerical and military pay, he has not saved a dollar. All his money is spent on his *partida*; and of the men composing it he is not only the commander, but also the parent. Canon Barrios is his secretary and always accompanies him.

\* This was the burden of a song in favour of the constitution, sung by its admirers in the way of annoyance under the windows of those who were known to be opposed to it, frequently with menacing gestures, scurrilous epithets, and rough music. *Tragala, perro!* (Swallow it down, dog!) meaning the constitution, is the most striking passage in the song, and was repeated at the end of every stanza, frequently in full chorus. This species of political serenading is now revived.



the municipality interposing, the offending regiment was disarmed till some more definitive measure should be devised.

The tumult subsided, but the position of the royal family continued precarious, owing to the indiscreet zeal of the royalists, which it became impossible to control. On the 1st March, the second session of the Cortes opened; and in his speech, the king noticed the dangers to which he was exposed, lamenting that the measures adopted by the ministers to sustain that portion of the royal prerogative assigned to him had not been effectual. These remarks were considered as a personal attack upon the ministers, who the next day begged to resign. This step was probably anticipated, and on the 3rd the king instructed Admiral Jabat to desire the Cortes to propose a list from which he might select an administration. The subject gave rise to much animadversion, the leading speakers in the Cortes expressing themselves satisfied with the conduct of the ex-ministers, in consequence of which the interference of the chamber was declined. Not wishing to take the responsibility upon himself, the king referred the matter to the council of state,\* which presented a list of three eligible persons for each of the seven departments, from which M. Bardaxi, a man of

\* The council of state was named by the king on a proposition from the Cortes.—Article 133 of the Constitution.

moderate politics, was selected as prime minister.\* This choice did not prove agreeable to the majority in the Cortes; nor was it long before an opportunity presented itself of testifying their dislike.

A question of magnitude now interposed to draw off the attention of the Spaniards from the wretched condition of their internal affairs. The disapproval of the manner in which the constitution had been re-established was followed by manifestations of a disposition on the part of some of the Continental powers to interfere, and it was thought that this subject would be agitated in the congress adjourned from Vienna to Verona. The alarm caused by the events at La Isla had been increased by the contagious effects produced in Portugal and Naples, where the liberals, not having time to frame new institutions of their own, provisionally proclaimed the Spanish Constitution as the law of the land. Western Europe thus presented a new and menacing aspect,

\* M. Bardaxi, a native of Andalusia, early entered the diplomatic career, and was minister of foreign affairs in 1812, and envoy to Turin in 1819. The others named were, M. Feliu, for the interior, formerly a sub-lieutenant in a militia regiment of Lima, and a deputy in the Cortes of 1812 for Peru. In 1814 he was exiled to Zaragoza, and in 1820 contributed to the re-establishment of the constitution. His politics were nevertheless moderate. M. Pelegrin was appointed to the department of ultra-marine affairs, M. Cano Manuel to that of justice, M. Barata to that of finance, and M. Moreno y Daoix for war.

and much was feared from the rashness, inexperience, and intemperance of those who in both countries had secured to themselves the supreme control. Three revolutions had severally been effected in a manner contrary to the principles avowed at the settlement of general peace, and in their consequences were dangerous to European tranquillity. An impulse of an alarming tendency had been thus given; the question therefore was, how could it be stopped without the intervention of war?

Mr. Canning's appointment gave a new turn to our foreign relations. The points at issue had not been all settled at Vienna, several still remaining to be discussed at Verona, where it was expected the question arising between France and Spain would engross attention. The French for some time had been collecting near the Pyrenees a large military force, equipped for active service, the advanced line of which, under pretext of guarding against epidemic contagion, was employed as a *cordon sanitaire*. In this demonstration, however, an ulterior object was concealed. As neighbours, well acquainted with Spanish affairs, the French were early convinced that so unnatural a state of things must end in a violent convulsion, for which it would be proper for them to be prepared, their territory, in similar cases, having always served as a refuge to the fugitives of the defeated party. Numbers of their own malcontents, as well as

many Italians, had also fled to Spain and fraternised with the liberals of that country, being allowed pensions for their support. The speedy termination of the Italian revolution had excited feelings of disappointment among the members of the Spanish Cortes, who hoped that the success of other labourers in the same vineyard would strengthen their own cause; but so great was the reliance afterwards placed upon the good effects of a diversion, that the idea of stirring up a rebellion in France, with the aid of a co-operating force, was entertained by several leaders of the extreme movement party.\*

\* General Vaudoncourt, a decided Napoleonist, furnishes particulars of his own plan, in his "Letters on the Internal and Political State of Spain, in 1821, 22 and 23," without concealing names. His project was, to attack France from Catalonia; and insinuations were held out that a party of Napoleonists had been secured to support the invasion. It was even added, that influential officers in several French regiments were ready to join the enterprise. Montarlot, a French journalist, raised his standard at Zaragoza and announced his design to enter France with a co-operating force. Riego was charged with being one of his abettors and deprived of his command. This matter, however, was never cleared up, nor any inquiry instituted, notwithstanding M. La Garde, the French agent, was on this occasion extremely active, and his reports most probably helped to decide the policy afterwards pursued by France. General Vaudoncourt says that he himself "received a letter from Cagnet de Montarlot, advising him of the plans which he had formed with deputies, general officers, military men, and citizens of every class;" adding, "that the French liberals who had extolled him so much, and spread all over the country lithographs of his portrait, had engaged his services."

The primary object of the French envoy at Verona unquestionably was, to obtain from the congress the expression of an opinion favourable to interference; and in this hope details of the occurrences in Spain were furnished to the members. Counts de España and Jouffroy also repaired thither, prepared to uphold the cause of Ferdinand VII, and by their activity gained him many friends. Mr. Canning already knew that the other allies felt disposed to interfere, and consequently presumed they would lean to the side of France. Acting abstractedly on his own policy, and pretending to deprecate foreign interference, whether by counsel or force, in the internal concerns of other countries, he instructed the English envoy to assure the allies "that if a declaration of any such determination should be made at Verona, come what might, he should refuse the king's consent to become a party to it, even though the dissolution of the alliance should be the consequence of the refusal."\* After various explanations, tending to show that the majority were favourable to interference in some shape or other, the British envoy gave in a counter-declaration, expressive of a firm determination to abstain from taking any part in the affair. After this communication, the allies deliberated on the subject without the presence of the British plenipotentiary, and it was agreed to hold towards Spain a common language

\* Stapleton's Life of Canning, vol. i. chap. iii.



in separate notes. After this the three cases were specified in which France should be entitled to their support: viz. 1st, in case of an attack by Spain; 2nd, of any personal outrage—viz. on the king or royal family; and 3rd, of an attempt to change the reigning dynasty.

Whilst these declarations were made at Verona, Spain had fallen a prey to anarchy and civil war. The Cortes prepared to meet impending dangers by increasing the army and organising the militia on an extensive plan. The kingdom was also divided into eight military districts, and a summary mode of punishment was decreed for those engaged in insurrection. The royalists, however, were not deterred by the imposing attitude of their enemies. Commotions occurred at Seville, Barcelona, Carthagená, Zaragoza, and in Murcia. In Alava the curate Merino had also collected eight hundred men, with whom he entered Salvatierra and tore down the stone of the constitution, after capturing the national guard of Vitoria. Lopez Baños, commanding the military district of Pamplona, defeated him and took some prisoners, whose leaders were subjected to martial law and executed. The indiscriminate severities then inflicted upon ecclesiastics gave rise to those dreadful acts of reprisal which marked the struggle and have continued with little intermission up to the present day.

Influenced by example, the labours of the press, and the exertions of the clubs, even the *Manolos*

seemed to have embraced extreme liberal opinions and felt eager to join in every species of tumult. The moderate inhabitants were not only terrified at the course which the revolution had taken, but were also apprehensive of some dreadful catastrophe that might disgrace the country in the eyes of Europe. In order to repress commotions, Morillo, who had just arrived from South America, was appointed to command the capital, and much reliance was placed on his energetic character. The Cortes closed on the 30th of June, when the king proceeded to the baths of Sacedon, the *Thermida* of the Romans, a town of about three thousand inhabitants in the province of Cuenca, situated a league from the Tagus.\*

In the spring of 1822, Quesada formed a small royalist army in the Basque provinces and Navarre. The Catalonian bands had also acquired some consistency, under the direction of the Trappist and Baron d'Eroles. The former, whose family name was Antonio Marañon, had been a captain in the regiment of La Princeza, and dur-

\* The new town, built for the accommodation of those who frequent the baths, is called Isabella. The mineral waters were esteemed by the ancients, and analysed in 1800, when the Infante Don Antonio was advised to use them. The benefit which he then experienced, contributed to render this place a favourite retreat of the royal family, at whose expense the new baths and pump-room were erected. It became remarkable in the annals of the contest from its being supposed that some of the principal plans for the reaction were there concocted.

ing the war of independence acquired a reputation for bravery frequently bordering on temerity. His feelings were of the most ardent kind, and, taking a sudden dislike to his profession—even to social life, he buried himself in the seclusion of a convent of the order of La Trappe, afterwards suppressed by the Cortes. Captain Marañon thus became Father Antonio. Partaking of the spirit of the times, he replaced his epaulettes upon his shoulders, sallied forth from his retreat, and assuming the command of a small band of trusty followers, by a *coup de main*, which brought back to his recollection the stirring scenes of his youth, took the Seo de Urgel, the *Urgellium* of the Romans, situated at the foot of one of the southern declivities of the eastern Pyrenees.\* This place, rendered memorable in the annals of the war, contains a population of about three thousand souls, and stands between the rivers Vadira and Segre. It was formerly walled; but the fortifications having

\* Being completely commanded on the north by a parallel height, at the distance of only half a cannon shot, called Las Horcas (the Gallows), from which the streets can be easily enfiladed, the fortifications were transferred to this hill, upon which the citadel, called the Castle and Tower of Solsona, was constructed. The rapid torrent of Belira flows at the foot of the hill, which renders the approach on that side more difficult. On the intervening space stands the village of Castel Ciudad; and beheld from this spot, the hill, with its crowned summit and extraordinary projections, presents a singular appearance, suggesting the idea of a giant seated, his feet resting on the bank of a stream and his head reposing on a rock.

been destroyed and the ditches filled up, the only remaining vestiges of its former strength are the four principal gates. It is one of the oldest of the episcopal sees, and was pillaged by the French in 1794. It was here the regency established itself, under the presidency of the Marquis de Mataflorida,\* aided by the Bishop of Tarragona; and the Baron d'Eroles took charge of the military department.

\* D. Bernardo Moso Rosales, bred a lawyer, was a deputy for Seville in the Cortes of 1814, and one of the leaders of the opposition. He is said to have framed and presented to Ferdinand VII, at Valencia, the address signed by the sixty-nine deputies, called *Persas*, or Persians, from an allusion made in it to an ancient usage of that people; and for his services to the royalist cause was created Marquis de Mataflorida. He was sincerely attached to the ancient institutions, being of opinion that it was only through their revival and gradual improvement that the welfare of the country could be promoted. Baron d'Eroles was born at Talaru in 1782, and educated for the legal profession in the university of Cervera. When the French invaded Spain, he was among the students who took up arms; and his services, after eight months' training, were accepted by the Junta of Catalonia, when a small band was placed under his orders, which gradually increased; but having been made prisoner at the siege of Gerona, he was sent to France, whence he escaped at the beginning of 1810. Shut up in Figueras by Marshal Macdonald, he succeeded in a sortie with four hundred cavalry, and gained the interior in defiance of a large blockading force. This daring *coup de main* brought him into notice. He failed in his defence of Mont Serrat in July 1811; but succeeded in his attack on Peñiscola, where he captured the garrison left there by Suchet on evacuating Spain. In 1814, he was made lieutenant-general and governor of Catalonia. Throughout the various convulsions of his unhappy country, his conduct was consistent and dignified. When the Con-

Such was the state of the royalist cause at the close of 1822. The regency had for some time defied the power of the Cortes; and although the want of provisions afterwards compelled its members to quit Urgel, they nevertheless continued to act. The Cortes sent their best troops and commanders to that part of the country where their authority was most threatened; and still they could not put down their enemies in either Catalonia or Aragon. From the Basque provinces, Zavala kept up his communications with Merino, who operated between Burgos and the Ebro; at the same time that Bessieres,\* after holding Me-

stitution of 1820 was re-established, he withdrew into private life and devoted himself to an instructive course of studies. M. Thiers, in his tour to the Pyrenees in December 1822, saw the Baron at Urgel, was struck with his appearance, and in his sketch, published in the following year, makes particular mention of him.

\* George Bessieres was a native of the environs of Montpellier, of mean birth, but of an active disposition. He went to Spain to seek his fortune; and when General Duherme was at Barcelona in 1808, he employed him as a commission agent. Bessieres entered the Spanish legion of Bourbon, and soon rose to the rank of captain. At the close of the war he superintended a spinning concern at Ripoll, established by a Frenchman, and in 1822 joined the regency of Urgel, from whom he received a colonel's commission. He captured Mequinenza, of which place he was made commander. Accompanied by a Swiss, named Ullman, he made several daring excursions into the interior, approaching the very gates of Madrid. He became a great favourite with the royalists, and even with the royal family. In 1826, it is well known that Ferdinand VII. wished to rid himself of his ministry, but was restrained by



quienza for eight months, pushed his incursions to the vicinity of Madrid. Quesada passed from Navarre to Urgel and back, with a column of fifteen hundred men, and did not lose a single soldier. When Merino was hotly pursued by a superior force, he withdrew to the mountains or dispersed; and as soon as the pressure of danger was over, reappeared stronger than before. The Madrid Gazette boasted advantages, and repeatedly asserted that the *feotas* were destroyed; but it turned out that some of these victories actually were disasters. The royalists stood their ground, though unprovided with money or arms, in defiance of overwhelming forces well organised and

considerations towards France. Zambrano and Ballesteros were particularly obnoxious. Bessieres was employed to go down to Aragon and Catalonia to get up a commotion, the watchword of which was to be, *Viva el rey y caiga el ministerio*; and it is believed that the king and queen were the only parties in the secret. Bessieres went to Guadalajara, that part of the country in which he had operated with so much success against the constitutionalists, and raised his standard against the ministry. The authorities of the province reported what was passing to the Madrid government, and Count de España instantly came down at the head of the cavalry guards. Bessieres was taken on the confines of Cuenca, and news of the event transmitted by express to the government. The bearer returned with an order for Bessieres to be shot. He begged permission to be conveyed to the king's presence, and was refused. He suffered with the greatest firmness; and it is very confidently asserted, that on learning his death, Queen Amelia fell into convulsions which lasted for three days. Bessieres was deserving of a better fate, and the royalists never can pardon M. Zea for the part he took in this affair.

equipped. This phenomenon can only be accounted for by the adhesion of the great majority of the people to those principles which the royalists professed, and the interest felt in supporting the altar and the throne. By these principles it is that the Spaniard, left to himself, is usually actuated ; and, if duly examined, it will be seen that the present struggle partakes of the same character, and that the stoutest champions engaged in it are actually contending on the same spot.

## CHAPTER VIII.

The Guards mutiny, and attack the Capital — Repulsed, and capitulate. — Catalonia. — Mina's Cruelties. — Castell-fullit. — Romagosa. — The Allied Powers present Angry Notes. — Insulting Answers. — Mr. Canning and the Spanish Liberals. — France declares War. — Liberals resolve to remove the King to Seville. — Proclamations of the French and Regency. — Eguia. — Erro. — Scenes on the Bidassoa. — Disappointed Refugees.

THE contagious fever which desolated several towns on the southern coast aggravated the horrors of a civil war: nevertheless the royalists were emboldened not only by the attitude assumed by France, but also by the dissensions raging among the constitutionalists. Reposing no confidence in the administration, the majority in the Cortes made several attempts to dislodge them, and, hoping to intimidate the king, presented alarming addresses, accusing the ministers of remissness in not putting down the insurrection, and urging their dismissal. The king stood firm, notwithstanding the perils of his situation and the increased symptoms of effervescence. Riego's banishment was a theme of censure, at a moment when an incident served to excite feel-

ings of deadly animosity between the life-guards and the militia-men. On the 30th of June the Cortes closed, after an exchange of speeches containing, as may easily be imagined, little sincerity on either side. The ceremony being over, the king was about to enter his carriage, when loud vociferations from the multitude assembled in the two opposite interests rent the air, — one party evidently premeditating an insult which the other was prepared to repel. An affray followed; the grenadier guards interfered, and a few lives were lost. The same afternoon, Lieutenant Landaburu, of the guards, and supposed to be a liberal, was shot by one of his own soldiers whilst endeavouring to check their impetuosity.\*

Party feeling now rose to such a height, that it seemed impossible to prevent the spilling of blood. So great was the irritation of the guards at the indignities to which the king and royal family were exposed, that their officers were unable to restrain them. A second *dos de Mayo* was expected, and the palace threatened with an assault. A party of guards occupied the front avenue and the Plazuela de Oriente, with advances as far as the Consejos; whilst another detachment formed on a commanding hill, pushing piquets

\* He was revered as a martyr, and a debating society, bearing his name, established under the presidency of M. Romero Alpuente. For the use of this society the municipality appropriated the refectory of a suppressed convent.

as far as the parish of Santiago. The national militia also took up a position in Constitution Square, and in front of the Town-hall, with the same precautions. Madrid now presented the melancholy spectacle of two armies of fellow-countrymen eager to engage. Morillo fortunately appeased the tumult, and the troops withdrew to their respective quarters; but in the night, four battalions of the guards sallied forth, completely equipped, and proceeded to the Pardo, a royal residence on the left bank of the Manzanares, two leagues north-west of Madrid, surrounded with woods.\* The signal of alarm was now sounded, and the disposable troops, commanded by Generals Morillo, Ballesteros, and Palarea, prepared for defence,—when at this moment Riego reached Madrid. The Duke del Infantado, the Marquis de las Amarillas, and the

\* This structure was erected by orders of the Emperor Charles V, and enlarged and embellished by Charles III, as well as by Ferdinand VII. The building resembles a fortress, with a surrounding ditch planted with shrubs. The inner yard is square and spacious, two elegantly painted staircases ascending from it,—the one leading to the royal apartments, and the other to those of the Infante Don Carlos. The first are hung with rich silk tapestry, of home manufacture, after Spanish designs, representing national customs and dresses. The pictorial decorations are superb. Some of the ceilings correspond to the time of the founder, and others to that of Charles III, painted in fresco. That of the ambassadorial saloon, by Juan Galves, represents the several provinces of Spain, personated by comely damsels, with appropriate devices, and the principal pro-



Count de Castro Terreño, were among the king's attendants at the palace.

Such was the state of Madrid on the 2nd July; and if it had not been thought that the eyes of Europe were then fixed upon Spain, a dreadful catastrophe must have occurred. In the afternoon, a remonstrance came in from the officers of the guards, in which they declared "that repeated outrages had convinced the soldiers that there was a design to disarm them; that it was not possible to restrain their offended courage; and that in this situation, and in order to keep the battalions together, the officers thought it best not to abandon them, persuaded that they would always remain faithful to the king and the laws:" adding, "that to force, the men would never submit, preferring death to dishonour." It is difficult to judge of all the motives of irritation; but it is evident that the guards deeply resented the injuries inflicted

ductions of each province. In the centre is an emblematical figure of Spain, seated on a golden throne, surrounded by the four cardinal virtues. The arches of the roof are painted after drawings of choice figures in the Vatican; some of the other roofs were painted by Bayen, Juan Ribera, and Zacarias Velasquez. The Infante Don Carlos' rooms face the west, the ceilings forming part of the old palace. The Princess de Beira and her son had also suites of apartments on the same side of the building. There are farm-houses and sporting-lodges on the grounds, tastefully fitted up. The Manzanares flows through the park, which is extensive, varied with hill and dale, and well stocked with game. The Pardo has lately been the favourite residence of the Dowager Queen Christina.

upon the royal family, and were resolved not to endure the humiliation of being disarmed by militia. Matters remained in this state till the 4th without any attempt at a compromise, when the permanent deputation informed the king that if he did not break the captivity in which he was held, the appointment of a regency would be necessary; whilst his majesty, on the other hand, applied to the council of state, demanding guarantees for his life, threatened by a republican and anarchical faction.

Nothing final having been determined, some of the battalions moved on the morning of the 6th from the Pardo towards Madrid, and after reconnoitring the Puerta del Hierro, and exchanging a few shots with the piquets, returned to their former positions. The next morning they entered in battle array, and from three different points attacked the main square. After a severe conflict, in which many lives were lost, the guards were overpowered and driven back to the Puerta del Sol, where they made a stand and returned to the charge. Again repulsed, confined to narrow streets, and exposed to the fire of artillery in their front and on their flanks, they withdrew towards the palace, where they sought shelter.\* A flag of

\* The fact cannot be disguised, that at this period a plan existed to produce a reaction by the introduction of two chambers. This, it was thought, would lead to a kind of *juste milieu*; and it is well known that Martinez de la Rosa, Sierra Pambley,

truce having been hoisted, conferences commenced; and it was proposed that the four battalions which made the attack should be disarmed, whilst the other two remaining quiet in the palace were to retire with their arms. These terms not having been accepted, the implicated guards fled towards the interior; and being pursued, several were put to the sword, whilst others capitulated. Thus ended this lamentable affair, which nearly plunged the capital into general mourning. Of no avail would it be to inquire which party was most to blame. This and the many other collisions which preceded and followed it were the effects of a system; and without divesting that system of all that was destructive and pernicious in its original character, it would not have been possible to obviate the calamities which Spain has since had to deplore.

and several other members, both of the Cortes and the administration, had joined in the scheme, which was supported by Generals Morillo and Ballesteros, as well as by several other officers opposed to Riego and the La Isla party. It is also presumable that the court was favourable to the plan; and there are reasons for believing that some foreign ministers felt inclined to uphold it, as the best means of checking the revolution. If the life-guards had succeeded, a change doubtless would have ensued; but the opposite party, who seem to have been apprised of what was going on, took the alarm, and the national guards, all flaming constitutionalists, were secured to their interest. Some desperate movement on the part of the life-guards hovering about the Pardo being anticipated, Riego was privately called up to Madrid to command the militia in case of an emergency; both Morillo and Ballesteros being distrusted.

During these commotions, and while it was yet difficult to foresee to what length popular violence might be carried, the foreign ambassadors sent in notes declaring that their courts would regard any attempt upon the king's person as an act of hostility to themselves ; which, coupled with the late occurrences, roused the ardour of the provincial royalists. Catalonia was the cause of great disquietude to the constitutionalists; and in order to put down the Army of the Faith, and dislodge the regency from the Seo de Urgel, Mina was appointed early in September to command that principality, and entered on his duties at Lerida. As he himself states, he found "the factious, to the number of thirty-three thousand, masters of almost all the country, in possession of various strong places and fortresses, protected by a great part of the towns, and, what was of still greater importance, they had a centre of union and government, viz. the titular *Regency of Spain*, established in Urgel;" adding, "these were the elements which presented themselves in Catalonia." After noticing his preparations, he proceeds thus: "I commenced operations on the 13th ; and a month and a half sufficed me to organise a small army, to raise the siege of Cervera, and take possession of Castell-fullit.\* I

\* Cervera is a small walled city, having since 1717 a vote in Cortes. It is situated on a hill at the entrance of a large plain, twenty-one leagues west of Barcelona, and thirty-four from Zaragoza. The university is a fine and spacious building. The inhabitants manufacture coarse linens. Castell-fullit,

ordered the total destruction of this last-mentioned town, as a punishment for the obstinacy of its rebellious inhabitants and defenders; and by way of retorting the contempt with which they replied to the repeated messages I sent them, as well as for a warning to the rest, upon its ruins I ordered the following inscription to be placed: "Here stood Castell-fullit. *Towns, take warning; shelter not the enemies of your country.*"\*

partly rebuilt, and containing about four hundred souls, stands on the declivity of a hill, in the bishopric of Vich and district of Manresa, three leagues from Barcelona. Its principal fortification was a Moorish castle, connected with the church by a curtain. There were also three advanced towers, fronting the east, north, and west, equally of Moorish construction,—one round, and the other two square. These remnants of antiquity were equally destroyed by Mina, whose resentment was most probably excited by the circumstance of the garrison having escaped, accompanied by the principal inhabitants.

\* "A Short Extract from the Life of General Mina, published by himself," in Spanish and English. Lond. 1825.—"*Aquí existió Castell-fullit. Pueblos, tomad exemplo; no abrigueis á los enemigos de la patria.*"—At this period it may be said that the war of extermination commenced which has raged ever since. As a proof of the spirit with which the constitutionalists were then actuated, subjoined is an extract from a proclamation, issued by Mina a few days before the Duke d'Angoulême entered Madrid:—"Art. 1. All persons who may have been members of a junta, society, or corporation opposed to the present system of government, as well as those who may have enlisted men or conspired against the constitution, shall be irrevocably shot the instant they are taken. Art. 2. Any town in which the inhabitants are called out against the constitutional troops shall be burned to ashes, and till one stone is not left upon another."—At the same time that the governor of Catalonia



Thus spoke and acted the hero of Catalonia at the close of 1822! After enumerating a variety of other exploits, the captain-general comes to his attack upon the fortress of Urgel, where he experienced difficulties, and exultingly adds, "that in the end constancy and heroism were victorious, and six hundred profligates and robbers, taken out of the prisons, who formed the greater part of the faction of the ringleader Romagosa,\* the defender of the fortress of Urgel, expiated their crimes on the morning of the evacuation by their death upon the field." The men thus barbarously butchered were royalists, the countrymen of this savage pacificator: their only

published this proclamation, General Villacampa at Seville issued a similar edict, in which he declared that "every one who by word or deed co-operates in the rebellion shall be held to be a traitor, and punished as such; further, that any one knowing the situation of the factious and concealing it shall be held to be a traitor, and as such treated." This edict closes with the following: "The members of the municipalities of towns situated at the distance of six leagues from a constitutional column, who may fail hourly to send in a report of the movements of the factious in their vicinity, shall pay out of their own property a fine of ten thousand rials; and if any injury should arise out of the omission, he shall be judged in a military manner."

\* Romagosa was a native of Abisbal in Catalonia, and when the French invaded that province, gained his livelihood by burning charcoal. Being of an active and enterprising mind, he assembled a few followers, and took the field as a guerrillaman, and became the terror of the French couriers and others travelling to and from France with small escorts. Having prospered in his new calling, he commenced hostilities on a

crime was that of having embraced a cause opposed to his own. The feelings of humanity revolt at these recitals — they are too horrible to be dwelt upon: yet, after all, of what avail were so many vaunted barbarities?—They did not dismay the royalists or change the course of events; but they left an indelible stigma upon the constitutional cause, and sullied those laurels which Mina had gained in the war of invasion. He took the fortress of Urgel, as he himself acknowledges, on the 3rd of February 1823, and on the 7th of the following November embarked for England, after capitulating with the French.

The transactions in Spain were loudly censured,

larger scale, evincing great tact and daring in his mountain warfare. At the close of the war, the rank of general was confirmed to him. In 1821 he raised a party in the district of Tarragona, and joined the Army of the Faith. After the death of Ferdinand VII, he passed over into Portugal, and swore allegiance to Carlos V, whom he accompanied to the Spanish frontier, and also to England. He was an unlettered man, and his manners coarse, but his courage and the soundness of his principles unquestionable. Known to be extremely popular in Catalonia, he proceeded thither by the way of Perpignan, in order to command the Carlists and promote the insurrection. Having been surprised at a curate's house on his way into the interior, seven leagues from Barcelona, he and his host were taken and shot at Igualada, towards the close of 1834. Mina dreaded him more than any other man in Catalonia; and it is an undoubted fact, that if he had not met with so untimely an end, the Carlists in the principality would have been organised before the Queen's party were in a situation to make head against them. He was blamed for his negligence in not having scouts out to give notice of the enemy's approach.

and it daily became more apparent that tranquillity could not be restored unless through foreign advice or interference. On the 4th January the French ambassador at Madrid delivered in a copy of his instructions, in which, after a recapitulation of the late occurrences and an allusion to the principles agreed upon at Verona, it was observed that France was "intimately united with her allies in the firm resolution of repelling revolutionary principles and movements; that she equally concurred in the wishes entertained by them, that a remedy should be found by the noble Spanish nation itself, for evils calculated to disturb other governments and impose upon them painful precautions." On the 10th, the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian envoys also handed in the declarations of their respective monarchs, made at Verona, accompanied with notes similar in purport and tendency. That of Count de Nesselrode, dated November 20th, 1822, after expressing the feelings and determinations of the allied sovereigns respecting recent events in Spain, and pointing to the calamities attendant upon institutions which had sanctioned military revolt, speaks in these words:—

"Anarchy appeared in the train of revolution—disorder in that of anarchy. Long years of tranquil possession ceased to be a sufficient title to property; the most sacred rights were disputed; ruinous loans and contributions unceasingly renewed,

destructive of public wealth and ruinous to private fortunes. Religion was despoiled of her patrimony, and the throne of popular respect. The royal dignity was outraged, the supreme authority having passed over to assemblies influenced by the blind passions of the multitude. To complete these calamities, on the 7th July blood was seen to flow in the palace, whilst civil war raged throughout the Peninsula.

“During nearly three years the allied powers continued to flatter themselves that the Spanish character, so constant and so generous whenever the safety of the country was in question—lately so heroic when struggling against a revolutionary power, would at length show itself even in the men who had the misfortune to betray the noble recollections which Spain might proudly recall to every nation in Europe. They flattered themselves that the government of his Catholic Majesty, undeceived by the first lessons of experience, would adopt measures, if not to stop the calamities bursting upon them from all quarters, at least to lay the foundations of a remedial system, by gradually securing to the throne its legitimate rights and necessary prerogatives, as well as by affording to the people adequate protection, and to property indispensable guarantees.

“These hopes have been utterly disappointed. Time has only brought with it fresh injustice—violence and the number of victims have in-

creased. On the other hand, in imitation of the revolutions of Naples and Piedmont, which the Spanish conspirators call their own work, we hear them announce that their subversive plans have no limits. In a neighbouring country they strove to excite tumults and rebellion, in more distant ones they laboured to secure accomplices; the activity of their proselytism was everywhere felt, and everywhere produced some disasters. Such conduct would necessarily excite general reprobation," &c.

The despatch then suggests a mode of reconciling differences, and ends thus: "In vain will malevolence represent the expression of these wishes in the light of foreign interference, seeking to dictate laws to Spain. To express a desire to see protracted misery terminate—to snatch from the same yoke an unhappy monarch—to stop the effusion of blood, and facilitate the re-establishment of order, certainly is not to attack the independence of any country, or to establish the right of intervention against which any power would have reason to protest."

Great offence was taken at both the declarations and notes. The liberals became furious, considering themselves insulted; and had it not been for the advice of the envoy representing the power which had assumed the garb of neutrality, the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian diplomatists, on the spur of the moment, would



have received their passports. On more mature reflection, a circular was sent to the Spanish agents at the courts of St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin, signed by D. Evaristo San Miguel, one of the heroes of Las Cabezas, authorising them severally to make a verbal reply and furnish copies if required. This circular opens thus: "It would be unworthy of the Spanish government to answer the notes of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, because they are only a tissue of lies and calumnies." This singular paper in few words and round assertions repels *seriatim* the offensive charges, and ends by declaring "that the government will never deviate from the line traced out by its unalterable attachment to the constitution of 1812."

The ministers of the three allied powers, ascertaining the spirit in which their communications had been received, a few days afterwards demanded their passports. The one for the Russian envoy was inclosed in a letter from the Spanish minister, couched in these words: "I have received the very insolent note which your excellency forwarded to me, and confining myself, as my sole reply, to stating that you have shamefully abused, perhaps through ignorance, the law of nations, I transmit the passport required, hoping that your excellency will quit this capital with as little delay as possible." This conduct was applauded in the clubs and revolu-

tionary circles as an act of heroism and nationality worthy of the glorious cause ; but, in the situation in which the Spanish minister was then placed, it will scarcely be thought prudent, in moments of irritation, to have vented the feelings of his party in so unguarded a manner, sensible as he must have been that they were not those of the king. Spain was at the time immersed in civil war, her coffers were empty, her army was in arrears, and a small minority only was satisfied with the existing state of things. Her prospects were therefore the most gloomy ; and although the French minister still remained at Madrid, it was evident from the communications which had passed with him upon the subject, and the way in which the Pyrenean force stationed as a *cordon sanitaire* had been converted into an army of observation, that his government would resent an affront levelled at the four allies—nay, take upon itself the charge of seeking satisfaction.\* The offence was rendered

\* It is unquestionably a fact, that the Spanish constitutionalists were at the time greatly misled by Mr. Canning's professions, and the idea that they possessed the sympathies of the people, as well as of the government of Great Britain, from which they expected to derive substantial support. This idea was strengthened by the circumstance of several British officers, and among them Sir Robert Wilson, having come over to raise troops in their defence. In an argument held at the time with a leading liberal upon the impolicy of San Miguel's answers, the retort made was—" We have learned our policy in a leaf plucked from the creed of no less a personage than the British minister."

stronger and more direct by the publicity exultingly given to the whole correspondence, as an appeal to the liberals, and in the hope of reaping a larger harvest of applause. The effect, however, produced both at home and abroad did not answer the expectations of the liberal ministers. Their obstinacy and intemperance were thus placed in a more striking point of view; whilst, on the other hand, the royalists ascertained that the king really possessed the sympathies of the four allied powers to an extent of which before they had no conception.

The scales of peace and war were now held by the hand of France, prepared for an alternative long foreseen. The result of the Madrid negotiations operated as an additional weight to fix the king's inclination for war, and on the 28th, (January) at the opening of the chambers, he announced his determination in these words: " Divine justice permits that, after having long made other nations experience the terrible effects of revolution, we should ourselves be exposed to the dangers arising from similar calamities in a neighbouring state. I have attempted everything to secure the safety of my people, and to preserve Spain herself from the extreme of misfortune. The blindness with which the representations made at Madrid have been repelled leaves little hope of preserving peace. I have ordered the recall of my minister; one hundred thousand

Frenchmen, commanded by a prince of my own family, are ready to march to preserve the Spanish throne to a descendant of Henri IV—to save that fine kingdom from ruin and reconcile it to Europe. Let Ferdinand VII. be free to give to his people the institutions which they can hold only from him, and which in securing their repose may dissipate the just inquietudes of France. From that moment hostilities shall cease.” This declaration was at the time violently censured, as being founded upon the highest principles of despotic confederacy, as opposed to the law of nations, and subversive of the established maxims of international intercourse ; but, let it be viewed in its effects, let it be compared with that species of interference at the present moment practised towards Spain : in this way only can a just conception be formed of the motives which actuated France and her allies at the period alluded to.

As the hostile preparations of the French were regularly reported and the danger became more pressing, the Madrid government redoubled its efforts to meet the emergency, and, among other expedients, early in February it was resolved to remove the king to a safer place. He objected ; but the ministers persisting, a vote passed the Cortes on the 15th, authorising them to remove the government, leaving to the king the choice of place. On the 19th, the session closed ; and in the afternoon the king signified his intention of

changing the ministry. In the evening, a large concourse assembled in front of the palace, uttering seditious cries, some demanding the reinstatement of the ministry, others a regency, and several even the king's death. The uproar was tremendous, and an attempt was made to force the gates of the royal residence, which the guards repelled. The troops formed under the windows and kept the populace at a distance; but the agitation continued with increased violence, and the menacing shouts were redoubled. At length the municipality interposed, by informing the king that more serious commotions were expected in the course of the night, and urging him to recall his orders for changing the ministers, as the only means left to preserve tranquillity. The king sent out a message, signifying his acquiescence, when the crowd gradually dispersed. If it had not been for this act of resignation, the streets of the capital in all probability would then have been deluged in blood, so great was the effervescence noticed among the contending parties. For several days afterwards tumultuous crowds continued to parade the streets, vociferating threats and seditious cries under the windows of obnoxious persons.

On the 1st March the Cortes again opened, when the reinstated ministers sent in their resignation. The Cortes pressed the king to name the place to which the government was to remove,



and Seville was definitively fixed upon, but not the day of departure. It was afterwards determined that on the 20th the removal should commence; and in the mean time, efforts were made to collect the necessary funds. So great was the penury of the government at this very moment, that the king's plate as well as funds belonging to several corporate bodies were seized to meet the public exigencies. At the hour appointed, the members of the royal family took the Andalusian road, followed by the government and Cortes, as well as by a large concourse of individuals, escorted by a military force. Abisbal had been appointed to the command of the capital, his force amounting to about four thousand men; but the accounts received from the provinces, even at this early stage of the contest, afforded only inauspicious presages of the issue. The conscriptions had proved almost ineffectual: the people were tired of contributions, and disgusted with the follies which they had witnessed; whilst, at the same time, the liberals themselves suspected the sincerity of several of the officers to whom, in their difficulties, they had confided the command of their armies.

By the end of March the French had assembled an army of eighty thousand men under the orders of the Duke d'Angoulême; the centre commanded by Oudinot, the right by Molitor, and the left by Moncey. With this force, the Army of the

Faith, under Eroles, Quesada, and the Trappist, was to co-operate. On the 2nd April the Duke d'Angoulême issued his first proclamation, explanatory of the reasons which induced the French government to send an army into Spain, followed by an address to the soldiers, containing this passage: "It is not the spirit of conquest which induces us to take up arms—a more generous motive animates us. We are going to place a king upon his throne—to reconcile his people to him, and, in a country a prey to anarchy, to re-establish that order which is necessary to the happiness and safety of both nations." The provisional Spanish Regency, composed of Señores Eguia, Erro, and Calderon,\* also published an address, dated the 6th, in which they reminded their coun-

\* General Francisco Eguia, born at Durango in 1751, was a deputy to the Cortes of 1812, and ascended through the various ranks to that of lieutenant-general, which he attained in 1802. He was employed as chief of the staff in the war against the French, joined the king at Valencia, and commanded the advance under Elio which marched upon Madrid. He was appointed war minister, and afterwards captain-general of Old Castile, again to the war department, and next placed in command of Granada. The changes in 1820 compelled him to seek an asylum in France, where he attached himself to the royalists who accompanied the Duke d'Angoulême, and became a member of the regency. On the overthrow of the constitution he was appointed to the command of Galicia, which he retained till 1833, when he was replaced by Morillo. He was also made a grandee, and the title of Marquis de la Lealtad conferred upon him. Eguia was an officer of the old school, and a rigid disciplinarian, well remembered for the rules and regulations which he drew up for the army. So pre-

trymen of the calamities which they had endured for three years, and expressed a hope that the day of peace had at length arrived, and with it the happy influence of order and justice. As a means of preparing a suitable reception, the regents then alluded to the advance of a French army, and the views by which its leaders were actuated ; observing, “ they no longer bear those hostile standards which once threatened your liberties ; theirs is the banner of peace, destined to heal the wounds of anarchy, to cover with its protecting shield those brave men who are about to restore the throne and the altar, to rescue our unhappy sovereign and his august family from the thralldom in which they are held by a handful of rebellious subjects.”

cise were his remarks upon the dress and *coiffure* of the soldier, that he acquired the nickname of *Coletilla*. He was uncle to the officer of the same name who lately commanded the Carlist army in the northern provinces. He died in Madrid at an advanced age.

D. Juan Bautista de Erro at an early age entered the bodyguards ; but during the war of invasion, served as accountant-general to the Catalonian army, when he presented a general plan for the liquidation of the debts due to the inhabitants of that principality for supplies, which were in a complete state of confusion. The plan was accepted, and realised to the great satisfaction of the government. M. Erro was then made intendant of Catalonia, in which situation he rendered essential services. He was afterwards appointed to the intendency of Madrid, and during the time of the constitution withdrew to France, where he joined the regency. On reaching Madrid, he took charge of the finance department, which he held till some time after the king's return to the capital, when he was removed, and made a counsellor of state—equivalent to an appro-

The address, pointing to the nature of the service now rendered by France, and remarking that it is "consoling to humanity to see the resolutions of cabinets, and the examples of that policy which does not look to an increase of territory, or interested treaties, but to the consolidation of the real principles of justice and social bonds, threatened with dissolution," ends thus: "The moment is come when, free from the oppression which weighs you down, you will be enabled to show to Europe how just and merited was the opinion formed of you. Let us not leave to our armies, or to our allies, the whole glory of our deliverance, since the whole nation is interested in the great success; but never let the energetic expression of its will be sullied by any of those excesses at which honour and generosity revolt. Spaniards!

bation of his conduct. In the course of a little time it was ascertained that his removal from the finance department was owing to his having, in union with the treasurer-general Don Pio Elisalde, rejected a sum equal to eighteen millions of francs surcharged by the French for supplies made during their intervention. The French agents remonstrated, and the matter was submitted to a council of state, at which the Infante Don Carlos presided, when the award of the finance minister and the treasurer-general was confirmed. Through intrigues these two upright functionaries lost their places, but were both made counsellors of state. D. Luis Lopez Ballesteros was then called to the finance department, and the rejected item in the French claims admitted. When Ferdinand VIIth's fourth marriage was agitated in the council of state, M. Erro gave a contrary opinion, and was on this account together with D. Pio Elisalde and Father Cirilo, banished. Exiled to Seville,

your provisional government does not recognise any acts of authorities created by rebellion: the administration which existed previous to the inroads of violence, in 1820, shall be re-established. The edifice of anarchy thus destroyed and our sovereign restored to freedom, those institutions can be established which circumstances advise and require. In our ancient laws and usages he will, doubtless, find the requisites which, combined with our peculiarities of character, and in harmony with our manners and our wants, will permanently settle our future destiny."

On the same day, the right of the French army moved towards the Bidassoa and halted at the foot of the bridge, when a singular spectacle ensued. A number of French officers and other refugees had assembled at Bilboa and St. Sebastian's, where they were employed in the fortifications, or incor-

and thence to St. Lucar, he effected his escape to Gibraltar at the end of 1835, came to England, and availed himself of the earliest opportunity to pass over to the northern provinces, where, on his arrival, he was named minister by Charles V. He is an excellent administrator, experienced in all financial details, and a good scholar. He is a native of Biscay, and, like the generality of his countrymen, firm and uncompromising in his politics.

D. Antonio Gomez Calderon, the other regent, was born at Baena, in the province of Cordova, and sat as a deputy in the Cortes of 1814. He was bred a lawyer, and before the invasion employed as fiscal in the council of Indies. He belonged to the opposition, and was one of the sixty-nine Persas who signed the address presented to the king at Valencia. He died at Madrid in 1828.



porated in a newly-raised corps of sharpshooters commanded by a well-known foreign colonel. Hearing of the Duke d'Angouleme's approach, they set out for Irun, and, as the French army drew up on the other side of the river, to the number of about two hundred, mostly dressed in old uniforms of the ex-imperial guard, they posted themselves in front of a white wall, waving a tri-coloured flag, and crying out, *Vive Napoleon II—Vive la Liberté*, invited the soldiers on the opposite bank to join their ranks.\* General Vallin harangued them and told them to disperse. They answered by fresh provocations and insulting gestures, at the same time that the troops of the Spanish constitutionalists, crowning the heights in the rear, retained the attitude of silent specta-

\* The author, in his late excursion to the northern provinces, verified these particulars on the spot, and saw the position held by the refugees when fired upon. He also obtained a list of the names of their leaders, and copies of the incendiary proclamations which they had endeavoured to distribute within the French territory, some of which were published in the French journals. The circumstances as above related are fresh in the memories of the inhabitants of Behobie and Irun. At this very period two corps of Italian refugees, who first assembled at Mataro and Gerona, were operating in Catalonia under Mina's orders; the one commanded by Colonel Olini and attached to the Lloberas brigade; the other, headed by Colonel Pacchierotti, formed part of Milan's division. Several of Mina's staff-officers were also Italian refugees. The demonstration on the banks of the Bidassoa, in sight of the Spanish authorities, unquestionably hastened the passage of the river, for on the 7th the French artillery appointments had not been completed.

tors. A cannon was then fired without ball, and produced no effect. A pause ensued; still the refugees retained their position, and as it were braved the anger of those whom in the most infatuated manner they had addressed as comrades. Grape-shot was fired; several fell, others were wounded, and the deluded refugees retired to Irún, though not pursued. They afterwards made the best of their way to Corunna; but the bubble having burst with which they had misled the Spanish patriots of the day, it must have been a mortifying circumstance to the motley crusaders to notice that their treatment by the Spanish authorities, their late protectors, was very different from that which they had experienced when it was supposed that they possessed influence enough to cause one half of the Duke d'Angoulême's army to desert.

## CHAPTER IX.

Progress of the French.—Strength and Resources of the Constitutionalists. — Madrid surrenders. —The O'Donnels. —The Bishop of Vich, Milans, and Manso.—Defence of Catalonia.—King deprived of his Liberty.—Removal to Cadiz.—Reaction at Seville.—Scenes on the Shallows.—Morillo and Ballesteros declare against the Constitution.—Zayas and Villacampa.—Riego's last Attempt.—Galicia.—Noyade at Corunna.—Prison Assassinations at Granada.—Symptoms of Despondency in Cadiz.—The King released.—The Princess de Beira and the Fleurs de Lis.—The King's first Measures.—Follies of the Constitutionalists.

FROM the Bidassôa to Madrid the advance of the French resembled rather a peaceful procession than a hostile inroad.\* The capital, which only a

\* The French army crossed the Bidassoa on the 7th of April, when the constitutional troops threw themselves into St. Sebastian's, leaving the road to Tolosa open. St. Sebastian's was commanded by General Alexander O'Donnel, who had with him his regiment, called the Imperial Alexander; and Count Bourk was ordered to invest the fortress. He summoned the governor by a flag of truce, which was answered by a shower of musketry. The French charged, and the Spanish outposts were driven in. O'Donnel felt appalled at the boldness of this movement, and sent out to say that although a mistake had occurred with regard to the French flag of truce, he considered hostilities suspended at the moment the charge was made. The French drew back a few hundred paces, the constitutionalists resumed

few weeks before resounded with threats and invectives against foreign interference, now opened its gates without resistance. Along the whole line of road, not a single pass or position was defended. Scarcely was a gun fired, although the constitutionalists were called upon to act as well as to bully. The time had come when they were to pay the penalty of those empty and arrogant boastings, generally impolitic and always useless, which often invoke danger and never afford security. The day of trial came, and what was the result? On the 16th of August, the Duke d'Angoulême, after an uninterrupted march from the capital, reached Port St. Mary's, and sent over a letter addressed to the king, announcing that the rest of the country was delivered from the revolutionary yoke, and recommending the convocation of the ancient Cortes.\* And was this the *dénouement*

their old positions and again were driven in. A subsequent sortie was equally unsuccessful. The Duke d'Angoulême hurried to the spot, distributed some decorations, and returned to the main body of his army. At Ernani, deputations from the three Basque provinces met him and acknowledged the provisional government established in the name of Ferdinand VII.

\* "MONSIEUR MON FRERE ET COUSIN,

"L'Espagne est délivrée du joug révolutionnaire; quelques villes fortifiées servent seules de refuge aux hommes compromis. Le roi mon oncle et seigneur avait pensé (et les évènements n'ont rien changé à son sentiment) que V. M. rendue à la liberté et usant de clémence, trouverait bon d'accorder une amnistie nécessaire après tant de troubles, et de donner à ses peuples, par la convocation des anciennes Cortes du royaume,

expected by those who recollected the blustering language of the minister San Miguel, the estimates presented by the executive, and the arrogant manner in which the liberals spoke of their strength, popularity, and resources? Most assuredly not; and yet the catastrophe which afterwards befel them was not owing either to treachery or improvidence, but rather to the system upon which they were acting, and the undue means employed to compel the people to accept a new order of things, repugnant to their feelings, at variance with their usages, and only a few years before rejected with disgust.

When the French entered Spain, the constitutionalists, according to their own confession, had an efficient army of 96,750 men, not to mention volunteer corps in every part of the kingdom,

des garanties d'ordre, de justice, et de bonne administration. Tout ce que la France pourrait faire, ainsi que ses alliés et l'Europe entière, serait fait pour consolider cet acte de votre sagesse; je ne crains pas de m'en porter garant. J'ai cru devoir rappeler à V. M. et par elle à tous ceux qui peuvent prévenir encore les maux qui les menacent, les dispositions du roi mon oncle et seigneur. Si d'ici à cinq jours il ne m'est parvenue aucune réponse satisfaisante, et si V. M. est encore à cette époque privée de sa liberté, j'aurai recours à la force pour la lui rendre: ceux qui écouteront leurs passions de préférence à l'intérêt de leur pays répondront seuls du sang qui sera versé. Je suis avec le plus profond respect, monsieur mon frère et cousin, de V. M. le très affectionné frère, cousin, et serviteur,

“LOUIS ANTOINE.

“De mon quartier-général du Port Sta. Maria,  
le 17 Août 1823.”



companies formed by the provincial deputations and other scattered troops, ready to act.\* They had besides often boasted that the flower of the population was on their side, and the arsenals at their disposal. Possessed of the government, and with the resources of the nation at their command; having ample time for preparation, and occupying a country peculiarly adapted to defensive warfare, they were nevertheless unable to compete with an army made up of recruits without experience and veterans of doubtful fidelity. With less than one hundred thousand of such troops the Duke d'Angoulême succeeded where

\* This M. Calatrava, one of the ministers, admits, in his answer to Flores Estrada, dated London, November 16th, 1825, and, on the authority of General Buriel, furnishes the following return:

1st.	Army under Mina, partly in garrison	21,000
2nd.	Ditto of operations, under Ballesteros	18,400
	In garrisons	6,250
3rd.	Ditto under Abisbal at Madrid	8,310
	Garrison of Badajoz	2,400
	Organising in Estremadura	4,190
4th.	Ditto under Morillo	9,000
	Cavalry	1,500
	Garrisons	4,000
	Reserve under Villacampa	9,300
	Cavalry and infantry training	9,000
	Garrison of Cadiz	700
	Militia attached to 4th army	700
	Ditto of Madrid attached to the reserve	2,000
Total		96,750

four times the number of chosen warriors under the direction of Napoleon met with defeat and disaster. But, in both cases, the successful party was supported by the people, and their weight inclined the balance. It is however essential to know, not what the Cortes and liberals did on this trying occasion, but what part the great body of the people took in a dispute between the king and a faction, the decision of which devolved upon them. It is of moment to ascertain with accuracy and precision, not the state of public opinion in Cadiz and other fortified towns, but how the provinces thought and felt at this particular crisis; for, after all, they were the real arbiters on the great points at issue, and not the French. Some details are therefore indispensable.

On the 17th April, the Duke d'Angoulême's head-quarters were transferred from Tolosa to Vitoria,\* where he remained for some days in order to give time for the detached corps to join. On the 20th, Molitor, at the head of the second division, entered Zaragoza, having the previous evening been met by the magistrates. His entry was a scene of joy and popular exultation. Here 8000 Aragonese joined his division; while Ballesteros, com-

\* General Ballesteros commanded the defiles of Salinas, which were easily forced. Bilboa was simultaneously occupied by a small detachment of French and a corps of Spanish royalists under Quesada. At Pancorvo the constitutionalists made no resistance, leaving behind them thirty-one pieces of cannon and a corresponding quantity of stores.

manding the second army, composed of 24,650 men, including 6250 in garrison, withdrew towards Valencia. The defence of Madrid was confided to Count de Abisbal, commanding the third army, who had 8310 there in garrison, 2400 at Badajoz, and 4190 organising in Estremadura; making a total of 14,900 men. On the 17th May he announced his intention of abandoning his post, consoling the townspeople with an assurance that he would not quit them "until he had taken care to supply the place of his forces with a French corps capable of affording them protection." On the 18th, the capitulation was signed; and on the 20th, the French entered, when the inhabitants, relieved from their fears, effaced the *lapida* of the constitution, entered the hall of the Cortes, destroyed the furniture, and burned all the records found upon the spot. Abisbal was blamed, denounced as a traitor, and loaded with opprobrium; yet what other alternative remained? His sincerity could not be doubted by his accusers; but he saw that the whole population was against him, and that he could not rely upon the fidelity of his troops, most of whom joined the royalists the moment the French army appeared.\*

\* The family of the O'Donnells, a name rendered familiar to the English reader by the labours of Lady Morgan, passed into Spain after the defeat of the Earl of Tyrone during the reign of Queen Elizabeth. One branch settled there; but the other, Roric O'Donnel, returned to Ireland and made his submission, as appears from the deed signed by King James, in September

Mina commanded the first, or Catalonian army, with garrisons amounting to 21,000 men. For the defence of the principality regular plans had been formed, and much was expected from the efforts of the constitutionalists in a country still more strongly fortified by nature than by art; yet, at

1603, found in the appendix of Lady Morgan's novel. The O'Donnells, retaining all the chivalry of their ancestors, followed the military profession in their adopted country; and when the British army landed in the Peninsula, four brothers held commissions in the Spanish service; viz. Henry, Charles, Joseph, and Alexander. The first served under General Blake in 1809; and the part which he took in the relief of Gerona, at the head of the Ultonia regiment, first brought him and General Sarsfield into notice. In 1810, Henry O'Donnel was appointed to the command of Catalonia, where he created an army which, with alternate success, for a while held the French in check. Defeated on the plains of Vich by General Souham, and afterwards successful at the village of Abisbal, where he gained his title, he had the glory of witnessing the surrender of a whole French column under the orders of General Schwartz. The Catalonians were justly proud of this gallant deed, and Henry O'Donnel, now Count de Abisbal, became a great favourite with them. Deprived of his command in 1811, he was next year named a member of the regency; but, towards the close of the war, rejoined the army, and commanded at the capture of Pancorvo. On the return of Ferdinand VII. his full rank was confirmed and fresh honours bestowed upon him. After holding the command of the army of the Bidassoa, he was placed at the head of the troops destined for an expedition against South America. In this command it is believed that he acted an equivocal part, by first siding with the mutineers, and then betraying them. The constitutionalists roundly affirm that he had pledged himself to their interests, and was engaged in the conspiracy of 1819. That he belonged to their party, is evident from his subsequent conduct; and that he was

this very moment, Mina did not venture to trust any one of his eight fortresses in the hands of the militia;—a convincing proof that the people were against him. Scarcely could it be otherwise, after the scenes they had witnessed, one of which demands particular notice.

never afterwards trusted by Ferdinand's government, is also undeniable. After the restoration he retired to France, and died at Montpellier, May 17, 1834.

It was strongly suspected that whilst in Navarre, and so early as 1815, Count de Abisbal corresponded with Charles IV. for the purpose of bringing him back to reign as a *constitutional monarch*. Many persons also think that he was implicated in Lacy's conspiracy. When uniting in himself the command of the Cadiz expedition and the captain-generalship of Andalusia, he was understood to favour an attempt to bring about a new order of things. His object seemed to be to prepare the army for a grand enterprise; and he formed the plan of encamping the principal corps at Port St. Mary's, as he said, "in order to render the spirit of the soldiery uniform." This encampment was made in three divisions; and on the 15th July (1819,) the day of St. Henry, it was expected that the count would raise *the standard of liberty*, that being the festival of his titular saint. A question arising as to what form of government was to be established, he hung back at first; perhaps imagining that he would be made a dictator, having evinced a disposition to govern at the head of the army. Being told that there was no wish to establish a military despotism, his views changed, and on the 7th, having placed himself at the head of the infantry and Sarsfield of the cavalry, the officers implicated were arrested and the encamped regiments disarmed. Abisbal was then called up to Madrid, deprived of his command, and laid upon the shelf.

This family stands as a melancholy example of the dreadful consequences of civil strife. The count's only son was shot by order of Zumalacarregui, as will be afterwards noticed, and thus



The Bishop of Vich, suspected of royalism and opposed to the plan of church spoliation, had been confined in the citadel of Barcelona when the news of the French having entered the Spanish territory reached that place. The popular party cried out for vengeance, and finding no other object upon whom to wreak their fury, loudly called for the bishop's head. The popular leaders assembled at the dead of night as a committee of public safety, summoned the chief magistrate before them and reproached him for his apathy, ending a long harangue on the necessity of preparing for defence by telling him that the bishop must be put to death; adding, "the country's welfare requires that to-morrow's sun beam not upon his head." The political chief, who had

the title became extinct. Charles O'Donnel, the second brother, was a staunch royalist, and commanded a division of the Army of the Faith in 1822, when he experienced a defeat. During the war of independence he held command in Valencia, and at the peace was made captain-general of Old Castile. He had four sons,—three royalists, and one a *Cristino*. Of the three royalist sons, Pepe, who followed his king to Portugal, passed through England, and afterwards organised the Carlist cavalry, was killed pursuing a party of carabineers into Pamploña; the second was barbarously massacred at Barcelona, and the third joined Charles V. last August in Guipuscoa. The *Cristino* brother was wounded in an action in the northern provinces, but now holds the rank of brigadier in the queen's service. The father, it is believed, died of a broken heart on learning the fate of his two sons. He had previously been much affected by one of his sons joining that party to which he had himself always been opposed.

been roused from his bed, heard this extraordinary sentence, and doubted whether he was awake. He attempted to expostulate, and was answered, "Sir, you come here not to plead, but to obey." Before sunrise the bishop was forced into a coach, and as it was considered unsafe or too disgraceful to put him to death in the town, he was conducted by a piquet of infantry to a solitary part of the Tarragona road, and there shot by the hedge-side. This savage and brutal assassination was the first blow struck in defence of Catalonia.\*

Moncey, the eldest of the French marshals, entered Catalonia on the 13th April with 20,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, and 7000 Spanish royalists, directing his first movement upon Junquera, and

\* So great was the horror excited by the murder of this venerable man, decreed and executed *à la militaire*, that D. Pedro Sais Castellanos, the judge-advocate of Mina's army, on his arrival in England felt himself called upon to publish a manifesto to show that he had no part in the atrocious deed. The case had been instituted before him; but he gave it as a decided opinion that his was not a competent tribunal, and that the matter ought to be referred to the supreme court of justice. The bishop had been charged with having invited the French to enter, when it is well known that their interference was the effect of deliberations held at Verona, and hastened by the insulting conduct of the Madrid government. The judge-advocate states that one of the bishop's servants was also shot by his side, whose name was not even mentioned in the proceedings of which he took cognizance; adding, that "the prelate was shot by his escort, and as this could not be done without a written order, it is presumable that this order emanated from the commander-in-chief."

his next towards Figueras. Mina manœuvred in the interior ; while Milans was left to protect Barcelona, towards which city the first French division was afterwards directed.\* Milans occupied a position at Moncada, two leagues from Barcelona, his advance defending the village and heights of Castel Tersol, which the French carried after some resistance ; but Moncada was retained during the time they were occupying Mataró,† Granollers, and other neighbouring places. Mina, in the mean while, influenced by the French deserters and Italian refugees attached to his army, tried the singular experiment of entering the French territory, where he encamped near Les Guinguettes ;

\* D. Francisco Milans del Bosch was born at Mataró, where his patrimonial estates were considerable. He was an officer of the guards, and served in the campaigns of 1792 and 1793. He received an excellent education, and his fondness for field-sports made him active and strong. He passed through the war of invasion with great *éclat*, and attained high rank ; but being implicated in the Lacy conspiracy, he effected his escape, first to Gibraltar, and afterwards to Buenos Ayres. After the re-establishment of the constitution, he reappeared on the old scene of action, Catalonia, his native province, where his name was popular, and commanded under Mina.

† Mataró, a seaport and head of a navy department, with 13,000 inhabitants, five and a half leagues east of Barcelona. It is the *Illuro* of the Romans, and contains many of their antiquities and inscriptions. The old town, situated on a hill, retains its walls and gates : the new one is more extensive, reaching down to the sea-side. Granollers, a small town of 2500 inhabitants, stands on a plain, near the rivers Besos y Congost, three leagues from Mataró and five from Barcelona.

but not a single Frenchman welcomed his approach. He was afterwards blamed by some of his countrymen for yielding to an army of conscripts, when his voice and presence would have *roused the whole of France*:—but the Spanish liberals were always fond of building castles in the air. Mina had the mortification of retiring without meeting a single partisan, the inhabitants having fled to the mountains on his approach.

His disastrous retreat from Nuria\* after this expedition, and Gurrea's surrender, decided the fate of Upper Catalonia, and the captain-general resolved to set out for Barcelona. By the end of June the only constitutional army remaining in the field was that of Milans, and, as a *dernier ressort*, it was determined to add to it all the disposable troops in garrison.

After an unsuccessful attempt upon Mataró, Milans quitted the neighbourhood of Barcelona with his whole force, and posted himself at Molins del Rey, whence next morning he was dis-

\* Mina, in his Life already quoted, describes this disaster in these words: "The retreat from Nuria in the middle of June would have been memorable had not an unheard-of tempest which occurred on the morning of the 14th, in the highest and most snowy part of Catalonia, raising a terrible hurricane, and destroying all traces of the road, caused the separation of my column and the loss of one half of it, who were surrounded by the French troops and the factious." Gurrea, who had formed part of the expedition to France, surrendered to General Saint Priest in the Vall de Sevolles.

lodged and driven to Matorell. Cardona\* and Tortosa now opened their gates to the royalists; and at the same time, Manso quitted the constitutional banners.† The defection of his troops, the harassing nature of the service, and the difficulty of obtaining supplies in a country where the inhabitants were all hostile, at length forced Milans to shut himself up in Tarragona, which he did not quit till after the capitulation. The struggle in Catalonia from this moment became hopeless for the constitutionalists. Lauriston, after liberating Aragon, was advancing to form a junction with Moncey; Figueras and Urgel had capitulated; while at Barcelona, Tarragona, and Hostalrich, alone the constitutional flag continued

\* Cardona is remarkable for its position, the difficulty of its approaches, and the regularity of its positions, being built on an eminence in the centre of Catalonia. The town extends down the side of the hill. This place was at the time well provided.

† D. Jose Manso, a Catalonian and born in 1784, was a muleteer's boy at the commencement of the invasion. Having whilst attending on the French army been insulted by a cuirassier, he swore to avenge himself. To this affront he owed the change in his calling, and merit gradually led him to honours. Bold, vigilant, and hardy, he collected a band of partisans, and distinguished himself in that peculiar war of skirmishes and ambuscades which became so harassing to the French, who were obliged to keep up their communications by the aid of small detachments. Success procured him arms, booty, and the other means of providing for his band, which from one battalion gradually was increased to a regiment, called Hostalrich. He then descended to the plains and open roads, often attacking convoys. At the close of the war Ferdinand VII. made



to wave. These three places were eventually included in the same capitulation, and Mina on the 7th November embarked for England.\*

While the Duke d'Angoulême was marching upon Madrid, Lauriston clearing Aragon, and Moncey pushing the war in Catalonia, Bourke, with a corps of 5000 French, took the road to Galicia, where Morillo commanded the fourth army, composed of 9000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, stationed on various points, independent of 4000 more employed in garrisons. In the interval the Cortes continued their legislative labours at Seville, where they opened their sittings on the 23rd of April; and almost one of their first acts was a decree for the formation of a foreign legion of 10,000 men, into which all foreign de-

him a brigadier-general, and his regiment was retained. He sided with the constitutionalists in 1820, and acted under Mina's orders till he saw the contest fruitless, when he joined the French, and became extremely serviceable in preventing the further effusion of blood. His principles are unquestionably royalist, and it is believed that inclination did not lead him to favour Queen Christina's cause. At the death of Ferdinand he was acting as governor of Cadiz, at which time he wavered. The declarations of the British and French envoys fixed his determination, as well as that of several other officers in the same garrison. Since he has had several commands, lastly in Old Castile.

\* During this campaign, Madame Lacy, widow of the general of that name, at Barcelona organised a small corps of female lancers, whose duty was to take care of the wounded. They also encouraged the men to enlist. This example, in a country where females take an active part in politics, has in a few instances been followed in the present contest.

serters and refugees in Spain, or who might arrive to defend *the cause of liberty*, were to be admitted;" and yet, only a month afterwards, a proposition was made to convey the king and Cortes to the Canary Islands, and rejected by a majority of but eight votes.\* In June the great crisis seemed at hand, accounts of the successes of the French and the increase of the royalists reaching Seville from all quarters. In this desperate state of affairs, Sir W. A'Court on the 8th offered his mediation, and even declared his readiness to go to Madrid and bring back the best conditions he could obtain. The Cortes replied that they stood in no need of foreign interference, and only three days afterwards agreed on removing the king to Cadiz, as the only remaining place of safety, and appointed a deputation to wait upon him with this determination.

The deputation being ushered into the king's presence, informed him, that "the Cortes, after

\* The contract was made with Sir Robert Wilson, who was to hold the rank of lieutenant-general and appoint his own officers. The individuals attached to this corps were to have retiring allowances and pensions for wounds. Minister Calatrava, in his letter published in London, November 1825, says that it was he who arranged the terms of the bargain, and adds, that "if they were not carried into effect, the fault did not rest with Sir Robert, but arose out of insuperable obstacles which afterwards occurred." More particular notice is taken of the contract in this place, because it afterwards served as a model, if not an authority, for the one entered into with Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Evans, not in Spain, but in England.

declaring their sitting permanent, had resolved upon their own removal on the following day; alleging that according to the situation of affairs, if the French were to advance by forced marches, it would be no longer practicable for them to withdraw; in consequence of which they deemed it fit that his majesty and the Cortes should proceed to the Isla de Leon." The king replied that his conscience and the welfare of his subjects would not allow him to consent to this proposal. The deputation expostulated, when the king briefly replied—"I have given you my answer."

On their report being laid before the Cortes, Deputy Galiano, the spokesman of the day, made a motion to the following effect: "That, owing to his majesty's refusal to place his royal person and family in safety from the invasion of the enemy, it be declared that the provisional case has arisen in which his majesty is to be considered as labouring under the moral impediment contemplated by the 187th article of the constitution, and therefore that a provisional regency be appointed to exercise the functions of the executive, *only during his removal*."\* On this decision being communi-

\* The articles relating to the king's minority and a regency, are,—185th. The king is a minor until he hath completed his eighteenth year;—186th. During his minority the kingdom shall be governed by a regency;—187th. This shall also be the case when the king is disabled from exercising his authority by any physical or moral cause." The ministers during this singular proceeding were, J. M. Calatrava, E. Salvador, J. A. Yandiola,

cated to the Sevillians, great agitation prevailed; and it is thought that a plan was formed to rescue the king, which led to Colonel Downie's arrest.\*

J. M. De Pando, and F. Osorio. Don Alvarez Flores Estrada, in his printed letter dated London, September 17th, 1825, denouncing the follies and irregularities of that administration, on the manner in which the king was deprived of his powers thus addresses M. Calatrava himself: "You and your colleagues could not be ignorant that the ministers of every representative government are not only the counsellors, but also the natural defenders of the king; and consequently, that when deliberations were held respecting a measure amounting to a civil death, little less severe than that of capital punishment, the ministry could not properly perform their duty by keeping behind the curtain while so tragical a scene was going on, being bound to appear as defenders of the high personage about to be judged. Who can justify the Cortes," he adds, "for not having called the ministers, or the latter for not having been present at a sitting during which the most important measure that can be resorted to in a monarchical government was adopted? To have allowed this without any defence—without previously obtaining legal proofs of the defects in virtue of which the law authorised such an act—without any other formalities than a verbal judgment—hastily pronounced and finally, without afterwards openly manifesting to the nation the powerful motives of a resolution in which the whole country was so deeply interested, or evincing that regard due to the person of the king and to the decorum and dignity of all thrones,—was a deviation from that routine which ought to have been followed in so important an affair." The persons named to the regency were, Deputy Caetano Valdes, president; Don Gabriel de Ciscar and Don Gaspar Vigodet, counsellors of state, members. They were formally installed and the usual oath taken.

\* This officer, a Scotchman, had distinguished himself in the war of invasion, and had been rewarded for his services with the governorship of the Alcazar, or old palace of Seville, in which the royal family resided during their stay there.

The whole of the 11th was passed in indescribable confusion. As happened at Madrid, no money was to be had, and the means of conveyance were inadequate to the number of persons preparing to depart. In the afternoon of the 12th, the king, royal family, regency, cortes, and public functionaries left Seville, escorted by the Madrid militia and a few corps of regulars, commanded by Generals Zayas and Riego.\* No sooner was the fact ascertained that the regency and troops had quitted the city, than the inhabitants rose, tore down the *lapida* of the constitution, demolished the hall of the Cortes, the theatre, and the coffee-houses of notoriety. Immediately afterwards the surrounding villages followed their example.

Seville the next morning presented a scene of

\* Sir W. A'Court, on learning the appointment of a regency, reminded the government that being accredited to the king, he could not follow the regency to Cadiz without further instructions. To this the regents very considerably replied that the king should experience *no restraints* after his arrival at Cadiz. Not being satisfied, Sir William embarked for Gibraltar, as did the envoys from the United States, Netherlands, and Sweden. The Saxon minister, dropping his public character, accompanied the queen as a princess of the house of Saxony. This virtuous and amiable woman in fact required all the aid and protection of her countryman, being much affected by the perilous condition in which she was placed. When the cavalcade first entered Seville, unable to overcome her terror and disgust, she sat back in the carriage and was nearly invisible. In the journey to Cadiz her alarm increased; and the escort, not taking the direct road, rather added to the apprehensions of those whom it was proposed to guard.



the wildest fury and disorder. The ministers, deputies, clerks, and other implicated parties who were unable to withdraw by land, had hired large and commodious boats to convey away their furniture and valuable effects—all they had amassed during the exercise of power. The shallows prevented their progress down the river; which the gypsies and people of the Triana suburb observing, they hurried off to complete the work commenced on the previous evening. It almost seemed as if the Barbary corsairs had ascended the Guadalquivir in search of plunder, so general was the scampering upon the banks. To the cry of *Viva el rey absoluto!* the boats were soon gutted, the furniture broken in pieces, and the government papers thrown into the stream. The pillage of clothes, trinkets, and money was considerable. A swarthy and brawny gypsy, with huge whiskers, and dressed in the extreme of the *majo* fashion, seized upon two *talegas* of dollars, and supposing that his fortune was now made, tied them to his waist and endeavoured to gain the shore. The weight of his booty was however too great for his strength, and although a good swimmer, he sunk to rise no more. His relatives and several members of his clan flocked to the spot, and by their yells and howlings added to the effect of the tumultuous scramble. Several persons were killed in the affray, and a few fell victims to the indignation of the mob. Some houses were also pillaged.

At this moment the bells rung, and an alarm gave notice that a constitutional army was approaching; a fact soon confirmed by its appearance. The regiments with which it was intended that Abisbal should defend the capital, on retiring took up positions at Talavera and Aranjuez, in order to retreat along the Tagus; but on the French advancing, they withdrew to Truxillo. The ex-war-minister, Lopez Baños, had been appointed to the command of this force; and being one of the La Isla heroes, the government placed every reliance upon his exertions and the fidelity of his men, most of whom were *comuneros*. To them therefore the defence of the Cortes and ministers was confided, Seville being entirely destitute of regular troops. The news of the French having passed the defile of Despeñaperros and directed their march upon Cordova prevented the government from waiting for that protection which Lopez Baños was to afford, and his division arrived the day after their departure, and whilst the *majos* of La Triana were so busily engaged on the shallows.

The Sevillians, dreading the anger of the constitutionalists, and at the same time anxious to avoid another visit from such unwelcome guests, prepared for resistance. The lower orders, who all the day had been engaged in depredations or drinking in the wine-houses, felt disposed to aid

in the defence, and each one armed himself with the best weapon he could procure. Powder and ball being required, the crowd hurried off to the Maestranza, where a depôt was kept; but the guard refused admittance. They then proceeded to the Inquisition, which had been converted into a powder-magazine, and obtained entrance, some of them half-drunk and with lighted cigars in their mouths. Whilst helping themselves, the powder caught fire, and nearly four hundred persons were blown up into the air, or buried in the ruins of the building.

At this moment the constitutionalists appeared before the place. General Cabañas\* and some other royalists had collected a few regulars, determined to defend the avenues leading to the city. Aware of these demonstrations, Lopez Baños erected a battery on the heights of Altosano and fired upon his opponents. The few artillerymen who defended the bridge of La Triana being killed, the constitutional hero, after promising his troops twenty-four hours' pillage, forced a passage with his infantry, almost at the same moment that his cavalry crossed the ford at the village of El Algava. The right of pillage was commuted into a forced contribution, equivalent to one month's rent from every householder, and levied under the penalty of death. After a few hours' rest, Lopez Baños

\* This officer is now with the Carlists in the northern provinces, acting as inspector-general of infantry.

hastened towards the South ; and the day after he quitted Seville, the French entered and were well received. The Sevillians then felt that they should be exposed to no more constitutional inroads.

The fresh indignity offered to the king disgusted many who had hitherto clung to the constitutional cause. On the 26th of June, Morillo issued a proclamation, declaring that "he would not acknowledge the government, illegally established by the Cortes," and signifying his intention of sending a flag of truce to the French, to propose a suspension of hostilities.\* Ballesteros seems to have been equally undeceived by the events which had occurred since the arrival of the Duke d'Angoulême, and anxious to avoid the useless effusion of blood. As the French advanced, he quitted Valencia, retired to Murcia and subsequently to Granada. After some slight skirmishing, he concluded a convention on the 4th of August, acknowledging the authority of the Madrid regency.†

\* For his conduct on this occasion the Cadiz Cortes denounced Morillo as a traitor, and passed a sentence of capital punishment against him. The recollection of this sentence, and the dread of its being carried into execution, in all probability induced the general to quit Spain in the course of last September.

† Ballesteros was much blamed by the constitutionalists for this convention, and denounced as a traitor. "He was the child of the revolution," they argued; "had prospered with it, therefore he ought not to have abandoned its banners." He thought otherwise; and as the terms of the convention were at the time concealed in order not to add to the dismay of the constitution-

Towards the beginning of August, almost the only question that remained to be solved was, whether Barcelona or Cadiz would surrender first, so fast was the cause hastening to its dissolution. Riego appeared to be its only prop, and he was shut up in Cadiz. A plan was therefore formed to push him into active service; and it was thought that if he could only approach the army of Ballesteros,—which, after the capitulation, still remained embodied, though inactive,—his name and influence might bring over a large proportion of the men, who were supposed to be staunch constitutionalists. Riego undertook the task, and on quitting the harbour eluded the vigilance of the blockading force. He reached Malaga on the 5th of September, where he found General

alists, it may be serviceable to produce the preamble, as an additional proof of the state of public opinion when it was concluded.—“The cause which we defend, although just in its origin and honourably sustained, ceased to be so from the moment the majority of the nation pronounced against it, and especially after what happened to the king and royal family on their departure from Seville, when the king was placed in a state of captivity which left him no freedom to act even within the circle of the powers assigned to him by the constitution. Hence, therefore, the legitimacy of the Cadiz government has become a mere illusion, and I should consider myself culpable were I to continue any longer to obey it, and in this manner contribute to prolong, and even to aggravate, the enormous misfortunes which already weigh us down. Influenced by these reasons, and supported by the sentiments of the whole army under my command, solemnly and authentically declared, I have determined to enter into negotiations with Count Molitor, commanding the second corps of the French army,” &c.



Zayas\* at the head of four thousand men, the remnant of the reserve lately under the orders of General Villacampa.† Of this force Riego took the command, and with it proceeded towards the positions held by Ballesteros.‡ Reaching

\* D. Jose de Zayas was a native of the Havannah, and chief of General Cuesta's staff in 1808. He served during the whole of the war, and was present at the battles of Albuera and Murviedro. Whilst second in command of the army of New Castile, and enjoying the rank of lieutenant-general, he declared for the constitution in 1820, and was afterwards employed under Abisbal at Madrid. After the restoration he retired into private life, and died at Chiclana about the year 1830.

† D. Pedro Villacampa was born in Aragon, and at the time of the invasion was a serjeant of infantry. He then formed a guerrilla party, which became formidable to the French. Pursued from village to village during two months, he was at length shut up in the convent of Tremedal, an elevated spot in the province of Salamanca, and besieged, but succeeded in forcing his way out. Here his depôt of ammunition was destroyed, and the convent burnt. He miscarried in an attempt to succour Valencia, which place surrendered to Suchet. His enterprises, extending as far as Catalonia and the two Castiles, were always marked with talent and intrepidity. On the return of Ferdinand VII. he was confirmed in the rank of lieutenant-general; but, suspected of some participation in the Lacy conspiracy, he was confined in the castle of Monjuich. After the La Isla affair, the inhabitants proclaimed him captain-general of Catalonia, which rank was confirmed to him in 1821, and he afterwards commanded in Granada. In 1823 he passed over to Tangiers, embraced the Mahometan faith, and settled on a farm; but returned to Spain in 1833, to enjoy the new order of things. He is far advanced in age: the command of the Balearic Islands has, however, been conferred upon him.

‡ D. Francisco Ballesteros, a native of Zaragoza, served as a subaltern in the regiment of Aragon during the campaign of

Priego, sixteen leagues north of Malaga, he found himself in front of his rival's lines, who, perhaps advised of the nature of his movement, received him with a fire of musketry.

1793 against the French. He was next employed in the custom-house guards in Asturias; and on the French entering Spain, the junta of that province confided a regiment to him, organised under his own directions. He was afterwards entrusted with a superior command, and operated in the South, where he had several rencontres with the French. Defeated at Ronquillo and Castillejo in 1810 and 11, in the following year he beat General Marransin at Cartama, and Colonel Beauvais at Osuna; but subsequently pursued by General Couroux, he sought shelter under the guns of Gibraltar. He refused to serve under the orders of the Duke of Wellington after the British commander had been named generalissimo of the Spanish forces by the Cadiz regency, and stated his reasons in a loose pamphlet, in which jealousy and a false pride were the principal ingredients mixed up. When at the head of the war department in 1816, he formed a plan similar to that tried by Napoleon in the provinces east of the Ebro, the great object of which was to introduce a military government, as the best means of keeping the country in subjection. He wished the captain-general of a province also to be the president of the Audiencia, with a decisive vote, and at the same time take into his own hands the intendancy of the revenue, as well as that of the army. The civil government was also to be administered by officers of his own choosing, of whom one was to be placed in every village, town, and city, with rank corresponding to the size of the place. Thus, a lieutenant was to have charge of a village; a captain, of a town; and a lieutenant-colonel, of a city; keeping up constant communications with the war department. This would have thrown a number of persons out of bread, and made the war minister a military despot. Ballesteros, though at that time a great favourite with the king, was banished, and the plan dropped. The rest of his career is blended with the present narrative.

Riego demanded an interview; which being granted, he proposed that Ballesteros should resume his operations against the French, and tendered his own services to act in a subordinate command. The proposal was rejected, and Riego conceived the bold project of seizing Ballesteros's person. With this view he ordered the general's escort to be disarmed; but one of the prisoner's officers escaping from the house where the interview was held, harangued the troops, informed them of the treacherous manner in which their commander had been entrapped, and led them on against Riego. The latter, fearful of being overpowered, was glad to give up his captive, and hastily retreated towards Jaen, near which place he and his band were on the 15th made prisoners by one of Molitor's corps, sent to intercept their retreat. Riego was first confined at La Carolina, and thence conveyed to Madrid, where he was tried and executed by orders of the provisional government on the 7th November.

In Galicia, the French commander Bourke pursued his march with scarcely any interruption till he came before Corunna, where a strong constitutional party had collected, and determined to defend themselves, aided by Sir Robert Wilson. On the 15th, the French moved cautiously up, and on the heights in front of the town a sharp action ensued, the result of which was that the constitutionalists were driven in. Corunna was

afterwards regularly invested and blockaded by a naval force. Here the most barbarous occurrence of the many which sullied the annals of the constitutional contest took place. The French guns commanded the bay, in consequence of which a number of royalists confined in a pontoon rose upon their guards, cut the cables, and drifted out with the tide. Fearful that the other prisoners in the Castle of San Anton might equally escape, the military governor on the 22nd ordered fifty-two of them to be brought to the town, and in the afternoon they were lodged in the prison; but the civil authorities objecting to this step, in consequence of the crowded state of the prisons, as well as of the convents, the unhappy men were put into a small vessel and conveyed down the bay. After doubling the point on which the castle stands, and in front of the light-house, called the Tower of Hercules, they were brought up in pairs from under the hatches, and bound together back to back and thrown into the sea. One of the victims, seeing the fate which awaited him, jumped into the water before his hands were tied, and endeavoured to escape by swimming; but, being pursued by some of his executioners in a boat, they beat out his brains with their oars. The tide cast the bodies of these unfortunate creatures ashore, where they were the next morning found by the French soldiers on guard. General Bourke sent in a flag of truce,

complaining of this atrocious act ; but the monster in command, who had given orders for its perpetration, had in the mean time, together with several other patriots, made off in a British steamer, and eventually found his way to England, where he shared that hospitality which was experienced by the other refugees.\* On the 12th August, Corunna capitulated.

These atrocities were not confined to Barcelona and Corunna. So insolent had the *nationals* become at Granada, that royalists and persons of moderate politics could no longer live in the

\* The fifty-two drowned were all persons of distinction, and some of them had been confined for nearly two years and a half merely on account of their politics. Among them were Escandon, a brigadier from Asturias, a canon of Burgos; Noguera, secretary of the Corunna municipality; the curate of Majadan, Lieutenant-colonel Pereira of Orense, and his brother, together with several other officers. When Morillo entered the town with the French, several of the minor culprits were seized, which aggravated that officer's previous offence in the eyes of the constitutionalists. The captain of the vessel in which the horrid deed was performed, was afterwards discovered, and after being brought to Corunna for trial, was hung and quartered. His head was stuck up at Ferrol, one quarter of his body at Corunna, another at Lugo, a third at Santiago, and a fourth at Betanzos. Eight accomplices were also condemned, two of them the governor's adjutants. Three, however, poisoned themselves in prison before the hour of execution. Their bodies, nevertheless, underwent the ceremony of being hung, agreeably to their sentence. This Corunna *noyade*, which occurred while certain British officers were there, is mentioned to this day in terms of horror throughout Spain. Scarcely do the worst days of the French revolution present so inhuman a deed.



place. Of these a party of about fifteen resolved to withdraw into the country ; but no sooner had they left the suburbs than they were denounced as having gone out to form a guerrilla. The *nationals* instantly pursued them, and at the distance of two leagues succeeded in capturing seven, the rest escaping. Among the party seized was Father Osuna, an old and venerable professor in the convent of San Antonio Abad, the rest, custom-house guards and officers on half-pay. All, including the friar, were bound to the tails of horses,—in this manner led into the city and paraded through the streets ; after which, to add to the indignity, they were cast into the dungeons of what is called the lower or common prison, and herded with felons. Learning some days afterwards where the few who escaped had retired to, the eager *nationals* again sallied forth, and succeeded in surprising five at the little town of Colomera, situated in the mountains, four leagues from Granada. Their hands being bound behind them as an encumbrance, they were brutally assassinated on a small ridge of hills overlooking the bridge of Cubillas. So ferociously did the *nationals* wreak their vengeance upon these victims of their licentious fury, that their mangled bodies could not be recognised by their friends, who the next day went out to bury them. Among the victims were two officers of the guards, the handsomest youths in the province.

The seven confined in prison demanded an inquiry into the causes of their arrest and detention ; but nothing appearing against them beyond their being reputed royalists, which did not exactly warrant the penalty of death, the *nationals* felt afraid that their victims would escape. In the afternoon of the 4th February they therefore got up a commotion in the usual way, and, heated with wine, groups passed along the streets, demanding the heads of Father Osuna and his companions. Reaching the front of the prison, they set up dreadful yells, to be heard by the inmates, reiterating their demand, and endeavouring to force a passage through the gate, where a serjeant and a few soldiers were generally posted ; but when the uproar commenced, General Villacampa, the governor, doubled the guard and stationed a lieutenant there. The mob being disappointed, went away.

In the evening the lieutenant was changed, and an officer in the confidence of the *nationals* was placed at the prison-gate. The commotion was now renewed, and the leaders of the mob assembling at a noted coffee-house in the Plaza Nueva, their usual resort, the death of the prisoners was at once decreed.\* Sure of their game, the brave *nationals* hurried off to the prison, where they were received with a volley of musketry, pointed

\* This coffee-house, the rendezvous of the Granada clubbists, was afterwards shut up, and the owner glad to make his escape.

so high that the balls struck midway up the wall of the cathedral, fronting the prison-gate, where the marks are still seen. This saved appearances, and the commanding officer thought his responsibility sufficiently covered. The bloodthirsty mob now rushed into the prison, the leaders with their faces blackened and their persons disguised. Five inmates in separate cells were soon laid prostrate upon the ground, covered with stabs. One of them posted in a corner manfully defended himself with a pillow, which dropped from his hands after they had literally been cut to pieces.

Father Osuna was now led forth,—as the old man supposed, that his life might be saved ; but no sooner had he gone fifteen paces beyond the prison-gate and turned the corner of a narrow street, than he received a sabre-cut on the top of his bald head. He lifted up his hand to the streaming wound, and at the same moment a blow knocked him against the wall, upon which the bloody imprint of his hand was left as he endeavoured to save himself from falling. Dropping to the ground, he was beaten with sticks and cut with knives. Supposing him dead, the mob dispersed ; when the gaoler, hearing his moans, conveyed him back to the prison, where his wounds were dressed. The next day, the heroic *nationals*, hearing that Father Osuna still survived, flew to the prison ; when one of them, after insulting and upbraiding him for his royalist principles, put a

pistol to his right ear and blew his brains upon the opposite wall, where the bloody traces were seen till within the two last years, and till the interior of the prison was repaired. The seventh victim, who had been conveyed to the upper prison, was murdered under similar circumstances. These scenes ended in a drunken frolic; and if they occurred in 1823, can any one be astonished that they should now be repeated?\*

No army now remained in the field—the hopes hitherto entertained of British interference had failed, and the deficiency of means even to protract the struggle were daily rendered more apparent; still the liberals refused to listen to terms. On the 31st of August the Trocadero was carried, and the approaches to Cadiz were thus materially facilitated; an event a few days afterwards followed by the capture of the Castle of Santi Petri. The constitutional ministers then, for the first time, approached the king and begged him to open a correspondence with the Duke d'Angoulême, in the hope of concluding an armistice, by proposing a personal interview at an equal distance from the two armies. The duke sternly rejected the proposal, adding that he would not treat until the king and royal family were free; promising, how-

\* Judicial investigations were instituted respecting the Granada assassinations, of which the above are the leading circumstances. The parties implicated in them, as well as in the *Corunna noyade*, were excepted from the amnesty granted after Ferdinand VIIth's return to Madrid.

ever, when this condition was complied with, to use all his influence in order to induce the king to grant such institutions as he should consider conducive to the tranquillity and happiness of the realm. Alarm was increased with this mortifying reply, and yet nearly three weeks were spent in sullen inaction. Without even the slightest chance of relief or the remotest hope of success on any side, the Cortes seemed determined to protract their power to the very last, as if sensible of the awful responsibility under which they stood. Gladly would they have put an end to the appalling state to which they were reduced, even by consenting to modifications in their darling constitution, which before they had rejected with disdain; but overtures on this subject at so late an hour would only have served to expose their recent folly and their present weakness. Danger pressed, and, to add to the panic, a conspiracy was detected, in which seven battalions were implicated. Symptoms of general ferment began to show themselves; but the more serious grounds of apprehension arose from the change noticed in the disposition of even the most trusty regiments, which rendered it questionable whether they would defend the lines in case of attack.

On the 24th, the commander-in-chief laid before the government a report, couched in a most desponding tone, and containing a picture of the critical position in which the garrison was placed



owing to disaffection and the total absence of supplies. The next day discussions on the best means of obtaining terms which did not wear the appearance of unqualified submission commenced ; but on the 1st of October it was agreed that the king and royal family should freely embark for Port St. Mary's, where they were received amidst the liveliest demonstrations of joy, and welcomed on their fortunate escape ;—for, after the manner in which they had been treated both at Madrid and Seville, the greater part of the Spanish people never expected to see them rescued alive from the clutches of their oppressors,—so great was the obstinacy of the leading men at Cadiz, and so dangerous that ascendancy which the anarchists had obtained.\* Before he left Cadiz, the king found

\* The king and queen walked down to the pier arm in arm, the other members of the royal family following. Not one of them looked to the right or the left, and it was only when they were seated in the barge prepared for them that they considered themselves safe. The Princess de Beira and her sister Doña Maria Francisca, wife of the Infante Don Carlos, whose buoyant spirits and courageous disposition had greatly encouraged the other members of the royal family during the horrors of their captivity, wore pelisses, which they threw off on approaching the opposite side of the bay, when they appeared dressed in elegant white muslin, spotted with *fleurs de lis* in colours worked by themselves, during their seclusion, in compliment to the prince who was waiting on the beach to receive them. This demonstration on the part of the Portuguese princesses greatly offended the Infanta Doña Carlota, wife of the Infante Don Francisco de Paula, who had not been entrusted with the secret. The difficulties experienced by the royal party in making their friends

himself compelled to issue a decree, promising oblivion of the past, retention of rank, and personal security, at the same time conveying an assurance that he would acknowledge the public debt. The manner in which this declaration was required and given, as well as the peculiar circumstances in which all parties were then placed, rendered it evident that the constitutionalists themselves felt that an act extorted by intimidation could not be held binding, or in the least influence the king's future conduct. They had just come out of a foolish and inglorious campaign, which had so deeply involved them with those of their own party, that they stood in need of something redeeming at the termination of their career. This decree was the only guarantee they were able to obtain from the sovereign whose feelings they had outraged, whose life for nearly three years they had rendered a continued scene of danger and humiliation, and whose altered position was in itself a complete condemnation of their own acts.

On the day of his arrival at Port St. Mary's, Ferdinand VII. published a declaration in which, after alluding to the scandalous transactions which in 1820 preceded and accompanied the re-establishment of the constitution, and asserting that

outside acquainted with their real situation were so great, that one of their messengers actually once carried out of the lines a communication in his mouth, written on parchment with indelible ink.

treason, violence, and personal insults to himself were the elements employed to change the existing order of things, he made known that all the acts of the late government should be annulled, and those of the Madrid regency accepted and confirmed; by which means the ancient *regime* was re-established, the monasteries restored to their former possessors, and everything placed upon the same footing as before the La Isla mutiny. This step has been loudly censured, and the monarch accused of ingratitude; but, what was he to do? He was left to choose between the great majority of the nation and a handful of individuals who had arrogated to themselves the power of enacting laws and then forcing their observance upon the people, after dictating to him the manner in which he was to exercise the royal prerogative.\* Feelings of resentment may perhaps have carried him too far; but the question is, who was the aggressor,—the king, or the Cortes? This point must be decided before it is possible to judge between Ferdinand VII. and the Spanish liberals. Those who framed the constitution and plotted the mili-

\* In order to extend and secure the benefits of the constitution, after its re-establishment in 1820, lecturers were appointed in the principal towns, who explained the nature of its provisions and descanted upon its excellences. Rooms were usually appropriated for their use in the suppressed convents, where the lower orders were invited to these laudatory exhortations. The virulent articles in the leading newspapers were also read to the auditory.

tary mutiny which restored it were rushing on to a fierce democracy, until their giddy course was arrested by the French. Again this lesson was lost upon the tenacious liberals, since the very same parties are now endeavouring to subvert the law of Philip V, not for the benefit of the country, but as the only means of retaining their twice-lost ascendancy.

The follies and illegalities committed by the Cortes from the moment of their assembling at Cadiz may be easily traced in the pages of this narrative; and yet the same follies and illegalities were at Madrid and Cadiz repeated in 1820, 21, 22, and 23. The Cortes first became the legislators of the land by means of a flagrant act of usurpation, which, under the pretence of being legally constituted, they sustained at all hazards; the second time they rose into power by the aid of a military mutiny, and were not prudent enough to steer clear of the very shoals upon which they had previously been stranded. The first time, they had a fair opportunity of judging the evils of precipitate and ill-considered legislation: they then beheld events pregnant with lessons of political wisdom, and still had not the sense or the courage to correct old mistakes when chance again placed the helm of state within their grasp. On both occasions they fell from the same causes. Public indignation hurled them from their seats in 1814; and in 1823 they were overpowered,

not by the arms of France, but by the displeasure of their own countrymen, disgusted and wearied out with the turmoils in which they had been kept, as well as by the many atrocities which they had witnessed. Their army of 96,750 men was gradually frittered away; and while in fortified towns they were vainly denouncing vengeance, in the interior the lips of thousands greeted the Duke d'Angoulême, and welcomed him as the liberator of their king and country.\*

The Spanish liberals among us were accustomed to upbraid the restored Ferdinand for his ingratitude to those who during his captivity had defended his rights, secured his throne, and suffered the severest calamities on his account.† If all

\* It is only on the spot that the real opinions of the Spanish people on the intervention of 1823 can be collected. Near Carpio, on the road leading to Cordova, the inhabitants of Villafranca de las Abujas erected a column, on which is placed a black square marble slab with the four following inscriptions upon it in gilt letters:—1st. “Al S. D. Fernando VII, rey absoluto, Villafranca fiel;”—2nd. “Villafranca al soberano congreso de Verona reconocida;”—3rd. Villafranca á S. A. R. el S<sup>r</sup> Duque de Angouleme y su ejercito mui obligada;”—4th. “Villafranca á los realistas Españoles mui agradecida.”

† On his return from France, Ferdinand VII. evinced a sincere disposition for such changes and improvements as were consistent with the state of the country and did not partake of a revolutionary character. He even began with reforms under his own roof, and dispensed with many useless forms and ceremonies in the palace, where everything was sacrificed to etiquette, even down to the comfort and recreation of the royal family. The king formerly dined in public, and at the dinner-hour the officer on duty went down with a party of life-guards



this had been done by the legislators of 1812, however we might condemn their vanity or censure their follies—however we might despise their theories or smile at their presumption, we should still respect their exertions and sympathise with their sufferings: but, as appears from the very records of their own transactions, instead of forming a government for the purposes which they proposed, such a one as the wants of the country required—instead of directing the energies of the people, concentrating the national strength, conciliating their allies, and pursuing one grand and leading object, they rushed into speculative and impracticable plans of legislation, weakened the confidence of those who were exposed to the enemy's inroads, excited jealousies among the commanders of their own armies, and long retarded the full benefits of that aid which the British troops had come over to afford. Secured by the fortifications of Cadiz and intoxicated with the applauses of the mob, instead of attending to the prosecution of the war, they thought of nothing beyond the introduction of new systems, and how they could best strip the clergy of their revenues,

to the kitchen and tasted some of the dishes, which, when ready, were brought up in processional order between a file of soldiers and served up. These ceremonies were dispensed with, and the members of the royal family in their several establishments dined more *en famille*, occasionally inviting their friends. None of them, however, ventured to go out without the king's permission.

the nobles of their privileges, and the sovereign of his prerogatives.

In the progress of the second experiment, their power was derived neither from the will of the people nor the concessions of the prince, but from an army drawn on to mutiny by intrigue and corruption. In the capricious and tyrannical exercise of this illegal power they clashed with all orders in the state, and, as if they and their friends in Madrid held the exclusive right of dictating laws to the rest of the kingdom, they established a species of federation among their own partisans, which they upheld by a connected chain of societies,\* always ready to obey the mandates of

\* That of the *comuneros* was the most numerous and powerful. The objects of this institution may be thus described:—The confederation of the *comuneros* is the association of persons belonging to the middle orders in every part of the kingdom, proposing to emulate the virtues of those heroes who, like Padilla and Lanego, sacrificed their lives to the liberties of their country. Its members engage to maintain at any price the rights and liberties of the nation, established by the constitution, of which, as the basis of their principles, they adopt the 3rd article; viz. “that the sovereignty essentially resides in the nation, and therefore that to the nation exclusively belongs the right of establishing fundamental laws.” The confederation is divided into communities, each community being formed by the assembly of the *comuneros* of one *merindad* or district. Each *merindad* or district embraces the territory of a province, and is subdivided into an indefinite number of *torres* or towers, each of which is the meeting-place of the members corresponding to one section of the community. A *torre* cannot be composed of more than fifty, nor of less than seven members. A military corps, whatever its numbers may be, constitutes a *torre*. The rights and duties of every *comunero* are the same.

superiors. By this means they secured their monopoly of legislation at the expense of the community, taking care on all emergencies to provide an organical system of agitation which, as if it had been devised by infernal malevolence for the production of universal misery, assailed every order in the state, and extended its baneful influence to the peasant's cottage, as well as to the palace of the noble. Gratitude was due to the clergy, who, during the French invasion, roused the people to resistance, and preached fortitude under the severest reverses;—to the nobles who, like Albuquerque and Romana, sacrificed their all, teaching by example as well as by precept—to the provinces which raised and supported armies for their own defence—to the guerrillas which every town and hamlet assisted to re-

His rights consist in being eligible to all the offices of the confederation, and he is held to be under its special protection. His duties, in addition to those prescribed by his military oath, oblige him to contribute to the expenses of the *torre* to which he belongs, unless legally exempted. Each member is bound to investigate the causes of any misfortunes which may befall his country, either from the mismanagement of the administration or the ignorance of the people; and he is to propose the means which he may think best calculated to restore the national prosperity. No *comunero* is to make use of the influence of the confederation to obtain an appointment; but the confederation is to exert its influence in promoting the advancement of its most deserving members. The misconduct of a *comunero* renders him liable to the penalties awarded by the code of the confederation. The supreme government of the confederation is representative, and confided to a supreme assembly composed

cruit; and, finally, to the women, who carried with them to the mountains those provisions of which the French most stood in need,—who tended the wounded, and in some instances fought and bled on the field of honour: but what gratitude was at that time due to the Cortes? The dearest objects of attachment for which the Spaniards fought, were their king, their laws, and their religion; and to deprive them of these the Cortes did as much as the French. Aliens in feelings and opinions to the bulk of their countrymen, they disturbed the habitual and permanent concord which constituted the happiness of Spaniards, and was essential to their independence. They formed an isolated faction in the state, and thought themselves strong, as well as popular, when they were

of deputies, one from each *merindad*. The functions of the supreme assembly are as follows:—1st, to superintend the operations of the confederation;—2nd, to enforce the observance of the statutes and regulations of the code; 3rd, to fix the *merindads* and give to each its diploma; 4th, to issue diplomas to the different *torres* and their members; 5th, to transmit the resolutions of the assembly to the various juntas of administration for their circulation and execution; 6th, to receive the funds, keep an account of them, report upon them, and regulate their application; 7th, to change, if necessary, the rallying words, signs, and countersigns; 8th, to issue exemptions from payment, &c. With the aid of such a society as this, chiefly established among the officers of the army, a simultaneous movement could at any time be caused in the provinces, of which several examples have occurred in the course of the present contest.

only supported by the few soldiers and *employés* who received their pay. Hence, when the two trials came, they soon discovered that they had no hold upon society; in consequence of which, their efforts were paralysed the moment the disarmed population had an assurance of support.

The great error of the liberals throughout their first experiments, as well as the one in which they are now engaged, has been their disregard of the ancient institutions, and their having always acted in opposition to the general and substantial interests of the country. Whatever changes are introduced, their necessity must be first proved; and when determined upon, they must assimilate to whatever is permanent in the mind of the great majority, or is by them deemed important to the welfare of the community. If in their two first trials the liberals had acted temperately—if they had wisely and honourably adapted the ancient and national legislation to times and circumstances—if they had pursued general interests, instead of pandering to the ambitious or profligate purposes of demagogues and agitators, the country would not have rejected their measures, and at least they would have had credit for their good intentions. Had they refrained from outrages upon the king's person, respected the feelings of the influential classes, and been open to advice, they might still have



extricated themselves from the humiliating and dangerous predicament in which they had placed themselves by rejecting modifications and incurring the anger of the allied powers. They failed because they resorted to expedients which never would have been thought of unless by men conscious of wrong—men who had staked their all upon one die, who had wantonly imbrued their hands in the blood of their fellow-subjects. They acted as men who were sensible that truth and justice must in the end prevail against them—as men who from vanity, infatuation, or love of place, had consented to act in submission to an ephemeral, disorganising, and anti-social influence.

## CHAPTER X.

Mr. Canning's Policy towards Spain.—Its Errors.—Misleads the Liberals.—Ferdinand VIIth's difficulties on reaching Madrid.—Subdivision of Parties.—New Ministry.—Its early intentions moderate.—Casa Irujo, Ofalla, and Ugarte.—Why an Amnesty was not granted.—The Cortes Bonds.—Early Partialities in favour of Ferdinand VII.

It was apparent that the overweening confidence—the egregious vanity and the self-sufficient arrogance, with which the Spanish liberals acted in their dispute with France, arose out of a reliance upon British aid, and an expectation that the Spanish question would again involve Europe in a general war. The disapprobation expressed by Mr. Canning at the notes addressed by the three allies and France to the Spanish cabinet, the subsequent offers of mediation, and the pointed manner in which interference had all along been reprobated, unquestionably misled the *exaltados*, flattered and encouraged as they were by demonstrations from so powerful a quarter. That something like a long occupation by the French troops in case of success was anticipated, is proved by the fact that our minister immediately protested against it; a circumstance which,

coupled with the natural effects of competition on the score of ascendancy, was represented in the most favourable colours at Madrid. The sympathy which was manifested in England towards men supposed to be contending for their rights and liberties, and the arrival of certain British officers to raise a foreign legion and direct the Spanish councils, materially tended to strengthen this delusion.\*

In his policy, Mr. Canning acted on theories entirely his own—on abstract principles, and, as the sequel proved, on defective information. He imagined that the constitution could be modified—that its blemishes would work their own cure—that the La Isla mutiny was not an objection to its establishment, and that the liberals, if not the majority, at least constituted the only valuable part of the population. He also seems to have been influenced by the idea that the insurrections were instigated by the French to afford them a plea for interference, and judged lightly of the alleged violations of territory, as well as of the attempts making in Spain to create a counter-revolution on the other side of the Pyrenees. In other respects also, Mr. Canning laboured under

\* Mr. Canning, in a subsequent debate on Spanish affairs, explained the difficulties in which the British government had been placed with regard to their neutrality by two members of parliament, Sir Robert Wilson and Lord Nugent, having gone to Spain to assist the constitutionalists, in direct contravention of the policy of their country.

false notions. He thought there was little likelihood of the French securing by war those objects which they professed to seek by it; a point which Sir Charles Stuart was instructed to urge on M. de Châteaubriand's attention: and it cannot be disguised that our premier, together with many others equally sanguine, never once dreamt that the French would be cordially received. Although he possibly retained some lurking distrust, and did not perhaps take the Spanish liberals exactly at their word, he nevertheless expected that the determined spirit of the people would rise with the approach of danger, and that the late invasion was about to be played over again, never calculating that the very party who at that time opposed the French were now arrayed against the Cortes and the Constitution.

The Spanish question, it must be confessed, presented a novel and difficult case in diplomacy. It was accompanied by complicated and perplexing circumstances, of which the French were better judges than ourselves, and at a distance the projected enterprise wore an awful appearance. Even Talleyrand seemed terrified at the idea of a French army crossing the boundary. "It is now sixteen years," said the hoary politician, "since, being commanded by him who at that time ruled the world to deliver my opinion on the projected attack on Spain, I had the misfortune to displease that ruler by unveiling

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the future, and pointing out the multitude of dangers that would arise out of an aggression equally rash and unjust. Disgrace was the reward of my sincerity; and after so long an interval I find myself, by a singular destiny, under the necessity of renewing the same warnings and the same counsels." And yet, with all his experience, this able politician was deceived by drawing his conclusions from false premises. There was no parity in the two cases, as events fully testified. The one was an aggression, open and unprovoked, upon a proud, prejudiced, and irritable people; the other, a humane and friendly service which they solicited. The one assailed their independence and roused all their national animosities; whereas the other was calculated to save the lives of the royal family, to restore peace, to put an end to church spoliations, and restore things to their natural and accustomed level.

Mr. Canning's opposition to French interference was founded on the general and abstract principle, that no nation has a right to meddle in the internal concerns of another; and in thus arguing, he made no allowances either for the connexion between the two dynasties, or the peculiar position in which the French as neighbours were placed: yet he could not have been ignorant that the Spanish liberals were infatuated enough to think that they were not only able to secure the benefits of their constitution to themselves, but



also to extend its blessings to other countries. In the course of this narrative allusion has been made to the French deserters and Italian refugees, encouraged and organised for the purpose of attacking the French territory and stirring up the party known to exist in favour of the Bonaparte dynasty, of which the Duke d'Angoulême had a convincing proof the very day before he crossed the Bidassoa.\* In the same hope, Mina, at a later period, entered France, as Spanish troops had done before the invasion, according to M. de Châteaubriand, “ pour aller égorger quelques malheureux blessés de l'armée royaliste, qui croyoient pouvoir mourir en paix dans le voisinage, et comme à l'ombre de notre généreuse patrie.”

So fervent was the spirit of proselytism—so strong the determination of the Peninsular liberals to cling together and make common cause, that when it was rumoured that the deliberations of the Verona Congress turned upon the form of the

\* The subsequent trial of Berton and his associates furnished additional evidence of the existence of a plan to organise a revolt in France, particularly among Bonaparte's old soldiers; and there is no foreigner who like the author happened to be at Madrid towards the end of 1822, who did not see that such a scheme was actively supported by the secret societies and the framers encouraged by the government. These things were at the time spoken of in terms of ridicule by those who still entertained a high opinion of the discretion, honour, and enlightened views of the Spanish constitutionalists. The French ministers were also charged with exaggeration when they described the machinations going on against them in Spain; but time clearly showed that they were right.

Spanish government and the manner in which it had been established, the Portuguese regenerators, who in the interval had adopted the Cadiz constitution as a barren mother sometimes does a foundling to satisfy her disappointed lord, applied to the English government for a guarantee to secure that adoption, under a threat that, if rejected, an offensive and defensive alliance would be concluded with Spain ; hoping by this means to entangle Great Britain in case the Peninsula was attacked. So far had the compact of mutual aid been carried, that as soon as it was known at Lisbon that the French intended to cross the Pyrenees, the Portuguese chargé-d'affaires at Paris gave notice that his government would consider an invasion of Spain as a declaration of war against Portugal ; a notice afterwards confirmed by various corresponding acts, but totally disregarded by the French, who in their transactions in Spain carefully avoided all causes of collision with Portugal, and in no way deviated from the pledge originally given that their sole motives of interference were to liberate the king's person, and rid their frontiers of the vicinage of persons dangerous to their own tranquillity.

This therefore was not a case to which abstract principles could strictly apply, particularly when other circumstances are considered. The French Bourbons must have been aware of the reality of the perils to which their Spanish relatives were

exposed. To this subject their agents were more alive than those of England; and it could not have escaped them that the march of madness was fast proceeding—that the original plans of the French jacobins were pursued without relaxation—that the desperate crusade against monarchical institutions was going on, and, in the end, that the lives of the royal family would be endangered.\* The advance of the French into Spain created feelings of indignation, particularly in England; and when the speech of Louis XVIII. arrived, it was loudly censured as conveying “a declaration of war against a neighbouring power with scarcely one word to explain its necessity or to prove its justice,” particularly by those parties who now actually applaud the novel species of intervention for which Great Britain is indebted to the enlightened policy of one of Mr. Canning’s successors.

In entering Spain the French claimed nothing beyond those rights held and usually exercised under the law of nations. By timely measures, however, the impending evil (if such it was) might

\* It is very generally believed in Spain that during this emergency two projects were formed and discussed in secret sittings of the Cortes;—the one, to try and bring the king to the scaffold, as Cromwell did our Charles I; and the other, to convey him out to the Havannah. The fact is not established; but the surmise was strengthened by certain expressions which after their downfall escaped some of the leading members of the Cortes in their mutual recriminations.

have been averted. A country divided by faction and convulsed by party violence might have been pacified without so great a sacrifice and so bad an example, if Mr. Canning had not been quite so delicate. Whilst the French ministers still talked of peace, a request arrived from Madrid, urging the English government to use its good offices to obviate the impending rupture; and accordingly the head of the foreign department, under date of January 24, instructed Sir Charles Stuart to acquaint the French ministers with the nature of this overture. "Let M. de Châteaubriand," said Mr. Canning to the British ambassador, "ask of himself, as we in England have asked of ourselves, whether, if there existed in the frame of the government of France or of England respectively all those imperfections which either theoretical criticism or factious clamour imputes to them, we should consent, even if we were already resolved to probe and reform those imperfections, to do so on the demand of a foreign power, made under the menace of foreign war as the penalty of refusal." \*

Was there any similarity, it may be safely asked, between the constitution of England or France, and that framed at Cadiz under circumstances already described;—a constitution voted and signed by a majority of Spanish and South American substitutes, rejected in 1814, and now

\* Stapleton's Life of Canning, chap. v.

forced upon the king and country by the bayonets of an armed band of mutineers? Mr. Canning perhaps was not sensible of the tendency and consequences of this indirect encouragement; but in the eyes of the Spanish liberals so flattering a comparison amounted not only to an approbation of the new code, but also to a sanction of the means by which they themselves had obtained power,—the more so as the very man who had been raised to the ministry, and was then the channel of communication with the British government, was himself one of the leaders of the La Isla mutiny, and the historian who recorded the events of that memorable day.\* This delusion scarcely could have happened among any other class of politicians than Spanish liberals; but it is nevertheless a fact that, at the period alluded to, the constitution, its upholders, and all the late improvements, were by them supposed to be under the special protection of the British minister. Mr. Canning's efforts, however, did not check the ardour for interference, the French continuing to pursue their object with firmness, dignity, and success. What a Talleyrand deprecated and a Canning prejudged as a failure, turned out to be a mere military promenade. The great majority of the Spaniards felt grateful for this aid; a fact easily ascertained by question-

\* *Memoria sucinta de las Operaciones del Ejército Nacional de San Fernando, por Don Evaristo San Miguel*: Madrid, 1820.



ing them in the provinces, or by noticing the monuments raised to commemorate the event. Are similar manifestations of public feeling likely to honour the services of the foreign auxiliaries now engaged in Spain?

Aware of the minister's feelings and with access to his papers, Mr. Canning's biographer thus describes the breaking-up of the constitutional cause in Cadiz:—"In this desperate extremity, with the knowledge of Ferdinand's character, the wisest course would have been to have treated with the Duke d'Angoulême, who would at least have taken care to fulfil the terms to which he might have consented to have agreed; but, unfortunately, some unlucky spirit broached the fanciful idea that it would be more consistent with the character of a great nation to throw itself upon the mercy of the king than to bargain with an enemy at the gates. The engagements to which the Duke d'Angoulême was still willing to accede were entirely lost sight of; and after forcing the king's signature to a decree of amnesty in which his majesty was made to speak of the "*enemy's* camp" in a manner that clearly marked that he wrote under subjection, the Cortes and government announced that he was free, and even facilitated his departure."

It is not stated how the Cortes in their last moments could have negotiated directly with the Duke d'Angoulême, nor does any precise basis

appear to have been formed for negotiations;\* but if Mr. Canning in the early stages of the dispute had had the real welfare of Spain at heart—if he had wished to prevent the French invasion—if he had been actuated by a sincere desire to preserve general tranquillity, and spare the effusion of Spanish and French blood, instead of dreaming of modifications in a code the legality of which was inadmissible and its provisions impracticable; why did he not uphold that party which was favourable to the revival of the ancient institutions, or the granting of a charter similar to that of Louis XVIII, for both of which plans there was in Spain ample scope and fair opportunities towards the close of 1822, particularly for the first? Why was something of this kind not thought of at Verona? It is much to be feared that those who were then endeavouring to alleviate the misfortunes of Spain scarcely knew that she had ancient institutions capable of being adapted to all needful purposes; or, if aware of the fact, that they were at a loss how to advise their revival.

When Ferdinand VII. recovered his liberty, and with it the exercise of his kingly prerogative,

\* A few days before the surrender of Cadiz, Mr. Eliot was sent by Sir William A'Court to the Duke d'Angoulême, with a proposal to negotiate, and obliged to confess that the British minister himself did not know what terms the Cadiz government would offer, but imagined that a representative government would be a *sine quâ non* condition.

he certainly had before his eyes great and instructive lessons of experience, though at the same time it must be confessed that his position was extremely perplexing. The whole country was in a state of convulsion, divided into two parties as distant from each other as the north from the south; one small in number and obliged to dissemble or hide its principles—the other aggrieved, numerous, and supported by the prejudices of the great mass of the population. Vengeance had besides become the order of the day. The injured nobles and clergy flocked round the king and laid before him their complaints. From Catalonia he was reminded of the brutal murder of the Bishop of Vich; while, on the other hand, the houseless inhabitants of Castel-Fullit pointed to the still reeking ashes of their dwellings. Navarre and the Basque provinces enumerated the outrages committed against their franchises. The families of the fifty-two persons wantonly drowned in the bay of Corunna,—of those murdered in the prisons of Granada—claimed justice at his hands. The relatives of thousands who had perished in confinement, or fallen beneath the sword of the infuriated victor when from a conscientious principle they were defending the altar and the throne, called upon him to revenge their wrongs. It was remarked by those who at this time had access to the palace, that the great proportion of the persons who crowded the galleries

and anti-chambers, waiting for audiences to present memorials, were dressed in deep mourning, many of them disconsolate widows who had purposely come up from various parts of the kingdom. The words *exaltados*, *anarquistas*, *tragalistas*, *zurriaguistas*, *comuneros*, *masones*, *landaburenses*, *martilleros*, and other similar denominations, constantly resounded in his ears.\*

In this state of things, the most judicious—nay, the only course to pursue, was to allow time to heal the wounds of the state—to soothe and calm the violent passions with which the public mind was agitated—in a word, to let party animosities and civil odiums subside, before a definitive plan of improvement was fixed. The liberals—at least those who were abroad and remote from danger—railed and ranted at delays, attributing them to ignorance, fanaticism, ingratitude, and a wish to

\* These are subdivisions of one party. The four great and distinct parties into which Spain was then divided were, *Afrancesados*, *Liberales*, *Serviles*, and *Persas*, whose clashings in the state gave rise to more enmities and confusion than all the triumphs of Rome put together. The first commenced with the invasion, the second and third with the disputes respecting the merits of the Cadiz constitution, and the fourth, as already shown, soon after Ferdinand VII. returned from France. The liberals assert that the principal arms employed against them were, calumny, the people's attachment to Ferdinand VII, and the ignorance of the lower orders. The *serviles*, in calling their opponents *jacobins*, conceived that they conveyed a sufficiently correct idea of the motives which actuated their own conduct and sanctioned their resistance.

persecute and misrule. In these charges they were, however, both hasty and unjust. The first persons who approached Ferdinand VII. and assisted at his councils certainly were not the men who could have rescued Spain from the chaos into which she had been plunged, first by the French invasion, and next by the reign of Spanish liberalism; but they did not retain their places longer than a fortnight. The Marquis de Casa Irujo\* and Count Ofalla were appointed to the ministry; a choice which could not have been objectionable even to Mr. Canning, since

\* Casa Irujo was an old diplomatist and many years ambassador in the United States, where he married the daughter of a governor of Pennsylvania belonging to the Jeffersonian party. He was the first who applied steam to the grinding of corn in Spain, and his grist-mill was established at Cadiz after a model brought from Philadelphia. D. Narciso Heredia, a native of Granada, married a lady who had been a nun, and to one of her clerical relatives he was indebted for a situation in the foreign office. He sided with the French party, and after Ferdinand's return was named a war counsellor. In the second reign of the constitution,—that is, from 1820 to 1823,—he was a constant attendant upon D. Antonio Ugarte, in whose anti-chamber he spent hours, waiting for an opportunity to open his budget of news. It may be proper to observe that M. Ugarte was at that time one of the most important personages in Madrid. He had been an agent for law-suits; but being active and intelligent, he rendered services to M. Tatischeff, the Russian envoy, who introduced him at court, and having occasion for a confidant within the palace, through his influence placed him at the head of the *camarilla*,—the back stair-case council—that invisible and formidable authority, which in Ferdinand's lifetime exercised an unbounded sway. Ugarte was made



his biographer, speaking of the new administration, says, "its members were all of the moderate party, and those who really entertained patriotic feelings began to hope that better days were about to dawn upon their country." He also confesses that "the ministers were busily employed in endeavouring to arrange an amnesty, as the first step towards the re-establishment of order and peace; but their endeavours were foiled by the fanatical and vindictive spirit of the individuals by whom the king was surrounded."\*

It is thus acknowledged, and by no question-

director-general of the expeditions against South America, and the funds destined for this object passed through his hands. He effected the purchase of the rotten ships from Russia, and in return for this service had the cross of St. Ann bestowed upon him. So rich and powerful did Ugarte at length become, that little was obtained at court without his patronage. He made ministers and viceroys: all the good things were in fact at his disposal, and hence his levies were constantly attended by place-hunters.

Being left a widower, M. Heredia espoused the sister of the Marquis de la Torresilla, rather deformed, and by no means a beauty, who in her own right was the Countess de Ofalla, which marriage conferred upon him the title of count, in Spain called *titulo de bragueta*: lately Queen Christina made him a grandee. He was the commissioner for the settlement of the British claims, and in the paper styled the "will of Ferdinand VII." the count is named secretary of the council which the queen was to consult on important affairs. Ugarte went as ambassador to Turin, a political banishment, where he died. He experienced much ingratitude from men who by his influence were raised to the ministry.

† Stapleton's Life of Canning, chap. vii.

able authority, that moderate men were, a fortnight after the king's return to the capital, selected for the ministry, as well as that a disposition existed to grant an amnesty. Mr. Canning's biographer states the reasons, at the time most probably transmitted from Madrid, why this amnesty of which so much has been said was not granted; and he is also candid enough to admit that "a fortnight after his accession to office, Casa Irujo was struck with apoplexy, from which he never recovered." Had the real truth then been told, it would have amounted to this,—that the king, in the predicament in which he was then placed, could not without the greatest danger grant an amnesty in the face of an injured and irritated people. Of this fact Mr. Canning must have been aware, as his biographer admits that "the Madrid government was dependent for its safety on a foreign force, which, however, by a singular destiny was much more frequently employed in restraining the excesses of the party which it came to support, against the party which it had overthrown, than in keeping down the struggles of the latter party to regain their lost ascendancy, on the plea of doing which its presence in the Peninsula was required." It is further acknowledged that, owing to hesitation on the part of the king to acknowledge the Cortes bonds, "the government was reduced to such straits that the most pressing public business was

with difficulty carried on, and all attempts at establishing any regular system of government rendered utterly hopeless." And from what motives, here attributed to the king when they rather concerned his council, did this hesitation to acknowledge the Cortes bonds arise? As will be hereafter shown, because equivalent value had never been given for them—because a portion of this paper had been purloined or unduly appropriated; and lastly, because the king had declared his determination not to confirm any act extorted from him by intimidation,—and this, with the forced loan, was one of the last performed at Cadiz.\*

\* These bonds were at length acknowledged, in March 1831, and upon this act the following observations were then made: "The matter seems to be viewed by the Spanish government as one of expediency; and notwithstanding the illegality of the original debt, there appears to have been a disposition to befriend the innocent sufferers, although it may not have been convenient to come to the present determination till now. The strength, however, physical as well as moral, which the Madrid government has acquired within the last few years, materially alters the case; and there being no longer any dread that a faction or an ephemeral government can again borrow money on the faith of the nation, the inconvenience which the new measure may occasion will not be very considerable. We must therefore take the acknowledgment of the Cortes bonds rather as a proof of the liberal spirit by which the Spanish government is actuated than as an act of justice, and doubtless in that light the holders will view it. This point having been decided after mature consideration, it is but fair to conclude that the Spanish government will scrupulously fulfil all the engagements arising out of the new pledge."

Without attempting further to defend or palliate the conduct of Ferdinand VII, and merely looking at the question as one of right and expediency, it will appear manifest to any person who takes the trouble to investigate the subject, that the Cadiz liberals erred when, unsolicited and unempowered, they took upon themselves the formation of a code repugnant to the principles of those institutions under which the Spaniards had lived and prospered, opposed to their habits, and subversive of established order. The observance of this code they sought to enforce by means of violence and coercion. No people on earth are so jealous of their chartered and long-preserved liberties and privileges as the Spaniards—a fact fully established by the very struggle at this moment going on; and yet the liberals of 1812 and 1820 were so obstinate or so infatuated as to lose sight of this important landmark, and endeavoured to destroy whatever could bring to the minds of their countrymen the recollections of their former grandeur and nationality. The Spaniards are proverbially loyal, and perhaps no sovereign ever came to the throne with such strong predilections in his favour as Ferdinand VII. When his return from France was expected,\* notwith-

\* The expectations of his return are thus described by a liberal writer of some eminence, in 1821 :—" En esto se anuncia la proxima venida del rey, de aquel Fernando tan suspirado, y corre la voz de que Fernando nos va á sacar de nuestros apuros y congojas, á librarnos de todo temor—de toda impiedad : Dios

standing the errors at Bayonne and all the sacrifices to which they had given rise, the enthusiasm of the people almost amounted to idolatry. The fervency of their ardour and the sincerity of their devotion could not be believed were it not for the testimony of eye-witnesses; and yet, long before he treads the Spanish territory, the liberals declare that he is to swear to the whole of the mystic book in their presence, or else be discarded from his throne. If he does not consent to these conditions, some one else is to be named in his stead.

No modifications were then thought of; at the frontiers he was to be received by troops in the pay of the liberals, and thence escorted to the hall of their sittings, where, blindfolded, he was to take an oath of which he could neither understand the import nor foresee the consequences;—the very same oath which in 1820 he had to take in order to obviate the calamities of a civil war, threatened by a mutinous army. The legislative experiment was again tried, from March 1820 to October 1823, and totally failed. Mr. Canning's biographer, after defending that minister's policy towards Spain, is in the end obliged to confess that the "constitutional government was

lo habia criado para consuelo de los Españoles! En llegando él, ah! se acabarán las disputas—los peligros y las lágrimas. Se hacian rogativas públicas por su feliz llegada y prorumpian en llorar hombres, mugeres, viejos, niños, al oir en la iglesia una Ave Maria por la salud de nuestro amado Fernando."



defective, and administered by individuals whose conduct rather tended to aggravate than to mitigate those defects; that the blemishes of the constitution had already arrayed against it a majority of the nation :” and yet it was at one time thought that these blemishes would work their own cure, that the defects might be gradually removed; but how was this to be done without a compromise between the king and the liberals? and could this have been satisfactorily arranged in either 1814 or 1823?

After the indignities heaped upon him and the other members of the royal family, in the whirlwind of clamour by which he was borne away when he reached Madrid, Ferdinand VII. could not enter into terms with his personal enemies, who still insisted upon their original conditions—who would not abate an atom of their demands, and who by their conduct had proved that they scarcely belonged to the nation whose destinies they wished to control. It is not, however, intended to enter into the quarrels of the liberals with Ferdinand VII, or to examine their mutual accusations. It will suffice to show that in 1824 a disposition existed to establish an improved form of government—to follow the advice of the Duke d’Angoulême, and then point out the causes which prevented this disposition from being productive of beneficial results.

## CHAPTER XI.

Difficulties after the Restoration.—Amnesty and its exceptions.—Purifications.—Refugees.—Eager to regain power.—Attacks upon the Spanish Coast.—Valdez at Tarifa.—Iglesias.—Bazan.—The Richart Conspiracy.—Renovales.—Commotions in Catalonia.—Their object.—Zambrano.—Intrigues against Don Carlos.—The King's Jealousies.—Scenes near the Pyrenees.—Alexander and Joseph O'Donnel.—Spanish Lines attacked.—Torrijos.—Failures.—Persevering Efforts of the Constitutionalists.—The Country prospers during their absence.

HOWEVER desirous Ferdinand VII. may have been to follow the advice of the Duke d'Angoulême, his friend and liberator,—however sensible of the necessity of giving to his government an improved form and allaying pre-existing causes of discontent,—it will be readily admitted that though the ministers chosen after the restoration were avowedly the best men the country could produce, the nature and magnitude of the difficulties which surrounded them were such as could scarcely be overcome by any abilities whatever. They found everything unhinged and in disorder. The misfortunes of which the Cadiz code was so lamentable a memorial, daily showed themselves in some new shape. The more the state of the

country was inquired into, the more flagrant the errors, if not the guilt, of the fallen party appeared. The reports from the provinces were appalling—the treasury empty, and foreign credit destroyed. On isolated points the shades of opinion might have varied; but in the condemnation of the acts of the liberals, the public voice was unanimous. Then only was ascertained in its full extent the galling nature of their yoke. Such a result was to be expected. Twice had the liberals failed by forcibly introducing changes absurd in theory and impossible in practice—by attempting more than the general intelligence of the country would warrant, and by stirring up an intestine war, the consequences of which must have been lamentable indeed had not the French opportunely interfered.

It is difficult to form a correct estimate of the character, or duly to appreciate the motives of public men, particularly in Spain, where the opportunities of judging are extremely limited; but if we examine with attention the close of the Cadiz drama, we shall clearly perceive that if the liberals did not obtain better terms and a French guarantee, it was owing to their own obstinacy or neglect; and also that the appointment of such ministers as Casa Irujo and Ofalla ought to have inspired some confidence, and led them to believe that their reconciliation to their sovereign and their country, if they sincerely wished it and were

prepared to lay aside their extravagant notions, was merely a matter of time. France and the other allies were interested in the permanent tranquillity of Spain: they did not wish to see the professions made at Verona and in their own notes belied. The eyes of Europe were upon them, and they could have no disposition to leave their triumph only half achieved.

At the earliest possible moment an amnesty was published,\* in the preamble of which, after acknowledging that through the aid of his allies and the efforts of his subjects he had been restored to his legitimate rights, the king expresses his anxiety to extend his clemency to all persons who had erred either from delusive motives or under the influence of seduction, and accordingly grants a general pardon for all political offences committed from the beginning of 1820 to the end of October 1823, excepting, nevertheless—1st, the authors of the military rebellions at Las Cabezas, Isla de Leon, Corunna, Zaragoza, Oviedo and Barcelona, where the constitution was proclaimed; 2nd, those of the Madrid conspiracy in March 1820; 3rd, the military chiefs concerned in the Ocaña mutiny, and especially Count de Abisbal; 4th, the authors of the provisional junta, mentioned in the decree of March 9th, 1820; 5th, those who signed or authorised any document for taking away the royal functions,

\* In the Madrid Gazette of May 20th, 1824, and dated at Aranjuez.

appointing a regency, or subjecting any member of the royal family to a judicial process; 6th, those who in the secret societies promoted the above objects; 7th, the writers or editors of works tending to bring the religion of the state into disrepute; 8th, the authors of the Madrid commotion of February 19th, 1823, when the palace was violated and the king deprived of his prerogative of naming ministers; 9th, the judges who sentenced General Elio; 10th, the authors of the assassinations of Archdeacon Vinuesa, the Bishop of Vich—of those committed in the city of Granada, and at Corunna on the persons confined in the Castle of San Anton; 11th, the members of the Cortes who voted for the king's deposition and the formation of a regency in the sitting of July 11th, 1823, &c.

This decree was accompanied with an exhortation, calling upon all Spaniards to forget past injuries and lay aside animosities for the sake of union and internal peace. "Without tranquillity and submission to the laws," says this paper, "it is impossible for the government to be established on a solid basis, or public prosperity to be restored." And yet these offers of reconciliation were not only rejected, but also inveighed against by the journals which the liberals had established in England and France. No allowance was made either for the king's position or the state into which they themselves had plunged the country.



The exceptions certainly were numerous; but when the past is considered, how could they have been confined within a smaller compass? The specifications are clear and distinct; they allude to events flagrant and notorious; and where is the government, under all circumstances, that would or could have been more merciful? Many liberals were excluded from place and pay, deprived of the opportunity of again insulting the people and trampling upon the national institutions; yet what better treatment had they reason to expect after the use so lately made of their power? The principal exceptions operated against assassins—men whom no amnesty could reach; the rest had still the means of individually remonstrating, and going through a process of *purification*, of which some availed themselves.\* This was, however,

\* The facilities at first allowed for these *purifications* were considerable, and many liberals as much implicated as any who fled to France or England availed themselves of them, and were reconciled to the government and reinstated in their offices. These facilities were carried so far, that they actually became a subject of public reproach on the part of the royalists, and, as will hereafter be seen, led to an insurrection. The conduct of the absentees gave rise to a change of system, and inflicted serious injuries upon the liberals remaining at home. The attack upon Tarifa threw many private families into dismay, the *purifications* of the *indefenidos* being then stopped. Persecutions commenced; suspected persons were sent from one point to another, and rigid orders issued for the *surveillance* of all dangerous characters. Many liberals were at that time literally seen begging their bread in Spain, whilst their comrades abroad were enjoying their pensions and dreaming of an early restoration to power.

too humiliating for those who had been hailed as heroes, lawgivers, and ministers. They could not endure the idea of returning to those stations from which they had emerged to preside over the destinies of their country. They had not the good sense or the philosophy to imitate the example of the *Afrancesados*, who had long before ceased to form a separate faction in the state.

The persons excepted did not amount to two thousand; one third of whom came to England, and were supported either by a government allowance or by public benevolence—demonstrations by which they were again misled. The ladder of their ambition had been thrown down—they were smitten with the popular thunder and flung prostrate; but they still hoped to rise up and retrieve their fortunes. They had found sympathy and support both in England and France; some lucky incident might still restore them to all their lost honours. Systematic plans for reactionary movements were accordingly formed, and pursued with unabated ardour; the first effects of which were seen in August 1824, when a band of emigrants assembled at Gibraltar with the view of attacking some part of the neighbouring coast. Dividing themselves into two parties, the one commanded by Colonel Valdez proceeded to Tarifa, and on the 3rd seized the castle and town, where they remained till the 19th, when they were ejected with considerable loss. The other, led on by a Madrid militiaman, named Iglesias, by trade

a silversmith, landed at Marbella, where they were taken by the king's troops, and most of them, including their commander, shot.\*

The following year, another emigrant, named Bazan, who in 1808 was attached to a Navarrese guerrilla, in 1820 employed in the revenue, and in 1823 made a colonel, sailed from Gibraltar with a band of followers, and landed at Guardamar, on the coast of Alicant, where he maintained his ground for several days. Troops came down, and, being taken, he and most of his companions were shot at Orihuela. In 1830, Brigadier Torrijos prepared an expedition in the Thames, for which purpose a vessel was engaged and seventy-five desperadoes embarked. The project was however frustrated in the river, and the printed proclamations seized. By dint of perseverance and renewed combinations, the never-despairing refugees, however, seemed convinced that they should eventually prevail, as they had done after their first downfall, when, it will be remembered, they experienced no less than nine failures; viz. in 1814, that of the two Minas at Pamplona; in 1815, that of Porlier in Galicia; in 1816, that of Richart at Madrid, whose conspiracy was discovered and himself hanged; † in the same year, that

\* On the 26th of last June an annual funeral service was performed at Madrid in commemoration of the death of the political martyr, Captain D. F. Iglesias; at which ceremony M. Mendizabal and many officers of the national guards assisted, but not one of the royal guards commanded by Quesada.

† D. Vicente Richart held a high office, and was a man of an

of Renovales, who landed on the coast of Biscay and was glad to escape;\* in 1817, that of Navarro, a lawyer at Valencia, frustrated by General Elio, when four of his companions were hanged; in 1818, that of Colonel Vidal,† Captain Sola, and others at Valencia, defeated by Elio, and thirteen

intrepid character. The king, returning from his rides on the Alcalá road, was in the habit of alighting, and walking with the queen and other members of the royal family to a small house in a field, called the *Venta*, where he ate fruit. Here it was intended that a party of horsemen, prepared for resistance, should seize and convey him to Alcalá, and then force him to accept the constitution. As regards the seizure, the project was certainly feasible, and why it was given up for another of a more diabolical kind has not been explained,—which was to assassinate the king at one of his evening audiences. Richart undertook to strike the blow; but one of his accomplices betrayed him, and he was seized in the gallery leading to the king's room, and the dagger with which his purpose was to have been accomplished found upon him. He was gibbeted in the Plaza Mayor, evincing great firmness to the last.

\* Renovales during the war of independence had distinguished himself in Asturias and Biscay. He was appointed a lieutenant-general, and in 1814 emigrated to England. Keeping up a correspondence with his old companions, he planned a descent upon the Cantabrian coast; but, finding it impossible to make any impression, he abandoned his enterprise, which led to the arrest of many individuals supposed to have acted in concert with him. Returning to England, he joined the South Americans, and embarked for New Orleans. Being taken prisoner, he was conveyed to the Havannah, and died in the prison of La Cabana, on the 15th April 1820, the very day on which the news of the re-establishment of the constitution reached the island of Cuba.

† General Elio surprised Vidal and his accomplices at their meeting. Vidal fired upon the general, missed, and then rushed upon him with a dagger. Elio defended himself, and Vidal was killed on the spot.

of the conspirators executed; in the same year, that of General Lacy at Barcelona, himself shot: in 1819, the great conspiracy prepared for the expeditionary army, first encouraged and afterwards frustrated by Count de Abisbal; and shortly afterwards another, got up by Torrijos and Romero Alpuente at Alicant;—still, the next year, their combinations proved successful.

A singular commotion now broke out in Catalonia, of which some mention ought to be made in this place. The royalists in that principality imagined that the Madrid government was too liberal, and took offence because many persons who figured from 1820 to 1823 had been *purified* and received places. The ministers, particularly Zambrano and Ballesteros, had become obnoxious, and a disposition prevailed to force the king to make choice of other men. An opposition party was with this view formed, secretly instigated, as it was supposed, by the liberals, in the hope of turning internal dissensions to their own advantage. The efforts of this party first showed themselves in 1825, when an attempt was made to seize upon Tortosa and failed. In 1826 fresh indications of discontent appeared; Tortosa was again attempted, and the insurrectionary projects extended to Peñíscola. Next year the scheme was revived, and the principality very generally convulsed. Trillas and Llobet recruited their bands, and proclamations were



issued, declaring that the intentions of the insurgents were "to release the king from the captivity in which he was held." These movements were repressed and a short time afterwards recommenced, when the insurgents concentrated in the districts of Manresa, Vich, and Gerona, assuming a more formidable appearance. The ostensible leader was Jeps del Estangs, who, under the title of commandant-general of the royalist divisions, descended to the plains and exacted contributions. It was also presumed that Baron d'Eroles was implicated in these commotions, and many thought that a secret project had been formed to raise the Infante Don Carlos to the throne.

The Count de España was the captain-general of Catalonia, and by a circular of the war minister, Zambrano,\* dated August 31st (1827), he

\* The Marquess de Zambrano was always rated as an officer of inferior talents, but an assiduous courtier, and for his advancement chiefly indebted to the circumstance of being brother-in-law to the favourite Grijalva. He had early declared against the constitution; and when it was re-established in 1820, experienced some persecution and a short confinement on account of his royalist politics. This strengthened his other claims to favour; but his administration of the war department, and the severities exercised against the Catalonians after they had surrendered their arms under a pledge of pardon, made him many enemies. The circular quoted is one of the most senseless and contradictory papers ever penned. It is a complete rhodomontade—an empty bluster, distinguished by the author's ruling passion, vanity. The war minister never acquired the nickname of Marquesito; but he is low in stature, and when dressed

received extraordinary powers to put down the revolt, which however had become much more general than was imagined in Madrid. The insurgents set up a regency, and established a gazette, called the "Catalonian Royalist," to explain the motives by which they were actuated. On the 9th of September the commander of the troops assembled at Vich issued a proclamation, breathing enmity against the constitutionalists, and bitterly complaining of the preferences shown them by the ministry.\* The Manresa division at

in his official coat he looked big, and was wont to say that with the cuirassiers of the royal guards, as he had formed them, he could march to St. Petersburg. He was fond of aping the manners of Napoleon, and usually wore a plain frock-coat; but on the slightest occasion ordered a review, when he appeared in grand regimentals, attended by a numerous staff, at the head of whom he trotted down the ranks with an air of importance which made the veteran who had really seen service smile. Like Napoleon, he wore his hat cocked in front—perhaps to add to his size. In the summer of 1825 the ex-war-minister, who happened to be in France, trotted off to the northern provinces, where he offered his sword and his services to Carlos V. He was politely told that neither were required. This step was a bold one, or the seeker of a *portefeuille* must have been unaware of the opinion generally entertained in Spain of his plan for the pacification of Catalonia.

\* The following are the introductory and closing paragraphs:

"Long live the King! Catalonians, who love the king and obey his sovereign decrees, do not believe that the troops already raised follow the cause, or will ever embrace the party of the constitutionalists, as some have attempted to make you believe. No, never; our glorious object is that our well-beloved monarch, Ferdinand VII, should be delivered from the infamous freema-

the same time entered Igualada and repaired the fortifications. Bands were also raised at Montblanc, Puente de la Armentera, Mataró, Cervera, and several other places, estimated at 24,000 men. Eventually the king proceeded to the principality, when the insurgents quietly laid down their arms; but so numerous were the examples afterwards made—so dreadful the severity exercised by Count de España and his officers, that the Catalonian royalists have been ever since overawed. What they then suffered has beyond

sons, who, by artifice and cunning, have contrived to usurp the government. It is in vain that his majesty has dictated the decree relative to several military purifications, with orders to examine most rigorously into the reports, when the greater part of the members of the juntas of purification are themselves not yet purified, or have succeeded in getting themselves declared in a state of purification through intrigue or bribery, while none of the individuals who formed part of the royalist army have yet been appointed members of the said juntas. But why speak of purifications? They were not necessary; several constitutional civil and military officers have obtained appointments without undergoing any purification, while royalists have been dismissed from their places with the most arbitrary effrontery.

“What might not be said on the infraction of the sovereign decrees issued for the purpose of granting employments to the royalists, particularly that of the 9th of August 1824, which orders that they shall have the preference? How many orders has not his majesty issued for the execution of those decrees, particularly for the punishment of the revolutionists, and for indemnifying, in preference to all other things, the towns and villages for the damage and loss they sustained in defence of the just cause? All this has been done in vain; the royalists have been exposed to derision and to the most cruel persecutions; the

all doubt materially contributed to keep them back on the present occasion, when they have so many increased motives for reiterating their old complaints: but who does not see in the movements of the Catalonians the very singular position in which Ferdinand VII. was then placed? The inhabitants of nearly a whole province complain of the preferences shown to the constitutionalists, and rise up in the hope of redressing a public wrong, at the same time that the emigrants abroad were reproaching the Madrid government with their hardships and the ingratitude with which they were treated!

In the hope of increasing the confusion at that time prevailing in Spain and rousing the king's jealousies, the liberals gave out that this revolu-

constitutionalists have enjoyed favour and protection: the contractors for the constitutional government have been indemnified, while the advances made for the just cause are entirely forgotten. The constitutionalists have been employed, and the royalists dismissed. Finally, important offices have been conferred on constitutional militiamen, while the honourable titles of religion, fidelity, and royalism, have become motives of exclusion, which bar our approach to the throne.

“Catalonians,—These are the motives which have made us take up arms in defence of our well-beloved monarch. The king wishes justice and obedience to his commands; but, alas! all the paternal care of our adored monarch has hitherto only served to make the authorities spend their fury on the royalists; and if it be true that there was a necessity for modifying the police formed by the constitutional vermin, and men formerly devoted to the brother of Napoleon, there remain still other evils to which a remedy must be applied. Hasten then to exterminate impiety, injustice, and all the men in place who

tion was raised for the purpose of placing the Infante Don Carlos upon the throne. In order to give weight to this report, they had manifestos and other papers printed abroad and circulated in Spain,\* railing against Ferdinand VII. and suggesting the expediency of proclaiming his brother. That the latter was then extremely popular and considered as the head of the royalist party, is an undoubted fact; but the Catalonians had no views beyond those explained in their proclamations, and besides, they knew full well that the Infante Don Carlos was too wise and too conscientious a prince to meddle in a senseless or treasonable scheme.

So indignant was the infante at this calumny raised against him, that he demanded an inquiry; and a commission was accordingly named, com-

belong to the dark sects of freemasons, *comuneros*, and other religionists, who govern under the mask of moderation. Follow me, and the Great God of armies will recompense your efforts. Follow me without the fear of being deceived. Follow, and you will be armed, fed, and rewarded: follow in order. The provinces of Spain, suffering under the same evils that we suffer, are acting in the same way. The sound part of the army is animated by the same sentiments. Two hundred thousand royalists, who have been despised and persecuted by the infamous men who manage the government, are our companions in arms, ready to conquer or to die with glory."

\* The author has one of these papers before him, styled, "Manifesto, addressed to the Spanish People by a federation of pure Royalists on the state of the nation and the necessity of raising to the throne his most Serene Highness the Infante Don Carlos." This paper was, in 1826, written in London by well-known parties, and printed in Spanish and English.



posed of magistrates of the highest rank, among whom were members of the Supreme Council of Castile. The investigation, at the infante's request, was carried on in the most rigid manner; and in more than one thousand examinations of persons, not only in Catalonia, but also in other parts of the kingdom, there was not one in which the conduct of the infante was in the slightest degree implicated, or an act disclosed that had any reference whatever to him.

The king's jealousies of his brother commenced soon after they left Cadiz, in 1823. The infante had gained much popularity, and Ferdinand VII. was blamed for having done things directly contrary to his brother's advice. Queen Amelia having no children, the people naturally began to look up to the infante as the future sovereign; and, notwithstanding his retired habits, this predilection towards him was manifested whenever he appeared in public. Demonstrations of this kind first excited jealousies in the king's breast, which were carefully kept alive by certain courtiers and leaders of the liberal party, well aware that they would sink into insignificance on a change of dynasty. At this period it was that the plot now going on in Spain actually commenced.

Ever mindful of their success in 1820, and encouraged by the recent events in Catalonia, as well as by what had just happened in France, the absentees were inspired with fresh ardour, consider-

ing that a new scope had opened for their exertions. In considerable numbers they eagerly assembled near the Pyrenees, at the western extremity, headed by Mina, Valdez, Mendez—Vigo, and others. A directing junta was also established at Bayonne, and another at Perpignan, under the guidance of Milans, who in anticipation appointed himself commander-in-chief of the Catalanian army. Disputes regarding precedence being settled, Mina issued his proclamation, dated October 1st, informing those whom he imagined were anxiously waiting for his approach, “that the moment a glimpse of hope presented itself for the liberation of his country, he had put himself in motion.” Another proclamation was sent forth by Colonel Alexander O'Donnel, and arrangements made along the whole line to cross the Pyrenees.\* Some demur followed—preparatory proclamations were however sent in, and those who had rushed to the feet of the Pyrenees stood gazing at the summits with visionary aspirations

\* Alexander O'Donnel, younger brother of Count de Abisbal, joined the French and commanded a Spanish regiment, to which Joseph Napoleon gave his own name. Having been sent to the campaign of Moscow, he was taken prisoner; and the Emperor Alexander having ordered all the Spaniards formerly belonging to the French army to be collected into one corps, which by special permission assumed his name, the command was conferred upon Colonel Alexander O'Donnel, and he sailed with his regiment for Spain. This distinction saved him from the odium attached to the *Afrancesados* and his rank was confirmed. He was at Ocaña when the La Isla army revolted; and having been

that their enemy would come and deliver himself bound into their hands. Eventually the several attacks were made, and not meeting with the slightest encouragement, were all repelled.

Whilst these operations were going on near the Pyrenees, General Torrijos assembled his associates at Gibraltar, whence he sallied forth and attacked the lines of St. Roque, in sight of our garrison. Having failed, he afterwards ascended the Mediterranean and landed near Malaga.\* His unhappy end is well remembered; but, after issuing such a manifesto as that which he printed in London, and his two attacks upon the Spanish territory, it was scarcely possible for this rash and deluded chieftain to escape the penalty of those laws which he had

joined by the Count, at his suggestion the regiment was assembled, and at the head of his men he proclaimed the constitution. Alexander has two sons, Pepe and Emilio, officers in the urban guards at Seville.

Joseph, the third brother and a royalist, embraced the patriotic cause and commanded at the battle of Castalla in 1812, where he was defeated by Marshal Suchet. He commanded the lines of St. Roque in 1820, at the moment when Riego was traversing the lower part of Andalusia with fifteen hundred men in order to extend the insurrection. Joseph O'Donnel pursued and attacked him. Through these rencontres Riego lost a part of his force, and for some time the result of his enterprise remained dubious. This brought the royalist general into disgrace with the constitutionalists, and on their gaining the ascendancy he retired into private life. The idea of brothers being opposed to each other in so deadly a strife must have been extremely painful to his feelings.

\* Torrijos commenced his career as a page in the palace, and was afterwards made a captain of infantry. He served during

so frequently provoked. These successive attempts did not suffice to undeceive the Spanish liberals. Unmindful that every detected conspiracy and every defeated attack served only to swell the list of sufferers, or increase the number of those who were compelled to throw themselves on the bounty of foreigners, they did not stop to calculate the injury which they were inflicting, or to reflect on the manner in which they sanctioned those severities of which they complained. Acting neither from motives of patriotism nor disinterestedness, they laboured in order to excite the people and render their own cause national, hoping to rouse the thoughtless rabble by the prospect of better times, or the chance of satiating their vengeance on obnoxious persons. The insurrection of a part of the Cadiz garrison, and a movement of liberals towards the Sierra Bermeja,\* under

the war of independence, attained the rank of brigadier, and being confined at Murcia when the reaction of 1820 took place, on his release he hastened the adoption of the constitution at Carthagená. He afterwards served under Mina in Catalonia, and in an attempt to retake Belaguer from the royalists, was defeated by Romanillo and compelled to retire upon Lerida. He was a polite and accomplished man, ambitious, and his memory is tainted with acts of wanton cruelty.

\* A double range of mountains to the west of Malaga, running so parallel to each other that the basements of the one nearly touch the other, but remarkable in the difference of earth of which they are composed, one having a white and the other a red appearance. The great singularity is, that although the red range is the highest, it does not retain the snow; whereas the other wears its white cap during the summer and serves to

Manzanares, followed by his death and the capture of the greater part of his band, which happened in March 1831, were among the last attempts made by the emigrants and their friends to disturb the tranquillity of Spain and regain their lost power.\*

No infatuation can be imagined so great as that evinced by the Spanish liberals during their second emigration. No failures could undeceive or deter them. They were constantly dreaming of a restoration by means of popular reaction or a military mutiny, and devising the plans by which it was to be effected. In the large towns they unquestionably had partisans, and the number increased with the disappointment at not seeing the ancient Cortes assembled, and improvements in-

supply the neighbouring towns with frozen snow to make ice-creams. The white range produces oak and ash—the other only pine. The mineral waters issuing from them have also different properties. These heights, the Alpujarras and the Serrania de Ronda, are much frequented by smugglers, who, on being well paid, take an active part in the plans of the refugees.

\* The Cadiz insurrection and the attacks upon several points of the kingdom gave rise to a decree, published in the Gazette of March 22nd, establishing a military commission at Madrid, and in the provincial capitals where it should be deemed necessary, for the trial of persons taken in arms upon the Spanish territory, or engaged in exciting rebellion. This decree enjoins the observance of the ordinance of October 1st, 1830, awarding the penalty of death, after a summary trial, in the cases above mentioned. Of this ordinance and decree the Christinos availed themselves to sanction the first acts of retaliation committed against the Carlists.



troduced in the general government, as well as in the machinery of the provincial administration: nevertheless, amidst apparent languor, and whilst the constituted authorities seemingly acted upon the sole principle of self-preservation,—an attitude which the liberals compelled them to assume,—the country, comparatively speaking, prospered. Internal tranquillity was nowhere disturbed — no symptoms of discontent manifested themselves which did not arise out of external instigation. The armed bands entering by the Pyrenees, or landing upon the coast, were joined by no partisans except a few smugglers; on the contrary, the peasants fled at their approach. Whatever discontent did exist retained an isolated form, though the country was inundated with incendiary papers, and the clubs as well as the other seminaries of seditious agitation were actively employed. The usual number of disappointed persons were always ready for any enterprise, and idlers were on the alert; confederates had also been procured in the army and navy, among the public functionaries—even in the palace, and yet within all was silence and content; at the same time that many foreign prints teemed with accounts of approaching insurrections—of impatience and discontent among the Spanish people, the depth of whose long sufferance, it was said, had been fully ascertained.

These revolutionary projects were long carried

on with unabating zeal. No reflection, no regret, no sentiment of remorse—no whisperings of conscience ever obtruded themselves upon their directors, when they learnt the discomfiture of their advanced guards, and saw the number of victims caused by their follies.\* No matter who were the sufferers, so long as they could triumph. They found supporters in London and Paris, and that sufficed to cheer them on. The liberals of one half of Europe made common cause with them, and the prospects in Portugal seemed to favour their designs. When Mina and his associates succeeded in penetrating a few leagues into the Spanish territory, in a secluded part of the Pyrenees, the pæans of victory resounded on every side. The British public were told that the population would flock to his standard—that the road to Madrid was open to him. Really one would almost think there was something true in the charge so often made against us abroad, that the English are ready to sanction every crime and

\* Among the expedients employed at this period, was that of sending infernal machines in the shape of fulminating letters to obnoxious persons. These letters were addressed to the king, the Princess de Beira, and others. General Eguia was the only person hurt by their explosion; but the dread in the public offices was at the time so great, that a machine was invented for the purpose of opening heavy and suspicious letters without the risk of personal injury. The authors of this diabolical invention were never discovered. The letters were usually put into the post-office at Seville.

credit every delusion.\* Almost the next post, however, brought advices that the *hero* of Navarre had scarcely escaped with life, after having been a solitary wanderer among the woods and precipices. Still it must be confessed that their last plans were the best—or at least the most plausible. Torrijos and his associates in their manifesto considerably assured their countrymen, that “they did not seek to re-establish the constitution of 1812, because,” add they, “being uncertain whether it is that which the nation by this time deems most expedient, we do not consider it lawful to anticipate its determinations; nor does it behove us to do more than submit to that which it may determine upon as being best.”

After thundering forth threats and denunciations for years against all who opposed the great

\* In alluding to this invasion, an English newspaper of high credit, with great gravity observed, that “Mina will not enter Spain without a strong conviction of the probability of success; but if he should enter, such is the charm of his name on Spanish ears, that a few days would, we imagine, be sufficient to induce the king to convene the Cortes, and use all other proper means to prevent a civil war.” A morning journal of more eminence, speaking on the same subject and venturing to predict success, assured its readers, “that the train has long since been ready and waiting for the match; that it is in the heart of Spain—in towns and provinces, from north to south, that the movement towards a constitution works onwards, the Pyrenees being but a gate through which the exiles rejoin their countrymen every hour.” The whole force which they were then able to bring up did not exceed fifteen hundred Spaniards and eight hundred foreigners of all nations.

book of the law—after making its principles and its provisions part of the public education, and shedding torrents of blood in its defence, this is a strange concession—an extraordinary act of humility on the part of men who, to carry on their new enterprise, had declared that “the country was in danger—that an internal enemy had seized upon the realm—that a faction surrounded the king, and that every Spaniard was therefore bound to take up arms and join them for the purpose of restoring him to his people, and enabling the nation to recover its independence and liberty.” After sustaining both the validity and importance of the constitution—after forcing it upon the king at the point of the bayonet, and loading him with invectives for opposing it—nay, placing his life in jeopardy because he reluctantly obeyed their mandates, or complained of the thralldom in which he was held, this is a most singular avowal, made at the crisis of their hopes—at a moment when they were going forth, as they thought, with every prospect of success—with fresh combinations and supported by numerous friends. They must at length have discovered that the code, the merits of which they so long and loudly boasted, had become an object of universal contempt and loathing—that the slaughter and confusion which it had caused was not forgotten—that the whole scheme of 1820 had been left to the deep damna-

tion of its own baseness ; and on this account, and in deference to public opinion, when the grand projects for 1830 were formed, the old emblems no longer figured upon the banners of the invaders. Their aim now was to destroy the “ faction which surrounded the king,” and then, as they said, leave the ulterior question to the decision of the nation.

But the Spanish people were not to be deluded by vague or visionary promises. “ Liberty and independence” to them were words of ominous import ; while the past had left too deep an impression upon their minds to be effaced by manifestos and proclamations, the pompous and inflated productions of a foreign press. They besides stood in awe of theories imbibed on the banks of the Thames and Seine. Doubtless they would have gladly hailed the introduction of a more perfect system in the government, as well as in the administration of justice—they would have rejoiced to see the court conduct itself in a more dignified manner—many other improvements they might have wished ; but they did not feel inclined to owe these or any other benefits to the emigrants. They remembered too well that the presence of these men in Spain had produced disturbances which their power had matured into anarchy ; and that since their absence, the country had assumed a new and more cheering aspect, the dark gloom of political dissensions had been dis-



pelled, and the union of industry with contentment had succeeded to those rancorous animosities which so short a time before had lacerated the bosom of society.

Defective as the administration in Spain may have appeared from 1824 to 1833 — however much the Spaniards may then have lagged behind the spirit of the age, this is nevertheless the only interval of peace and prosperity which they have enjoyed in the course of the present century. More perhaps might have been done—many abuses were left untouched; still commerce and agriculture continued in a progressive state of improvement. The public burdens had also greatly diminished. Under the administration of the Cortes, the general taxes levied were equal to 100 millions of rials, afterwards they were reduced to 40, and the provincial rents from 295 millions lowered to 130. The best test is perhaps that of the finances; an idea of which may be formed from the subjoined approximate statements, founded upon correct data.

The foreign debt created by the Cortes from

September 1820 to October 1823	£19,000,000
Ditto by the king, from October 1823 to September 1830	5,000,000
Foreign debt cancelled by the Cortes	None!
Ditto by the king	1,000,000
Interest paid on domestic debt by the Cortes	None!
Since the restoration	Paid regularly.
Public expenditure under the Cortes	6,648,133
Ditto since the restoration	4,197,772

During the first restoration,—that is, from 1814 to 1820, a period which abroad was usually pronounced the most gloomy of Ferdinand VIIth's reign,—the navy was increased, and the army, although not materially reduced from the enormous establishment left at the close of the war, was nevertheless reorganised and classed into what were called the “Peninsular and Ultra-marine divisions,” after heavy arrears had been paid up. With the credit of the Cadiz merchants and the support of the government, two expeditions were also prepared at the expense of twenty-four millions of dollars; the one conducted by General Morillo in 1816 to the Spanish main, and the other which in 1819 Count de Abisbal was to have commanded, to Buenos Ayres, already provided with artillery, transport-ships, and every other requisite. And yet all this was done without adding to the foreign debt, or making onerous sacrifices at home.

During the second Restoration the functionaries in each department were regularly paid. In the time of the Cortes, the naval force consisted of two ships of the line, four frigates, and twenty-seven smaller vessels: subsequently it was increased to six ships of the line, twelve frigates, and ninety-four smaller vessels. The minor improvements during this period were, a board of trade and an exchange established at Madrid, a revision of the tariffs, and greater facilities for

travelling through the increased number of diligences. The navigation of rivers, the construction of canals, and the opening of railroads, were also encouraged. A conservatory of arts was opened at Madrid, in which interesting exhibitions of Spanish industry took place, and Cadiz was made a free port. New commercial and penal codes were also ready for publication. The improvements in the public roads were visible; an object for which the Cortes from 1820 to the end of 1823 appropriated £108,290, whereas from 1824 to 1828 the king's government set apart £447,333 for the same purpose. The national manufactures revived, and the looms of Valencia and Catalonia were constantly employed. The northern provinces exported wheat and flour; which not only excluded from the markets of Cuba the supplies hitherto received from the United States, but also assisted the consumption of England in moments of scarcity.

The great charges usually preferred against the government by the absentees and movement party were, a wish to abridge the civil rights of the people through the influence of ministerial power, and a total absence of legislative authority in the management of public affairs. To a certain extent these charges were perhaps true, and a system of strong and arbitrary rule followed, which in some instances may have degenerated into despotism according to the notions

entertained in free countries where representative governments exist; but any abuses of power which occurred did not affect the general population, or appear revolting on the spot, though they gave rise to incessant clamour abroad. The spirit of favouritism was also carried to objectionable lengths, and many grievances were certainly left unredressed. The administration of justice in some respects was defective, the police exercised a vigilance which wore the appearance of undue severity, and the ministers were under no responsibility. Great allowances are, however, to be made for the situation in which the Spanish government was placed immediately after the Restoration,—a situation easily conceived by those who reflect on the troubles in which the country had been constantly kept since the French invasion. Nevertheless, as results proved, much good had been done, and the people were disposed not to cavil about what was omitted, but to give the government credit for benefits actually enjoyed. At no former period had they so many opportunities of judging the acts of public functionaries, whose duties were defined and properly understood. The receipts and expenditure were regularly published; and although reforms of a sweeping character did not meet the eye, the work of improvement went on with a steady pace, and in a manner perhaps more congenial to the taste of the great body of the people than any

which could have been suggested from either London or Paris. Strict economy prevailed in the treasury department; and if the stability of the laws or the financial administration can be taken as tests of either comparative tranquillity or growing prosperity, the award will be greatly in favour of the Restoration.



## CHAPTER XII.

A new Era.—The King's fourth Marriage—Its consequences.—His Character changes.—Grijalva, the Favourite.—The Law of Succession.—Expedient devised to change it.—The Pragmatic Sanction—Its real object.—Illegality of the measure.—The Partida Laws.—Ancient Practice regarding the Succession.—The Queen's Accouchement.—Disappointment.—The King's Illness and reported Death.—Alarm.—The Crown offered to Don Carlos—Rejected.—A Midnight Conference.—The Pragmatic Sanction annulled.

A NEW era now commenced, produced by a combination of various causes. The refugees had failed in all their enterprises—their revolutionary speculations had been defeated, and the experience of seven years served only to show that the Spanish people would not consent to the re-establishment of a system which had been the fruitful parent of innumerable follies and atrocities. Judgment passed against the liberals,—the last failures had destroyed their hopes, and seeing the uselessness of pursuing the old phantom any longer, they deemed it best to bend to circumstances and change their tactics. Towards the close of 1830 affairs assumed a character propitious to their designs. The change of dynasty in

France, and Ferdinand VIIth's union with a Neapolitan princess, opened an untried field for their labours—a new theatre for their operations.\* A national question of a novel kind arose which could not fail to bring the two parties again into collision,—a question on the solution of which the destinies of Spain would depend, and one contemplated with entirely opposite feelings.

Ferdinand VII. was unfortunate in his three first marriages. Not being blessed with children, no one of his own blood remained to inherit his honours and preserve the throne to his dynasty. Whether disappointment preyed upon his spirits, infirmities soured his mind, or impending difficulties unmanned him, matters little: certain it is, that soon after his last marriage a change was noticed in his character and conduct which gave rise to gloomy forebodings. An alteration in his habits and disposition became particularly observable. He suddenly took an aversion to public business, upon which he formerly employed a large portion of his time; while symptoms of depression and grief marked his countenance whenever he could withdraw from the public gaze.†

\* His third queen, Maria Josephina Amelia, a Saxon princess, of a most amiable and virtuous character, died in the night of the 16th of May 1829; and immediately afterwards plans and negotiations for a fourth matrimonial alliance commenced, under the auspices of the Infanta D. Luisa Carlota, with whose sister a contract was signed on the ensuing 9th November.

† Persons who have acted both as his ministers and his

The weight of past misfortunes and a dread of the future seemed to absorb his thoughts, when any interval of leisure or the absence of flatterers afforded him opportunities for reflection. He had lived a chequered life—ruled in days of trial and calamity,—for the last sixteen years at variance with a portion of his subjects, alternately his judges and his accusers, during which period he had to contend against anarchy and revolution. He had often been compelled to submit to the severest humiliations,—his life itself had been endangered; still his opportunities of doing good had been frequent, and he now seemed haunted with the apprehension that he had not always judged rightly—not always performed the duties of son, king, and brother.

Ferdinand's affections changed with his habits.

counsellors acknowledge that Ferdinand VII. had an extraordinary tact for business, was clear-headed, and had an astonishing memory; but was unfortunate in the choice of favourites admitted to his *camarilla*; and at the door of these favourites many of his errors may be laid. It is, nevertheless, a fact that till the time of his last marriage he was popular in Spain. The people made great allowances for the difficulties of his position, and Godoy's persecutions were never forgotten. He was the first monarch who introduced the practice of daily audiences, at which he patiently received memorials and heard the complaints of his subjects. He was considered as a friend to the lower orders, and the champion of the ancient institutions, as well as of the religion of the state. No monarch was ever beset by so many conspiracies; no one had more enemies abroad, or at home was exposed to so many contending influences.

That attachment always evinced towards his elder brother and constant companion decreased, and the unanimity which hitherto prevailed among the several branches of the royal family, living under the same roof in separate establishments, gradually disappeared. Formerly the king had been so extremely jealous of his authority, that no one of his other queens ever ventured to take part in public affairs. Her present majesty, however, soon became the life and soul of the administration. Through her influence, or at her nod, the secret springs in every department were moved—scarcely could it be said that the king had a will of his own. The queen introduced a new policy, distinguished by two leading features; the first of which was to secure the throne to her own issue; and the second, to make concessions in favour of liberalism after the example set in France.\* To these great objects her attention was directed, and for their attainment a different tone was given to the government in all its ramifications.

The effects of this change soon became visible in every part of the kingdom. Emerging from their hiding-places, the liberals showed a bolder front, and at Madrid reappeared among the political gamblers of the *Puerta del Sol*. Several per-

\* It was confidently believed at Madrid, towards the end of August 1831, that the Queen of the French, in her letters, frequently advised her niece to use her influence with her husband to grant institutions in accordance to the *wants and wishes* of Spain.

sons also returned from exile whose presence had hitherto been deemed incompatible with the public tranquillity ; and meeting with no impediment, others followed their example, anticipating that the wheel was about to turn and again throw them uppermost. The announcement of the queen's pregnancy became a signal for renewed exertions ; but the news excited very different feelings in the two parties who by this time were almost arrayed against each other. Scarcely had the queen been initiated in the court intrigues, when she discovered that she had a rival whose popularity eclipsed her own, and whose claim to the succession interfered with any that might be advanced in favour of female issue. This rival was the Infante Don Carlos, whose unblemished character had endeared him to the people, and whose own claim stood protected by the law of Philip V, enacted under all the legal formalities.

The queen and her friends, therefore, determined on the abrogation of this law, and after a long and studied preparation the project was cautiously imparted to the king. It was Ferdinand VIIth's weak point to allow himself to be swayed by some back-staircase favourite or other, often raised from the dregs of society ; a defect which not only injured his own reputation, but also thwarted the plans of his ostensible ministers. In this respect he seemed to have derived no advantages from experience—to have learned nothing



in the school of adversity. In early life he himself had been the victim of a favourite ; nor could he have forgotten that the enthusiasm displayed in his favour when he stepped forward as the opponent of Godoy chiefly arose out of a general detestation of that minion's acts, and his abuse of a power which the Prince of Asturias alone had the courage to withstand. And yet this example did not suffice to guard Ferdinand VII. against his father's errors, though the consequences of those errors were scarcely repaired by an act which, under other circumstances, would on his part have amounted to rebellion.

Lozano Torres,\* the first favourite, was suc-

\* D. Martin de Garay was secretary to the central junta, and author of the grand plan for abandoning the Peninsula, going over to Mexico and there governing in the name of Ferdinand VII. after raising the Spanish part of the continent of America into an empire ; which plan was submitted to the central junta when the French threatened Andalusia. He was bred a lawyer, but, though a man of strong mind and extensive learning, devoid of experience in administrative matters. By him many of the proclamations and diplomatic notes of the day were however penned. In 1817, when the Spanish finances were in a most deranged state, he was appointed to that department, under the king's pledge that a plan presented by him to the Cadiz government should be tried, being of opinion that nothing but an organic change could rescue the nation from the predicament in which it had been placed by extravagance and want of order. His plan consisted in taking away the provincial rents and reducing other items of revenue, establishing in their stead a direct contribution amounting to more than the suppression and reductions. It had been prepared with great diligence, was founded upon the best statistical data, and although

ceeded by Ugarte; and on the latter falling into disgrace, his place in the *camarilla* was filled by D. Juan Miguel de Grijalva, whose rise and the ascendancy which he gained over his royal master's mind were so extraordinary as to deserve particular notice. Grijalva was a native of Valladolid, born of poor but respectable parents. His inclinations led him to study the law, the common refuge of those persons in the middle ranks who can obtain cheap education, and have no calling for either the army or the church. He displayed a plodding, wary, and laborious disposition, without the slightest indication of ability. Having completed his studies, he was sent up to court

attended with great difficulties, the scheme was hailed by many as the first step in economical reform. The distribution and collection of the new tax were entrusted to the municipalities, many of which returned the minister their warmest thanks. The first portion was readily collected, the second lagged, and of the third scarcely any could be recovered. The new impost wore the appearance of an innovation, and it was impossible to overcome the prejudices of the people. In 1818 the government nevertheless persisted; but the obstacles were so insurmountable that the project failed, and Garay lost his place.

Garay's fall was hastened by the intrigues of Lozano Torres, the king's first favourite. This man was the son of a Cadiz watchmaker, and when a youth had the advantage of a little travelling. During the French war he served in the commissariat, and gained some money and reputation. On the king's arrival at Valencia, Lozano addressed a long exposition to him, filled with protestations of devotion, and bitter invectives against the liberals; soon after which he was called to court and privately consulted. By means of flattery and the most assiduous attentions he gained favour, always wearing a large-sized portrait of

provided with the usual letters of recommendation, his friends confidently anticipating that he would push his way. His address served as a passport; and soon finding that all the good things were in the gift of the crown, he joined the suitors accustomed to bask in the sunshine of the palace. For a long time he cultivated the profession of a courtier, with more perseverance than success,—till having through experience become better acquainted with the intricate paths which lead to power, he discovered that there was no surer method of improving his prospects than to form a matrimonial connexion, as a stepping-stone to the objects of his ambition. Having married the daughter of Charles IVth's huntsman—a person of no mean consequence at a court where the chase was at that time almost a daily amusement,—he conceived that his fortune was made.

Through this introduction Grijalva obtained a subordinate situation in the palace. Afterwards he attended the king to Valençay, and at a later the king round his neck. The other artifices of which he availed himself are still a frequent topic of conversation in Madrid. At length he wormed himself into the king's secrets so strongly that it became impossible to dispense with his services. Various lucrative employments were offered to him, all of which he declined, protesting his disinterestedness. In one of those ministerial commotions so frequent in Ferdinand VIIth's reign, Lozano was made prime minister and head of the foreign department—the very object which he had so long had in view; and which after some affected resistance, and expressing his fears

period to Cadiz; in both which places his fidelity and discretion were in all probability put to the test. He grew old in his master's confidence, and was frequently entrusted by him with private secrets as well as public cares. Thus he became one of the most useful persons in the palace, his opinion being asked on all occasions of difficulty or embarrassment. At length he was appointed to the administration of the king's patrimony, as well as to the office of bearer of the privy purse, and in the end became the principal distributor of the royal favours. So great was his ascendancy, that the king treated him with marked deference, never joking with him, as he was in the habit of doing with other attendants and even with his ministers. His hold upon his master's mind was the more secure, as he carefully abstained from soliciting any honours which could render him an object of either jealousy or envy. Having attained the summit of his ambition and amassed a large fortune, he prudently retained his place be-

that he was unequal to the task, he accepted. On coming down to his bureau, the clerks refused to serve under him; and he was transferred to the department of grace and justice—confined to matters connected with the church and the magistracy. Having in these two branches plenty to give away, he soon gained friends, particularly as he enjoyed the king's favour. He strenuously opposed the Florida treaty, and in 1816 negotiated the king's marriage with the Portuguese princess, which added to his influence. He was never thought to be so firmly fixed in his station as at the moment of his disgrace, which happened in November 1819.

hind the curtain, always within call. Through his agents he was informed of everything passing in public, his reports often serving as a check upon the public *employés*. His advice frequently outweighed the opinion of the council; and from 1824, the period when he was made closet counsellor, he may be said to have formed nearly all the ministries. He supported Ballesteros in the finance department for reasons easily imagined. He patronised Zambrano, his own brother-in-law, and through his advice M. Zea was called to the cabinet.

To the experienced agency of Grijalva was chiefly confided the abrogation of the law of Philip V. He was commissioned not only to prepare the king's mind for the proposed measure, but also to devise the means of overcoming the legal difficulties. The task was perhaps the less repugnant to the feelings of Grijalva, as in 1825 he had clashed with the royalists; and it will easily be conceived that the smiles of a fascinating queen were equivalent to commands.\* It is well

\* In 1821 and 22, Grijalva was confidentially employed by his master to mix among the leaders of the constitutional party, in order to ascertain what was going on and gain over deputies. He played his part dexterously; and having money at command, it is probable that he retained some friends among them. On their change of policy, the liberals secured this man to their interests, and he was thus made one of the instruments of their restoration. He died soon after the announcement of the civil war, in a most unhappy state of mind; and, it is believed, left important revelations behind him, entrusted to the clergyman who assisted at his last moments.



known that the king long resisted the project, and even indignantly spurned the first overtures through which it was introduced to his notice. His character—even his taste for amusements, had however greatly changed. From being bold, crafty and versatile—stirring, jocose and inquisitive, languor and indifference now pervaded all his actions. Formerly he delighted in knowing everything that passed, whether in the European courts or among the *manolas* of Madrid;—now, he scarcely ventured to address a question to the few persons allowed to approach him. A nervousness was remarkable in all he did, and if he signed a paper it was with a tremulous hand. So circumstanced, it was scarcely to be expected that Ferdinand VII. could resist the many batteries opened upon him: indeed, from the first, steps were taken to render him the chief agent in the projected revolution; by which means it was hoped that the complaints of foreign powers would be obviated and prejudices at home disarmed.

The greatest difficulty, however, still remained to be overcome. The law which excluded females when there was male issue was precise and peremptory. It had been enacted with the due concurrence of the Cortes, and formed part of a general settlement of the peace of Europe, guaranteed by England and France. This law was besides recorded in the statute-book, and for one

hundred and twenty years had been held as the only rule of succession. Its abrogation therefore was a matter of the most serious consideration, affecting not only the prospective claims of the king's brother, strengthened as they were by his popularity and the royalist interest which he represented, but also those of other members of the Bourbon family who came after him in the line of succession. The undertaking was indeed arduous and awful, in consequence of the extensive changes which it was likely to introduce.

It was not a matter of mere family aggrandisement upon which the queen had set her heart. The proposed measure arose out of no wish to revive a principle successfully maintained in former times. It was part of a system of which there was a further action in reserve. More and deeper mischief was contemplated than that of depriving one branch of its hereditary rights. The alteration in the established rule was intended as a seal to a revolution. This was the light in which Ferdinand himself viewed the proposal when first made to him ; and although his scruples gradually gave way when he found himself beset by the creatures and puppets of the queen, there was no other period of his life in which his resolution on this point could have been shaken. Even then the whole scheme would have failed, if a clever and fascinating woman had not been the principal agent. Her great aim was to raise up a

barrier between the Infante Don Carlos and the throne, and the king's jealousy of his brother's popularity was the chord touched with most effect. The queen also knew that this feeling chiefly led to her own marriage, and it was agreed that the most propitious moment for the developement of the plan would be the termination of the rejoicings to which the announcement of her pregnancy had given rise.

So early however did the preparations commence, that soon after the queen reached Madrid, Grijalva appeared in the office of the secretary of state for grace and justice, with a private message from the king, directing the head of that department to send up the records of the Cortes of 1789 regarding the succession, which, the bearer of the message added, his majesty himself delivered into the hands of the late minister immediately after the demise of Queen Maria Isabel.\* These papers having been sorted out, M. Calomarde took them to the king, who retained them in his possession for nearly a fortnight, when he returned them to that minister with a marginal decree written upon them in his own hand, ordering their publication. The minister remonstrated upon the inexpediency and impolicy of the measure, which, he observed, would tend to encourage the revolutionists still actively engaged in con-

\* Second daughter of John VI. of Portugal, married to Ferdinand VII, and died at Madrid December 26th, 1818.

spiracies; but the king persisted, and with a degree of warmth directed his resolution to be carried into effect. In compliance with this command, the whole was forwarded to the council; and in the Gazette of the 6th April (1830), to the astonishment of every one, an edict, dated March 29th, appeared with the following remarkable heading:—"Pragmatic Sanction, having the force of law, decreed by King Charles IV. on the petition of the Cortes for 1789, and ordered to be published by his reigning majesty for the *perpetual* observance of law 2, title 15, partida 2, establishing the regular succession to the crown of Spain;"\* alleged to have been in force for seven hundred years.

The publication was also carried into effect with the usual solemnities. The rain fell in torrents; nevertheless the magistrates and heralds proceeded to do their duty by reading the decree

\* The Cadiz liberals first attempted to change the order of succession. Article 174 of their Constitution enacts thus:—"Solo se sucederá en el trono perpetuamente por el orden regular de progenitura y representacion;" and article 176, "En el mismo grado y linea los varones prefieren á las hembras, y siempre el mayor al minor; pero las hembras de mejor linea, ó de mejor grado en la misma linea, prefieren á los varones de linea ó grado posterior." Ferdinand VII. followed the example of the very men whom he denounced as innovators and had opposed for twenty years, actually borrowing the term *perpetual* used by them, and introducing it into his own pragmatic sanction. This coincidence at the time led to playful remarks on the probable durability of the last enactment compared with the first.

aloud and posting it up in the public places. The streets of Madrid were thronged with an anxious and inquiring multitude, who did not hesitate, in no measured terms, to express their surprise and disgust at this glaring imposture. Nobody could understand how the reigning sovereign, of his own will and accord, could venture to sanction a law alleged to have been passed by his father forty-one years before, and which, even if it had then been perfected, (and the reverse was the case,) could not be held valid for obvious reasons. The *leyes de Partidas*, now appealed to, were never acknowledged as fundamental laws of the monarchy. They were completed by Alonzo the Wise, in 1260, who in the same year held Cortes at Seville, but did not cause them to be accepted.\* They were first brought into notice by the *ordenamientos de Alcalá*, in 1348, as supplementary laws; and afterwards in the same character by the *leyes de Toro*, published in 1505. These are the two first codifications of the Castilian laws ordered to be observed; and in both it is expressly declared that recurrence is not to be had to the *Partida* laws, unless cases should arise for which no provision is made in the two national codes;† which, together with all laws subsequent-

\* Mondejar, *Memorias Historicas del Rei D. Alonso el Sabio*, lib. iii. cap. 7.

† Mr. Wyndham Beawes, British consul at Cadiz and Seville for thirty years, and avowedly a man of great research, in



ly passed, were collected and by authority published in the *Recopilacion* in 1745, and lastly in 1805, by command of Charles IV, under the title of *Novissima Recopilacion*, or Newest Collection.

This is the code in force, formed with the utmost care; and after obtaining the sanction of the Council of Castile, it was proclaimed the law of the land, and as such observed; one of its provisions being, that no law can be held valid unless previously notified by edict and made known through the medium of the magistrates.\* The want of this formality alone would deprive the petition alluded to, even if Charles IV. had passed it into a law, of all validity and effect: and it must not be forgotten, that instead of publishing what took place in the Cortes of 1789, the members were severally bound by oath not even to reveal the fact of a question regarding the succession having been introduced to their notice. Several laws of the *Novissima* further enact, “that no letters patent or ordinances shall be valid if contrary to right, law, and established *fuero*; that

his civil and commercial work on Spain, published in 1793, speaking of the laws of Castile, observes thus:—“The order now subsisting with regard to the determination of suits is, in the first place, by the laws of Toro, by the *pragmaticas*, *capitulos de Cortes*, and laws of the New *Recopilacion*; in the second, by the laws *del Fuero*, regal as well as municipal, in the usages and customs not contrary to the laws of the New *Recopilacion*; and in the third place, by the laws *de Partida* ;” adding, “that this is the common law of Castile.”

\* Ley 12, tit. 2, lib. de la Novissima.

no enactments shall be complied with, if in opposition to law, or prejudicial to any party ; that all measures detrimental to a third person shall be null and void unless that person be previously cited and heard ; that no one shall be deprived of his property and rights, until after a hearing and conviction," &c.\* In the edition of the statute-book of 1745, as well as in all the subsequent ones, the law of Philip V. stands as the only rule of succession, confirmed and ratified by Charles IV : Ferdinand VII, therefore, could not call that a law which his father never avowed. The Infante Don Carlos was born under the law of Philip V, on the 29th of March 1788,—consequently eighteen months before even the slightest idea was entertained of altering its provisions ; and of the rights which he thus acquired he could not be deprived without a hearing. This is a principle of Spanish law which no royal mandate can destroy—no new policy subvert.†

\* Vide *Manifiesto sobre el Derecho de Succeder en el Trono de España*, Leyes 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 ; tit. 4 ; lib. 3, de la Novísima.

† The French minister, in the chamber of peers, July 4th, 1836, declared “ that the abolition of the Salique law in Spain had done no injury to France, and that sooner or later such a law must be repealed in every constitutional state.” In the first place, the settlement made by Philip V. was not founded on the Salique law ; and, in the second, if that settlement was effected by legal means, and has been in force for much more than a century, even M. Thiers would scarcely hazard the opinion, that it is to be repealed by a manifest fraud and a flagrant deed of spoliation.

In publishing his pragmatic sanction, Ferdinand VII. not only performed an illegal act, but also committed a two-fold fraud ;—first, by alleging that a law was passed in 1789 to alter the rule of succession ; and secondly, by wishing it to be understood that the *Partida* laws in former times regulated this important point.\* In the course of six hundred and ninety-two years,—that is, from 417, to 1109, — not one female held the throne in her own right. Doña Urraca in that year succeeded her father, Alonzo VI, who died without male issue ; when, as her historian observes, “our laws not being opposed to the succession of females, the kingdom devolved to the daughter.”† In 1217, Doña Berenguela, in default of a male line, took the throne, on the demise of her younger brother, Henry I, and immediately transferred it to her son, Ferdinand III, only eighteen years of age, by a formal renunciation in his favour ; proving by this act, that although the law did not exclude females, it was contrary to its spirit and the usage of the times for them to occupy the throne. This queen had besides been twice

\* The pragmatic sanction affirms that the *Partida* law had been in force for seven hundred years, and alludes to the benefits derived from its observance, particularly that of the union of Castile and Aragon. The lawyer who drew up that paper must have forgotten, that according to the Gothic law, the sovereign was elective.

† Fr. Henrique Flores, *Memorias de las Reynas Catholicas*, &c. Doña Urraca, Reyna propietaria, vol. i.

acknowledged by the Cortes of Castile, in case male issue should fail. Doña Isabel the Catholic obtained the crown by virtue of a resolution passed in Cortes, after her brother's death; and her daughter Juana, also succeeded her mother in default of male issue. In no one of these cases were the laws of *Partidas* appealed to: but even if they had, so long as it was at a subsequent period thought advisable to establish a new and statute law of succession, which was done with all the legal formalities, that law could not be abolished to the detriment of another by the simple fiat of the reigning monarch without a gross act of injustice and illegality.\*

The determination having been taken to abrogate the law of Philip V, the queen's next care was to watch the king, that he might neither have a moment left to himself for reflection, nor be approached by any one who could alarm his conscience or prey upon his fears. New rules and regulations were established, the object of which was to make every one within the palace

\* That no rule of succession existed in the days of Alonzo the Wise, is evident from the fact of his having assembled the Cortes at Seville in order to determine whether the oath should be taken to the Infante D. Sancho; his elder brother Ferdinand having died and left male issue, to whom Sancho was actually preferred. This is the first instance of the oath being taken to the heir-apparent during the father's lifetime; a practice which has continued ever since. Vide Mondejar, *Memorias Historicas de Alonso el Sabio*, lib. v. cap. 34.

subservient to the queen's wishes, and useful in forwarding the machinations of her adherents. All the influential persons who were notorious for liberalism or for hostility to the claims of the Infante Don Carlos were invited to join her party, and every species of art employed to render her popular among the lower orders. The royal pair were in the habit of riding out unattended by guards, frequently alighting to enjoy the pleasure of a walk ; which, from the novelty of the practice, was considered by the people as an act of confidence. At the beginning of October (1830) the queen's confinement was daily expected, and the event acquired an additional interest from the circumstance of the country being threatened with an invasion, the refugees having at that time assembled near the Pyrenean frontiers. The principality of Asturias sent up a deputation, requesting permission to do homage to the expected infant, immediately after the birth, *if it should be a son* : and to render the event more brilliant, a programme of the ceremonies to be observed on the occasion was published, in which it was announced, that in case the queen was delivered of a son, the royal standard would be hoisted on the palace ; if a daughter, a white flag.

As the day approached, big with the fate of Spain, public anxiety increased ; each party actuated by opposite wishes. Nowhere are the for-



malities so precise and punctilious at the delivery of a queen as in Spain. On the first symptoms of labour, the members of the royal family, foreign ambassadors, and deputations from the councils of state and Castile, from the board of *Los Reynos*, together with other functionaries, attend in the anti-chamber of the state apartments as witnesses. In the morning of Sunday, October 10th, these several parties were summoned; and at two in the afternoon, the child was born. Its cries were heard for some time before the sex was announced; when the king, in an abrupt and impatient tone, cried out, "What is it?" "A *robust daughter*," was the reply, given by the physician; at which the king turned pale, and expressions of chagrin and disappointment escaped him. His countenance betokened a distrust in the efficacy of the steps taken to annul the law of Philip V. The infant was christened Isabel, treated as heirless to the crown, and military honours paid to her. \*

This failure in the queen's hopes, the Carlists almost attributed to an act of Divine Providence; and after so singular an incident, they assumed a bolder attitude. The queen's friends then saw that a more formidable opposition than they had expected was rising up; and as the king's health

\* The child is placed naked on a rich silver salver, which the king holds, and turning to the assembled party, declares it to be his son, or daughter, as it happens.

daily declined, they felt the necessity of extending and strengthening their preparations. It was agreed that the army should be secured by the removal of all suspicious officers, who were to be replaced by others in the queen's interest. On the 12th October (1831) she presented to the army two banners embroidered by herself, and in addressing the officers expressed her hope that under them they would defend the rights of Ferdinand VII. and his issue. These banners were received by five generals; but the Infante Don Carlos, notwithstanding his superior rank, was not present. Scarcely would it have been consistent to invite him by his presence, to sanction an act which he could not fail to consider as an indication of the approaching civil war—as a threat thrown out against himself. The same Gazette which recorded the presentation of these banners also contained a bulletin, announcing that on the 11th, the king had experienced an alarming paroxysm of gout and from this period his health began to decline. On the ensuing 30th January, the queen was delivered of another daughter; which aggravated her disappointment, and at the same time encouraged the Carlists.

In the middle of September, and while the court were at La Granja,\* the gout suddenly rose to

\* San Ildefonso de la Granja is a royal summer residence, in the province of Segovia, and fourteen leagues from Madrid, situated on the western declivity of the Carpetanian mountains,

the king's stomach, and for some time he remained almost lifeless under the violence of the attack. The news flew to Madrid, where it was reported that he had actually died. The politicians of the capital were on the tiptoe of expectation; solicitude marked every countenance. At this moment several grandes, now leagued with the opposite party, together with generals and other influential persons, urged the Infante Don Carlos to come forward and accept the crown, not only as his right, but also as the only means of preserving public tranquillity. The conscientious prince rejected their offer, though well aware of the extent of his popularity in every part of the

a prolongation of the range extending from the defiles of the Guadarama. The palace was built by Philip V. in 1720, and stands upon high and rugged ground, surrounded by hills covered with pine, oak, ash, and other sightly trees. This spot, besides ample scope for field-sports, contains so many clear springs and streamlets, that they inspired the royal founder with the idea of forming here a Spanish Versailles. The town has a population of about four thousand souls, and is remarkable for a fine collegiate church, built in the form of a cross, and fitted up with elegant tribunes for the reception of the royal family and suite. The dome and ceiling were painted by Vayen and Maella, by whom also are most of the pictures over the side altars. The one over the high altar is of the Solimena school, and was brought from Naples. It represents, above, the Divine Being; and underneath, in the attitude of adoration, are seen several members of the royal family of Spain entered on the calendar of Saints, such as St. Carlos, St. Ferdinand, St. Louis, St. Theresa, &c., all likenesses. The altar-piece is of beautiful porphyry, marble, and jasper; but the *sagrarium* is formed entirely of lapis lazuli. The body of the royal founder

kingdom; alleging that so long as the king lived, he would never do an act derogatory to his character, either as a brother or a subject. He was then invited to take the regency upon himself, which, it was argued, could be done without any violation of his principles, on the plea of the king's illness, and to rescue the country from a dreadful crisis; but again the prince declined to interfere, observing, that his rights and those of his family were clear and still well protected; protesting that he would not take any step that might hereafter render his conduct liable to misrepresentation. Had the prince then lifted up

remained buried behind the high altar till the year 1758, when it was transferred to the new Pantheon, built by order of his son and successor, Ferdinand VI, near the sacristy.

The palace is contiguous to the church, with the principal front facing the gardens, and has a square yard in the centre. The side buildings are large and numerous, affording stabling and other conveniences for the royal guards. Charles III. always spent the months of July, August, and September at this delicious retreat; a practice usually followed by his successors. In the town is a royal manufacture of linens, called Calandria, founded by Charles III, and also glass-works. The hospital standing in the suburbs is a fine edifice. The gardens occupy higher ground than the town, and nowhere are they surpassed in ornamental lakes, basins, and fountains. One lake is called the Sea, from its enormous size. Besides numerous fountains, some of which are of the first order,—the one called La Pama, throwing water to an elevation of a hundred and thirty feet, and visible from Segovia, there is a prolonged cascade, descending in ten gradations, formed by receptacles with stone pavements, ornamented with groups of figures, into which the water successively falls. When the sun strikes the falling

his hand, the regency, and eventually the crown, would have been his own: Spain would have been saved from the horrors of a long and sanguinary civil war. But where is the man who does not respect the prince's motives of action—who does not admire the disinterestedness with which he refused a sceptre already within his grasp?

For some time previously to his illness the king was not only sensible of the perils of his own situation, but also well aware that the country was hastening on to a fearful crisis. Though his jealousy of the Infante Don Carlos had been carefully kept alive, there were moments when the yearnings of his heart were extremely tender

streams, the prismatic effect is astonishingly beautiful. The statues in the palace, as well as in the gardens, are magnificent and numerous. Many ornamental parts of the buildings are of the finest-coloured marble, found in the mountains of Spain. Some of the choicest statues from this place, Aranjuez, the Pardo, and even the palace of Madrid, were, however, by order of Ferdinand VII. removed to the Royal Museum for the use of students. The number of ancient statues now collected there is forty,—four of which are Egyptian, in good preservation, three Greek, several Etruscan, and the rest Roman; besides ninety-eight other relics of antiquity, consisting of busts, urns, &c. Some of them formerly belonged to Queen Christina of Sweden, who sold them to Philip Vth's ambassador at Rome. The mountains surrounding San Ildefonso abound in granite, crystalized feldspath, gneiss, porphyry, slate, iron, and other metals. At the distance of half a league stands the small palace of Valsain; and of two leagues, that of Riofrio, built after the model of the Madrid palace. The Carthusian monastery of Paular, in the picturesque valley of Lozoya, is also about the same distance.



towards an affectionate brother and sincere friend, blessed with three sons,—a mark of divine favour of which he seemed conscious that he was himself deprived. He felt that he had outlived his popularity, and saw himself deserted by the royalists, the party to whom he had hitherto looked up for support. His bed of sickness was surrounded by strangers, the presence of some of whom was extremely irksome to him ; but he had not the courage to complain.\* After his recovery, on more than one occasion he expressed regret at being deprived of his brother's visits, as well as of those of other old friends ; yet so studied were the queen's attentions—so soothing her professions and buoyant her spirits, that his temper remained unruffled. Every precaution was taken to prevent him from becoming conscious of the chains which he wore ; and though there were opportunities when the Infante Don Carlos was able to catch a few moments of private conversation with the royal patient, it is an established fact that he never once reproached his relative with either the re-

\* It is a fact, that during the whole time of his brother's illness, the Infante Don Carlos night and morning presented himself at the antichamber to inquire after the patient's health, but without being allowed admission to his bedroom. Don Ignacio Menendez had attended the king at Valençay, and from the year 1814 always shaved him. On his recovery, the king was astonished at finding another person appointed to perform the operation. He remonstrated, but, even in his weak and nervous state, was obliged to submit to the unpleasant necessity of having his chin handled by a stranger.

straints which he experienced, or the premeditated acts of injustice against himself and his children.

On the death of M. Salmon, the Count de Alcudia was named minister of foreign affairs; and, from the known royalist principles of this nobleman, it was strongly suspected that the king had been made sensible of the error into which he had fallen. His late illness and the spirit rising in the country excited serious apprehensions even in the queen's breast, although she saw herself supported by bold and adventurous partisans pledged to her interests. Still she could not divest herself of those fears so natural to one who found herself in a strange country, beset with dangers, and every expedient was devised to strengthen her party. A project was even formed to interest the Infante Don Carlos in her favour. In the morning of the 17th of September, the Count de Alcudia went to his apartment, with a message from the king, informing him that a decree was drawn up appointing the queen to the regency in case of her consort's demise, and urging the infante to be her principal counsellor. The offer was declined, and the bearer returned to the king's bedchamber. In the afternoon, the count again visited the infante, with a fresh message and proposal, using both entreaties and persuasions to induce him to accept the appointment of co-regent with the queen, on the express condition, however, of first

acknowledging his niece's rights to the throne. The infante unhesitatingly declared that he would never assent to such an arrangement, or by any other act of his own bar those rights which the law awarded to himself and children in case his brother died without male issue; very emphatically adding, that the nation was with him. The count endeavoured to appeal to his religious feeling, by observing that if he persisted, a civil war was inevitable, the consequences of which would fall upon him. To this the prince spiritedly replied, that the consequences would not fall upon him, since it was they who provoked the civil war, and immediately withdrew, leaving the count in almost a state of stupefaction. After this he gave orders that no bearers of similar messages should be admitted into his presence.

The whole of that night was spent in anxious deliberations by the king's bedside; and it is more than presumable that, after the firmness evinced by the infante, the Count de Alcudia very plainly told both the king and queen that no terms could be made with him. The obsequious ministers, and Grijalva, the original plotter of the fraud, now trembled for themselves, as well as for the awful position in which they had placed the country. Copious tears were shed at this midnight conference, the full particulars of which will doubtless some day or other be brought to light; but suffice it to say, that the next morning, (Sep-

tember 18th,) the king, being in an extremely weak and exhausted state, commanded the count to go down to the room where the ministers were then assembled in council; which he did, and calling aside M. Calomarde, informed him of what was passing upstairs, adding that their majesties were then waiting for him. Scarcely had the minister of grace and justice entered the bedroom, when, in the accents of despair, the king told him of the dangerous aspect which matters were assuming. The minister confirmed the king's report, and further observed, that, under cover of the late changes, many revolutionists had again made their appearance; and, as their combinations were kept up with foreign countries, it was evident that *the crisis would end in blood.*

On the utterance of this word an involuntary emotion escaped the queen, who cried out, *Todo menos eso—yo no quiero sangre*: “Anything but that—I do not wish for blood.” “What means have we then left,” said the king, addressing himself to the minister, “of guarding against the coming storm and obviating the catastrophe by which we are threatened?” “To abrogate all that has been done to establish the *Partida* law; for then the hopes of the revolutionists will be nipped in the bud,” was the reply. “My only wish is for the welfare of my people,” observed the king: “your reasons have convinced me—immediately therefore pen a decree abrogating the late law; *but I enjoin you not to let*

*any one know of it until my eyes are closed ; and take care that till then it is not published, or allowed to go out of the department of grace and justice."* "But," replied Calomarde, "it is proper that the other ministers should equally have cognizance of the fact, there being no other way of passing the decree with the requisite formalities ; as besides, having official knowledge of the document, they must also witness its signature." To this the king agreed, again directing the greatest secrecy to be observed. Calomarde then asked the king what hour would be convenient to receive him and the other ministers with the decree ready prepared ; when his majesty replied, "Exactly at six in the afternoon." (*Esta tarde á las seis en punto.*)

Calomarde left the king's bedroom, and descending the staircase, rejoined the ministers, whom he informed of the resolution taken by their majesties, as well as of the orders which he had received to carry it into effect. Some altercation ensued as to who was to draw up the decree ; when Calomarde, taking up a pen, sketched the subjoined.

"Anxious that tranquillity and good order should not be interrupted, and desirous of giving to my subjects a proof of the affection which I bear them, I have thought proper to abrogate law 2, tit. 15, partida 2, establishing the regular succession to the crown, and also any clause or clauses in my will contrary to this my last determination ; and it is my wish that the present do remain secret



in the office of the secretary of state for grace and justice until after my demise. Let the same be so understood, &c.—To the president of my council, &c.”

This decree was read and approved of in a full council of ministers; the chief clerk of the department of grace and justice, as well as the secretary of the council of state, being also present. This done, M. Calomarde went to the king's room alone, and informing him that as it had been thought advisable to introduce into the decree prepared for his signature a clause annulling anything which his majesty might have introduced into his will contrary to these his last wishes, it was proper that his pleasure should also be known upon the subject: to which the king made answer, *Lo apruebo—está mui bien*: “I approve of it—it is well.” At the hour appointed, the ministers entered the apartment, and the screen being removed, assembled round the king's bed. Calomarde then read the decree in a loud voice; and at the conclusion, the king said, *Está bien*: “It is well.” The queen took a pen, and handing it to the king, placed a blotter under the written paper for greater convenience. The king affixed his usual sign manual, and turning towards Calomarde, asked him whether he wished his name to be signed in full. The minister observing that as the decree was one of the utmost importance, it might perhaps be advisable, the king signed FERNANDO at the side of his

flourish, and handed the document to Calomarde : after which, looking round at the ministers and missing one, he asked where Zambrano was. "Sire," replied one of them, "being the war-minister, he is gone to Madrid to place himself at the head of the troops, in order to prevent any commotion that might occur in the critical circumstances in which we are placed."

Of this decree, so witnessed and signed, sealed copies were sent to the various departments of government, to be opened and used in case of the king's death. It was, however, impossible to conceal a transaction of such deep and general interest. The secret transpired, operating upon the minds of the two conflicting parties in a manner diametrically opposite. It consoled the royalists, but drove the liberals to a state of fury and desperation. Madrid was agitated by cabals and violent projects of every kind. It being ascertained that the original document was lodged in the office of the minister of grace and justice, plans were formed to go down to San Ildefonso and assassinate him, in order to seize the paper and prevent its publication in case the king should not survive. Alarmed by these hostile demonstrations, Calomarde inclosed the decree in a letter addressed to the president of the Council of Castile, informing him, that he was carefully to keep the sealed inclosure, and not open it until by telegraph or express he should receive special orders

to that effect. In the mean while, the king's illness was attended by new and alarming symptoms. His medical attendants, however, proved their skill, and, with the aid of strong remedies, removed the disorder from the stomach: but it was soon seen that the king had experienced an apoplectic stroke; for although he recovered so far as to quit his bed and gained some strength, he was never afterwards more than the shadow of what he had formerly been.

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